And here I thought I was up to date, knowing about F-86s with radar gunsights.
So what's the next lesson about, Prof?
So what's the next lesson about, Prof?
Incredible detail...
But one caveat: the "odd" configuration of forward turrets on that Japanese cruiser was the same as the configuration of the nine American Brooklyn-class cruisers. All of the Brooklyn-class cruisers served in the Pacific, and veterans of the theater would have seen one or more of them. That three-turret configuration wasn't common in either navy, but it seems off for someone to think of it as "odd".
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Good points and I am aware that several classes from various navies used a three-forward with the center super-firing setup as described for the Myoko-class Cruisers Tilley saw. Perhaps "atypical" or "unusual" would have been a better word-choice but I think the sentiment is the same--as you said, @Anarch King of Dipsodes, the configuration "wasn't common for either navy." When you consider that most of his exposure to capital ships has been either in passing during transport or by means of propaganda/recruiting/war-bond posters, etc. and that most of them will show the more typical American two-forward arrangement I don't think it is entirely out-of-line for him to think of it as "odd" even if he had seen it before on single ships here and there (which isn't assured). Also, consider that Navy Intelligence likely gave them a quick "crash-course" in basic ship Identification and as part of that would have included overview of certain stand-out features which will aid specific ID: the approximate length, number of funnels, number and arrangement of guns--I am fairly positive this configuration would have been mentioned as one that stands-out. So, the use of "odd" here was less "unexpected" or "unheard-of" and more "strange" or, as I said, "unusual."
EDIT: I went ahead and changed it from "odd" to "unusual" as it couldn't be mistaken for "unexpected" or "unique."
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Ch.38(d) - Addendum: Battle East of Samar After Action Summary
Battle East of Samar
25 October 1944
Commander Task Force 77 summarizes briefly:
1. At 0315I/25 we received dispatch from Commander SEVENTH Fleet notifying Task Force 77 that Commander THIRD Fleet had temporarily abandoned SAN BERNARDINO Straits and that HOBO Night Patrols had confirmed that a large enemy force was coming through. Commander THIRD Fleet had sent a large surface force to intercept the enemy force and were expected to arrive in the vicinity of SAN BERNARDINO Straits at approximately 1000I/25 to 1100I/25. Until then, the northernmost Task Units of Task Group 77.4 were advised to prepare dawn patrols to the north and prepare attack aircraft with anti-ship ordnance as available.
2. At 0605I/25 aircraft of Task Unit 77.4.3 (Northern CVE Group) reported many enemy battleships, cruisers, and destroyers on a southerly course about 24 miles north and westward of the Task Unit. Task Units 77.4.1 and 77.4.2 were moved northward to support Task Unit 77.4.3 and all three released their destroyer screens to intercept the approaching enemy while the CVEs immediately began commencing coordinated aerial attacks against the enemy using any means available.
3. At this point the situation was tenuous but not desperate. Our surface combatant forces were deep in the southern part of SURIGAO Strait after the battle of the early morning, and after five days of almost continuous bombardment of shore objectives and fighting a naval action, they were exceedingly short of ammunition and fuel. Moreover, the destroyers had expended almost of their torpedoes. Nevertheless, all of our available surface forces were ordered to concentrate at eastern entrance LEYTE Gulf, preparatory to moving to the support of the retiring CVEs, and a call was made to Commander THRID Fleet appraising him of the situation. The advance warning of the probable sortie of the enemy force through SAN BERNARDINO Strait had allowed Task Group 77.4 to prepare aircraft accordingly and immediately strike the enemy force.
4. At about 0700 aircraft of Task Unit 77.4.3 effected a torpedo attack against the enemy force which was observed to cause them to temporarily change course to the north and east. This was subsequently followed by similar attacks by aircraft of Task Units 77.4.1 and 77.4.2 using limited AP Bombs as well as the few Torpedoes available. These attacks reported badly damaging one CA and caused additional damage to at least one, or two, other CAs as well. During these attacks, the CVEs were effectively hidden from the enemy by smoke laid by the Destroyers and by a rain storm.
5. The enemy, however, re-engaged at about 0745I/25, and at a range of 17,000 yards commenced bombardment against the forward destroyer screen of Task Unit 77.4.3. While the DEs laid smoke between the enemy force and the CVEs, Hoel, Heerman, and Johnston closed under fire to within 10,000 yards and launched a half-salvo torpedo attack against the enemy BBs, followed by the other half-salvo against the CAs at 7,000 yards. For the following one hour and one half, the destroyers and destroyer escorts of Task Unit 77.4.3 and Task Unit 77.4.2 continued harassing attacks against the enemy thereby ensuring they would be unable to come within effective firing range of the CVEs. During this heroic action, three DDs and two DEs were lost to enemy action but they confirmed at least two enemy CA sunk, two CA or CLs badly damaged, one BB possibly damaged, and two DDs badly damaged.
6. These attacks, in combination with continued air strikes with every conceivable form of plane attack, including dummy torpedo runs by planes without torpedoes, forced the enemy to retire to the north by 0930I/25.
7. Between the time of the start of the enemy’s withdrawal until 1130 VFs and VTs of Task Group 77.4 continued limited strikes against them.
8. The Battle Line of Task Force 34 engaged the retreating enemy at about 1200I/25.
[… CTU 77.4.3 Report, CTU 77.4.2 Report, and individual ship reports of TG 77.4 removed …]
Commander Task Force 34 summarizes briefly:
1. At 0224I/25 Task Force 34 was formed and ordered by Commander THIRD Fleet to set course due south to intercept expected enemy surface fleet transiting SAN BERNARDINO Strait.
2. At 0630 we received alert from Task Group 77.4 that the enemy fleet was east of SAMAR, at approximately 11-30 north by 125-25 east on course 110 at 18 knots. At this time, Task Force 34 was in vicinity of 14-25 north by 126-00 east making 20 knots on course 180. Task Force 34 increased speed to 24 knots at this time in an effort to make all haste to provide assistance to Task Group 77.4.
3. Between 0700 and 0930 various communications from elements of Task Force 77 were received regarding enemy actions. After this period, at about 1015I/25 we received direct report from Task Group 77.2 that the enemy fleet was at 11-30 north by 126-25 east on course 320 at 14 knots and that they were continuing to undertake limited air strikes against the enemy.
4. At 1100 Scout aircraft were launched from BatDiv EIGHT, CruDiv FOURTEEN, CruDiv SIX, and CruDiv THIRTEEN. At 1132I/25 the scout from SANTA FE reported the enemy fleet as four BB, seven CA, and approximately 10 DD in the vicinity of 11-45 north by 126-15 east on course 330 at 12 knots. At this time Task Force 34 changed disposition from Cruising to Approach and available combat Observation aircraft were launched and general quarters was called.
5. At 1150 NEW JERSEY, MASSACHUSETS, and ALABAMA all reported radar contact bearing 170 at 38000 yards. At this time Full speed was ordered and Task Force 34 deployed for a Normal Engagement at Long Range. Task Group 34.2 advanced at full speed on course 220 to pass beyond the enemy fleet’s line of approach and gain their left flank. Task Group 34.4 turned to course 160 to continue to close toward the enemy’s right flank. Task Group 34.3 moved between Task Group 34.1 (Battle Line) and the enemy heading and both of these Task Groups changed heading to 240 to come directly across the enemy’s front. By 1154 positive radar tracking of the enemy ships was achieved by WASHINGTON and others in Task Group 34.1 at ranges between 31000 and 34500 yards.
6. Following instructions from Commander THIRD FLEET to engage at Long Range, Task Group 34.1 commenced firing at 1203I/25 at ranges between 25500 and 28000 yards. The enemy was on bearing 165 with course 312T, their disposition was scattered and irregular, believed to be due to continued air attacks from Task Group 77.4. Task Groups 34.1 and 34.3 had succeeded in Crossing the Enemy’s “T.” The main enemy force consisted of 3 BB (identified as YAMATO, KONGO, NAGATO), 1 CA (possibly MYOKO class), 1 CL (later identified as an AGANO), 6 DD (believed to consist of one SHIMAKAZE, two YUGUMO, and three of other types), and two other vessels trailing believed to be one DD or CL and one CA (possibly a TONE). The remainder of the Enemy force at this time was believed to be 10-15 nautical miles to the East-Southeast of the main enemy force, as reported by spotter aircraft. Commander TASK FORCE 34 ordered Task Group 34.1 to concentrate fire on the Enemy BBs with Task Unit 34.3.1 engaging the enemy’s lead vessels, all of this was commencing from behind a smoke screen laid by 34.3.3 as they advanced. The initial 16” salvos were observed to land amongst the Japanese ships, with IOWA achieving a straddle of the YAMATO class BB on her second salvo at 26,700 yards.
7. Shortly after the Battle Line started firing, Task Unit 34.4.2 commenced bombardment of the enemy’s right flank at ranges of approximately 22000 yards. Task Unit 34.4.3 continued to close on the enemy while laying a smoke screen between the enemy fleet and Task Unit 34.4.2.
8. The enemy vessels did not immediately return fire, instead between 1205 and 1209 they were observed to turn with approximately half turning to their starboard into TG 34.2 and half continuing on roughly their original course toward our Battle Line. This former group consisted of the BB identified as NAGATO, 1 CL, and 3 DD. Throughout the entire engagement the enemy appeared disorganized and without good central control. Large caliber fire from the enemy commenced at 1212. Their initial main caliber shots were short and are believed to have been obscured by the smoke from Task Unit 34.3.3.
9. The Battle Lines continued to exchange long-range fire for approximately 15 minutes from this time. No fewer than 17 Main caliber hits from NEW JERSEY, IOWA and WASHINGTON were observed against the YAMATO class BB during this time. MASSACHUSETTS recorded 5 hits on the KONGO Class BB during this, with observable damage to the forward turrets of the enemy BB. SOUTH DAKOTA recorded one hit against KONGO before switching fire to NAGATO at 1211 as she turned broadside to TG 34.1. ALABAMA did not fire until 1213 when she trained on the NAGATO, recording 3 hits during the next 12 minutes.
10. Task Group 34.2, having maneuvered off the enemy’s forward left, was out of position until they were able to come to course 190 at 1221. Task Unit 34.2.4 immediately closed range with the enemy, while Task Unit 34.2.3 laid smoke in front of Task Unit 34.2.2. Cru.DIV Fourteen (Task Unit 34.2.2) opened fire on the enemy’s forward left at this time from a range of approximately 18,000 yards.
11. At 1224I/25 NEW JERSEY, leading TG 34.1, received two main caliber hits from the enemy, believed to be from the YAMATO. One hit passed through the unarmored bow without exploding but causing flooding in the forward hold. The other impacted into the base of No.2 Turret jamming the turret gear and knocking out the port gun. At 1226 WASHINGTON received a heavy caliber hit, likely from the KONGO, which temporarily disabled the Radar fire control and direction finding. Damage control was able to restore primary direction finding by 1243.
13. By 1228 the distances had closed to 20,000 yards and Commander TF 34 ordered Task Units 34.1.1 and 34.1.2 40 Right and Flank speed to open up the distance and allow damage control. NEW JERSEY began to fall behind during the maneuver due to flooding in her bow. Task Unit 34.1.3 was allowed to separate from the main battle line to turn 160 port so they could maintain contact with the enemy right flank and close toward TG 34.4.
14. At around this same time, Task Unit 34.2.4 release a full complement of Torpedoes in front of the advancing enemy battle line from a range of 6500 yards while also engaging three enemy DD and CA identified as MYOKO. In this action, they received medium range fire support from Task Units 34.2.2 and 32.2.3. BILOXI and MIAMI both reported multiple 6 inch hits against MYOKO. VINCENNES reported sinking a DD during this action while OWEN and MILLER also report enemy DD sunk. Following the release of their torpedoes, HUNT was hit by an enemy torpedo, believed to be from one of the screening DD and the remainder of Task Unit 34.2.4 was forced to turn due to a large number of enemy torpedoes. By 1230, Task Unit 34.2.2 was likewise forced to turn away from the enemy torpedo attack, placing them out of action for the next 20 minutes. Task Unit 34.2.3 turned into the enemy torpedoes to close on the enemy destroyers.
15. The main body of the enemy battleline was observed to turn to their port around 1231 possibly as result of a combination of TG 34.1 turn to starboard and the on-coming torpedoes from Task Unit 34.2.4. This also resulted in the enemy BBs identified as YAMATO and KONGO clearing their rear turrets by 1236. After this, the enemy Battle Line concentrated fire on NEW JERSEY which received at least five more main caliber hits from YAMATO losing rear fire-control, one rear 5 in. battery, and other damage to her aft superstructure, including the aviation deck and hanger.
16. Between 1216 and 1240 TG 34.4 was engaged with the elements of the enemy fleet which had turned toward them beginning 1209. Task Unit 34.4.2 engaged the enemy CL, identified as AGANO class, from ranges between 21,000 and 14,000 yards. During this time, both SANTA FE and MOBILE report many main and secondary hits against the enemy CL, resulting in the enemy craft being reported as dead in the water by 1240, at which time Task Unit 34.4.2 was forced to turn away to avoid the second of three enemy torpedo attacks.
17. During TG 34.1’s turn, Task Unit 34.3.3 had closed range ahead of the advancing enemy battle line. At approximately 1232 COGSWELL and CAPERTON fired a spread of torpedoes at ranges of less than 5500 yards while under fire from medium and small caliber rifles of YAMATO and KONGO and two DDs. CAPERTON received multiple hits, knocking out her engines, and three guns.
18. TF 34 Battle Line completed their turn to starboard by 1233 and commenced firing over the port quarter as they increased the range on the slowing enemy. Task Unit 34.3.1 reports multiple 8 in. hits against KONGO and YAMATO.
19. At about 1233 the enemy identified as MYOKO was hit by one torpedo from Task Unit 34.2.4. This was followed at 1234-1235 by two separate hits on BILOXI by enemy torpedoes, both to her stern, resulting the complete loss of the stern and all propulsion and steering. At about that same time no fewer than two torpedoes from COGSWELL and/or CAPERTON struck YAMATO’s starboard bow and beam.
20. By 1242 MASSACHUSETS had recorded a total of fifteen 16 in. hits against the KONGO class BB. By this time, the enemy KONGO was burning uncontrolled and no longer returning fire. Radar contact confirmed that it had slowed to less than 11kn and KNAPP in Task Unit 34.3.3 reported its foredeck was awash with a prominent list to starboard. This enemy BB was observed to sink at 1330.
21. Task Unit 34.1.3 (BatDIV NINE) were able to maintain steady fire solution on the enemy NAGATO between 1232 and 1244 with eleven reported main battery hits all to the NAGATO’s port side. By 1250 HEALY from Task Unit 34.4.3 reports the NAGATO had ceased firing her main batteries and was slowed in the water. It was finished off by torpedoes from CLARENCE K BRONSON and COTTON at 1315
22. INGERSOLL and KNAPP fired a spread of torpedoes in front of YAMATO at 1248 from 5600 yards. The enemy took no evasive action and four struck along enemy BBs starboard side at 1252.
23. For the next 20 minutes, the bulk of both opposing battle lines were largely silent as TG 34.1 increased the range from the enemy battle line and provided support to NEW JERSEY as she effected repairs. Two enemy DDs in their left flank, later identified as a SHIMAKAZE and a YUGUMO, were engaged at close range by Task Unit 34.2.3 with the loss of both enemy vessels but resulting in irreparable damage to OWEN, which sank at 1354. Task Unit 34.2.4, less HUNT which had withdrawn to perform temporary damage control from the earlier torpedo hit, engaged both enemy CAs, a MYOKO and a TONE, with support from VINCENNES and MIAMI of Task Unit 34.2.2. The MYOKO was confirmed to sink at 1316 at which time the TONE turned to course 180 and attempted to escape to the south alone.
24. Between 1250 and 1320 TG 34.4 with support from Task Unit 34.1.3 reported one enemy DD sank, the CL sank, one DD badly damaged, one DD damaged. During this portion of the engagement the third, and final, enemy torpedo attack succeeded in fatally damaging SANTA FE. She was ordered abandoned at 1326 and while MOBILE and HEALY assisted SANTA FE’s crew, the remaining two enemy DD retired to the southeast.
25. By 1330 the enemy YAMATO was the only enemy vessel remaining in the active battle area. TG 34.2, less BILOXI (badly damaged), less HUNT (badly damaged), less OWEN (lost) and TINGY (assisting OWEN survivors) were recalled from pursuing the TONE class CA. Commander TF 34 ordered CruDIV SIX (Task Unit 34.3.1), INGERSOLL and KNAPP to escort NEW JERSEY from the battle area while CAPERTON assisted COGSWELL. IOWA joined with BatDIV EIGHT (Task Unit 34.1.2) to close range on the YAMATO and maintain steady bombardment at CLOSE range until it surrendered or foundered. Task Unit 34.1.3 was to provide flanking fire to the same effect.
26. At 1344 ALABAMA and SOUTH DAKOTA reported numerous radar contacts at 48,000 yards bearing 100. Further tracking of these contacts and aerial reconnaissance confirmed them to be the remainder of the enemy striking force heading 360 at 12 knots. The group consisted of 1 BB (KONGO class), 1 or 2 CA, possibly 1 CL, and 5 DD. The CA (MOGAMI Class) was reported to be severely damaged in the bow but continuing to make head.
27. After another 10 minutes of bombardment at ranges from 14,000 to 11,000 yards from Task Unit 34.1.2 plus IOWA, the YAMATO received another 15-18 16” hits (three were possible near misses) with only sporadic and inaccurate fire from the rear turret and secondary batteries in response. Two 16” hits from MASSACHUSETTS near the rear turret of the YAMATO silenced this battery at 1354. At this time, Commander TF 34 ordered the battle line to pause fire to conserve ordnance. Additional salvos were ordered by WASHINGTON at 1357, IOWA at 1400, and WASHINGTON again at 1404 after which no more shots were fired at the enemy BB.
28. At 1407 the enemy YAMATO was listing 30 degrees starboard, this increased until 1421 when it capsized. Approximately one minute later the YAMATO class BB suffered a catastrophic explosion and quickly sank.
29. At 1402 MOBILE joined Task Unit 34.1.3 (BatDIV NINE) and closed range on the second enemy force. They were joined by Task Group 34.4 less SANTA FE (fatally damaged) and HEALY (assisting SANTA FE) by 1406. Following, at 1412, Task Unit 34.1.2 plus IOWA and Task Unit 34.3.1 changed course to 070 to intercept the second enemy force. At 1421 DORTCH reported critical fuel and was ordered to withdraw to NEW JERSEY.
30. Around 1430 Task Unit 34.1.3 commenced bombardment of the enemy KONGO class BB at 26,000 yards. Between 1430 and 1445 SOUTH DAKOTA recorded six hits on the KONGO and ALABAMA recorded two hits before switching fire to the enemy CA at 1436. MOBILE reported one DD badly damaged and on fire by 1450.
31. By 1445 Task Unit 34.1.2 plus IOWA started firing from 28,000. The enemy DDs made smoke and came about to intercept this force. Between 1452 and 1500 the force of DDs made close range gun passes at Task Unit 34.3.1, causing minor damage to the anti-aircraft batteries of NEW ORLEANS. NEW ORLEANS and WICHITA reported three enemy DDs were fatally damaged and sinking by 1500. Although the DDs appeared to be making torpedo attacks, no torpedoes were observed during this action.
32. This action continued as ranges closed between 1500 and 1520 at which time the enemy CA exploded following a salvo from ALABAMA. SOUTH DAKOTA ceased fire at 1525 when the KONGO class BB was witnessed to have her foredeck awash back to the conning tower with a 10-degree list to port. This enemy BB finally sank at 1630. NEW ORLEANS and WICHITA collectively sank another DD by 1600.
33. By 1600I/25, most of our DDs were critically low of fuel and in the case of DORTCH, COTTON, HICKOX, and MARSHALL, were out of fuel. In addition, the battle line was critically low of Armor Piercing ammunition and were no longer able to effect full salvos. No further pursuit of the remnants of the enemy surface forces was deemed necessary or advisable and COMMANDER Task Force 34 ordered all Task Groups to concentrate around the crippled NEW JERSEY.
[…individual Task Group, Task Unit, and Ship reports of TF 34 removed …]
25 October 1944
Commander Task Force 77 summarizes briefly:
1. At 0315I/25 we received dispatch from Commander SEVENTH Fleet notifying Task Force 77 that Commander THIRD Fleet had temporarily abandoned SAN BERNARDINO Straits and that HOBO Night Patrols had confirmed that a large enemy force was coming through. Commander THIRD Fleet had sent a large surface force to intercept the enemy force and were expected to arrive in the vicinity of SAN BERNARDINO Straits at approximately 1000I/25 to 1100I/25. Until then, the northernmost Task Units of Task Group 77.4 were advised to prepare dawn patrols to the north and prepare attack aircraft with anti-ship ordnance as available.
2. At 0605I/25 aircraft of Task Unit 77.4.3 (Northern CVE Group) reported many enemy battleships, cruisers, and destroyers on a southerly course about 24 miles north and westward of the Task Unit. Task Units 77.4.1 and 77.4.2 were moved northward to support Task Unit 77.4.3 and all three released their destroyer screens to intercept the approaching enemy while the CVEs immediately began commencing coordinated aerial attacks against the enemy using any means available.
3. At this point the situation was tenuous but not desperate. Our surface combatant forces were deep in the southern part of SURIGAO Strait after the battle of the early morning, and after five days of almost continuous bombardment of shore objectives and fighting a naval action, they were exceedingly short of ammunition and fuel. Moreover, the destroyers had expended almost of their torpedoes. Nevertheless, all of our available surface forces were ordered to concentrate at eastern entrance LEYTE Gulf, preparatory to moving to the support of the retiring CVEs, and a call was made to Commander THRID Fleet appraising him of the situation. The advance warning of the probable sortie of the enemy force through SAN BERNARDINO Strait had allowed Task Group 77.4 to prepare aircraft accordingly and immediately strike the enemy force.
4. At about 0700 aircraft of Task Unit 77.4.3 effected a torpedo attack against the enemy force which was observed to cause them to temporarily change course to the north and east. This was subsequently followed by similar attacks by aircraft of Task Units 77.4.1 and 77.4.2 using limited AP Bombs as well as the few Torpedoes available. These attacks reported badly damaging one CA and caused additional damage to at least one, or two, other CAs as well. During these attacks, the CVEs were effectively hidden from the enemy by smoke laid by the Destroyers and by a rain storm.
5. The enemy, however, re-engaged at about 0745I/25, and at a range of 17,000 yards commenced bombardment against the forward destroyer screen of Task Unit 77.4.3. While the DEs laid smoke between the enemy force and the CVEs, Hoel, Heerman, and Johnston closed under fire to within 10,000 yards and launched a half-salvo torpedo attack against the enemy BBs, followed by the other half-salvo against the CAs at 7,000 yards. For the following one hour and one half, the destroyers and destroyer escorts of Task Unit 77.4.3 and Task Unit 77.4.2 continued harassing attacks against the enemy thereby ensuring they would be unable to come within effective firing range of the CVEs. During this heroic action, three DDs and two DEs were lost to enemy action but they confirmed at least two enemy CA sunk, two CA or CLs badly damaged, one BB possibly damaged, and two DDs badly damaged.
6. These attacks, in combination with continued air strikes with every conceivable form of plane attack, including dummy torpedo runs by planes without torpedoes, forced the enemy to retire to the north by 0930I/25.
7. Between the time of the start of the enemy’s withdrawal until 1130 VFs and VTs of Task Group 77.4 continued limited strikes against them.
8. The Battle Line of Task Force 34 engaged the retreating enemy at about 1200I/25.
[… CTU 77.4.3 Report, CTU 77.4.2 Report, and individual ship reports of TG 77.4 removed …]
Commander Task Force 34 summarizes briefly:
1. At 0224I/25 Task Force 34 was formed and ordered by Commander THIRD Fleet to set course due south to intercept expected enemy surface fleet transiting SAN BERNARDINO Strait.
2. At 0630 we received alert from Task Group 77.4 that the enemy fleet was east of SAMAR, at approximately 11-30 north by 125-25 east on course 110 at 18 knots. At this time, Task Force 34 was in vicinity of 14-25 north by 126-00 east making 20 knots on course 180. Task Force 34 increased speed to 24 knots at this time in an effort to make all haste to provide assistance to Task Group 77.4.
3. Between 0700 and 0930 various communications from elements of Task Force 77 were received regarding enemy actions. After this period, at about 1015I/25 we received direct report from Task Group 77.2 that the enemy fleet was at 11-30 north by 126-25 east on course 320 at 14 knots and that they were continuing to undertake limited air strikes against the enemy.
4. At 1100 Scout aircraft were launched from BatDiv EIGHT, CruDiv FOURTEEN, CruDiv SIX, and CruDiv THIRTEEN. At 1132I/25 the scout from SANTA FE reported the enemy fleet as four BB, seven CA, and approximately 10 DD in the vicinity of 11-45 north by 126-15 east on course 330 at 12 knots. At this time Task Force 34 changed disposition from Cruising to Approach and available combat Observation aircraft were launched and general quarters was called.
5. At 1150 NEW JERSEY, MASSACHUSETS, and ALABAMA all reported radar contact bearing 170 at 38000 yards. At this time Full speed was ordered and Task Force 34 deployed for a Normal Engagement at Long Range. Task Group 34.2 advanced at full speed on course 220 to pass beyond the enemy fleet’s line of approach and gain their left flank. Task Group 34.4 turned to course 160 to continue to close toward the enemy’s right flank. Task Group 34.3 moved between Task Group 34.1 (Battle Line) and the enemy heading and both of these Task Groups changed heading to 240 to come directly across the enemy’s front. By 1154 positive radar tracking of the enemy ships was achieved by WASHINGTON and others in Task Group 34.1 at ranges between 31000 and 34500 yards.
6. Following instructions from Commander THIRD FLEET to engage at Long Range, Task Group 34.1 commenced firing at 1203I/25 at ranges between 25500 and 28000 yards. The enemy was on bearing 165 with course 312T, their disposition was scattered and irregular, believed to be due to continued air attacks from Task Group 77.4. Task Groups 34.1 and 34.3 had succeeded in Crossing the Enemy’s “T.” The main enemy force consisted of 3 BB (identified as YAMATO, KONGO, NAGATO), 1 CA (possibly MYOKO class), 1 CL (later identified as an AGANO), 6 DD (believed to consist of one SHIMAKAZE, two YUGUMO, and three of other types), and two other vessels trailing believed to be one DD or CL and one CA (possibly a TONE). The remainder of the Enemy force at this time was believed to be 10-15 nautical miles to the East-Southeast of the main enemy force, as reported by spotter aircraft. Commander TASK FORCE 34 ordered Task Group 34.1 to concentrate fire on the Enemy BBs with Task Unit 34.3.1 engaging the enemy’s lead vessels, all of this was commencing from behind a smoke screen laid by 34.3.3 as they advanced. The initial 16” salvos were observed to land amongst the Japanese ships, with IOWA achieving a straddle of the YAMATO class BB on her second salvo at 26,700 yards.
7. Shortly after the Battle Line started firing, Task Unit 34.4.2 commenced bombardment of the enemy’s right flank at ranges of approximately 22000 yards. Task Unit 34.4.3 continued to close on the enemy while laying a smoke screen between the enemy fleet and Task Unit 34.4.2.
8. The enemy vessels did not immediately return fire, instead between 1205 and 1209 they were observed to turn with approximately half turning to their starboard into TG 34.2 and half continuing on roughly their original course toward our Battle Line. This former group consisted of the BB identified as NAGATO, 1 CL, and 3 DD. Throughout the entire engagement the enemy appeared disorganized and without good central control. Large caliber fire from the enemy commenced at 1212. Their initial main caliber shots were short and are believed to have been obscured by the smoke from Task Unit 34.3.3.
9. The Battle Lines continued to exchange long-range fire for approximately 15 minutes from this time. No fewer than 17 Main caliber hits from NEW JERSEY, IOWA and WASHINGTON were observed against the YAMATO class BB during this time. MASSACHUSETTS recorded 5 hits on the KONGO Class BB during this, with observable damage to the forward turrets of the enemy BB. SOUTH DAKOTA recorded one hit against KONGO before switching fire to NAGATO at 1211 as she turned broadside to TG 34.1. ALABAMA did not fire until 1213 when she trained on the NAGATO, recording 3 hits during the next 12 minutes.
10. Task Group 34.2, having maneuvered off the enemy’s forward left, was out of position until they were able to come to course 190 at 1221. Task Unit 34.2.4 immediately closed range with the enemy, while Task Unit 34.2.3 laid smoke in front of Task Unit 34.2.2. Cru.DIV Fourteen (Task Unit 34.2.2) opened fire on the enemy’s forward left at this time from a range of approximately 18,000 yards.
11. At 1224I/25 NEW JERSEY, leading TG 34.1, received two main caliber hits from the enemy, believed to be from the YAMATO. One hit passed through the unarmored bow without exploding but causing flooding in the forward hold. The other impacted into the base of No.2 Turret jamming the turret gear and knocking out the port gun. At 1226 WASHINGTON received a heavy caliber hit, likely from the KONGO, which temporarily disabled the Radar fire control and direction finding. Damage control was able to restore primary direction finding by 1243.
13. By 1228 the distances had closed to 20,000 yards and Commander TF 34 ordered Task Units 34.1.1 and 34.1.2 40 Right and Flank speed to open up the distance and allow damage control. NEW JERSEY began to fall behind during the maneuver due to flooding in her bow. Task Unit 34.1.3 was allowed to separate from the main battle line to turn 160 port so they could maintain contact with the enemy right flank and close toward TG 34.4.
14. At around this same time, Task Unit 34.2.4 release a full complement of Torpedoes in front of the advancing enemy battle line from a range of 6500 yards while also engaging three enemy DD and CA identified as MYOKO. In this action, they received medium range fire support from Task Units 34.2.2 and 32.2.3. BILOXI and MIAMI both reported multiple 6 inch hits against MYOKO. VINCENNES reported sinking a DD during this action while OWEN and MILLER also report enemy DD sunk. Following the release of their torpedoes, HUNT was hit by an enemy torpedo, believed to be from one of the screening DD and the remainder of Task Unit 34.2.4 was forced to turn due to a large number of enemy torpedoes. By 1230, Task Unit 34.2.2 was likewise forced to turn away from the enemy torpedo attack, placing them out of action for the next 20 minutes. Task Unit 34.2.3 turned into the enemy torpedoes to close on the enemy destroyers.
15. The main body of the enemy battleline was observed to turn to their port around 1231 possibly as result of a combination of TG 34.1 turn to starboard and the on-coming torpedoes from Task Unit 34.2.4. This also resulted in the enemy BBs identified as YAMATO and KONGO clearing their rear turrets by 1236. After this, the enemy Battle Line concentrated fire on NEW JERSEY which received at least five more main caliber hits from YAMATO losing rear fire-control, one rear 5 in. battery, and other damage to her aft superstructure, including the aviation deck and hanger.
16. Between 1216 and 1240 TG 34.4 was engaged with the elements of the enemy fleet which had turned toward them beginning 1209. Task Unit 34.4.2 engaged the enemy CL, identified as AGANO class, from ranges between 21,000 and 14,000 yards. During this time, both SANTA FE and MOBILE report many main and secondary hits against the enemy CL, resulting in the enemy craft being reported as dead in the water by 1240, at which time Task Unit 34.4.2 was forced to turn away to avoid the second of three enemy torpedo attacks.
17. During TG 34.1’s turn, Task Unit 34.3.3 had closed range ahead of the advancing enemy battle line. At approximately 1232 COGSWELL and CAPERTON fired a spread of torpedoes at ranges of less than 5500 yards while under fire from medium and small caliber rifles of YAMATO and KONGO and two DDs. CAPERTON received multiple hits, knocking out her engines, and three guns.
18. TF 34 Battle Line completed their turn to starboard by 1233 and commenced firing over the port quarter as they increased the range on the slowing enemy. Task Unit 34.3.1 reports multiple 8 in. hits against KONGO and YAMATO.
19. At about 1233 the enemy identified as MYOKO was hit by one torpedo from Task Unit 34.2.4. This was followed at 1234-1235 by two separate hits on BILOXI by enemy torpedoes, both to her stern, resulting the complete loss of the stern and all propulsion and steering. At about that same time no fewer than two torpedoes from COGSWELL and/or CAPERTON struck YAMATO’s starboard bow and beam.
20. By 1242 MASSACHUSETS had recorded a total of fifteen 16 in. hits against the KONGO class BB. By this time, the enemy KONGO was burning uncontrolled and no longer returning fire. Radar contact confirmed that it had slowed to less than 11kn and KNAPP in Task Unit 34.3.3 reported its foredeck was awash with a prominent list to starboard. This enemy BB was observed to sink at 1330.
21. Task Unit 34.1.3 (BatDIV NINE) were able to maintain steady fire solution on the enemy NAGATO between 1232 and 1244 with eleven reported main battery hits all to the NAGATO’s port side. By 1250 HEALY from Task Unit 34.4.3 reports the NAGATO had ceased firing her main batteries and was slowed in the water. It was finished off by torpedoes from CLARENCE K BRONSON and COTTON at 1315
22. INGERSOLL and KNAPP fired a spread of torpedoes in front of YAMATO at 1248 from 5600 yards. The enemy took no evasive action and four struck along enemy BBs starboard side at 1252.
23. For the next 20 minutes, the bulk of both opposing battle lines were largely silent as TG 34.1 increased the range from the enemy battle line and provided support to NEW JERSEY as she effected repairs. Two enemy DDs in their left flank, later identified as a SHIMAKAZE and a YUGUMO, were engaged at close range by Task Unit 34.2.3 with the loss of both enemy vessels but resulting in irreparable damage to OWEN, which sank at 1354. Task Unit 34.2.4, less HUNT which had withdrawn to perform temporary damage control from the earlier torpedo hit, engaged both enemy CAs, a MYOKO and a TONE, with support from VINCENNES and MIAMI of Task Unit 34.2.2. The MYOKO was confirmed to sink at 1316 at which time the TONE turned to course 180 and attempted to escape to the south alone.
24. Between 1250 and 1320 TG 34.4 with support from Task Unit 34.1.3 reported one enemy DD sank, the CL sank, one DD badly damaged, one DD damaged. During this portion of the engagement the third, and final, enemy torpedo attack succeeded in fatally damaging SANTA FE. She was ordered abandoned at 1326 and while MOBILE and HEALY assisted SANTA FE’s crew, the remaining two enemy DD retired to the southeast.
25. By 1330 the enemy YAMATO was the only enemy vessel remaining in the active battle area. TG 34.2, less BILOXI (badly damaged), less HUNT (badly damaged), less OWEN (lost) and TINGY (assisting OWEN survivors) were recalled from pursuing the TONE class CA. Commander TF 34 ordered CruDIV SIX (Task Unit 34.3.1), INGERSOLL and KNAPP to escort NEW JERSEY from the battle area while CAPERTON assisted COGSWELL. IOWA joined with BatDIV EIGHT (Task Unit 34.1.2) to close range on the YAMATO and maintain steady bombardment at CLOSE range until it surrendered or foundered. Task Unit 34.1.3 was to provide flanking fire to the same effect.
26. At 1344 ALABAMA and SOUTH DAKOTA reported numerous radar contacts at 48,000 yards bearing 100. Further tracking of these contacts and aerial reconnaissance confirmed them to be the remainder of the enemy striking force heading 360 at 12 knots. The group consisted of 1 BB (KONGO class), 1 or 2 CA, possibly 1 CL, and 5 DD. The CA (MOGAMI Class) was reported to be severely damaged in the bow but continuing to make head.
27. After another 10 minutes of bombardment at ranges from 14,000 to 11,000 yards from Task Unit 34.1.2 plus IOWA, the YAMATO received another 15-18 16” hits (three were possible near misses) with only sporadic and inaccurate fire from the rear turret and secondary batteries in response. Two 16” hits from MASSACHUSETTS near the rear turret of the YAMATO silenced this battery at 1354. At this time, Commander TF 34 ordered the battle line to pause fire to conserve ordnance. Additional salvos were ordered by WASHINGTON at 1357, IOWA at 1400, and WASHINGTON again at 1404 after which no more shots were fired at the enemy BB.
28. At 1407 the enemy YAMATO was listing 30 degrees starboard, this increased until 1421 when it capsized. Approximately one minute later the YAMATO class BB suffered a catastrophic explosion and quickly sank.
29. At 1402 MOBILE joined Task Unit 34.1.3 (BatDIV NINE) and closed range on the second enemy force. They were joined by Task Group 34.4 less SANTA FE (fatally damaged) and HEALY (assisting SANTA FE) by 1406. Following, at 1412, Task Unit 34.1.2 plus IOWA and Task Unit 34.3.1 changed course to 070 to intercept the second enemy force. At 1421 DORTCH reported critical fuel and was ordered to withdraw to NEW JERSEY.
30. Around 1430 Task Unit 34.1.3 commenced bombardment of the enemy KONGO class BB at 26,000 yards. Between 1430 and 1445 SOUTH DAKOTA recorded six hits on the KONGO and ALABAMA recorded two hits before switching fire to the enemy CA at 1436. MOBILE reported one DD badly damaged and on fire by 1450.
31. By 1445 Task Unit 34.1.2 plus IOWA started firing from 28,000. The enemy DDs made smoke and came about to intercept this force. Between 1452 and 1500 the force of DDs made close range gun passes at Task Unit 34.3.1, causing minor damage to the anti-aircraft batteries of NEW ORLEANS. NEW ORLEANS and WICHITA reported three enemy DDs were fatally damaged and sinking by 1500. Although the DDs appeared to be making torpedo attacks, no torpedoes were observed during this action.
32. This action continued as ranges closed between 1500 and 1520 at which time the enemy CA exploded following a salvo from ALABAMA. SOUTH DAKOTA ceased fire at 1525 when the KONGO class BB was witnessed to have her foredeck awash back to the conning tower with a 10-degree list to port. This enemy BB finally sank at 1630. NEW ORLEANS and WICHITA collectively sank another DD by 1600.
33. By 1600I/25, most of our DDs were critically low of fuel and in the case of DORTCH, COTTON, HICKOX, and MARSHALL, were out of fuel. In addition, the battle line was critically low of Armor Piercing ammunition and were no longer able to effect full salvos. No further pursuit of the remnants of the enemy surface forces was deemed necessary or advisable and COMMANDER Task Force 34 ordered all Task Groups to concentrate around the crippled NEW JERSEY.
[…individual Task Group, Task Unit, and Ship reports of TF 34 removed …]
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Bravo. A shot by shot account that reads like it could have been written on the day.
Good shooting by Iowa, too: straddle that early?
My compliments to her captain.I'd say I feel a bit sorry for IJN, but I really don't.
I honestly didn't want it to be such carnage...but the Japanese forces were already damaged, tired, and depleted. Couple that with the sheer volume of fire arrayed against them and there was just no way around it. 2 IOWAS, 1 N.CAROLINAS, 3 SOUTH DAKOTAS; 5 CLEVELANDS, 1 WITCHITA, 1 NEW ORLEANS, and 16 FLETCHERS...That's just sooooo much firepower. And that TF 34 arrived at the perfect time, from the perfect place. It was bound to be a bad-bad day for the IJN.
By my count, the "survivors" of the Center Force are the CA TONE, DD OKINAMI, DD HAMANAMI (from the first group); CL YAHAGI, DD URAKAZE (from the second group). I am undecided on exactly which ones are finished off by McCain's CTG 38.1 and which may find themselves prey to waiting subs as they try to escape east. We may just leave that to the imagination and history.
By my count, the "survivors" of the Center Force are the CA TONE, DD OKINAMI, DD HAMANAMI (from the first group); CL YAHAGI, DD URAKAZE (from the second group). I am undecided on exactly which ones are finished off by McCain's CTG 38.1 and which may find themselves prey to waiting subs as they try to escape east. We may just leave that to the imagination and history.
She had a steady fire-control lock with her Mk.13 for many minutes prior to the first salvo. Still, the shot was so good, Lee felt it worth mentioning even in the "Summary" report.Good shooting by Iowa, too: straddle that early?
@EverKing You mentioned that Northern Forces' carriers would also be sunk in this ATL Leyte. It would appear that after this battle the IJN will be a force only of destroyers and submarines as I had commented earlier. I would guess this would permit an earlier establishment in TTL of the naval blockade of the Home Islands.
This was quite a switch from your aviation based expertise but I think you did well on the story. I found it realistic.
This was quite a switch from your aviation based expertise but I think you did well on the story. I found it realistic.
Indeed. It wasn't entirely by design. As I mentioned, the timing of TF 34's appearance was about as bad as it could possibly be for Center Force. I have to wonder if this action (combined with that at Surigao in the early morning hours of the same day) may prolong the Battleship's life by a bit. On the flip side, these action only prove the battleship's efficacy against other battleships--if no opponent has them, why keep them?
Survivors from Northern Force ITTL include:
- CVL Chiyoda (crippled, sank IOTL by CRUDIV 13--Santa Fe & Mobile, attached to TF 38)
- BB Ise
- BB Hyuga
- CL Tama (crippled, sank IOTL by USS Jallao (SS-368)--this likely still happens ITTL)
- CL Oyodo
- CL Isuzu
- DD Hatsuzuki (sank IOTL by CRUDIV 13--Santa Fe & Mobile, attached to TF 38)
- DD Wakatsuki
- DD Shimotsuki
- DD Maki
- DD Sugi
- DD Kuwa
- DD Kiri
- DD Akikaze
The few stragglers from Center and Southern Forces are scattered and trying to make it back by ones and two to Formosa. If they can be found they should be fairly easy prey. Those surviving from N.Force (above) are heading straight back to the Home Islands and are just about all that remains of the IJN. CVL Chiyoda will likely find herself easy pickings for American Subs if they can get to her before she effects adequate repairs to get moving.
I really should write up a full loss list for each force (including the Americans, who have lost a few more ships than IOTL and likely many more men).
Thank you. I am not a naval warfare expert by any means and tried my best to at least make it plausible.
Driftless
Donor
The stand-off glide bomb already exists in somewhat primitive form by this point, and will probably get a boost as being a more efficient and less costly (blood and treasury) means of ship killing. Of course, that's dependent on the development of workable means for control. (Paging Hedy Lamar and frequency hopping
)In full research and outlining mode for the next chapter back in ETO.
Incidentally, did you know that the tail marking for the B-24s of the 458 Bomb Group (96 Combat Bombardment Wing, 2 Bomb Division, 8th AF) is a circle with a 'K' in it? I suppose, if the group got lost or had some other oddity happen one might say that "strange things are afoot at the Circle-K."
Incidentally, did you know that the tail marking for the B-24s of the 458 Bomb Group (96 Combat Bombardment Wing, 2 Bomb Division, 8th AF) is a circle with a 'K' in it? I suppose, if the group got lost or had some other oddity happen one might say that "strange things are afoot at the Circle-K."
Very well done. Decisive USN victory - but the Japs do get some licks in. Halsey will no doubt be celebrated for this - even though the key deployment was over his objections.
AFAICT, US losses were:
3 DDs and 2 DEs from "Taffy 3" (same as OTL).
CL SANTA FE
DD OWEN
NEW JERSEY, BILOXI, HUNT, and CAPERTON were seriously damaged.
One other note: "INGERSOL" should be "INGERSOLL".
Indeed, I fully expect Halsey to minimize his initial objections in his reports and stand himself out as the great tactician who destroyed the IJN.
Thanks for that, I'll check and see what I missed. I know second reference to 34.2 is supposed to be 34.3. I have to check course for 34.1 & 34.3.
EDIT: I have fixed the spelling of Ingersoll where it appears in the report and corrected the second reference in Paragraph 5 to the disposition of 34.2 to instead be 34.3.
Regarding the initial course of 34.1, in paragraph 2 it was established that the entire TF 34 was on course 180 during the Cruising phase of their movement. This course was not over-ridden during the subsequent Approach phase. It was only during the change of disposition to "Normal Engagement at Long Range" that the course was changed variously for each Task Group within the Task Force, as described.
To summarize:
- 0224I/25-0630I/25 - Disposition: CRUISING - Course 180 @ 20kn
- 0630I/25-1132I/25 - Disposition: CRUISING - Course 180 @ 24kn
- 1132I/25-1150I/25 - Disposition: APPROACHING - Course 180
- 1150I/25 - Disposition: NORMAL ENGAGEMENT AT LONG RANGE
- TG 34.1: Course 240 (battle line)
- TG 34.2: Course 220 (right-flank - attacks enemy's left)
- TG 34.3: Course 240 (center - moves between Battleline and enemy)
- TG 34.4: Course 160 (left-flank - attack enemy's right)
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Also, for those interested, I based some of the described initial tactics and action on information from "War Instructions United States Navy 1944" Although I did not follow it all exactly (it's not my specialty by any means) I at least tried to convey some level of basic understanding from Lee for these basic tactics. Also note, the publication date of those particular instructions in 1 Nov 1944, so Lee would have been operating under an slightly older set (although likely still very similar).
Finally, for those who have already read ch.38(d) Addendum... you may want to check again as I added an Order of Battle for TF 34 that may help clear up who's who and with what Task Group/Unit.
Finally, for those who have already read ch.38(d) Addendum... you may want to check again as I added an Order of Battle for TF 34 that may help clear up who's who and with what Task Group/Unit.