AHC/WI: USS Panay incident leads to war

[Arcavia]

Pretty much exactly what it says on the tin, what does it take for the USA to declare war on Japan in the aftermath of the Japanese sinking of the USS Panay during the Nanjing Massacre?

Does the absence of a Pearl Harbor mean that the US is less unified around war, leading to a possibility of a negotiated peace once it becomes obvious Japan will lose? Or does public outrage at the sinking and the treatment of civilians by the Japanese provoke similar levels of outrage?

Does the continued existence of the US Battleship fleet mean that more battles are decided by big guns, or do the Japanese have success early in the war sinking battleships by air power? What are the military/doctrinal consequences of this?

Does the USA ever enter into the European war? If not, can the UK and CCCP successfully defeat the Nazis, possibly with US aid?

Do the Soviets take advantage of the Japanese distraction with the USA to make inroads into Manchuria?

 

[Driftless]

Does the continued existence of the US Battleship fleet mean that more battles are decided by big guns, or do the Japanese have success early in the war sinking battleships by air power?

At some point, some months into this altered war, do we see an analog of the Force Z fight, only with both the US and Japanese battleship fleets trying to dodge the other sides torpedo, dive, and level bombers?

 

[Simon]

Pretty much exactly what it says on the tin, what does it take for the USA to declare war on Japan in the aftermath of the Japanese sinking of the USS Panay during the Nanjing Massacre?

There were a pair of news cameramen aboard the Panay during the attack, one of whom—Norman Alley—managed to record it on film. Apparently at the urging of Roosevelt and the State Department he removed some of the most extreme footage of the incident so as to not inflame American public opinion. Loughery111 in their timeline Thirty Extra Feet has Alley deciding not to cut—a possibly apocryphal—thirty feet of film which features the most outrageous footage and also publicise the Rape of Nanking as the point of divergence, tipping the US into war with Japan. I haven't actually read the timeline myself so I can't speak to its quality.

 

[David T]

The actual effect of the Panay incident in OTL was to strengthen isolationism in the US.

As David M. Kennedy writes in Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945, p. 402: "But the Panay was not to be a modern Maine, nor even a Lusitania. Its sinking produced a cry for withdrawal, not for war. 'We should learn that it is about time for us to mind our own business,' Texas Democrat Maury Maverick declared in the House. A few months later, a Fortune magazine poll showed that a majority of Americans favored getting the United States out of China altogether. When Japan tendered an official apology for the Panay incident and paid some $2 million in reparations, the crisis swiftly blew over.

"The principal residue of the Panay affair in Congress was not more bellicosity but more pacifism [citing the boost the incident gave to the proposed Ludlow Amendment]... https://books.google.com/books?id=UQlEq9GILRgC&pg=PR111

In view of the OTL reaction, I find it extremely unlikely that more "extreme" footage would have led to the US going to war. A more likely reaction would be, "yes, that was awful---so let's get out of China now."

 

[RightHoJeeves]

There's no incentive for either country to escalate the issue into a war since the US wants nothing to do with any conflicts in the Far East and the Japanese do not, at this stage, consider a war with the US to be desirable or necessary. Thus we had the quick diplomatic resolution of Japan apologizing and paying an indemnity.

 

[Arcavia]

There's no incentive for either country to escalate the issue into a war since the US wants nothing to do with any conflicts in the Far East and the Japanese do not, at this stage, consider a war with the US to be desirable or necessary. Thus we had the quick diplomatic resolution of Japan apologizing and paying an indemnity.

So what does it take for there to be a public outrage in the USA leading to war? I mean the Japanese did fire on a US Ship...there has to be a way for that in coordination with the Nanking atrocities to lead to war if the *right footage is produced and leaked.

 

[RightHoJeeves]

So what does it take for there to be a public outrage in the USA leading to war? I mean the Japanese did fire on a US Ship...there has to be a way for that in coordination with the Nanking atrocities to lead to war if the *right footage is produced and leaked.

Public opinion would become more unfavorable towards Japan if such footage became widely known but that doesn't change the overall perception in the United States that a war in China is none of our business and it isn't worth sending American boys across the Pacific to die for.

I think Pearl Harbor is an appropriate scale to use in determining how much provocation would be required to ignite American public opinion and firmly set it on prosecuting a war with Japan to the finish. The Panay incident simply doesn't meet that standard without something truly insane happening like the IJA capturing the crew and the diplomats aboard and using them for bayonet practice with the entire incident captured on film.

 

[hzn5pk]

What if butterflies for the Panay was to:
1.) Evaluate US warplanes in the Far East where American bases in Guam and Philpines were vulnerable to Japanese air attacks. - the result was to increase anti-air defence and increase land based air. Eventually leading to radar stations and training to occur.
2.) Understanding that Japanese shipping would be vulnerable leading to submarine and torpedo development. Basically, more testing was conducted on torpedos and some (not all) of the flaws were fixed before Dec 1941.
3.) Increased shipbuilding for the Pac fleet. - FDR would combine preparedness with more jobs to fight the depression.

The buildup starts in '38, intensifies in '40 after France falls and Japan takes Indochina.

All leads to confrontation.

A result of increased US buildup in the Pac may be an earlier Pear Harbor like decapitation strike.

Lets say that Pearl is still Dec 8, 1941.
Philpines is also surprised and aircraft is taken out on the ground.

Guam takes heed and responds to radar to defend itself and confront Japan on Saipan. Eventually Guam becomes a stalemate for Japan, as they cannot achieve air suppieriorty.

That and US subs make a bigger impact earlier in the war.

Japan still takes Philipines, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Java .... but fail to take Guam and Wake. They take the Gilberts, Bismark and Admiralty islands but cannot take the Solomon's due to being stuck with Guam and it draining resources along with US subs taking a toll.

Another nail in the coffin comes when Essex class carriers come into the picture 3 months ahead of OTL.

End result - Japan contained sooner, more light infantry divisions are tagged for Med. theatre. US/Brit able to put more troops in Italy, southern France, Hugo, and Greece

 

[Alanith]

So what does it take for there to be a public outrage in the USA leading to war? I mean the Japanese did fire on a US Ship...there has to be a way for that in coordination with the Nanking atrocities to lead to war if the *right footage is produced and leaked.

Well, having some IJA officers brazenly round up some of the survivors and be filmed having an impromptu decapitation contest couldn’t hurt.

 

[David T]

Well, having some IJA officers brazenly round up some of the survivors and be filmed having an impromptu decapitation contest couldn’t hurt.

Japan repudiates and punishes the officers, and as in OTL offers an apology and compensation. The Japanese didn't want a war with the US over China in 1937 any more than the US wanted a war with Japan at the time.

 

[Jellico]

At some point, some months into this altered war, do we see an analog of the Force Z fight, only with both the US and Japanese battleship fleets trying to dodge the other sides torpedo, dive, and level bombers?

I carefully consider the use of the word "hilarious" when imagining the above. There is no radar. Minimal on aircraft radio. Everyone is using at least one combat biplane. C&C is primitive, and I am not sure either side can cordinate more than two carrier loads at once.

OTOH this probably suits the Japanese more. I am not sure that the US had any hard counters to IJN cruiser/destroyer tactics.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

At some point, some months into this altered war, do we see an analog of the Force Z fight, only with both the US and Japanese battleship fleets trying to dodge the other sides torpedo, dive, and level bombers?

Not at "some months into". War Plan ORANGE was so deeply ingrained into the USN psyche you could have decapitated the entire upper echelons of Navy leadership, and still had nothing but WPO on the new leaders minds. From the 1920s or earlier the Navy had been testing over and over way to prosecute a naval war with Japan. The results of twenty+ years of fleet exercises and map games, were: 1. The fleet does not have the combat range to fight Japan without establishing substantial forward supply & refit bases across the Pacific. These will be built as part of a island hopping campaign methodically advancing westwards to the Marianas island and possibly to the Ryukus. 2. The superiority in size and capability established by the Washington Naval Treaty is not enough. 12-24 months building program should float new classes of capitol ships that can curbstomp the IJN. 3. Not enough was know about Japanese capabilities. 12-24 months of shipbuilding/preparation can be used to raid and take opportunities, thus giving the USN experience in fighting the Japanese.

This was all at the core of how the USN actually fought the war 1938-1945. The first tentative steps were in the early revival of naval warship construction in 1938. Planning and prepping for the new BB & CV classes in 1938/39 addressed # 2. The revival of landing craft design work, amphibious warfare training for the US Army, and expansion of the Marine Corps in 1939 was part of #1. #3 was reflected in the aggressive raiding and willingness to stalk and ambush Japanese operations in 1942.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... and I am not sure either side can cordinate more than two carrier loads at once.

...

I'm fairly sure no one was even trying.