What would you do differently at Versailles in 1919?

No rational person could think that Poland would be able to contain Germany AND the Soviet Union. It would literally need nuclear weapons for that.
In 1919 the USSR was seen as a bunch of czar-killing anarchists, as the Russo-Polish war would later prove, they were not in military terms very much of a threat yet. Germany on the other hand is supposed to be limited to 100,000 men. Poland could be expected in 1919 of being able to hold either of them off ( with a little help if needed by the Entente ), no one would think in 1919 they would ever act in concert ( the OTL pact was a big shock).
 
Apologies if this has come up before, I haven't read the whole thread.

In my view, with hindsight, the basic issue at Versailles was that Germany was going to be unhappy with any peace treaty predicated on it having lost the war as its public didn't accept that was what had happened. Germany would then seek to overturn any peace treaty likely to be imposed, and its long term ability to do so was clear. The exclusion of Russia from eastern Europe and destruction of Austria-Hungary meant that it was surrounded by weaker countries against which it had claims and which would not unite against it due to their claims against each other. So renewed conflict may well have been inevitable unless either the great war lasted longer (to occupy more of Germany to make it clear they had lost) or the peace treaty imposed no penalty on or claims against Germany (with the possible exception of Alsace Lorraine) and possibly also allowed Germany to incorporate the German speaking areas of Austria-Hungary, or the western allies remained united behind treaty enforcement.

The terms of the treaty and its aftermath split the US-UK-French alliance, encouraging German resistance and economic disaster, all of which paved the way for the Nazis and the "extremist" attempt to overthrow the treaty and the international order more broadly. I think Wilson was the politician with the power to break the logjam, forgiving interallied war debts would have allowed the British to do the same and both them and the French to scale down their reparation demands. This would have removed the most obvious source of ongoing public friction and rancour, as well as easing the functioning of the international economy, potentially affecting the great depression. It was the combination of the Young plan for reparations and the depression that turned the Nazis from a fringe party into a major one. The result might have been a Germany more willing to live with the status quo and the allies more prepared to enforce the status quo, both making challenges to the treaty less likely although by no means impossible.

I don't want to get dragged into a debate on what reparations were actually paid as informed estimates naturally vary due to the issue of valuing deliveries in kind. Two points might be worth making though. Firstly, the effective reparations burden (A&B bonds) was fairly close to Keynes's suggestion of what the Germans could afford (£2.5bn vs £2bn) although this doesn't mean it was affordable. Secondly, Germany received more in commercial loans from the US during the 1920s than it paid in reparations and then largely defaulted on these debts in the 1930s.

Just my tuppence worth and again my apologies if none of this is new.
 
Interwar Czechoslovakia was among the most industrialized countries of the world, and didnt have to unite three partitions into something resembling a country, didnt have the fronts passing through her lands three or four times in the course of six years of wars, didnt have her industry evacuated to Russia or destroyed by Russian and German armies, didnt have her town and cities turned to ruin
Czechoslovakia need to inite Czech lands, Slovakia and Ruthenia of which Ruthenia was especially backward.
 
In 1919 the USSR was seen as a bunch of czar-killing anarchists, as the Russo-Polish war would later prove, they were not in military terms very much of a threat yet. Germany on the other hand is supposed to be limited to 100,000 men. Poland could be expected in 1919 of being able to hold either of them off ( with a little help if needed by the Entente ), no one would think in 1919 they would ever act in concert ( the OTL pact was a big shock).

No one with a scrap of brain power would assume that the 1919. situation would last forever. And it's not like Germany's victory in 1939. in any way hinged on the Soviet invasion.


The truth of the matter is that once Germany and Russia got back on their feet Poland has no chance of winning a war against either one of them. So envisioning it as a buffer of sorts is incredibly short-sighted at best and absolutely bonkers at worst.
 
Czechoslovakia need to inite Czech lands, Slovakia and Ruthenia of which Ruthenia was especially backward.
True, but they at least came from one empire and afaik Czechoslovak lands had not been seriously devastated by WWI or following wars and warlets.
 
No one with a scrap of brain power would assume that the 1919. situation would last forever. And it's not like Germany's victory in 1939. in any way hinged on the Soviet invasion.
The truth of the matter is that once Germany and Russia got back on their feet Poland has no chance of winning a war against either one of them. So envisioning it as a buffer of sorts is incredibly short-sighted at best and absolutely bonkers at worst.
If the ToV limits had been enforced and the Lenin style anarchy had continued then Poland would have been an adequate buffer. Please remember a buffer is not meant to be able to always stop a threat on its own, the thinking in 1919 would be that it just had to hold long enough for aid to reach it or be able to make the cost of victory too high. Finland for instance was a buffer during the cold war, it could not have stopped the Red Army on its own but could make the cost of doing so prohibitive. The same was the thinking with Poland, it only had either to be able to put up enough of a fight to make it not worth it or last long enough for intervention to work. This is not HoI, factors such as possibility of intervention do act as deterrence.
In 1939 Germany would not have attacked if the Soviets had not been members of the pact ( and vice versa ) and not to put too fine a point on it , attacking Poland did lead to the destruction of the Third Reich.
 
If the ToV limits had been enforced and the Lenin style anarchy had continued then Poland would have been an adequate buffer.

So, Poland is an adequate buffer only under literally ideal conditions. Doesn`t seem like a good plan.

Please remember a buffer is not meant to be able to always stop a threat on its own, the thinking in 1919 would be that it just had to hold long enough for aid to reach it or be able to make the cost of victory too high.

That was also Polish thinking in 1939. That example doesn`t really speak in favour of the "buffer" idea.

Finland for instance was a buffer during the cold war, it could not have stopped the Red Army on its own but could make the cost of doing so prohibitive.

Finland can only make the attack prohibitive if it is a sideshow front. Faced against a dedicated Red Army attack, they`d be torn to shreds. And before you say "Winter War" or "Afghanistan", the post WWII Red Army was a different beast from its 1939. iteration, and it would not be a war against insurgencies.

Finalnd was a political buffer.

The same was the thinking with Poland, it only had either to be able to put up enough of a fight to make it not worth it or last long enough for intervention to work.

That would assume that other nations would actually come to her aid and not sit back and let her get overrun.

This is not HoI, factors such as possibility of intervention do act as deterrence.

I have no idea what HoI is, and as we could see from OTL, intervention did not really deter a dedicated attack.

In 1939 Germany would not have attacked if the Soviets had not been members of the pact ( and vice versa )

That`s debatable.

and not to put too fine a point on it , attacking Poland did lead to the destruction of the Third Reich.

This is like saying that Napoleon`s victory at Austerlitz ultimately caused the restoration of the French Monarchy. I`d put that "technically correct" Futurama meme here, but this statement is too silly even for that.
 
1 So, Poland is an adequate buffer only under literally ideal conditions. Doesn`t seem like a good plan.
2 That was also Polish thinking in 1939. That example doesn`t really speak in favour of the "buffer" idea.
3 Finland can only make the attack prohibitive if it is a sideshow front. Faced against a dedicated Red Army attack, they`d be torn to shreds. And before you say "Winter War" or "Afghanistan", the post WWII Red Army was a different beast from its 1939. iteration, and it would not be a war against insurgencies.
Finalnd was a political buffer.
4 That would assume that other nations would actually come to her aid and not sit back and let her get overrun.
5 I have no idea what HoI is, and as we could see from OTL, intervention did not really deter a dedicated attack.
6 That`s debatable.
7 This is like saying that Napoleon`s victory at Austerlitz ultimately caused the restoration of the French Monarchy. I`d put that "technically correct" Futurama meme here, but this statement is too silly even for that.
1 Irrelevant, Poland was recreated as it was land that the Entente did not want to be under German or Russian control. It is therefore a buffer between the two. In 1919 it seems it would be strong enough, might not have been the greatest plan but guess what sometimes you only have weak ones to choose from.
2 The Entente did not care much about Poles when it wrote the ToV, it just wanted something that would reduce the threat of Germany/USSR by denying them the territory and resources. The belief was that Germany or the USSR would think that the cost/risk was too high of taking them. In part it was all a bluff but it was the best they could come up with given their constraints.
3. Finland was a buffer between NATO/Warsaw Pact, just look at the way military purchases were split between both sides and the agreements in place to ensure it favored both equally.
4 That was the part bluff and part assumption that nobody wanted either Germany/USSR to control Poland so they would act.
5 HoI is a wargame, its not to good at modelling some of the soft factors in my opinion.
6 Stalin insisted on attacking after the Germans because he feared it might be a trap to destroy the Red Army. There was a fear pre war that if Germany attacked Poland the Russians would wait till both were weakened and then attack to grab East Prussia as well as Poland.
7 Not quite , Poland was a buffer, that means its defense against a serious attack was always based on the threat of intervention causing the cost of conquering it to be seen as too high. The guarantees might have failed to do what the Entente/Allies hoped and prevent the attack, but they did up the potential cost as intended. Germany gambled it could pay the cost , it got it wrong. Poland in that regard did what the ToV intended, it acted as a tripwire, it was unfortunate the Germans were a lot better than expected and could crush it before FR/GB could capitalize on a 2 front war.
 
True, but they at least came from one empire and afaik Czechoslovak lands had not been seriously devastated by WWI or following wars and warlets.
Eastern Slovakia was devastated by Carpathian campiagn 1914/15. Again in 1918/ 19 Slovakia was fought over with Hungarians and then Red Hungarians. At one point Hungaruan Reds made it almost to Polish border in Eastern Slovakia in hope to link with Soviets. Slovak Red Republuc was created. Of course there were also limited Polish incursions into Spis region but these were just small episodes.
 
Apologies if this has come up before, I haven't read the whole thread.

In my view, with hindsight, the basic issue at Versailles was that Germany was going to be unhappy with any peace treaty predicated on it having lost the war as its public didn't accept that was what had happened.

Agreed. German attitudes were a given, and no conceivable treaty would have satisfied them.

It's not German attitudes that need changing but Allied ones. The treaty needs to be one that opinion in the victor powers sees as just, to the point where they are willing to maintain it by force if nec'y.


Germany would then seek to overturn any peace treaty likely to be imposed, and its long term ability to do so was clear. The exclusion of Russia from eastern Europe and destruction of Austria-Hungary meant that it was surrounded by weaker countries against which it had claims and which would not unite against it due to their claims against each other. So renewed conflict may well have been inevitable unless either the great war lasted longer (to occupy more of Germany to make it clear they had lost) or the peace treaty imposed no penalty on or claims against Germany (with the possible exception of Alsace Lorraione) and possibly also allowed Germany to incorporate the German speaking areas of Austria-Hungary, or the western allies remained united behind treaty enforcement.

Leaving them all German/populated areas adjacent tot heir borders might have helped. Certainly the 1939 occupation of (non-German) Prague provoked a reaction in a way that the demand for the Sudetenland did not. But given the general reluctance to face a second war, that is at best only a maybe.
 
Divide Germany along cultural lines.

Keep the AH Empire as some sort of Fereration. Otherwise carving out hard boundary lines in an empire formed by a mosaic of nations would only create conflict, oppression, and ethnic cleansing.
 
First the obvious things.

Germany looses the colonies like OTL.

Alsace-Lorraine is returned to France

My divergences -

* Anschluss will be forbidden in perpetuity, for both the German speaking populations of rump Austria and Czechoslovakia.
* The Saarland's coal mines will send 88% of their produce to France, but after 1929 this is deductable from the reparations to be paid to the French. Saarland remains German, but is included in the demilitarized Rhineland.
* Eupen Malmedy is retained by Germany, but Belgium receives higher reparations instead.
*Schleswig-Holstein will be kept united and unchanged, as Denmark failed to participate in the war.
*Danzig is made into a Free City like OTL, but will have referendum on rejoining Germany in 1925, while a port for Poland is constructed at Gdynia. In this transition period, Poland will have considerable say in Danzig.
* The Hultschiner territory ceded to Czechoslovakia will have a referendum to decide the allegiance of its people, to be held after the Upper Silesian referendum. If the outcome of the aforementioned treaty is Polish, and this territory would no longer share a connection with Germany, it becomes Czechoslovakian anyways. (No weird enclaves.)
*Upper Silesia will be winner-takes-all, one or the other will own the entirity of the territory, both sides will respect their respective ethnic minorities.
*The Memel territory will be administered by the LoN until 1921, when a referendum will be held, to choose between Lithuania and Germany.
*The town of Soldau and the surrounding settlements will be included into the East Prussian referendum.

* The German State and its successors accept guilt in accelerating and inciting tensions into the war that this treaty is designed to end. (Instead of full blame, as originally)
 
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