WI: No Great Purge

[alexmilman]

Any adequate government will not tolerate an alternative power base in the army.


No. The reason for the lack of command staff is not repression. And the fact is that the number of the Red Army from 1500,000 people in 1937 increased to 5000000 people by June 22, 1941. And by July 1941 up to 10000000 people. And before that, from 600,000 people in 1932 and up to 1500,000 people by the beginning of 1937. The absence of repression will not help in any way. Moreover, I doubt the military genius of Tukhachevsky and other repressed officers.

The purges had been bad in general because most of the victims did not commit any crimes against regime (which does not mean that most of the ‘heroes’ of the RCW did not deserve to be executed for the crimes they committed during that war but this is besides the point). So it makes sense to discuss only practical impact and on that issue I agree with you.

Well, it can probably argued that an absence of the purge would make things somewhat better just because the old cadres at least knew the routine but an overall value of the military victims of the purge is a big question mark.

To start with, most of the senior commanders raised during the RCW and after that did not overburden themselves with a continued military education. Take, for example, Marshal Blucher. One of the top heroes of the RCW and quite loyal to Stalin who was even ready to overlook his drunkenness (“old horse knows the route; today he is drunk but tomorrow he’ll sober up”, etc.) but the 1st relatively modern military conflict on the Lake Hasan demonstrated that Marshal has no idea about the nechanized war and this was an end of him. Tukhachevsky, putting his personal issues with Stalin aside, was a capable person (but his encounter with the marginally “Western” Polish army was a disaster and since then he was obsessed with the revenge) but his ideas regarding mechanization of the Red Army were on a fantastic side numbers-wise (levels of the military production he demanded never were reached) and were not necessarily going in the right direction. Theory of a deep offensive, routinely attributed to him, was actually developed by Triandophilov well before the purges (to be fair, Tukhachevsky supported it bit went slightly overboard with its practical applicability) but remained mostly on paper (Kiev Maneuvers was seemingly mostly a showcase) and clumsy attempt to implement it in 1941 resulted in a loss of most of the Red Army’s armor. It seems that there were few successful implementations later during wwii.

Then goes military education. The military education became a part of the standard high education in 1926-27 so the graduates had been getting a lower officer rank and were considered officers of the reserve while having close to zero experience of a military service. Taking into an account that most of them had been called to service at the start of the war we have a generally incompetent body of the low rank officers.

The professional military academies and schools. Who were the instructors in the terms of their qualification if most of the officer corps (from which these instructors had been taken) was severely under-educated and had been very skeptical about the usefulness of the theoretical knowledge (much advertised Zhukov was openly expressing opinion that the graduates of the General Staff Academy are all idiots)?

A standard “spiel” is that there were numerous officers of the Russian imperial army who went to serve the Soviets and had been purged. This is, of course, correct but it is often an overlooked fact that by the 1917 a big percentage of the officers with a rank below colonel had been war-time promotions, often after the rudimentary war-time school. Brave and capable people but not necessarily with a good military education. Some of them after the RCW graduated from the RKKA Academy but was it enough?


Then, look at the performance. By the start of the war most of the army level commanders were from the same pool as the victims of purges and at least Pavlov was for a while overseeing development of the mechanization program. But as soon as the things had been getting wrong many of these commanders had been abandoning control of their troops and, at best, were trying to get out of encirclement on their own. Is there a valid reason that most of the purges commanders would perform much better?

 

[Crueldwarf]

But was better than the NKVD Political Officers who were actually running things post Purge, than the cowed Red Army Officers.

The funniest thing about Purges is that Red Army leadership was not especially cowed afterwards. At the very least no more than they were before.

I would add that most of the victims of these purges were exonerated posthumously or 'rehabilitated' after Stalin died by the Russian Government

The issue with mass rehabilitation waves that occurred both post-Stalin death and after USSR fell that they were essentially blanket pardons that basically never revisited actual cases built against repressed. It was basically automatic exoneration for all cases when the subject was sentenced under specific parts of 58th article.

As an example: I had to do some archive practice back in a day and so worked with what remained of regional NKVD archive that had criminal cases on some repressed Red Army officer. One particular one I remember to this day. A regiment commander was sentenced and executed as a Japanese spy. But the case contained more things that just rather obviously bogus accusation of high treason. The case had accusations of two instances of rape of a minor with signed victim statements and preliminary investigation results.
But the guy went under as a spy because political charge was more expedient and easier to prosecute. And of course this guy was later exonerated because spy charge was bogus. Rape charge wasn't, But no one bothered to check.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The funniest thing about Purges is that Red Army leadership was not especially cowed afterwards. At the very least no more than they were before.

The issue with mass rehabilitation waves that occurred both post-Stalin death and after USSR fell that they were essentially blanket pardons that basically never revisited actual cases built against repressed. It was basically automatic exoneration for all cases when the subject was sentenced under specific parts of 58th article.

As an example: I had to do some archive practice back in a day and so worked with what remained of regional NKVD archive that had criminal cases on some repressed Red Army officer. One particular one I remember to this day. A regiment commander was sentenced and executed as a Japanese spy. But the case contained more things that just rather obviously bogus accusation of high treason. The case had accusations of two instances of rape of a minor with signed victim statements and preliminary investigation results.
But the guy went under as a spy because political charge was more expedient and easier to prosecute. And of course this guy was later exonerated because spy charge was bogus. Rape charge wasn't, But no one bothered to check.

Given the numbers involved I am sure that it would be easy to find some victims who were worthy of being murdered by the state - but the mass majority were not

 

[Karahar]

I would add that most of the victims of these purges were exonerated posthumously or 'rehabilitated' after Stalin died by the Russian Government

So what? I don't really believe openly biased excuses, some of which are quite obviously completely wrong.

But was better than the NKVD Political Officers who were actually running things post Purge, than the cowed Red Army Officers.

The same NKVD workers who were shot much more intensively than the military?

 

[Crueldwarf]

Given the numbers involved I am sure that it would be easy to find some victims who were worthy of being murdered by the state - but the mass majority were not

I didn't try to find anything. It was just one case in one random folder that I had to sort out as a student doing menial work in an archive.

In general Purges weren't selective in their nature. They didn't target virtuous or innocent, they targeted random people without any real rhyme or reason.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

So what? I don't really believe openly biased excuses, some of which are quite obviously completely wrong.

Good for you

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I didn't try to find anything. It was just one case in one random folder that I had to sort out as a student doing menial work in an archive.

In general Purges weren't selective in their nature. They didn't target virtuous or innocent, they targeted random people without any real rhyme or reason.

So what was your point in bringing up the example then?

The purge was a non judicious method of murdering without trial or due process a million or so Russian's (some claim multiple millions) which was massively detrimental to the Russian state and its people and went some way to contributing the the many millions who died during the Nazi invasion who might otherwise have survived.

 

[marathag]

he same NKVD workers who were shot much more intensively than the military?

So you would agree, they were risk adverse, with zero initiative past Orders sent from Moscow.
And with no Orders forthcoming, they would stick with the last received message, do nothing about German Incursions on Soviet Territory.
The Adventurous would defend themselves, and request further instructions.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

1. Yes, the Germans *did* smash the French army--it would have been much harder if a whole 1/3rd of that army was not surrounded without a fight.

"Without a fight"? When 7th Panzer Division showed up at the Meuse crossings, did the French just throw down their weapons and run away? Did the French not counterattack at Laon on 17 May. Was the French First Army not heavily engaged in Belgium? Who killed the 40,000 Germans who died in the Battle of France?

Not even the Russians had any loss during the war that profound.

The opening phase of BARBAROSSA saw at least two million Soviets captured, most without ever firing a shot.

2. The Japanese held out for years, and likely would have held out yet another if Manchuko did not collapse, so your point does not stand.

The Japanese held out, but did not win. The Soviets held out, and won because other factors came into play.

 

[Crueldwarf]

So you would agree, they were risk adverse, with zero initiative past Orders sent from Moscow.
And with no Orders forthcoming, they would stick with the last received message, do nothing about German Incursions on Soviet Territory.
The Adventurous would defend themselves, and request further instructions.

It is stereotype that as usual have very little to do with the reality.

1941 is full of examples of Soviet commanders on all levels ignoring orders from Moscow and doing their thing. Both during the war and before it. For example Moscow ordered measures for camouflaging airfields in Western military districts four times between February and June 1941. These orders were basically ignored.

Somewhat funnier episode happened near Leningrad during the war. Three KV tanks were detailed to support a counter attack by a rifle regiment. Attack achieved some success but all three KVs were mobility-killed during it, What is notable about the situation was that at that time tanks were already considered extremely valuable resource and there were standing orders to not allow infantry commanders to control any armor attached to their units. But captain that commanded the regiment in question prevented the evacuation of tanks by threatening the crews with force as he wanted to keep the tanks as strong points on his new positions, Some day later a technician team arrived to repair the tanks, regiment commander didn't allow them to do that either (as functional tanks would be able to simply leave). And this epic story went for about a week with frantic exchange between division command post, front HQ in Leningrad and various civilian authorities that were tasked with tank repair. Nothing was done about it. Division commander was covering for his subordinate and stalling. The whole mess had all the chances to go even higher to NKO and Stalin level but Germans renewed their advance and situation resolved itself as regiment was thrown back from the positions and tanks were lost.

 

[AJE]

I actually think the purge saved the USSR. Germany beat a better military (France) quickly because the will to resist collapsed. France's whole strategy was *always* going to lead to them committing reserves to Belgium. France had one goal alone--avoid WW1 again. It was politically impossible to get the people to seriously fight for years, on French soil, and spend all that money and blood. France wanted to bloody Germany bad in Belgium and then win in a year. When this didn't work out, the memory of the last war led to a general collapse. France could have dragged out fighting in its south and then from its colonies--but they were not going to, this was never a serious option. Vichy France did not arise by mistake in some political vacuum.

Now take Russia. Minus the purges, the persecutions, the sheer human brutality. The USSR would still have less men on their frontiers than the Axis forces come June 22nd. By August 1st, their army would be effectively destroyed. A non-brutalized population would have coup'd Stalin and sued for peace, likely not repeating the mistakes of 1917.

Stalin waited at his dacha expecting to be offed in the first week of the war. Instead, people looked to him for leadership out of fear and being so brutalized knowing nowhere else to turn. And so, the USSR survived 1941 where I think no other power would have. They even lacked guns for many of their men. And bullets. WHy did the people fight? Because they were in a psychological state of submission impossible in Poland, France, or Germany 1941. Compare this to Germany 44-45 where strategic bombing and the holocaust cowed the German populace into a steely submission and brutal fatalism.

And so, the USSR survived simply by outlasting the Germans and letting them over extend their supply lines. In other words, Russia won simply by not giving up. This is despite Russia losing every counter offensive, including after Tyfun, where Russian losses far exceeded Germans. But they fought on, despite millions upon millions of new reserves with zero experience being called up to fight with crap equipment or none at that. Germany could have never anticipated this.

I think in retrospect, Barbarossa was a "good" plan that should have worked. Just like the "Strategic Bombing" should have "forced" German surrender. What WW2 got wrong was that brutalizing populations *does not* win wars, it extends them. If the USSR did not cause a collapse in Manchuko, it's unlikely the a-bombs would have ended the war in Asia. And if this were the case, our whole memory and assessment of deterrence through terror would likely be much different.

But this is false, as shown in a post from the Off-Topic Archive:

Even in good, generally unbiased histories dealing with the Second World War, I often come across a few variants of a pat phrase, all saying that "The Soviet Union endured losses no democracy could have contemplated" or "one virtue of Stalinist totalitarianism was that it could absorb the enormous losses of the Eastern Front and fight to victory rather than collapsing." I smell a rat. If any country, including a democracy, had been in Russia's position of facing an openly genocidal foe, it would have fought on-and a democracy probably wouldn't have shredded its officer corps or engendered millions of attempted collaborators who probably would have been decisive if the invaders weren't the Nazis.

 

[Kome]

Only the cavalry turned out to be normal.

The based Budyonny.

 

[comrade cat]

But this is false, as shown in a post from the Off-Topic Archive:

I think so. Brutalized by Stalin or not, once it is revelaled that the nazis weren't just out to subjugate them, but exterminate them, anyone with half a brain will fight to the bitter end.

I mean, its just no brainer. Its not something like "if you collaborate/do not resist, you will be spared". Under the nazis, if you're a Jew or a Slav, at the end of the day, you'll ended up dead no matter what. So why bother playing nice?

 

[pattersonautobody]

But this is false, as shown in a post from the Off-Topic Archive:

That reply is meme history the moment it says "openly genocidal." France and other countries despite Germany's published program of genocide and what not. While you can cite German cruelty which became clear weeks into the war and undeniable months in, any other country likely would have collapsed in six weeks. If Stalin was offed, as he expected, they would have lost the war in a matter of weeks.

So, in short, you are incorrect my good sir.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

"Without a fight"? When 7th Panzer Division showed up at the Meuse crossings, did the French just throw down their weapons and run away?

Exactly. It took Rommels division over 48 hours to overcome a single infantry division. The defense was a second tier reserve DI that had less than two days to entrench. As late as the 14th May the defense there was such Rommel had his command tank shot out from under him by a AT gun.

Did the French not counterattack at Laon on 17 May. Was the French First Army not heavily engaged in Belgium? Who killed the 40,000 Germans who died in the Battle of France?

When I checked a couple years ago a currently accepted number was 58,000 dead. A few thousand more than the estimated killed by Soviet Forces in the first six weeks of OP Barbarossa.