What would you do differently at Versailles in 1919?

I never argued for that: I talked about Bavaria and only Bavaria, witch by previous posts even you agree had a strong degree of nationalism at the moment (tough we disagree on how strong). Saxony, Hannover or anything else to be carved out would be silly but there is enough in Bavaria to work with. You dismissed the Bavarian soviet early on, its possible to do so, similar arguments can be made to dismiss Eisner and his free state too, a case can be made for that I suppose. Add them toguether tough, and add the plotting of some of the far right and the right with the Wittelsbach's as late as the early 30's and you have too much smoke around for it not be some kind of fire.

Even in Bavaria case, I never even argued a referendum would work, merely that the idea was not so unthinkable that it could be accepted in time by a majority of the population (with possibly some less harsh treatment by the entente to seal the deal).

Quickly like this most of the books I read on the subjects aren't in my posession (and frankly I am not that invested in this discussions that I would run to my university to get them ASAP) so I would cite Gustav Von Khar and the Emergence of the Radical Right in Bavaria who said While it does give some doubt that Kahr was indeed on board it does tend to indicate two things a) that there is a decent historiography who believe that he was and b) that they're was an actually significant separatism sentiment (while its easy to dismiss the Bavarian soviet or the Bavarian free state separately its harder to deny that both of them toguether meant something) that made such an idea even remotely plausible.

As far as the Munich Soviet Republic is concerned I could not find anything on its declaration of independence (unfortunately the english wiki does not give a source) on the internet. My impression is that Munich Soviet did not want to be independent from Germany as much as it wanted to turn the entirety of it into a Soviet Republic. Kurt Eisner was at the head of a provisonal government and in the landtagselection his party got 2,5% of the vote. Yet, even if we were to accept each of your examples as failed "separatist" efforts, that still does tell us next to nothing about the actual amount of support for an independent bavaria among the population.

Again, that quote says nothing about a significant separatist sentiment, it only says that Kahr possibly had separatist designs.

By that same logic the rhineland could (should?) also have been made an independent nation, because there was also some kind of separatist sentiment. I believe an attempt at making Bavaria independent would have gone much the same way as the attempts at installing an independent Rhenish Republic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhenish_Republic
 
As far as the Munich Soviet Republic is concerned I could not find anything on its declaration of independence (unfortunately the english wiki does not give a source) on the internet. My impression is that Munich Soviet did not want to be independent from Germany as much as it wanted to turn the entirety of it into a Soviet Republic. Kurt Eisner was at the head of a provisonal government and in the landtagselection his party got 2,5% of the vote. Yet, even if we were to accept each of your examples as failed "separatist" efforts, that still does tell us next to nothing about the actual amount of support for an independent bavaria among the population.

Again, that quote says nothing about a significant separatist sentiment, it only says that Kahr possibly had separatist designs.

By that same logic the rhineland could (should?) also have been made an independent nation, because there was also some kind of separatist sentiment. I believe an attempt at making Bavaria independent would have gone much the same way as the attempts at installing an independent Rhenish Republic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhenish_Republic

In fact we can infer far more then that, as I argued above.

As for the Renish Republic, it doesn't stand to comparaison. It was entirely created by the allies in their zone of occupation and only reared his head once while Bavarian nationalism reared his head from time to time.

In fact, Bavarian nationalism was such a thing in 1918 that it did attempt to negociate a separate armistice with the allies.

In 1918, Bavaria unsuccesfully attempted to negociate a separe peace with the allies
Germany at War: 400 Years of Military History.

Honestly, I feel that your pet peeve with the peoples who carve Germany in little pieces in those discussions make you go too much in the other direction. A good deal of european states during that era had some kind of autonomist movements or people wanting reunion with another country, there is no reason for Germany would be so different. A new Bavaria might fail but it won't necessarely will.
 
Thinking about this a bit more, especially regarding the scenario I commented on before ( with foreigners willing to rule over a civil war in the middle of Europe for decades: german guerillias against occupiers, against other germans, occupiers against occupiers, in ever shifting alliances), it is theoretically possible that putting Germany in "time out" for a few generations could indeed make for a less deadly 20th century overall.

I feel that the WWs happened in a very specific time window, in a very specific stage of germany's evolution and sense of self.
Early 20th century germany was both a product and a freak of its time, the late 19th century logic of great power competition, that a few powerful nations could structure the world with brute military and technological might, and aparently we needed to try it at least twice (with exponentially increasing hysteria) before figuring out that trying to punch our way out this late in the game was bound to be a suicide mission. There was this strange idée fixe you see in the writings of Oswald Spengler (shudder), the rejection of linear history (other than technological), very transparently because germany was late to the party as a unified, powerful nation and NEEDED to believe in atemporality to justify bursting out of its limitations like some sort of military-industrial gopher.

In the alternate scenario above, Germany would only emerge as a nation again in an era where old imperialism is passé, germans themselves having forged a new national identity based precisely on opposition to imperialism, identifying with other colonized peoples to a degree rather than trying to emulate Britain and France. This new germany (completely unified or not) would resent the former occupiers and be prone to populism/xenophobia and weird political experiments, but more Venezuela or Sadam's Iraq than Third Reich. The german question would return, but in a very different time and a very different mindset. There would be no "peace" in Europe, but at least it would have passed the cultural time window for another WW. In a way, the nazis were striking the iron while it was still hot.

Then again, for this to work out better than OTL we have to rule out other war-hungry powers emerging on the continent and everyone moving away from racism and the idea of continental conquest without the crescendo of WWII.
It's not impossible. I would still expect the 20th to be full of wars and civil wars, but it's hard to imagine it being any worse than what we've seen. Perhaps increasing liberalism and democracy would spread through slow erosion of the colonial Empires.

Out of fancy, I would imagine 2017-Germany in that timeline to resemble south American states like Argentina, somewhat cranky towards countries like the UK and the US, far less developed and populous than it could be, under an authoritarian regime or just moving out of one as a fragile democracy vulnerable to populist weirdness.
I vastly PREFER the one I have, but humanity at large might not, regarding the overall body count.
 
Was it still not after WWI explicitly made illegal by 1930s LNT? More KM action in WWII that allowed the USN to use it free of first use guilt.
After Pearl Harbor , the USN would have used unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan even if the KM was using cruiser rules. You cannot underestimate the effect that attack had, it was weapons free, to the knife.
 
Israel created from seized Ottoman territory, including OTL occupied territories.

IsraelMap.jpg


The newly independent Jordanians won't like it, but too bad.

This is madness. There were less than 100,000 Zionist Jews in Palestine, at this time, but about 400,000 Arabs.

The Balfour Declaration, allowing Zionist Jews to settle in Palestine while declaring "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" was controversial enough. Establishing an outright Jewish state in Arab-majority territory? It would trigger full-scale rebellion in Palestine, and violent reactions throughout the Middle East.

Also, at this time, even the Zionists had not yet decided on creating a sovereign Jewish state; and the Zionists were a distinct minority in world Jewry.

(The great majority of Jews were either: liberals or socialists who wanted Jews to become full citizens of their countries, not bow to the bigots by emigrating; or traditionalists who wanted to preserve their existing communities and thought secular Zionism was blasphemously presumptuous, since the Messiah had not come. The idea of a refuge for Jews was hardly considered - the chief anti-semitic government in the world had just been overthrown by revolutionaries who promptly abolished all anti-Jewish laws.)
 
Thinking about this a bit more, especially regarding the scenario I commented on before ( with foreigners willing to rule over a civil war in the middle of Europe for decades: german guerillias against occupiers, against other germans, occupiers against occupiers, in ever shifting alliances), it is theoretically possible that putting Germany in "time out" for a few generations could indeed make for a less deadly 20th century overall.

I feel that the WWs happened in a very specific time window, in a very specific stage of germany's evolution and sense of self.
Early 20th century germany was both a product and a freak of its time, the late 19th century logic of great power competition, that a few powerful nations could structure the world with brute military and technological might, and aparently we needed to try it at least twice (with exponentially increasing hysteria) before figuring out that trying to punch our way out this late in the game was bound to be a suicide mission. There was this strange idée fixe you see in the writings of Oswald Spengler (shudder), the rejection of linear history (other than technological), very transparently because germany was late to the party as a unified, powerful nation and NEEDED to believe in atemporality to justify bursting out of its limitations like some sort of military-industrial gopher.

In the alternate scenario above, Germany would only emerge as a nation again in an era where old imperialism is passé, germans themselves having forged a new national identity based precisely on opposition to imperialism, identifying with other colonized peoples to a degree rather than trying to emulate Britain and France. This new germany (completely unified or not) would resent the former occupiers and be prone to populism/xenophobia and weird political experiments, but more Venezuela or Sadam's Iraq than Third Reich. The german question would return, but in a very different time and a very different mindset. There would be no "peace" in Europe, but at least it would have passed the cultural time window for another WW. In a way, the nazis were striking the iron while it was still hot.

Then again, for this to work out better than OTL we have to rule out other war-hungry powers emerging on the continent and everyone moving away from racism and the idea of continental conquest without the crescendo of WWII.
It's not impossible. I would still expect the 20th to be full of wars and civil wars, but it's hard to imagine it being any worse than what we've seen. Perhaps increasing liberalism and democracy would spread through slow erosion of the colonial Empires.

Out of fancy, I would imagine 2017-Germany in that timeline to resemble south American states like Argentina, somewhat cranky towards countries like the UK and the US, far less developed and populous than it could be, under an authoritarian regime or just moving out of one as a fragile democracy vulnerable to populist weirdness.
I vastly PREFER the one I have, but humanity at large might not, regarding the overall body count.

I shudder to think about what would be necessary to reduce a Nation with a modern education system and buerocracy to a tribal level. Shoot all teachers, tradesmen, organisiers and intellectuals.
I still think trying to be reconcilliatory would have worked out better than being as aggravating as possible.
Despite what propaganda apparently successfully made some think until these days, germans are not a seperate race hardwired for conquest who need to be kept down. Kept down needed to be a trade and power rival.... There, the motivation in a pinch.
 
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I shudder to think about what would be necessary to reduce a Nation with a modern education system and buerocracy to a tribal level. Shoot all teachers, tradesmen, organisiers and intellectuals.
I still think trying to be reconcilliatory would have worked out better than being as aggravating as possible.
Despite what propaganda apparently successfully made some think until these days, germans are not a seperate race hardwired for conquest who need to be kept down. Kept down needed to be a trade and power rival.... There, the motivation in a pinch.

Not sure where the “tribal level” is supposed to come from, even the scenario I commented on didn't go this far. Also, let’s not turn this into a tearful discussion whether or not we are a species of orcs (the answer is “NO”! Success! Next Question!).

If we go by making the safest 20th century possible, the question is what either conciliation or occupation could accomplish.

What would “conciliation” even mean, regarding the goals and mindset Germany had walking into and out of WWI? Germany wasn’t under threat as a nation. Rather, its elites had the ambition that its standing should match its military, industrial and demographic heft, by showing the whole world what german security guarantees meant (= possibly overruling French or British guarantees).

Obviously, no peace treaty can satisfy that. So the next best thing is to not punish and/or humiliate Germany for trying.

So you get a somewhat more stable, dignified Weimar Republic unburdened by Versailles. It is also filled to the brim with WWI-veterans, military planners and intellectual elites who are walking out of this with 3 lessons:
- The result of WWI is disappointing, but not devastating. The other powers respect us as an equal. So clearly, we didn’t do anything wrong or unusual. It was not a defeat. It was not a mistake. It was an ATTEMPT that didn’t work out.
- We ALMOST had the glorious victory we were promised. ALMOST! All of our trauma and sacrifices ALMOST would have paid off. We were so, so close. WE could have been the glorious winner offering the others a generous, sportsman-like peace.
- Germany continues to grow every day, unburdened, and is now stronger than ever. Who knows what further heights we could reach, with the right people in charge? Instead of these meek democrats who owe everything to the generosity of our enemies.

That’s the kind of Germany we wanna ride out of the 20th century without further military catastrophies? In an age where liberal democracy and human rights were still challenged by things like fascism and communism? It’s entirely possible. If we quickly lose the momentum of that emergence as a great power - theory of geopolitics. But it doesn't seem likely.
In fact, the next conflict might not even be sparked by Germany itself, but by another country cracking under the tension of having an ever-growing superpower at its doorstep.

WWII and the nazis weren’t ALL Versailles, they were a mutation of the logic of european power, and a certain idea about the world and Germany’s place in it in particular, which Versailles drove into a higher pitch.

In summary, it might be better than OTL, which is not difficult to achieve, but in terms of safety alone, I’m far from sure this is the safest bet.

Again, unless you factor in some other aggressive power that absolutely needs a strong, independent, militarized Germany to keep it in check.
 
With reconcilliatory I more meant steps like normalising trade and diplomatic relations, stop treating germany like a pariah etc.
Just get things back on a more open track, and not all the closed markets etc. wich otl were imposed.
 

Perkeo

Banned
If we go by making the safest 20th century possible, the question is what either conciliation or occupation could accomplish.
Not either or. Occupation can alter the rules for conciliation, allow the occupants to negotiate from a position of strength, but as a long term solution???
Just look at the two Germanies after WWII. West Germany is loyal to her former occupants to this day, except for being chewed out by every Republican president for not being militaristic enough. East Germany collapsed literally the day the people stopped fearing the occupants, long before the occupation did end. What do you think made that difference, more occupation or more conciliation?
What would “conciliation” even mean, regarding the goals and mindset Germany had walking into and out of WWI? Germany wasn’t under threat as a nation.
That is half true at best. Of course the Franco-Russian alliance was a threat to Germany as a nation.
I am not saying triggering WWI was the appropriate answer, but there's a difference between a Cold War going hot due to terrible crisis management like WWI and a completely unprovoked attack like WWII.
Rather, its elites had the ambition that its standing should match its military, industrial and demographic heft, by showing the whole world what german security guarantees meant (= possibly overruling French or British guarantees).
Have a quick look at the world map of 1914 and explain how overruling French or British guarantees are any better than German ones. Indeed I'd be proud if French/British style "security guarantees" had never been issued by Germany - but unfortunately the truth is more shameful.
Obviously, no peace treaty can satisfy that. So the next best thing is to not punish and/or humiliate Germany for trying.
Once again, what do you think made the success of the Western occupation after WWI, humiliation or the lack thereof?
And as for punishment this doesn't exactly tend to work if
- it's based on a forced confession
- the sentence isn't even defined
- reintegration into society is not planned or eved desired.
That doesn't mean they must not punish Germany, it means they must not fail to plan beyond the punishment.
In fact, the next conflict might not even be sparked by Germany itself, but by another country cracking under the tension of having an ever-growing superpower at its doorstep.
IMO cracking under the tension of having an ever-growing superpower at its doorstep is precisely what Germany did in 1914.
Again, unless you factor in some other aggressive power that absolutely needs a strong, independent, militarized Germany to keep it in check.
Well, the Sowjet Union served that purpose IOTL - and saved a lot of German asses.
 
This obviously isn't just Versailles, seeing as how you're doing stuff beyond Germany.

1) Austria will keep the southern Sudetenland, and will have access to the sea via the port of Fiume, for this purpose the Slovene lands will remain apart of the Austrian federal state and Slovene will be recognised as the country's second official language. For his attempted peace overtures in 1917 Emperor Karl will be allowed to maintain his throne so long as he renounces his titles in all newly formed states.

2) All contiguous Hungarian majority areas go to Hungary.

3) Czechoslovakia will a federal state, not a unitary state.

4) Romania will receive its desired land on condition that it agrees to establish an autonomous region for its new the Hungarian minority.

5) Serbia will annex the remaining South Slavic lands of the Central Powers (cheer up Bulgarians, in a very round about way you're now united with Macedonia).

6) Reparations for damaged infrastructure will not include merchant shipping sunk by U-boats (this actually massively lowers the total sum to be paid).

8) Germany will be forbidden from annexing Austria and (in addition ot OTL's military limits) is forbidden from maintaining a military intelligence service (and that ladies and gentlemen in how you butterfly Hitler!) The German army is allowed to be 1.5x its OTL size, but conscription is to be constitutionally forbidden.

9)The Polish eastern borders will be decided by their ongoing war with the Soviets. In the west the border will be settled by referendum, a corridor to the sea will (while remaining part of Germany) be opened to free movement by Polish citizens and a rail line connecting Poland to Danzig is to be opened to Polish traffic.

10) the Greco-Turkish Border will be settled in the ongoing Greco Turkish war

11) A sliver of Northern German SW Africa goes to Portugese West Africa

12) German Samoa will be joined with American Samoa

13) Britian and France will respectively receive the south and north levant. The remaining Arab majority regions go to the Hashemite Caliphate.

14) The Kurdish regions will hold a refferendum on independence or remaining a part of the Ottoman Empire

15) France Receives A-L, and a large demilitarized zone is to be established in the German Rhineland.

16) Italy recieves what it did OTL, and it's allowed to take Austria's share of Tianjin, and the portion of the Russian share to which it borders. British Somaliland is transferred to Italy.

17) Rwanda and Burundi will remain with East Africa (now a part of the UK) Belgium will instead be compensated with Portugese Cabinda

18) The Baltic Landeswher, the army of German East Africa, and all Friekorps units outside of Germany upon the signing of this treaty are to be reorganized into the League of Nations Monitoring and Intervention Force (which will also be open to enlistment by foreigners), this force will be normally based in the Baltic and Armenia to guard against Soviet aggression, but by the will of the LoN assembly can be redeployed to other conflict zones observation and intervention. (yes the LoN just got its own Blue Helmets)

edit: some minor additions and point 18
 
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After Pearl Harbor , the USN would have used unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan even if the KM was using cruiser rules. You cannot underestimate the effect that attack had, it was weapons free, to the knife.

It's also important to note that the Japanese would not often abandon ship, and would try to ram the submarine.
 
corridor to the sea will (while remaining part of Germany) be opened to free movement by Polish citizens.
I repeat once again, by doing this you're opening Poland to severe economical pressure from Germany. What does it matter if the citizen movement is free if trade is not even tariff-free? What can Poland do if Germany suddenly decides that they're ending this violation of their sovereignty and stop honoring the treaty?
 
I repeat once again, by doing this you're opening Poland to severe economical pressure from Germany. What does it matter if the citizen movement is free if trade is not even tariff-free? What can Poland do if Germany suddenly decides that they're ending this violation of their sovereignty and stop honoring the treaty?

Invade Germany? I've made the argument before that Poland can only be blockaded into submission if Germany is rearmed, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, and France doesn't intercede. You know, like in OTL 1939, where not only did the Corridor not help, but as the casus belli, it was literally worse than useless.
 
Poland needs an access to the sea that does not depend on other nations. That's why the corridor was put in place in the first place. The only other option might be to give it part of East Prussia/Lithuania and get a passage at its far North East
 
I repeat once again, by doing this you're opening Poland to severe economical pressure from Germany. What does it matter if the citizen movement is free if trade is not even tariff-free? What can Poland do if Germany suddenly decides that they're ending this violation of their sovereignty and stop honoring the treaty?
unregulated flow of people means unregulated flow of goods. Unless the border check point requires every pole driving a vehicle larger than a family car to park and proceed on foot. If the Germans end the treaty, then the larger Polish army mobilizes and threatens to tear of Danzig and everything east of it.
 
unregulated flow of people means unregulated flow of goods. Unless the border check point requires every pole driving a vehicle larger than a family car to park and proceed on foot. If the Germans end the treaty, then the larger Polish army mobilizes and threatens to tear of Danzig and everything east of it.
First, trade goods in bulk are moved by freight trains and river barges not cars (or since we speak of 20s Poland, horse drawn wagons). Second, in OTL, the second the relevant traty imposed by Versailles expired (iirc it was 1926), Germany launched trade war against Poles hoping for economic and thus political vassalization of Poland
 
First, trade goods in bulk are moved by freight trains and river barges not cars (or since we speak of 20s Poland, horse drawn wagons). Second, in OTL, the second the relevant traty imposed by Versailles expired (iirc it was 1926), Germany launched trade war against Poles hoping for economic and thus political vassalization of Poland
Poland's rail network is cobbled together from three different economies OTL it had to expend vast amounts of capital on standardizing rails and making rail lines that actually connect to each other, it could be genuinely beneficial for them to opt for large truck fleets at an ahistorically early time. As for the treaty, just make it indefinite.
 
Invade Germany? I've made the argument before that Poland can only be blockaded into submission if Germany is rearmed, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, and France doesn't intercede. You know, like in OTL 1939, where not only did the Corridor not help, but as the casus belli, it was literally worse than useless.
Sure, but invading Germany is only an option if the international community sees it favourable light and there is next to zero chance of it being the case. Poland can invade on their own, but Germany will use it as an excuse to rearm and later retake more land.
 
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