So I am right that taking eastern Ukraine did not require Typhoon, contrary to your assertion that it did.
If you want Army Group South to get it's ass kicked, maybe even see some of its forces encircled and destroyed given that no Typhoon means no Vyazma-Bryansk and an extensive left flank for AGS, in place of Army Group Center, sure.
ITTL, they'll be fighting on roughly just as large a front as they were mid-1943 with somewhat more forces (assuming they don't send a whole bunch to France or Italy like you say they would) and about the same supply situation they had in 1942 prior to Operation Blau (which was far from perfect). The Soviets, for their part, will be vastly better equipped, led, and trained then they were IOTL 1941. This means they would more resemble the Red Army of 1943 rather then the one of mid/late-1942... except massively larger. They'll even be able to peacefully incorporate all the hard lessons they learned in 1941 without being interrupted by having to conduct any offensives or defend against a German one, which is major advantage not even the Red Army of a 1942 where Barbarossa doesn't occur would have.The reason the Soviets were able to exploit German weakness in OTL mid-late 1942 was because the Germans were fighting on an incredibly long, overextended front and badly supplied in the south. ITTL they will be fighting on a shorter, more fortified front with a perfect supply situation.
At worst for the Soviets, it goes like Second Smolensk: the Germans are able to fall back with their forces and only modest losses, but still lose something like 200-250 kilometers of ground and the bulk of their defensive works...
Not the offensive ones. Attacks such as the counter-offensive at Mortaine, the Second Ardenne Offensive, and Operation Spring Awakening are notable for the lack of faith the German military leadership put into them and the subsequent lack of energy in their conduct. The individual soldiers on the battlefield fought with great vigor (except for the Volksgrenadier, predictably enough) as did some of the field commanders, but in operational terms these were some of the worst led German offensives of the war, which is reflective of the fact that the operational commanders did not put any stock in their success.The military establishment prosecuted campaigns with great vigor and energy very late in the war when it was clear defeat was looming, and it is not at all implausible that they were do the same in this situation.
And Montefiore is directly contradicted by none other then Lavrenti Beria.We've been over this before in my thread. Montefiore, a professional historian who speaks Russian and spent years digging through Soviet archives, says the offer I referenced was genuine.
Well it is conceivable that he might wait an extra year. But whether he decides to go in 1942 or 1943, the Red Army will be in a far better position to launch offensives then it was IOTL 1942.What I'm disputing is that it can be said with certainty that he'd renew it in TTL 1942 when in OTL he had no plans to start a war in 1942 in what would have been a much more favorable situation.
Stalin's attitude pre-Barbarossa OTL is not relevant since he was disabused of any idea of settling things peacefully with Hitler by Barbarossa.
Halifax is in America by before Barbarossa even begins and there is no one left who is interested in even a temporary arrangement. And there is little reason to enter into such an arrangement given the imminence of American entry.Well, this hypothetical peace deal would also probably be seen as a temporary arrangement.
Oh, well then: the ground forces are not useful since the infrastructure in North Africa can't support them and they aren't going to achieve anything sitting in France or Italy waiting for an invasion that isn't coming until after Stalin has already re-entered the war. The German naval forces aren't useful cause there really mostly wasn't any on the Eastern Front. Much of the industrial resources aren't useful because the relevant assets in question are largely for fighting a ground war and not a naval-air war... you can't build a submarine or airplane in a factory meant for making tanks. That just leaves the aircraft, but even 100% of the Luftwaffe chances against the combined might of the RAF and USAAC can be summed up with a sentence involving snowballs and hell.I was responding to your statement earlier that "Many of the resources German will send to the Atlantic and Med are not only inadequate but also not useful."
Well, then I'll say it right now: it's so unlikely as to be not worth considering. I'm just begging the assumption right now.Okay, but you were willing to discuss it without immediately saying that it was so unlikely as to be not worth considering.
The maybe you can give the details of what he says? Because I've already cited a source noting that there was already notable, existing, undamaged infrastructure that the Japanese seized intact. Oh, and that the industrial build-up of the region was so slow as to take almost a decade.The entire chapter, beginning on the page I referenced, goes into the matter in detail.
Ignoring that it would largely be evacuated or demolished by the Soviets and that the productivity of the work force would be reduced by the fact they would be steadily murdered by the Germans...And the quote clearly implies that the industry of the Donets be used as is rather than being dismantled.
No, the 20th too. British entry into both WW1 and WW2 was the product of the same policy.So no source, just history from 1500-1815, not in the 20th century.
If Halifax both believed and was interested in a lasting peace with Hitler, then he wouldn't be interested in rearmament. What use is there for rearmament if you don't intend to fight?Also in terms of Halifax wanting to rearm, that's what you do when your army was disarmed in a mass desperate evacuation if you want to have any sort of deterrent to invasion, having just been massively defeated and lost all your continental allies.
Glantz's argument is that there was really not much the Soviets could have to stop the Germans in the frontier regions given the history since the purges in 1937. Slowing down and bleeding the Germans offensive, taking some of the steam out of it, while managing to salvage most of the forces a lot like what happened in Western Ukraine is certainly possible. This would have a major impact on the Battles along the D'niepr River, in the Soviets favor.His argument in Stumbling Colossus is that there was really not much the Soviets could have done to stop the Germans in 1941 given the history since the purges in 1937; they'd need another year at least to be a credible defender.
Given he must have been aware in how bad a shape the Red Army was at that time (after all he was trying to buy time with the MR-Pact for a reason):
If Stalin were convinced of an attack in 1941 against his out-of-shape Red Army, may he (instead of going on the attack as the OP suggested) have abandoned all hope of actually fighting a proper defense in 1941 and instead opt for trading space for time? And focus 6 months of preparation on preparing the best fighting withdrawal and delaying action the Red Army is able to execute at that stage (plus evacuation of industries)? To pull back the Red Army in good order and conserve it best as can while it learns the tricks of the trade ("with live ammunition" so to speak)?
My guess is that just pulling back in an orderly fashion would have already slowed down the German advance more than the OTL defense. While conserving Soviet strength and still feeding Hitler's hubris (aka "Biggest Allied WWII Asset").
Pretty much this.
The idea of strategic defense-in-depth was certainly there among the Red Army's military establishment (it was discussed in 1940 and 1941) but wasn't something that was wholly embraced. It is possible that the Red Army, if forced to adapt to the fact that war may be coming in 1941, might revisit it since their other (incomplete) plans were predicated on war coming in 1942 and presumed an army that doesn't exist yet.But this will give up much territory still. Would Stalin be willing to do that and be willing to do so as his strategy right from the start? And if he were: Would the Red Army of 1941 be capable of conducting a proper fighting retreat and delaying action? Or was it even incapable of that?
The Red Army was certainly capable of conducting an improvised fighting retreat with some success in both 1941 and 1942 show, so a planned fighting retreat would naturally go better. My gut feeling is that Stalin would still insist on holding onto the 1941 border for as long as possible before giving ground, which would still result in encirclement and destruction of Soviet forces. The encirclements won't be as large, destroying only a chunk of the Western Front instead of the whole thing (the Uman encirclement is a possible analogy, as there the Germans managed to catch and destroy a portion of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts but not it's entirety), and the Germans are in worse shape by the time they reach the river D'niepr. There Stalin is going to insist on holding-at-all costs, since the D'niepr is the last natural barrier between any invader from the west and the Soviets major industrial regions. And given the precedent of Kiev, it might actually work out.
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