WI: Soviet invasion of Europe in summer 1941
- Thread starter Iggies
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Deleted member 1487
The Soviets didn't have the ability to attack in 1941 with OTL run up to the Summer. So they'd have to forego reorganizing, expanding, and modernizing in 1940 to get ready for a limited offensive in the Summer of 1941. As ON said the Soviets might well lose the war when their forces are wiped out in even worse circumstances than IOTL and give the Nazis casus belli plus probably significantly more support in occupied Europe for their war with the Soviets.
The only arguable chance they'd have to make that a viable option, even then its a long shot, is not have Tukhachevsky purged and develop Deep Battle more along with Stalin leaving the military alone to professionalize.
The Red Army suffered serious problems in 1941 that would have crippled them even worse than IOTL had they gone on the offensive:
1. Their leadership was shit. The Great Purge had eliminated about half of the Soviet officer corps, and in general their replacements were inexperienced, chosen for political loyalty rather than military skill, and were afraid to make independent decisions.
2. Poor equipment: Take tanks for instance. Most of the tanks early on were T-26 and BT series tanks, which proved no match for the Panzers. In addition many of the tanks were poorly maintained, which caused them to fall apart. Aircraft had similar problems, with the added disadvantage that Soviet pilots only had about 5% as much flying experience as their German counterparts. Finally the Soviets lacked basic things such as radios and trucks.
3. Logistical problems: Due in part to the reorganization that was going on when Barbarossa started and military incompetence the Red Army had poor logistics. Adequate transportation was in short supply, and units often went into battle with little to no logistical support (which meant that after an engagement or two they were done).
In short the Red Army in 1941 wasn't ready for any serious engagement.
1. Their leadership was shit. The Great Purge had eliminated about half of the Soviet officer corps, and in general their replacements were inexperienced, chosen for political loyalty rather than military skill, and were afraid to make independent decisions.
2. Poor equipment: Take tanks for instance. Most of the tanks early on were T-26 and BT series tanks, which proved no match for the Panzers. In addition many of the tanks were poorly maintained, which caused them to fall apart. Aircraft had similar problems, with the added disadvantage that Soviet pilots only had about 5% as much flying experience as their German counterparts. Finally the Soviets lacked basic things such as radios and trucks.
3. Logistical problems: Due in part to the reorganization that was going on when Barbarossa started and military incompetence the Red Army had poor logistics. Adequate transportation was in short supply, and units often went into battle with little to no logistical support (which meant that after an engagement or two they were done).
In short the Red Army in 1941 wasn't ready for any serious engagement.
The Red Army started its expansion in 1940, and planned to finish it by 1942/43. By June 1941, the Soviet Union established 220+ new devisions (including 61 tank and 36 mechanized divisions), but all of them were undermanned: half of these units were not even 50% manned or equipped.
You don't invade Europe with your war machine still half-complete.
You don't invade Europe with your war machine still half-complete.
They would get as far as the Polish German border before suffering an enormous defeat and driven back. Costs the allies the war
Maybe ITTL Stalin believe all the sign and people that say that Hitler will soon launch an invasion...so it try to attack first (sure not the brightest decision but Stalin was not a military genius and frankly there is nobody that it's suicidal enough to argue with him about this)
Deleted member 1487
Zhukov proposed this IOTL for May 1941, but Stalin rejected it, correctly recognizing that the USSR was not ready for any sort of war in 1941:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgy_Zhukov#Controversy_about_a_plan_for_war_with_Germany
See "The Storm and The Whirlwind", from the book Third Reich Victorious.
In summation--the Russians get their asses kicked.
In summation--the Russians get their asses kicked.
I think this is an interesting angle for a Soviet start of a war with Germany. Probably, the historical plan was only a contingency plan and Stalin gambled that he could prepare another year, but it nevertheless were the plan for a war with Germany.
What would it take for Stalin to be convinced that Germany were indeed going to war?
Just believing some of the intelligence provided to him?
If we assume he do become convinced - for whatever reason - that Germany is going to strike as soon as the roads are dry and Hitler is done in Greece/Yugoslavia, what would he do then?
It seems the whole doctrine, ready or not, were for the attack, so what would he do when expecting/believing in a German attack in June? Striking already in May would be my guess (please comment on this), but what would be the consequences (and on this)?
PS. Lets assume this is without Germany expecting the Soviets to strike (eg. unlike storm and the whirlwind).
And lets not forget that Crete probably would not be occupied in case of a Soviet attack mid-May.
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From their point of view such an attack would have been a disaster
From our POV the attack would have fared MUCH better than what happened really.
At least Russian units would have been deployed, on the field, with artillery deployed, with ammunition ready, with planes dispersed on many airfields and so on. The front units are probably going to be destroyed but while fighting insteat of surrendering and dying in camps. Industry would have been better protected and high command wouldn't have been paralized. At the same time a short advance 10-20km would have allowed them to capture huge quantities of supplies and railway material.
At the same time they would have been able to focus on Germany (I really doubt that Romanians for example would have attacked then, they would have tried to win time to see what was happening).
Soviets would have stopped deliveries much sooner and would have been able to capture many ships in harbors.
On the short run I expect a sovied advance during one week or two then some huge defeats... but they would have saved time and germans woud never have been able to advance really deep in Russia. On the long run it's better for the soviets.
From our POV the attack would have fared MUCH better than what happened really.
At least Russian units would have been deployed, on the field, with artillery deployed, with ammunition ready, with planes dispersed on many airfields and so on. The front units are probably going to be destroyed but while fighting insteat of surrendering and dying in camps. Industry would have been better protected and high command wouldn't have been paralized. At the same time a short advance 10-20km would have allowed them to capture huge quantities of supplies and railway material.
At the same time they would have been able to focus on Germany (I really doubt that Romanians for example would have attacked then, they would have tried to win time to see what was happening).
Soviets would have stopped deliveries much sooner and would have been able to capture many ships in harbors.
On the short run I expect a sovied advance during one week or two then some huge defeats... but they would have saved time and germans woud never have been able to advance really deep in Russia. On the long run it's better for the soviets.
Well this would assume some forward planning on his part rather than Stalin waking up one morning and going 'ah sod it lets invade Europe'
So I dont think its healthy to simply say as some have suggested that the Red Army was not ready in the Summer of 41 - if the decision had been made then they would have been far more prepared that the utter shambles that they were when the Germans invaded OTL.
Lets say that Stalin believed the warnings of Sorge backed up by the British and US intellegence services as early as Aug 1940 rather than putting his fingers in his ears and going "lalalalalalalala I cannot hear you"
An attacker has all sorts of advantages that hide a multitude of sins.
They can choose where they are strong and where they are weak because they know that they are attacking and when and in most cases initially the Enemy would be to busy reacting to take advantage.
In the OTL German Invasion - Stalin had gone to great lengths to stave off any possibility of giving Germany an excuse for war and as such the Red Armys dispositions, supplies and readiness for war was pathetically inadequate in the Summer of 41.
Indeed many Russian formations were hamstrung by their inability to maintain their tanks and supply their artillery beyond one battle due to lack of preparation, lack of transport and a lack of supplies.
We can talk of the German army's advantage of Mission Command and Skill at arms relative to the Red Army etc but if caught unprepared for an attack then initially the German Army is going to be in trouble.
Also Russia had at their disposal 5 million + men underarms and 25,000 tanks.
Far less than half of this was active in the Wetern Russian region and effectively at peacetime readiness
In OTL June 1941 the tanks were scattered about Russian in peacetime garrisons etc and in most case lacked spares and enough transport to support them in battle.
Had Stalin decided to get the first blow in 'May/June' 1941 then initially I would expect things to go the Red Army's way as they would be far more organised and prepared for combat than June 22 1941 OTL found them.
Red Army Armoured units would have been properly re-organised with enough supplies and transport, increased numbers of troops would have been brought into the area and also given improved suppies etc
Much has been said regarding the Russian tanks mostly made up of T-26, BT-5 and BT-7 tanks etc that made up the bulk of those tanks not being as good as the German tanks (lacking radios etc) - it has to be said that the 3500 odd German tanks most of them where light tanks as well such as the PZ II (782), PzKpfw 35(t) (160) and PzKpfw 38(t) (660)
Only 976 were PZ III (with 37mm or 50mm guns) and 439 were PZ IV
http://www.achtungpanzer.com/battles.htm#barb
However they are significantly out numbered
Now all that being said - I have no doubt that the German Army would not shatter under such an assault - but it would be subjected to all of the initial disadvantages that an Army suffers when attacked - particulalrly if the Red Army manages to pull of its desired Deep Battle effects and I would expect that by the time it rallys, concentrates it forces and begins to impose its advantages of training and equipment on the Red Army its going to have suffered significant casaulties.
Also this fighting would have taken place in Poland and not 'Russia' and I suspect that by the time the German Army turns things around - its too late for any chance of a German Victory in the East.
Certainly I do not see Moscow, Lenningrad or Stalingrad being threatened at any point in this example with subsequant major ops taking place much further to the West.
thaddeus
Donor
agree up to a point, wasn't a lot of the reason Stalin was able to exert complete control because the wolf was ... well past the door and in the house?
in this scenario the Soviets have launched an invasion and are suffering for it? certainly Stalin would shift (any) blame to others but his control MIGHT crack if/when the Germans advance?
Given some of the things Stalin had inflicted on the Russian peoples prior to June 22 1941 I would suggest that he already had complete control!
Lucky for the Germans then that the vast majority of the Soviet armoured park can be killed by the PaK 36.
Maybe avoiding the Winter War aka Finland decide to cave at the initial Soviet demand; in this manner the problems of the Red Army are not painfully in the open and Stalin can overstimate his capacity.
Deleted member 1487
Actually no. The Soviets did not have serviceablitly of all their tanks and airplanes, plus they'd have to retain at least 1 million mean in the East, as their invasion would trigger Japanese entry into the war as per the terms of the Axis pact.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tripartite_Pact#Text_of_the_pact
That means facing the Kwangtung army. Also the Italians would send troops to Romania immediately to protect their oil, while the Hungarians would also be forced to join in and provide airbases and manpower to the fight. A Soviet offensive is going to bring in a lot of enemies and probably make it politically impossible to get LL.
As part of Zhukov's plan only about ~180 division would even be able to attack, IIRC about half on hand in 1941. 5 million would also require full public mobilization, so would trigger German warnings about a possible attack. Also the Germans had radar systems in the East too at this point, so would have some early warning when Soviet aircraft try their attacks. As it was in may the Germans have at least 100 divisions already in the East and were moving in aircraft from France. Its not like the Soviets can get full strategic surprise either, the Axis and Finland all have extensive radio monitoring of Soviet communications, plus they had the LW overflights watching Soviet territory.
http://allworldwars.com/German-Radio-Intelligence-by-Albert-Praun.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_...uring_Operation_Barbarossa#Air_reconnaissance
The Soviets weren't able to intercept the high altitude Ju86 flights either:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_86#Operational_history
The high altitude Yak 9 didn't come into service until years into the war in the East, far too late to matter.
Also the Soviet mechanized corps were not up to snuff in terms of transport by OOB. You say they'd be allotted enough transport for supply, but the problem was the Soviets thought they had enough trucks to supply their tanks in existing units, which they only found out as a result of combat to be highly inadequate, something the Germans had to learn firsthand in combat too in 1939-40 before adopting the 1941 style Panzer division. In 1942 the Soviets disbanded their 1941 MC to form smaller tank units that were easier to supply and command. In 1941 the Soviets were completely unaware of how bad their structure was after reorganizing in 1940.
Also David Glantz, the english language patron saint of WW2 Soviet military research, has said a Soviet attack in 1941 would fall apart and end up a horrible disaster, which IMHO is basically gospel on this topic:
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/164872.Stumbling_Colossus
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