What was the bigger problem with the P-38s in the ETO - the fuel management/lack of range, or that there was a precious few of them available?
I think simply having a lot more available in the U.K. from 1943 onward would in itself have helped ameliorate some of the P-38s' difficulties in 8th Air Force use. For example the low serviceability rate that reduced squadron numbers. Also having more pilots in more planes may have more quickly increased the 8th Air Forces Fighter Command's experience base. But Lockheed couldn't build them any faster and everybody else wanted Lightnings too.
There should have been drop tanks being produced for the P-38 in the U.K. from day one. Even the modest sized 100 U.S. gallon would've helped. Add 200 gallons to the 306 gallon internal fuel capacity on the earlier P-38s. And then use the more fuel efficient cruise settings. How far could they escort the bombers with that set-up? At least as far as Schweinfurt one would hope. And if they need more fuel to reach Berlin then they'll need those 220 gallon drop tanks.
Last edited:
For any interested readers here is a link to a website that has the P-38 pilot training manual. One can view the manual online but if you want to download it in a PDF file they'll ask you to register with them. Which is free.
www.avialogs.com
Avialogs: Aviation Library - AAF Manual 51-127-1 Pilot training manual for the P.38 Lightning
{phocadownload view=file|id=3590|text=Download PDF}
Last edited:
British were making 90 imp gal (108 US gal) tanks many months before P-38s were escorting the B-17s in the ETO. Unfortunately, there seems to be a lot of mis-communication between the USAAF, RAF, and the manufacturer(s?) of the drop tanks - it was a major miracle when these tanks were secured fo the P-47s, that used just one of them per mission in 1943.
(IIRC, it seems like USAAF assumed that the heaps of the drop tanks in the UK are just waiting for the USAAF to use them in mid-1943)
Per this map, P-38 was good for 585 miles with 2x 108 gal drop tanks (this is probably for the J/L, these were with 410 gals of the intenal fuel); 520 miles with 2x 75 gal tanks. We can probably asume that 300+216 gals might give close to that 520 mile figure? Not really Berlin, but still a lot of Germany can be covered.
OTOH, Americans were certainly capable to provide any drop tanks required.
Yes, it wasn't really a problem caused by the British. The Americans should have had it arranged by day-one. Either through domestic production or British or both. And those paper-mache disposables drop tanks were a work of genius. Can you link to the map you're using for the range calculations please? Looking at the numbers I wonder how much further you could fly using the 30"/1600RPM/auto-lean cruise settings.
You are probably better off with the aircraft planing tables, that can be found in the manuals.
I think you've hit the core issues.
Nobody warned Lockheed of the desire for lots of P-38s soon enough, so more/less hand-building them was still a Thing far longer than it should have been. (Not to say Lockheed management preferring to sell Hudsons to Britain for more money helped...)
And the AAF was so hostile to escort fighters at all, the very idea of drop tanks was anathema.
The image of Lindy at the 475th is well-known, so can I offer a different perspective?
IDK, now, where I read it, but apparently, the 475th wasn't impressed by his range figures, because they were already flying longer missions and had been for awhile... (Take with spoonful of salt.)
Lockheed have had hundreds of Lightnings on order by the French and British, both the non-turbo and turboed versions. This is before XP-51 makes it's 1st flight. Hundreds of expensive fighters on order was an eye-watering amount of both hardware and money back in 1940 USA. Add also the USAAC/AAF needs and there is a veritable flood of fighters needed, a thing was in written before 1941.
Lockheed was making their A/C in the production line(s); the 'more/less hand-building them' was true for prototypes.
It took Lockheed an obscene amount of time to deliver the 1st YP-38 after the XP-38 crash, not helped with the aircraft being twin-boom (so there are three smaller fuselages to make per each A/C - not as conductive for fast production vs. a single bigger fuselage).
Now, let's point the finger to the AAC/AAF - they missed the opportunity to contract another source for the P-38s in a timely manner, that meant 2 things at least:
- any major change to a production line meant loss of fighters delivered by weeks
- obvious thing of not having as many of high-performance A/C for the needs of the global conflict
We can recall that P-47 was supposed to be made in 3 factories, A-20 was made in two (3?) factories, B-17, B-24 and B-29 also had more sources each.
AAC/AAF was also too late to test the YP-38 under low-temperature conditions, combined with testing them for suitability above 25000 ft; NACA received the YP-38 a bit too late, and their recommendations to lover the drag and increase the Mcr were never implemented.
All true, and I will stand corrected. (Faulty recall.)
I will reserve comment on what companies might (should?) get licences, since (as I recall) EverKing had that worked out nicely (and I make no claims to having better ideas on than him,
as well as he knows the subject).Considering that the first of the YP-38 prototypes didn't fly until September 1940, three months after France's defeat it's remarkable that the British and the French had arranged to purchase about 300 Lightnings back in early 1940 or was it 1939? Based solely on the performance demonstrated by the XP-38 in its brief existence and Lockheeds' persuasive sales agents. Well, throw in a little desperation and the good reputation the Hudson had with the British. Still, buying a huge order of an airplane that didn't exist seems pretty wild. But those were the times.
Last edited:
667 was the total for Europe (UK + France), contract signed in April 1940.
By that time, 80 were also ordered by the USAAC.
Thanks tomo pauk. I should have remembered the number at least if not the date. It was split 50/50 between the British and the French if I remember right. Counting the Air Corps' order almost 750 planes bought on spec. About 75 million U.S. dollars or so I think.
Last edited:
Those last two paragraphs highlight what may have been the biggest misstep in the OTL P-38 saga. It was the low production rate that either slowed or prevented the implementation of the various design improvements the P-38 needed to reach its full potential. The single biggest improvement being the centre wing sections and the cockpit nacelle redesign to increase the critical Mach speed the NACA wind tunnel testing showed. That report was issued in March 1942. And there was also the NACA report issued much earlier in October 1940 indicating methods to reduce drag. Plus the various other improvements either neglected or delayed. How much different would've been the development of the P-38 if it was being built by 2 sources going into 1942 and maybe even 3 sources later on?
Lockheed was operating 2 production facilities at Burbank in 1941. The Lockheed plant producing Hudsons and starting production of P-38s. The Lockheed Vega plant next door was starting production of the Ventura in late 1941. The Lockheed Vega plant would start building B-17s under license in mid 1942. While Lockheed needed to continuing building the Hudsons and Venturas it's unfortunate that the War Production Board didn't see the value of assigning the available production capacity at Lockheed Vega as a second source for P-38 production. I think it wouldn't have been too difficult to find another aircraft company to build B-17s. Well, 20/20 hindsight and all that.
When Lockheed ceased production of the Hudson in 1943 that could've switched that line over to P-38s. They could've ended up building 20,000 Lightnings by war's end.
Without the OTL critical shortage of P-38s the various design improvements, both large and small, could have been introduced into the production lines consecutively. That way production rates would not be alarmingly reduced. Thereby less resistance by the War Production Board to introducing improvements. Those very effective improvements described in detail in this storyline.
This is EverKings' drawing of the NACA redesign taken from the first page of his storyline. I'd like to recommend to any interested readers to check out the full story of EverKings' NACA P-38 timeline. If you haven't already.
I don't see what you're getting it. "last the 3 pages on Reader Mode" ?
I was assuming all of Everking's posts on the timeline would be seen in Reader mode while the posts from other users get hidden. There are only 3 pages of his posts.
Thanks for explaining. I never use reader mode so I was unfamiliar with it. Now I see what it does. Yes, only 3 pages of the storyline. Of course if you're in reader mode you'll miss the commentary much of which is pretty good.
Last edited:
That sounds like a plan.
Except it's putting it all on existing Lockheed facilities.
I see a flaw there, for a couple of reasons. One, EverKing's already alluded to: idle capacity (Curtiss? Or Fisher Body, which OTL proposed the nonsensical XP-75?). I think that could, & should, have been turned over to P-38s as appropriated.
The other is more the NAA approach: take advantage of USG $$$ to build whole new plants. This offers Lockheed (& USG) to to a bit of social engineering, too, by establishing factories in hi-UE, majority black areas. (Maybe that's asking too much...) It does mean probably a longer delay getting a second (third) source running, compared to simply retooling Curtiss or Fisher, which is why I lean to the first option. (Based on what's been written to date, I get the sense EverKing feels that way, too--but I won't put words in his keyboard.
)"Except it's putting it all on existing Lockheed facilities." @phx1138.
That wasn't necessarily a bad move. I didn't know that Lockheed had built so much production capacity going into 1942 and onward. I was surprised to learn that and I'm not sure how well known that is. For best example the Lockheed Vega plant built 2700 B-17s from 1942 to 1945. A large 4 engine turbocharged heavy bomber costing about $200,000 USD per plane. Imagine that amount of resources and production capacity directed toward the P-38 instead.
Of course the B-17s still needed to be built somewhere. But there did exist other companies that could have done that. As well as the other avenues that you've suggested. But I think the Lightning should've been left with Lockheed. They certainly had the capability to build possibly twice as many as they actually did while then being able to better incorporate the design improvements previously mentioned.
That wasn't necessarily a bad move. I didn't know that Lockheed had built so much production capacity going into 1942 and onward. I was surprised to learn that and I'm not sure how well known that is. For best example the Lockheed Vega plant built 2700 B-17s from 1942 to 1945. A large 4 engine turbocharged heavy bomber costing about $200,000 USD per plane. Imagine that amount of resources and production capacity directed toward the P-38 instead.
Of course the B-17s still needed to be built somewhere. But there did exist other companies that could have done that. As well as the other avenues that you've suggested. But I think the Lightning should've been left with Lockheed. They certainly had the capability to build possibly twice as many as they actually did while then being able to better incorporate the design improvements previously mentioned.
When you put it like that, it's hard to disagree.
There is a certain "rule of cool" for the P-38 to be licenced to somebody else, but I'd not advocate for cool to trump good sense.
That said, there's also something to be said for more than twice as many...