A humiliated United States might not be inclined to invade and occupy Haiti, the Dominican Republic.
Possibly, although these two countries are in a whole other class of weak and unstable and defenseless compared to Spain.
Possibly less influence in Central America, or other countries being more competitive in that region.
Possibly, although the Central American republics are in a whole other class of weak and unstable and defenseless compared to Spain, or even Mexico under Porfirio. But, with losing to Spain, other powers may be less hesitant to compete or resist.
Possibly more reluctance to get involved in a European war at all.
Possibly, but 16 years is a long time in politics, and it depends if a consensus remains to slink in home and remain cautious, judging foreign adventure foolish entirely, and sticking with that view, for a whole generation, even while foreign commerce remains a nontrivial part of America's economy, or if for some or most of that time a spirit of correcting or fixing patently exposed weaknesses is the dominant mood, in a determination to "never again" be so embarrassed internationally.
Winning the war could be a stretch, but a better prepared Spanish military could have given the US some nasty surprises that could lead to Spanish keeping Cuba.
That's pretty much the same as winning the war for Spain, and for America, it is definitely losing the war.
Hawaii may not be annexed or its annexation might be delayed, depending on how they lose.
This is a good point to bring up - Per wiki:
The
Newlands Resolution, 30
Stat. 750, was a
joint resolution passed on July 7, 1898, by the
United States Congress to
annex the independent
Republic of Hawaii. In 1900, Congress created the
Territory of Hawaii.
In 1897, US President
William McKinley signed a treaty of annexation for the
Republic of Hawaii which lacked 2/3 support in the Senate and thus never went into effect. In April 1898, the United States went to war with Spain. The Republic of Hawaii decided not to support the war effort and declared its neutrality. According to Ralph S. Kuykendall, "The Hawaiian government threw aside its neutrality and did all it could to aid the Americans....Honolulu became a mid-ocean stopover for the United States troops that were sent across the Pacific to follow up Dewey's victory. The American soldiers were enthusiastically welcomed and given a taste of Hawaiian hospitality."
[1] Hawaii demonstrated its value as a naval base in wartime and the American colony on Hawaii won widespread American approval for its help.
[2] With the opposition weakened by its strategic importance, Hawaii was annexed by the Newlands Resolution, by way of Congressional-executive agreement method, which requires only a majority vote in both houses. Although the bill was authored by a Democrat, most of its support came from Republicans. It passed the house by a vote of 209 to 91; supporters included 182 Republicans. It passed the Senate by a two-thirds majority vote of 42–21. It was approved on July 4, 1898, and signed on July 7 by McKinley. Queen
Liliʻuokalani sent a letter of protest to the U.S. House of Representatives in attempt to return control of her homeland to native Hawaiians, stating her throne had been taken illegally.
[3] On August 12, 1898, a ceremony was held on the steps of
ʻIolani Palace to signify the official transfer of Hawaiian
state sovereignty to the United States. None of the Hawaiian leadership attended, nor did most Hawaiian natives follow boycott directives.
[4]
I think Hawaiian annexation under the alternate circumstances of *
losing* the Spanish-American War is a toss-up, not guaranteed to be
tossed out, not guaranteed to still happen either. In basic terms, the white planter leaders of the Hawaiian Republic would still want it, and figures in the McKinley Administration, supporters in Congress and the Navy and pro-Imperialist circles would still want it as much or more than OTL to hold on to a sense of power and potency amidst the failure against Spain. But many in the Congress and public, aside those concerned with the ethics or morality of the annexation, would be concern about the practicality and feasibility of holding down Hawaii without national naval and military overextension, especially with national naval and military prowess revealed to be less than advertised, just ninety miles off the shores of Florida.
Comparing the timing of the Hawaiian annexation with the war, McKinley clearly intended to do it the year *before* getting drawn into a war with Spain and when he did not want a war with Spain. He just did not have quite enough votes. So he would still want it I think unless he came to believe it too dangerous for the country. The Hawaiian Republic government, run by white American planters, either American born or Hawaiian born 2nd generation American immigrants, would be friendly toward American Pacific operations against Spain, no matter how well or poorly they do, so that won't change. OTL the Spanish-American War lasted from April 21st 1898 through December 10th 1898, so it overlapped with the successful passage of the Newlands annexation resolution, although the resolution passed four days after the last important naval battle in Cuba, and two months after the Manila Bay victory.
A potential complicating factor, especially if the US is doing as badly in the Pacific, failing at or around Manila Bay or Guam, as in the Caribbean or Cuba, is that *Japan*
might be re-emboldened to resume objections, voiced as recently as 1897, to US annexation of Hawaii. And the McKinley Administration would not want to risk taking on a second opponent, known by professionals and thinking politicians to be more formidable than the Spanish, despite its non-whiteness, while having difficulty with Spain. Japan had dispatched cruisers to Oahu before and could do so again, and could influence situations on the ground through the Japanese worker and merchant population, which could attempt to work with native Hawaiians for a monarchical restoration and an all-racial franchise to replace the white and property favoring franchise of the Planter's Republic that sought annexation to the USA.
Japan may not take any chances, but it might, and might get the best out of the brinkmanship game.
An interesting consequence is that Roosevelt may never become president, because he gained a lot of popular support from the war.
Yeah, he did, and he was able to enjoy popular support, because he came out of the war....alive...which might not happen here.
I agree with you except on the Philippines. At that time Madrid would have been open to get rid of it. It has very little value as Spain has no major commercial interests in Asia
Yeah, I am quite sure they will sell the Philippines to whoever gives the biggest offer. Probably either Germany or Japan, considering they were the ones who were actually interested. And Philippines sale will probably include the Pacific Islands, as well, as some kind of deal.
But would Spain really have been amenable to selling the Philippines to another power, or granting them independence, and would it have seen selling them as more honorable than granting them independence? Do we have any historical sources or historians' views on this?
and was already in open revolt by the time the war started
....and how attractive would a colony in revolt be to a prospective buyer? Now *they* have to pay the costs of putting down the rebellion to enjoy the benefits of the colony. I mean, the French *did* buy Corsica when it was in rebellion from Genoa, but the 1700s were a different time. The US also did give Spain compensatory payments for the Philippines, after deciding staying to govern and and guide the Filipinos, "civilize and Christianize them," and "prepare them for eventual self-government," was the only appropriate thing to do after smashing the Spanish at Manila Bay and hanging out for too long.
Of course, a more powerful, more coherent Spain might deter the US into just going after Mexico again.
Mexico wasn't exactly "easy meat" during the Porfiriato (1877-1910). It's economy was growing, especially the mining sector, the Diaz Administration locked down control of wealth extraction with his Army and the "Federales", and the Mexican Peso was usually more stable than the US dollar at the time, even though the country was super unequal and neglectful of the poor. And even when it broke out into revolution, 1911 and after, well, the US did find it easy to "intervene" and put military forces in and meddle, but very hard to accomplish anything or get anybody to do what it wanted. All the factions had toughened up and learned how to fight and evade pretty well.