Advanced, yes, but what did he win prior to September 2nd?
The 2nd Guderian Group of Army Group Center , advancing towards Konotop, broke through to Desna on September 1 and seized a bridgehead at Shostka on its left bank.
The 40th Army withdrew in a southeasterly direction. The 21st Army, which had been evacuated from the east by the forces of the 2nd Panzer Group, and from the west by the 2nd German Army, approached Chernigov, was threatened by encirclement and began to hastily retreat south to the Desna.
Continuing to retreat under the onslaught of the enemy, the 21st Army on September 6 was transferred to the
Southwestern Front , which was in the
Kiev "boiler"
These links detail the failure of the Bryansk Front's offensive to stop Guderian from crushing a large part of the 21st Army or keep open the north flank of the Kiev salient in early September:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roslavl–Novozybkov_Offensive
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Рославльско-Новозыбковская_наступательная_операция
By September 2nd the Kiev Salient's northern flank was imploding in the aftermath of the collapse of Central Front and the ongoing failures of Bryansk Front to stymie Guderian.
It looks as of the 1st of September the main rail link from Kiev to Russia proper was already severed, leaving Poltava as the only remaining link and that was very soon to be cut:
Which the Soviets are going to lose anyways. By mid-August, all the industry that could be evacuated from Kiev had already been evacuated. Anything left was going to be lost anyways.
With hindsight, yes, but clearly STAVKA, not just Stalin, but also Shaposhnikov (Zhukov's claim that he told Stalin about the threat to the Kiev salient in his memoir was proven a post-war fabrication due to the fact he wasn't even listed as being in Moscow when he claims to have warned Stalin in a personal meeting) thought the situation was salvageable and that the next target was Moscow, not Kiev:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Киевская_стратегическая_оборонительная_операция
Stalin, fearing for Moscow, was more worried about strengthening the western direction, because he was sure that the German troops would resume their offensive operations soon on Moscow. [9] This was his opinion supported by the data of Soviet intelligence. [9] In the first half of August 1941, Moscow received a message from the resident of Soviet intelligence in Switzerland, Shandor Rado, in which it was said that the German command was going to strike Moscow through Briansk [9] . This message really corresponded to the intentions of the German command of the Army at that time [9]. Stalin, however, was not aware of the fact that in the 20th of August Hitler took the final decision to turn some of the forces of Army Group Center to the south. [9]
Well, when the alternative is that Kharkov winds up on the German side of the front it's easy to see which situation is superior.
Again with hindsight yes, but the problem was Soviet intel at the time about German intentions and perceived the risk to Moscow and benefits of holding Kiev that would help disrupt a German offensive against the capital.
Which is going to be lost anyways and is still secondary compared to the retention of the Donbass.
Okay, and? That happened anyways.
Again, said with hindsight; Stalin's intel told him Moscow was next and the Germans weren't going to pincer Kiev....so withdrawing only helps strengthen the German offensive toward Moscow, as it frees up their flank, sacrifices a fair bit of critical rail infrastructure, let's AG-Center and South develop direct land links, and strengthens the potential jump off points of AG-South against the Donbas (the Soviets not fully understanding how precarious the German logistic situation was or would be if they withdrew even further East).
So yes, in hindsight with full knowledge of the German supply situation, an early, orderly withdrawal by Southwest Front to the line you suggest would have considerably strengthened their hand....the problem is that the Soviets, even a post-Stalin regime, would have lacked that critical info and were being misled by their own intelligence.
For it to be hindsight requires the Soviet military establishment to not be already predicting the oncoming catastrophe by the middle of August. The problem was, they were predicting the oncoming catastrophe by the middle of August. So it isn't hindsight at all.
Some were,
but STAVKA and their strategic intel were not. Zhukov's post-war claims that he warned Stalin were probably an
invention.
STAVKA was apparently of the same mind, so it wasn't Stalin that was bucking everyone else, he was responding to the intel and advice he was being given by his military and intel services.
Unless they fail to club together into a power-sharing agreement, not any more so then IOTL.
They weren't Stalin, they'd have even more concerns about their public's and military's morale and willingness to follow them.
Probably mid-August at the latest. That's when the military advice to abandon it became overwhelming.
Except it wasn't based on Russian sources. It seems a lot of the post-war historiography was likely made up to burnish reputations after the fact.
The chorus of cries for retreat, quashed by Shaposhnikov, were not received until nearly September 10th:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Киевская_стратегическая_оборонительная_операция#Ход_боевых_действий_с_конца_августа
The chief of the
General Staff of the Red Army
GK Zhukov later wrote
in his memoirs that even before the battle began he reported to Stalin about the need to withdraw troops from the bends of the Dnieper, but was removed from office and, at the time of the Kiev battle, was replaced as Chief of General Staff
B. M. Shaposhnikov.
This assertion is doubtful, since in Zhukov 's office (where, as Zhukovasserts , this was happening), Zhukov's presence on the date or date indicated was not registered. [12]
On August 28, the
2nd Von Weichs Army launched an offensive from the
Gomel area to
Chernigov , encroaching
on the 5th Army of MI Potapov to the south. At the same time, the left flank of the Second Army as part of the
35th Army Corps clamped the
21st Army of the Bryansk Front , between its units and units
of the 2nd Guderian Tank Group , which was advancing east towards
Konotop .
On September 7, the 2nd Tank Group went to Konotop. On the same day, Marshal
SM Budyonny appealed to GHQ with a request to withdraw
the Fifth Army and was again refused. On September 9, the Germans occupied Chernigov. By September 10, while continuing to encircle the
South-Western Front , the 2nd Panzer Group defeated the
40th Podlas Army byinfiltrating part of the
Romnyon region . The enemy forced the Desna on sections east of
Chernigov and the
Dnieper - near
Kremenchug and southeast.
By this time, the reserve of the South-Western Front was completely exhausted. From the Kiev fortified areaTwo and a half rifle divisions were transferred to the Chernigov direction . On the night of September 11, two divisions of the 26th Army were transferred to the Konotop direction.
Tupikov , Vasilevsky and Budyonny insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops from Kiev, Shaposhnikov was against the immediate withdrawal of troops. The headquarters offered to conduct desperate attacks on the Konotop group of the enemy in cooperation with the Bryansk Front, organize a defensive line on the River Psel and only after that start the evacuation of Kiev. Only in this way, according to Stalin, it was possible to withdraw troops without the risk of encirclement and destruction.
Kirponos assured Stalin that the front had not thought of withdrawing troops before receiving a proposal to give reasons for the withdrawal of troops, that the front's forces were able to continue their resistance and asked to strengthen the front with reserves. By this turn of events, the Stavka was placed in a difficult position. The proposal for the withdrawal of troops came from Budyonny who referred to the request of the Military Council of the Front. It was ordered not to leave Kiev, do not blow up bridges until the special order of the Stavka. On September 12,
Marshal SM Budyonny was dismissed from his post as commander-in-chief of the Southern Direction.
Most likely fairly smoothly. The German mechanized forces are too far to the north and south to interfere with the withdrawal of the forces in the center. The only pursuers would be German infantry forces who would be hamstrung having to cross the rivers before they could even begin to pursue.
In mid-August sure. By early September it was probably too late for an orderly withdrawal given the advance of Guderian.
The bridgehead was not reinforced with panzer forces until the second week of September and was being defended by forces that wouldn't have to fall back at all until most of the Southwestern Front had already escaped encirclement.
Well, that was the point at which they could breakout given the historical resistance.
A lot depends on how quickly and in what stages a withdrawal from Kiev would take place. It may well be that STAVKA has them fall half way back and maintain part of the positions on the Dniepr and use one of the number of river lines west of the Poltava-Suny line.
Incorrect: 2nd Panzer Group did not achieve it's breakthrough on the northern flank until September 2nd. Prior to that it is pushing.
According to Soviet maps at least the 10th motorized division was already through Soviet lines and they were cracking the line open.
If the Soviets only start pulling back in September, then they are liable to still lose considerable portions of the Southwestern Front. It's leaving it rather late in the day.
Sure, but that seems to be when the majority of the calls to retreat actually happened.
Reasonable assumptions. The Soviets had already largely achieved that in June-July.
The Uman pocket and state of the Soviet 5th Army says otherwise.
All of which is of secondary in importance to the destruction of forces in AGC and can be achieved later much more efficiently once operations against AGC are completed.
In your mind, filled with hindsight, sure, but STAVKA apparently thought otherwise IOTL for some reason.
That 2nd Army liquidated the Bryansk encirclement does not change the reality that the reason there was an encirclement was because Guderian's panzers created it.
The Bryansk pocket proper, that is 3rd and 13th armies, not the 50th Army, was not really liquidated, the majority of Soviet forces managed to pull out as Guderian failed to actually close it. The pocket of the 50th Army was closed up nearly exclusively by 2nd army on it's own and liquidated with their own strength, not 2nd Panzer Army's.
Your own link gives an estimate of 150K irrecoverable and makes it clear that it is on the low-end of the estimate. And that there was a Bryansk encirclement at all is because of 2nd Panzers motorized units.
130k combined...much of which overlap. The Soviets count lost about 80k killed and missing; the Germans captured about 50k...which would fit into the missing category.
The majority seem to have been from the Soviet 50th army, encircled by 2nd Army, not 2nd Panzer:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/50-я_армия_(СССР)
Thus, as a result of encirclement in the region of Bryansk, the 50th Army in November 1941 was virtually completely destroyed and formed anew. Four divisions are being restored at the expense of the march battalions allocated from the Reserve of the High Commission, the 299th division was sent for reorganization to the rear, four (260, 278, 279, 280) divisions were disbanded.
This is all based on the assumption that 2nd Panzer Group still has the strength to execute the Bryansk encirclement. Without the captured fuel and trucks from the Soviets at Kiev and with more combat forces having to be diverted to guard the southern flank, that is questionable.
IOTL 2nd Panzer Group really didn't do the majority of the pocketing in October, they raced on to Orel and let 3rd and 13th Soviet Armies escape.
So even without their Orel leap they aren't really changing that much compared to OTL Soviet losses and probably are saving themselves a lot more losses than they'd take ITTL.
Had Guderian ever been like that, he would not have conducted the actions he did IOTL. It's far more likely that he tries the same sort of thing he did IOTL and gets even more seriously smashed for it. Your assuming a Guderian that is quite different then the one that actually existed, one who actually took into account his logistical and physical shortcomings.
Guderian did also consider the logistics of being able to do what he did as well as the weakness of the Soviet forces he was facing; IOTL he did what he did because the Kiev Pocket had been liquidated, he got those trucks and that fuel from Soviet stocks, and Bryansk Front was heavily weakened in September. Without all of that why would he do what he did IOTL? I have no illusions about Guderian's....shall we say ambition and wishful thinking, but there is a limit and his OTL actions had antecedents in logistic acquisitions and Soviet losses in September.
Everything I'm seeing states that the forces west of the D'niepr that were smashed were mainly the armored forces. The infantry and artillery forces largely managed to get away. Even the Germans commented on the ability of the Soviet withdrawal, with OKH's operations officer stating that "down here there is exceptionally systemic command". The newly raised units and reinforcements added to the Southwestern Front in July were not remotely adequate enough to field the number of men and guns the Southwestern Front had at Kiev unless they were added to the strength of those formations which had fallen back from the west.
What sources are you seeing that in? Yes the armored forces got it the worst, but they also had the majority of the trucks and fuel, which were overrun with 90% of the tanks.
Soviet forces in Kiev weren't simply Southwest Front, but also what was left of Central/Bryansk Front, reinforcements, new armies, and part of Southern Front.
The Soviets had already managed to withdraw from the frontier region with the majority of their artillery and motor vehicle assets. To suppose that the exact same forces under the exact same commanders could not do so again with an even better time-distance ratio is quite a stretch.
Based on what? I've read much of the same books you have, based on your citing of sources in previous discussions, and I'm not seeing that in Glantz or anywhere else. Quite the opposite. 5th Army was a hollow shell as were the other surviving armies of Southwest Front that managed to cross the Dniepr. They were reinforced with replacements as they retreated and assumed new defensive positions as well as were bolstered by new/reserve armies.
The Soviet maps of Southwest Front show what I mean:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/maps1941SW.htm
