This is were i would argue the best gains can be made from the money saved from not building the navy, not only more troops, but you can afford to equip the reserve cores with a full artillery and machine gun compliment.
WI: Germany in 1914 gets the 24 divisions required for the Schlieffen Plan
- Thread starter C.Z.A.R
- Start date
Looking at the Belgian railway maps the network was already dense. This was part of the most industrialized landscape on earth in 1914 & high capacity tracks crisscrossed. If Europe was anything like the US at the time the railways were actually a bit overbuilt for industrial needs & prudent investors were thinking twice about loaning capitol for more tracks & supporting structure. Germany still could have forced the issue, but if there was no war recovering the investment may have been problematic.
There is a assumption in these discussions the German military exploitation of the Belgian/French railways Was at its peak efficiency. A look at if that were actually the case might be in order. It might be more Eisenbahnbautruppen were needed for transport operations.
There is a assumption in these discussions the German military exploitation of the Belgian/French railways Was at its peak efficiency. A look at if that were actually the case might be in order. It might be more Eisenbahnbautruppen were needed for transport operations.
And how exactly could Germany get Belgium to upgrade ther tracks? Not that it would have helped sense throughput of the Belgium rail and road network pre war wasn't the issue, its was Belgium blowing it up after Germany invaded that was the issue.
I do believe that more railway troops were needed. Ground that was fought over during the age of industrial warfare does not come out with railways intact.
Repairs were needed. Rolling stock was needed. Bridges needed to be rebuilt. Timetables needed to be written up on the fly.
Also as I've written before it makes east first possible. Not smart but it becomes a viable option. Given the distances involved a 1914 east first campaign was impossible with the railway troops available.
Repairs were needed. Rolling stock was needed. Bridges needed to be rebuilt. Timetables needed to be written up on the fly.
Also as I've written before it makes east first possible. Not smart but it becomes a viable option. Given the distances involved a 1914 east first campaign was impossible with the railway troops available.
Garrison
Donor
But is that kind of mundanity that Willhelm and his Generals would ever pay attention to?
No. Probably should be a staff officer who would though.
A captain or a major attached to a generals staff who is an expert in logistics.
Since the General Staff paid enormous attention to the railways in Germany, capacity, schedules, ect... the answer should be yes. What appears to be the case is they underestimated the requirement for the Eisenbahnbautruppen. Exactly why that occurred I cant say. I would note they also underestimated the displeasure and resistance of the Belgians to the German 'Passage', a political miscalculation. To paraphrase a common remark of German officers in Belgium in August 1914; 'They hate us, but why?'
They French army did advance a bit into Belgium & had a role in railway damage in the area it operated in. I've only seen vague summaries of the conditions the French & Belgians left the railways in, but given the problems of delivering ammunition forward it appears to be poor. Or, worse than anticipated.
Circling back to the opening sentence; the German General Staff dominated operations & they were nothing if not trained and experienced in logistics. Their success in the 19th Century caused most other nations to emulate in one way or another the German general staff system. In the early 20th Century it was already becoming important to promotion prospects to generals ranks to have attended the nations staff school/s, and done one or more tours in your career as a staff officer at one or another level of command. One of the forgotten items about famous field commander Patton is that in the previous three decades to WWII is that he was usually rated highly in his performance in staff positions, and regarded highly in his ability when in command to manage a HQ staff.
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Its interesting to note when it comes to discussing sabotage of the railways what the tip of the German spear invading Belgium was. In ww2 it was the tank and the airforce that went first. In ww1 the first troops on the ground were in armoured trains that pushed in Belgium.
I wonder if Germany didn't invade across Belgium leading the way with trains if Belgian sabotage of their own railway net would have been less.
I wonder if Germany didn't invade across Belgium leading the way with trains if Belgian sabotage of their own railway net would have been less.
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
I agree. If the money is not being spent on dreadnoughts, then those 24 divisions should be well equipped with all the supporting arms, even if just to keep Krupps' profits up. Someone once came up with an estimate of how many army corps the HSF cost Imperial Germany.
Riain
Banned
Just for context after 14 September and 2 failed offensives on the left wing the Germans moved at least 10 Corps from the left to the right wing. The first battle of the Race to the Sea, Battle of Picardy was fought with 5 Corps; 1 from 1st Army (in place), 1 from 4th Army (marched in from the Ardennes), 1 from North Army (mobilised on the North Sea coast) and 2 from 6th Army (from Alsace-Lorraine). The second battle in the Race to the Sea, the Battle of Albert was fought with 4 Corps: the 2 from 6th Army that fought the previous battle alongside another Corps each from 6th and 7th Armies moved from Alsace-Lorraine.
The point being that the Germans had troops available that could have been sent to the Marne if the plan was followed, but it wasn't followed and some 3 weeks were wasted conducting 2 failed offensives on the left wing.
The point being that the Germans had troops available that could have been sent to the Marne if the plan was followed, but it wasn't followed and some 3 weeks were wasted conducting 2 failed offensives on the left wing.
I don’t know any German, so reading that discussion was a challenge. However, most English language sources I’ve read seem to agree with me.
Translated original war-plans for the East (alongside actual wargames from the time) show the logistical challenges of a mass Eastern deployment.
My main source is Terence Zuber, and in his books he states:
"Marching the 1st Army 100km [Across the Vistula to Soldau] would have taken five days. Deploying the 3rd and 4th Armies, with a total of thirteen corps, would have taken weeks. The (unstated) problem of the Ostaufmarsch was that, slow as the Russian deployment might be compared to the German deployment in the west, the Russian deployment was faster than the German Ostaufmarsch deployment."
"Four armies were to deploy in the east. The German rail net was not equal to the task and the deployment would have been slow. In particular, the 2nd Army, with 10 ID, would offload from its rail transport near the Vistula and then foot-march 100km to its assembly area at Ortelsburg – a week-long process."
“The 4th Army, with 8 ID, would deploy to eastern East Prussia, but be so delayed by the overloaded rail net that its initial mission would be to defend in place. It would later follow echeloned left of the 3rd Army."
All important parts are tranlated and clearly to be read.
... well ... such things happen, if mayor sources keep ignored
... esp. if the few parts 'told' as translated (... how far also 'interpreted' we don't know) by the one to few sources relate to outdated data for the topic discussed (in the thread cited by me as well as here).
However ... IMHO the rather decisive statement of the man in charge of logistics in 1914 ...
... translated and rather diffucult to be ... 'reinterpreted'.
... but ofc you'r free to consider or not consider whatever sources you like.
Do you have a translated version of any of your sources? I’d love to give it a read.All important parts are tranlated and clearly to be read.
... well ... such things happen, if mayor sources keep ignored
... esp. if the few parts 'told' as translated (... how far also 'interpreted' we don't know) by the one to few sources relate to outdated data for the topic discussed (in the thread cited by me as well as here).
However ... IMHO the rather decisive statement of the man in charge of logistics in 1914 ...
... translated and rather diffucult to be ... 'reinterpreted'.
... but ofc you'r free to consider or not consider whatever sources you like.
Also, that statement means nothing besides "well we could've rerouted East", it's barely implied that 3-4 armies in East Prussia would have adequate supply, or that they'd reach the East within a week or so.All important parts are tranlated and clearly to be read.
... well ... such things happen, if mayor sources keep ignored
... esp. if the few parts 'told' as translated (... how far also 'interpreted' we don't know) by the one to few sources relate to outdated data for the topic discussed (in the thread cited by me as well as here).
However ... IMHO the rather decisive statement of the man in charge of logistics in 1914 ...
... translated and rather diffucult to be ... 'reinterpreted'.
... but ofc you'r free to consider or not consider whatever sources you like.
I agree that a instant August 1914 decision to deploy east would have to be a slow roll out affair, vs a planned deployment.
Worst case still, assuming things go slow, the Germans deploy west, and start training east 2 corps at a time, every 2 weeks, starting with first army, you would still have 2 extra corps for east Prussia by the time a Tannenberg rolls around. assuming Russia attacks in such a time line), a couple more by the end of August 1914.
(It might make some sense to push a couple of corps into Silesia in this time frame if supply and rail constraints were easier there.)
You would have to think the Germans had the ability to deploy and supply 3 or 4 armies east, if only because that is what they would have do if they won in France in September 1914.
(46 German divisions were well across the Vistula in 1916, so the Germans were able to figure this out over time.)
However: Per the OP really only 10 extra divisions probably puts Germany in position to "win" 1914, allowing a medium sized fleet (just not build 1 dreadnought a year).
the extra German divisions go to: (2 divisions east 8th army, 2 divisions east Silesia (can also go east Prussia if need be), 2 divisions upper Rhine, 4 divisions Belgium garrison duty (keeps OTL right flank strong, extra forces allow for no need for diverting later).
Worst case still, assuming things go slow, the Germans deploy west, and start training east 2 corps at a time, every 2 weeks, starting with first army, you would still have 2 extra corps for east Prussia by the time a Tannenberg rolls around. assuming Russia attacks in such a time line), a couple more by the end of August 1914.
(It might make some sense to push a couple of corps into Silesia in this time frame if supply and rail constraints were easier there.)
You would have to think the Germans had the ability to deploy and supply 3 or 4 armies east, if only because that is what they would have do if they won in France in September 1914.
(46 German divisions were well across the Vistula in 1916, so the Germans were able to figure this out over time.)
However: Per the OP really only 10 extra divisions probably puts Germany in position to "win" 1914, allowing a medium sized fleet (just not build 1 dreadnought a year).
the extra German divisions go to: (2 divisions east 8th army, 2 divisions east Silesia (can also go east Prussia if need be), 2 divisions upper Rhine, 4 divisions Belgium garrison duty (keeps OTL right flank strong, extra forces allow for no need for diverting later).
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Riain
Banned
10 extra divisions to be spread about like that still leaves 20 divisions of the 6th and 7th Armies sitting on the left wing doing nothing of value, indeed undertaking 2 failed offensives while the right wing was desperate for troops.
I think this hits the nail on the head, the Germans up until 1913 had plans to deploy 4 armies into East Prussia so it was possible and even practical. Formation pig-pile is great, but when days count it doesn't compare with a well prepared plan set in motion from the get go.
I was thinking already having 4 divisions already in the east to handle the Prittwitz panic, not having to divert units to garrison Brussels and screen Antwerp would be able to keep the right flank strong. (and perhaps 2 divisions on the upper Rhine means you could not have to feed a Lorraine counter attack with reserves, keeping the right strong for the final September showdown, and easier to supply in those places initially. Enough to win or at least stabilize on the Marne, and holding Amiens, and Reims, (going with the theories there is only so much you can supply at the point of attack with first and second army, if that theory is not true, it makes sense to reinforce the right more initially)
Also, in Terence Zuber's "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1891-1914"All important parts are tranlated and clearly to be read.
... well ... such things happen, if mayor sources keep ignored
... esp. if the few parts 'told' as translated (... how far also 'interpreted' we don't know) by the one to few sources relate to outdated data for the topic discussed (in the thread cited by me as well as here).
However ... IMHO the rather decisive statement of the man in charge of logistics in 1914 ...
... translated and rather diffucult to be ... 'reinterpreted'.
... but ofc you'r free to consider or not consider whatever sources you like.
He states:
...in regards to the "Aufmarsch II in 1900/1"
"Aufmarsch II in 1900/1 was a true Ostaufmarsch, a massive deployment to the east the likes of which had not been seen since 1880: Schlieffen proposed to send 44 divisions to the east and only 24 to the west [...] five corps and 10 reserve divisions (20 divisions in total) to be assembled around Thorn, and nine corps and five reserve divisions (24 divisions in total) in eastern East Prussia."
"Given the high proportion of active army corps it contained, Schlieffen intended that the second, East Prussian group, conduct the main effort. The limited capacity of the Prussian rail net east of the Vistula meant that assembling 24 divisions in eastern East Prussia would have been a very time-consuming process, which would have sacrificed any hope of achieving surprise. "
...in regards to the "1905 Kriegsspiel"
"This was by far the most ambitious exercise of Schlieffen’s career, perhaps the greatest war game in modern military history."
"His concept for the operation was to conduct a strong initial Aufmarsch in East Prussia with 16 divisions (five corps and six reserve divisions). When the Russians had committed themselves to attacking, he would reinforce the eastern force with an additional 22 divisions (eight corps and six reserve divisions). This total of 38 divisions was all that the East Prussian rail net could support. "
...in regards to the "Die Befestigung und Verteidigung der deutsch-russischen Grenze"
"The German rail net in the east was suitable for the defense. There were four rail bridges over the Vistula into East Prussia. Two of these rail lines led to north-eastern East Prussia, while a major German rail line ran parallel with the border from Posen to Breslau. This would facilitate a defensive German deployment and troop movements.
On the other hand, rail communications from Poland into Germany were practically non-existent. One rail line ran parallel to the Vistula, but it was blocked by Fortress Posen. For a 400-kilometer stretch from Posen south to Silesia only one rail line crossed the border, and this was in the extreme south."
And, if you'd like to dispute his claims, there are the sources (in German) he uses. You, being German, have the ability to read, translate & interpret these sources. It would mean an end to the "Grosser Ostaufmarsch" logistics debate.
-Aufmarsch II 1900/01
Operationen gegen Rußland,12, Wilhelm von Dommes
'Der Schlieffenplan', 149–50, Wilhelm Dieckmann
Die Befestigung und Verteidigung der deutsch–russischen Grenze, Anonymous
-1905 Kriegsspiel
Chef des Generalstabes der Armee I Nr 13083 Z. Berlin, den 23. Dezember, 1905. Kriegsspiel November/Dezember 1905 Schlußbesprechung. Geheim!’ BA-MA PH 3/646. Maps Nachlaß Schlieffen BA-MA N 43/133. The Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv also has a complete copy, with maps, Generalstab 1237.
In addition.
In Terence Zuber's "German War Planning, 1891-1914 Sources and Interpretations", in-which there are precise English translations of extremely reliable German figures/historians, it states:
(actual original translated text)*In reference to Groener, the person you use as "definitive proof" 's "
"[Handwritten] Comments on the Denkschrift from the Military History Section concerning the "Development of the Operational Concept in a Two-Front War of 1871-1914."
[From the Denkschrift, Handwritten]: Re: Denkschrift by Field Marshal von Moltke immediately after 1871 pointed out the possibility of a simultaneous war with France and Russia. It said there was a need to consider in good time to provide for the means for the defensive.
[Groener's comment. Typed] In my opinion, given such a combination, there were only two remedies:
a) military training for the entire male population
b) massive expansion of the rail net.
[...]
[From the Denkschrift] Up to his retirement (in 1888), Moltke advocated the offensive against Russia.
[Groener] The plan for an offensive against Russia suffered from one great deficiency: the preparations for the expansion of the lines of communication were just being formulated. There was a lack of railway troops. The field railway system with locomotives was just being formed, but was still a very shaky supply system... Fast and decisive operations were hardly to be expected, given the transportation networks of the time.
I am currently awaiting further English translations of key documents. If I get them, I will post small segments here to hopefully invoke further discussion.
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