WI No Axis Invasion of France

What if the Germans had decided that instead of attacking France, they would attack the Soviet Union instead. This may make the Anglo-French Alliance a bit more sympathetic of the Axis, or maybe not. My question is would the Phoney War continue? Would this become a battle fought only in the North Sea and Northern Africa?
 

Cook

Banned
The invasion of Norway and Denmark goes ahead on schedule on 9 April 1940.
Hitler then hesitates and postpones the invasion of France until after the Scandinavian battle is resolved.

Cooler heads then prevail in France and Britain. Halifax becomes PM and continues the secret negotiations that he’d already started when he was Neville Chamberlain’s Foreign Secretary.

Benito Mussolini calls for a conference in Rome to decide the future of Europe. The conference is denounced by Winston Churchill as nothing more than “Munich 2”, but he is once again a lone voice in the wilderness since he resigned from the War Cabinet, refusing to serve under Halifax.
Halifax and Paul Reynaud attend the conference, as does Hitler and Goering. Vidkun Quisling, Francisco Franco and a few others are invited to add a bit of extra colour to Mussolini’s Opera.
The British naval blockade is by now clearly ineffectual and the ease that Germany defeated French and British forces in Norway has the allied military chiefs in a state of near panic.
Accepting the new European Status Quo is seen as the only alternative to Allied defeat.
The Peace treaty is signed on 12 May 1940.

Freed of the western entanglement Hitler now orders the German Army General Staff to plan the invasion of the Soviet Union for the spring of 1941.

General Udet, the director of air armament development orders the development of the jet fighter to be given the high priority. With the war in the west resolved Hitler sees no reason for jet development not to proceed.
 

Cook

Banned
Sorry Metalstar,
I was just throwing up a scinario to solve LoyalistColonial's initial question.
It's up to others to see where that would lead, or to find other ways to solve the inital problem.
 
I'm sorry, but I don't follow Cook's scenario. Nobody foresaw the catastophe in France. The Entente had decided that the invasion of Poland made clear that the Nazis could never be trusted and would never stop, and had to be rolled back by military force.

Why would their resolution falter before the military catastrophe, when Britain's held firm after (and the French did pretty well for a defeated county), without Germany offering any concessions?

Anyway, I'm not really an expert on the Soviet readiness at the time with regards to Stalin's connectedness to reality, the military equipment cycle, or the Purges and re-organisation. I can't really offer comment on the military likelihoods.

But Britain and France are unlikley to immediately start supporting the Nazis to the hilt (we had been negotiating with the Soviets before the M-R pact, and it wasn't that negotiations decisiely failed, it was just that we never made the effort to convince Stalin not to try Germany instead by giving him hard gains and military commitments), given that the Soviets, whatever their prospects look like, are unlikley to just roll to Berlin.

We might end up attacking the Soviets with bombing raids on Baku and Batum, snuggling up to Romania and Turkey (and Finland?), and trying to gain the most from the two ripping into each other, but it's not going to make us just forget how Nazist promises are worthless and their aggrandisement has to be reversed.
 
I've pondered the idea for some time. The Germans would still need to leave at least 40 divisions (during invasion of Poland they left 42ish) to guard the west wall in case of allied attack. That would leave only about 60-70 divisions (depending on what month the invasion was launched) to attack Russia which means they would have to attack on a much reduced front compared to Barbarossa. (Army Group Center alone had 70 divisions during operation typhoon)

The ideal for the Germans would be to invade whilst the Russians are up to their elbows in Finland, however that means attacking in the middle of winter which we know wasn't in their skill set.

If Hitler took this track and had some foresight about it (he hadn't lost all of his marbles in 1940) he would send serious material aid to the fins... perhaps using sweeden or norway as an intermediary... (small packets of infantry, artillery, and high velocity AA guns would help along with a contingent of "volunteer" fighter pilots to reduce air support to the Russians)

Assuming he was able to keep Finland in the war (and the many Russian divisions she occupied) until the spring rains were over he could launch his attack in may keeping everything north of the pripet marshes.

The western allies might be inclined to sit back, relax and let the two dictators destroy each other rather than crucifying themselves on the west wall
 
I can't see them attacking the USSR before they attack and defeat France. It would have been leaving their rear-end open to attacks for both the British and the French, and possibly America is this means they will come into the war earlier.

So, I can't see it happening unless Hitler gets really paranoid about the USSR. If it did happen it would probably mean a shorter war, on way or another.
 

Cook

Banned
This IS Alternate History isn’t it?
Enough of the “It didn’t happen that way therefore it couldn’t” and start working on LoyalistColonial’s original idea.

In 1940 Halifax as Chamberlain’s Foreign Secretary was secretly negotiating with Germany for an Armistice accepting the Status Quo. Had he become Prime Minister then a negotiated end to hostilities is likely to have been his government’s policy.
With no invasion of Northern France and the Low Countries in May of 1940 the Phoney War would have continued. The Allied High Command had no plan to break it.
Allied High command actually had no offensive plans whatsoever. French military doctrine in 1940 was entirely defensive. Plan D, the advance into Belgium following a German invasion was so that defensive positions could be taken up to defend Brussels. It was in no way a plan for defeating Germany.
France’s economy was suffering greatly from the extent of conscription and from communist anti-war strikes of essential industries. The Government was looking for ways of avoiding or at least surviving a war, not for a way to win.
Any Armistice would have seen France demobilise and English forces withdraw from the Continent. Suitable German reconnaissance over flights and armistice verification teams would certainly have formed part of the conditions.
The United States does not factor into events. Joseph Kennedy and the isolationists already had a strong position. With a German Victory in 1940 that position would more than likely been strengthened. American war industry would have been focused on strengthening its Navy.
So this brings us to a Western Europe that is at peace in 1940.
German industrial development would then not be constrained by Hitler’s restriction on new designs and the requirement of focusing on an 18 month war and could develop aircraft for what would be an entirely new war in the coming years.
 

Germaniac

Donor
actually for the Germans to begin their attack in the Winter would possibly be a much better scenerio for them because they will prepare themselves to a winter war, by the time they are reaching Moscow the Spring is coming, which mean no one it moving and then in summer the Germans have complete supremecy
 

Nikephoros

Banned
Except without neutralizing France, there will be an even greater drain of resources from Barbarossa. I don't expect it to quite work out the same way.
 
actually for the Germans to begin their attack in the Winter would possibly be a much better scenerio for them because they will prepare themselves to a winter war, by the time they are reaching Moscow the Spring is coming, which mean no one it moving and then in summer the Germans have complete supremecy

You can't just take it as read that an initial German attack equals massive initial gains. For one thing, if the Germans attack in winter, that will be a major disadvantage, unless they magic adequate equipment and training up.

For another thing, the role of the winter can be tremendously exagerrated. German advances being slowed by Autumn muds certainly gave the Russians breathing space outside Moscow, but the facts of the case are that Russian armed strength, by the skin of its teeth, fought off the Germans at the gates of Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donbas. The Germans failed.

In 19140, the situation would be entirely differant, what with the actual existence of a "western front", the differant state of the Red Army (for better or worse I can't say), etcetera.
 
BW and IBC have made some good points but another thing people seem to be forgetting is how much the Gemrans relied on horses before they conquered France. If they don't conquer France they will need to produce these trucks themselves, losing a lot of potential tanks and aircraft etc or continue using horses which could be disastorous. By 1941 France would have been numerically superior to Germany following BW's plan and could likely have broken the west wall. The air forces of Britain and France could have launched a much earlier strategic bombing offensive (Harris' argument of reaping the whirlwind wouldn't be as effective as there would be no blitz however I'm sure he could use plently of examples from the eastern front) which could have tied down a lot of German airpower whilst also greatly damaging German industrial capacity.

On the Eastern Front Stalin will be taken completely by suprise again seeing as Hitlers made an even dumber decision, however the odds are still in his favour. Of 2,574 tanks available for the Germans in May 1940, no fewer than 523 were Panzer Is. Furthermore, there were only 627 Panzer III's and IV's. At least a fifth of Germany's armor was composed of Panzer I's, while almost four-fifths were light tanks of one type or another. To counter this the Soviets had something like 256 T-34's and KV-1's and around 10,000 T-26's which were superior to every German light tank except in speed. Presuming that T-34 and KV-1 figures shoot up by 1941 it's hard to see the Germans reaching Smolensk let alone Moscow. This will also leave the agriculture of the Ukraine in Soviet hands as well as the hundreds of thousnads of troops they lost there.

American involvement probably won't be necessary and it's impossible the won't become involved in the west, Japan will likely still attack south east asia seeing it as a better choice than a pull out of China however with the Britain doing much better in the battle of the atlantic, Hitlers DoW might not come. However presuming the Holocaust still happens it's likely America will be involved by 1943. Mussolini will see no point in declaring war on the allies as the the only thing he has to look forward to is allied domination of the Med and the quick loss of his empire, it's more likely he'd stay neutral or possibly even join the allied side.

In short, Germany's in for a world of hurt.
 
To counter this the Soviets had something like 256 T-34's and KV-1's
1. Almost no trained crews for T-34/KV tanks in 1940.
2. T-34/KV produced in 1940 even more prone to mechanical breakdowns then models of 1941 year.
3. Production plan for 76 mm ammution in 1940 was totally screwed.

and around 10,000 T-26's which were superior to every German light tank except in speed.
1. Large part of 45 mm APS (mostly distributed to tank units) was of poor quality and not capable to defeat 30 mm of armor on any distance at all.
2. In 1940 almost no spare parts were produced for BT/T-26. So many tanks used in Poland campaign and Winter war weren't combat ready.
3. German Pz-II better then T-26/BT in terms of armor, internal layout, optics and crossterrain speed.
 

Nikephoros

Banned
OT, but one reason among very, very, many why Germany lost on the Eastern Front, is that their were Soviet officers who managed to survive the purges, who worked with the Germans developing tactics.

So although most officers were worthless, those who were knowledgeable eventually made their way back into positions of influence, if not outright command.
 
BW and IBC have made some good points but another thing people seem to be forgetting is how much the Gemrans relied on horses before they conquered France. If they don't conquer France they will need to produce these trucks themselves, losing a lot of potential tanks and aircraft etc or continue using horses which could be disastorous. By 1941 France would have been numerically superior to Germany following BW's plan and could likely have broken the west wall. The air forces of Britain and France could have launched a much earlier strategic bombing offensive (Harris' argument of reaping the whirlwind wouldn't be as effective as there would be no blitz however I'm sure he could use plently of examples from the eastern front) which could have tied down a lot of German airpower whilst also greatly damaging German industrial capacity.

On the Eastern Front Stalin will be taken completely by suprise again seeing as Hitlers made an even dumber decision, however the odds are still in his favour. Of 2,574 tanks available for the Germans in May 1940, no fewer than 523 were Panzer Is. Furthermore, there were only 627 Panzer III's and IV's. At least a fifth of Germany's armor was composed of Panzer I's, while almost four-fifths were light tanks of one type or another. To counter this the Soviets had something like 256 T-34's and KV-1's and around 10,000 T-26's which were superior to every German light tank except in speed. Presuming that T-34 and KV-1 figures shoot up by 1941 it's hard to see the Germans reaching Smolensk let alone Moscow. This will also leave the agriculture of the Ukraine in Soviet hands as well as the hundreds of thousnads of troops they lost there.

American involvement probably won't be necessary and it's impossible the won't become involved in the west, Japan will likely still attack south east asia seeing it as a better choice than a pull out of China however with the Britain doing much better in the battle of the atlantic, Hitlers DoW might not come. However presuming the Holocaust still happens it's likely America will be involved by 1943. Mussolini will see no point in declaring war on the allies as the the only thing he has to look forward to is allied domination of the Med and the quick loss of his empire, it's more likely he'd stay neutral or possibly even join the allied side.

In short, Germany's in for a world of hurt.

Red, all the German tanks were inferior at the start of Barbarossa... this would have been an issue except German doctrine eschewed tank vs tank combat except in emergancy situations. They instead engaged Russian tanks with artillery, anti tank guns, and air power. The Soviets could be counted on to do wild cavalry charges with their armor (much like the British did in 1941 and 42) and the Germans impaled them with gun lines... Von Schall had a quote at the time that, that tactic never failed.

Attacking in winter wouldn't work because there are not enough all weather roads in russia... would have to wait till may and just pour resources into the finns in the meantime
 
OT, but one reason among very, very, many why Germany lost on the Eastern Front, is that their were Soviet officers who managed to survive the purges, who worked with the Germans developing tactics.

It would be wrong to ascribe the whole of Soviet tactical thought (and the key ideas that made them perhaps the best army in the world by 1944-45 did basically exist in 1941) to interraction with Germans. There were many differant differences in the conclusions the two traditions drew about mobile warfare.

So although most officers were worthless, those who were knowledgeable eventually made their way back into positions of influence, if not outright command.

This is also an exagerration of Soviet ineptness. The purges were certainly real, but they combined Stalinist paranoia about a rival centre of power in the Red Army with an actual reform and re-organisation to respond to the lessons of the Winter War. The Germans happened to catch the Red Army with its pants down because officers were unfamiliar with their units and new organisational structures were untried, but it's not like the Soviets had deliberately murdered everybody of talent, and many purged officers went back into senior positions almost immediately as the badly bruised army was frantically re-ordered in time to stop to stop the Germans in autumn and winter.
 

Nikephoros

Banned
It would be wrong to ascribe the whole of Soviet tactical thought (and the key ideas that made them perhaps the best army in the world by 1944-45 did basically exist in 1941) to interraction with Germans. There were many differant differences in the conclusions the two traditions drew about mobile warfare.

Actually, I mostly meant the other way around. The Soviets assisted the Germans with designing many of their armored vehicles. The Soviets were the ones who could get away with building what they wanted.
 
Actually, I mostly meant the other way around. The Soviets assisted the Germans with designing many of their armored vehicles. The Soviets were the ones who could get away with building what they wanted.

Ah, I see. Sorry for getting the wrong end of the stick there. That's true, of course, although it would be equally wrong to describe the secret innovations of the Reichswehr to Russian tutelage. They fed one-another.
 
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