marathag
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The US had around 20 Army Divisions go thru the PTO during the whole war.
ETO, 42 Infantry,15 Armored and a couple Airborne.
You don't need a million man Army for the PTO
What might a US-Japanese war look like without a war in Europe?
- Thread starter NAF
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ETO, 42 Infantry,15 Armored and a couple Airborne.
You don't need a million man Army for the PTO
That will depend on the POD. Does the war occur in the 1930s? Or same as OTL December 7/8, 1941 but without Europe?
For 1930s wars, we have these scenarios.
There was a future war scenario of that published in 1925 and set in 1931:
Another POD is an American-Japanese War over the USS Panay incident.
alternate-timelines.com
In a early 1930s setting, the war would be stalemate. In a late 1930s, Japan has the advantage because they have five carriers. An incoming sixth was the Hiryu, launched in late 1937. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy mostly operated battleships and only had three carriers: USS Langley, Saratoga, and Ranger. The USS Yorktown was only commissioned in September 1937. Naval aviation was still seaplanes and biplanes. The Zero, P-40, and the TBD was not yet in service. The Two-Ocean Navy Act was not signed yet. The war might be a stalemate in Japan's favor especially if the USN is annihilated in the high seas of the Pacific. It won't end with a Japanese landing in Hawaii and California, but it would force the United States to somehow recognize Japanese dominance in the Far East. Possibly this will set the stage for a U.S.-Japan Cold War over the Pacific.
Now for the same scenario where conflict breaks out in December 1941, the scenario is different. The U.S. has more ships and planes this time. The TONA would have been signed. American ecnomic and industrial might would have tanked over the Japanese. Of course, we need a POD to somehow follow the same path where Japan still invades China and it is still embargoed by the United States.
For 1930s wars, we have these scenarios.
There was a future war scenario of that published in 1925 and set in 1931:
Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33: Bywater, Hector: 9781557095572: Amazon.com: Books
Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 [Bywater, Hector] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33
www.amazon.com
Another POD is an American-Japanese War over the USS Panay incident.
Panoply of Panay Possibilities | alternate-timelines.com
This thread is designed to consider a range of alternate outcomes for OTL’s Panay Incident of December 1937, when Japanese aircraft attack and sunk a US patrol boat, the USS Panay on the Yangtze
alternate-timelines.com
WI: The US goes to war over the Panay sinking
The USS Panay served in the Asiatic Fleet of the US Navy on the Yangszte River, protecting American nationals and property being threatened in the disturbances of Warlord Era China. In this capacity, she took part in the evacuation of American embassy staff from Nanking in December 1937. For...
www.alternatehistory.com
AHC/WI: USS Panay incident leads to war
Pretty much exactly what it says on the tin, what does it take for the USA to declare war on Japan in the aftermath of the Japanese sinking of the USS Panay during the Nanjing Massacre? Does the absence of a Pearl Harbor mean that the US is less unified around war, leading to a possibility of...
www.alternatehistory.com
In a early 1930s setting, the war would be stalemate. In a late 1930s, Japan has the advantage because they have five carriers. An incoming sixth was the Hiryu, launched in late 1937. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy mostly operated battleships and only had three carriers: USS Langley, Saratoga, and Ranger. The USS Yorktown was only commissioned in September 1937. Naval aviation was still seaplanes and biplanes. The Zero, P-40, and the TBD was not yet in service. The Two-Ocean Navy Act was not signed yet. The war might be a stalemate in Japan's favor especially if the USN is annihilated in the high seas of the Pacific. It won't end with a Japanese landing in Hawaii and California, but it would force the United States to somehow recognize Japanese dominance in the Far East. Possibly this will set the stage for a U.S.-Japan Cold War over the Pacific.
Now for the same scenario where conflict breaks out in December 1941, the scenario is different. The U.S. has more ships and planes this time. The TONA would have been signed. American ecnomic and industrial might would have tanked over the Japanese. Of course, we need a POD to somehow follow the same path where Japan still invades China and it is still embargoed by the United States.
So as I said we are moving into the land of multiple large PODs.
First no War in Europe
Second a radically different War with Japan.
The problem still is…. Getting the war to start but just between the US and Japan. And t hat is frankly all but impossible.
The US is not going to DOW Japan for anything short of Japan attacking the US/US Territory/US troops. And Japan views the US Pacific fleet and the US Pacific territories as a danger to Japan the truth is they have no reason to attack the US unless they start down a path similar to WW2. They need to start taking over Mainland Asia and thus get into arguments with the US. But this kind of action by Japan is going to upset the European powers that have territories in Asia.
So you are going to have a very hard time to find a way to get a war between the US and Japan that does not get GB and France involved as well.
First no War in Europe
Second a radically different War with Japan.
The problem still is…. Getting the war to start but just between the US and Japan. And t hat is frankly all but impossible.
The US is not going to DOW Japan for anything short of Japan attacking the US/US Territory/US troops. And Japan views the US Pacific fleet and the US Pacific territories as a danger to Japan the truth is they have no reason to attack the US unless they start down a path similar to WW2. They need to start taking over Mainland Asia and thus get into arguments with the US. But this kind of action by Japan is going to upset the European powers that have territories in Asia.
So you are going to have a very hard time to find a way to get a war between the US and Japan that does not get GB and France involved as well.
The US and Japan both expected any conflict to be primarily fought at sea and end in a negotiated peace. Generally both were distrustful of the other but not outright hostile. Assuming Japan acts rationally and doesn’t attack all of the undistracted colonial powers in the Pacific, this is likely going to be some scenario where the economic war accidentally goes hot, presumably somewhere in the late 30s or early 40s. A lack of American preparedness and access to at least some neutral shipping buys Japan a few inconclusive years to dig in. Japanese strategy was not ignorant to the fact that the US would overwhelm them in a protracted war, so they’d seek to negotiate sooner rather than later, possibly having a third party arbitrate. I’d expect any peace to be focused mostly on Japan’s position in China, with the Japanese pursuing acknowledge of their interests and influence and the US attempting to maintain their Open Door Policy. While I feel confident that the US is the better bet in this conflict, I think the outcome would depend heavily on how committed the American public is to the war and whether Japan is able to muster any international support.
All that said, it’s hard to imagine this conflict not expanding to include at least a few European nations. In OTL, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor because it incorrectly assumed the US would defend European colonial possessions in the Pacific and SEA, which were its real targets. Japan would have almost nothing to gain from fighting just the US.
All that said, it’s hard to imagine this conflict not expanding to include at least a few European nations. In OTL, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor because it incorrectly assumed the US would defend European colonial possessions in the Pacific and SEA, which were its real targets. Japan would have almost nothing to gain from fighting just the US.
Its 22. 6th ID entered combat June 44, 7ID May 43, Americal Oct 42 24th Dec 41 ( as it on Hawaii thereafter Jan 43) 25 ID Dec 41 as on HI then part Aug 42, 27th Nov 43, 31 Jul 44, 32nd Jul 42, 33rd sep 44. 37th jul 43, 38 Jul 44, 40 Apr 44 41 Jan 43, 43ID feb 43 ( but note part is on Guadalcanal part in NG) 77 may 43 but its first listed campaign is june 44, 81st Sept 44, 93rd March 44, 96 Oct 44 ,98 April 44, 11 AB may 44, 1st Cav July 43, Philippine Division Dec 4 - may 42
So yes with a start date for mobilitation around October 1940 by Jan Feb 43 you could deploy TTL start date Dec 41 so say Summer 44 the US would have a 8/9 Army nd may 2 Marine divisions divisions capable of at least administrative landings in small batches. Every unit outs HI and PI entering combat in 42 - 43 does so in the Solomons or New Guinea with at best very short hop and small scale landings against by then limited opposition with very limited air and naval support.
The lackof an ETO gives some more units but probably no more than 3 and
And this is basically the profile of the US deployment throughout WW2. A very limited force in q1-2 42, a jump in early 43 then another in q2-3 44 then another EO 44 and 45.
Without the the war in Europe though everything including most of the 42 units is shifted 18 + months downstream. Realistically some units could have been fielded TTL in 42 but at the expense of training cadre for later units which may be acceptable until you start planning Olympic.
Its not the absolute number of Units available that matters. its the number you can deploy and supply in the available terrain. The US took Tarawa with one Marine Div one Army RCT and an Army Bn.
And TTL in Summer 44 they would be able to do the same. But not a whole lot prior to that. 1st Marines going in in August 42 will just get obliterated after they land The USN has to retire 2,500 miles the IJN maybe 600. And that assume Makin is taken out.
I would tend to agree but the European 'price' is the US participates in collective security everywhere. Its possible the US makes another calculation and expects that the Europeans will follow along with US unilateral demands and they do not, and Japan lashes out.
This does not mean that in the phony war after the fall of the PI and before the US counterattack the Europeans dont turn Rabaul into a massive bomber base that makes truk untenable in the event of war and issue its own ultimatum based on Status Quo ante Marco Polo leaving div Chinese to fight amongst themselves. or for that matter that the Fleigende Tiger and their 109s dont cover themselves in glory in the defence of Chungking.
Stuff like the Panay Incident didn't trigger a war, so any incident would have to be pretty big. Some kind of skirmish spiralling out of control could lead to a war, which the US would win. The irony is that the Japanese thought PH would knock the Americans out quickly and win them the war, but instead they got destroyed. In a war caused by a smaller incident they're likely better off: in a conditional surrender Japan could probably keep South Sakhalin, Korea and Taiwan. From their point of view it'd be a loss, but compared to OTL a gain.
The Protective Mobilization Plan, the primary mobilization plan contemplated Bringing the Army & Air Corps to a maximum of 1.6 million men of approx 9-10 Regular Army & the 18 National Guard Divisions. Also to be mobilized were 60,000+ in the Reserve Officers Corps who were assigned as cadres for Army of the US d\formations. It was not expected all or any of those would remain as cadre for the AUS formation, as OTL they were redistributed to training commands, & Regular Army/National Guard formations to help bring those to full strength.
War Plan ORANGEs long time line & overall structure means the full PMP would not be required. I'd not even guess at this point what the War Department would recommend in those multiple possibilities. OTL the Central pacific offensive of 1943-45 was executed with hardly a dozen ground combat divisions. Perhaps half a million men including air and support services. Including training and support services in the US maybe another 300 to 400k out of the two million Army who remained in the US 1941-1945.
The difficulty with the 39 PMP though is manpower is not available.
On 10 May 1940 Morgenthau asks Marshall if its true that the US army could only field 75,000 fully equipped troops Marshall denies this as asserts that the true figure is 80,000. ( of a total manpower of 188k)
The Initial Protective force is supposed to be 240k Regular army and 400k NG. Fully equipped and deployed.
By Eo 1940 thats changed and the US army has around 620 k personnel - this is 3 months after selective service enacted so limited training.
Now I would agree that the force structure and probably the levels of conscription would be radically different, Although this may may mitigate against rapid moblisation as there would be a volunteer surge. That may in fact be enough for the ground ( and probably air) forces. For the navy well its going to be an issue on fleet size. Again may be enough.
The US army had an excellent mobilisation plan and industrial mobilisation plan but without money and manpower its just so much paper.