That's counting all slaves, including those in states that never left the Union and those who fled the Confederacy during the war.
There was
429,000 slaves in the border states and
500,000 fled during the entirety of the Civil War, most in 1864-1865 from what I can gather. That leaves over 3,000,000 in the Confederacy, with an average price in 1860 of $800 that's still $2.4 Billion. The earlier the victory, the fewer runaways as well.
And continues to ignore that the same tax rates tolerated during the war would not be tolerated in peace.
Just like taxes decreased over the 20th Century in America? America in the Cold War is a useful example to compare to a victorious Confederacy.
You seem to have switched topics from the Confederate greybacks to the Confederate cotton bonds. The Wikipedia article on the Confederate dollar, the "greyback", shows that the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th series of greybacks were redeemable with interest between 6 months and 2 years after a peace treaty was signed. Combined that's roughly $400,000 in hard currency that the Confederacy is going to have to scrape up from nowhere or default on.
It was unclear as to what you were speaking of. Confederation taxation on cotton exports alone was able to bring in around $4 Million in 1861 despite the blockade.
As to the Confederate cotton bonds, individual Confederates owned cotton, but most of them did not have years of cotton stored up, otherwise there would have been a glut on the market at the end of the Civil War. A lot less cotton was grown during the war due to the need for food crops as well as major portions of the Confederate labor force fleeing to the Union or engaging in work slowdowns. Additionally, much of the store cotton was destroyed to keep it out of Union hands. Most importantly, the Confederate government did not own this cotton, they would have to obtain it by taxing their people.
You've answered your own question here; the reason there wasn't a glut is because it was destroyed over the course of the war and a looking at cotton prices shows this was being reflected in the prices. We're also not talking about individual Confederates, we're talking about the Confederate government which did have control over massive amounts of cotton. Hence, why I said the Red River campaign.
A 50% inflation rate is still ruinous, plus reducing the rate did not eliminate the economic damage already done by the earlier 700% inflation. Your own chart shows that after the Currency Reform, about 15 Confederate paper dollars were worth 1 dollar in hard currency.
Which is a goal post shift on your part because whether or not the 50% rate is ruinous is a different issue from the earlier claim about the Confederacy being unable to restore the situation. Matter of fact, that proves how easily they could fix it; they passed the Currency Reform in early 1864 and then on until September of 1864, despite Lee being forced into Richmond and the Sherman advancing on Atlanta, the inflation rate fell from 700% to just 50% and was still falling until Atlanta fell. The reason it quit decreasing is obvious: the war had turned decisively against the Confederacy.
The Currency Reform Act shows that, had the Confederacy won, it could've easily fixed this crisis. This also ignores that inflation only began to become an extremely serious issue going into 1863, meaning an earlier victory would see the situation largely fix itself in the event of peace.
The Confederacy was suffering Bread Riots in spring of 1863, long before war reached the Confederate heartland.
Which again does not suggest immense damage had been done to the economic underpinnings of the Confederacy. Indeed, why bread riots existed is quite easily explained when one knows that Pre-War Confederate society was largely agrarian and the Confederate Army was largely farmers; a shortage of labor led to a decrease in production. It does not mean the farms had been burned and the fields salted.
It got worse later, but only 2 years into the war many Confederates had been impoverished by inflation, their infrastructure was failing due to being overburdened by the war, many of their work force had run away, and the Confederate government had accumulated massive debts.
Issues that did not arise until 1863 and thereafter could've been fixed fairly easily as I've pointed out.
There's also the question of how does the Confederacy win the war that early? Where do they find a general so skilled he makes Robert E Lee looking like a bumbling incompetent?
They can win very easily with the Generals they've got. Lee, for instance, damn near destroyed Pope's Army of Virginia in August of 1862. That would've brought in Anglo-French intervention, ending the conflict.
Interesting. What is your source for this?
Juan Prim was holding some talks with the Americans in secret on the subject. Here's some discussion of it
here and
here.
Feel free to provide any evidence of the US attempting to annex Cuba
See above.
IOTL: Panama Canal.
or Canada after the US Civil War.
Annexation Bill of 1866 and the
suggestion by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to annex Canada as repayment for the Alabama Claims.
So Menken wrote a speculative article on what might have happened if the US had joined the Central Powers in WWI? I'd be interested in reading it.
Baltimore Evening Sun, Nov. 11, 1931, "A Bad Guess," H. L. Mencken
Most of England's appalling troubles today are due to a bad guess: she went into the war on the wrong side in 1914. The theory of her statesmen, in those days, was that, by joining France and Russia, she would give a death-blow to a dangerous rival, Germany, and so be free to run the world. But the scheme failed to work; moreover, it had unexpected and almost fatal results. Not only did Germany come out of the mess a dangerous rival still; France also became a rival, and a very formidable one. Worse, the United States was pumped up to immense proportions, and began to challenge England's control of the world's markets. The results are now visible: England has three competitors instead of one, and is steadily going downhill. If she had gone into the war on the German side she'd be in a much better situation today. The Germans would be grateful for the help and willing to pay for it (while the French are not); the French would be down and out, and hence unable to menace the peace of Europe; Germany would have Russia in Europe and there would be no Bolshevik [communist] nuisance; England would have all of Siberia and Central Asia, and there would be no Japanese threat and no Indian revolt; and the United States would still be a docile British colony, as it was in 1914. . . .
The United States made a similar mistake in 1917. Our real interests at the time were on the side of the Germans, whose general attitude of mind is far more American than that of any other people. If we had gone in on their side, England would be moribund today, and the dreadful job of pulling her down, which will now take us forty or filthy years, would be over. We'd have a free hand in the Pacific, and Germany would be running the whole [European] Continent like a house of correction. In return for our connivance there she'd be glad to give us whatever we wanted elsewhere. There would be no Bolshevism [communism] in Russia and no Fascism in Italy. Our debtors would all be able to pay us. The Japs would be docile, and we'd be reorganizing Canada and probably also Australia. But we succumbed to a college professor [Wilson] who read Matthew Arnold, just as the English succumbed to a gay old dog who couldn't bear to think of Prussian MP's shutting down the Paris night-clubs.
As for the mistake the Russians made, I leave it to history.