USSR Doesn't Drop Deep Battle.

The idea here is quite simple: whether through being better politically connected or being protected by someone else or even just luck, Mikhail Tukhachevskiy and Vladimir Triandafillov managed to survive the purges and more importantly, their Deep Battle Doctrine becomes adopted and the standard in the Soviet forces.

The most obvious butterfly here would be in WW2 where the Soviet army not only does much better against Finland but also when the Germans come to attack, the army isn't caught with their pants down but I was wondering what would be the overall effect this would have not only for the Soviet military but also the war in general?
 
And this plane crash wasn't like the plane crash that Prigozhin died in?
Airplanes in the 1930s were not particularly known for their safety, but I get your point.
Can't believe I forgot about that, would it be better if he remained dead or if Tukhachevskiy only remained the further refine the doctrine?
I’d just edit it personally to just say that Tukhachevsky and Triandafilov survived their untimely deaths or something like that.
 
Airplanes in the 1930s were not particularly known for their safety, but I get your point.

I’d just edit it personally to just say that Tukhachevsky and Triandafilov survived their untimely deaths or something like that.
Soviet aircraft has also always had a reputation for the aircraft being the equivalent of Russian Roullete with a semi auto handgun.
 
The idea here is quite simple: whether through being better politically connected or being protected by someone else or even just luck, Mikhail Tukhachevskiy and Vladimir Triandafillov managed to survive the purges and more importantly, their Deep Battle Doctrine becomes adopted and the standard in the Soviet forces.

The most obvious butterfly here would be in WW2 where the Soviet army not only does much better against Finland but also when the Germans come to attack, the army isn't caught with their pants down but I was wondering what would be the overall effect this would have not only for the Soviet military but also the war in general?

1. The attrition that degraded the Axis armies so much occurs faster. They are being pushed back into the Baltic region, Beylorus, & central Urkraine at the end of 1942. The Led Lease deliveries of 1943 are less necessary, freeing up cargo shipping for other fronts.

2. Emboldend the Anglo Americans plan a much more aggressive strategy for 1943. By mid 1943 the Axis alliance has fallen apart, German armies are in retreat, and the Anglo/ US alliance has invaded Europe at several points, secured ports, and is building up for a killer blow in 1944. At the end of 1943 the Luftwaffe is shattered, the skilled ground forces cadres of early war are largely gone and the survivors spread to thin across a mass of 19 y/o conscripts and aging reservists, the transportations system is collapsing, Partisans active everywhere, and the modern state of the art weapons are delivered in decreasing numbers while many formations make do with the leftovers of the defeated armies of 1939-1941.

In the summer or autumn of 1944 the Red Army crosses the Vistula and the western coalition armies cross the Rhine.
 
And this plane crash wasn't like the plane crash that Prigozhin died in?

Russian planes are not known from their safety. And probably in 1930's these were more unsafe globally than nowadays.

To OP: This would change warfare lot. Soviets would fare much better on Winter War, perhaps even with complete victory. This would change WW2.
 
Russian planes are not known from their safety. And probably in 1930's these were more unsafe globally than nowadays.

To OP: This would change warfare lot. Soviets would fare much better on Winter War, perhaps even with complete victory. This would change WW2.
To be fair, 1930s planes in general were not known for their safety.
 
To OP: This would change warfare lot. Soviets would fare much better on Winter War, perhaps even with complete victory. This would change WW2.
Especially as a major reason Hitler went through with Barbarossa and was confident of its success (aside from the obvious ideological reasons) was because the Red Army was seen as a paper tiger after what had happened in Finland.
 
The idea here is quite simple: whether through being better politically connected or being protected by someone else or even just luck, Mikhail Tukhachevskiy and Vladimir Triandafillov managed to survive the purges and more importantly, their Deep Battle Doctrine becomes adopted and the standard in the Soviet forces.
Deep Battle was never dropped in the first place. There was no doctrinal charge in the Soviet military as the result of the Purges. Everything remained as it was during and after it. Manuals weren't rewritten, general strategic posture didn't change, research and development remained on the same track.

This prevalent idea that somehow Purges changed Soviet military doctrine is quite literally unsubstantiated by anything.

The only one person who succeeded at cancelling a potential Soviet military doctrine was Tukhachevsky himself in his feud with Svechin.

So nothing would change as the result. Because Soviet military issues weren't doctrinal.
 
So nothing would change as the result. Because Soviet military issues weren't doctrinal.

Yeah the massive expansion of the Red Army in such a short time was a much greater issue, a "mechanised" division which doesn't have any trucks is going to ineffective regardless of doctrine. You could probably pull off something akin to @Carl Schwamberger's with the PoD of the Soviets being better prepared (within their means) for Barbarossa but I don't see how a change in doctrine or personnel allows the Soviet state to heed the numerous warnings that were there IOTL.
 
Exactly. The Soviets went into WW2 withs rather solid doctrine and even most of the material. What they lacked was the training and organization to make the potential of that doctrine and material into actuality.
 
Airplanes in the 1930s were not particularly known for their safety, but I get your point.

I’d just edit it personally to just say that Tukhachevsky and Triandafilov survived their untimely deaths or something like that.
I don't see why Tukhachevsky in particular surviving changes much, and I think it's really hard to make him survive. Even from the earliest days of the revolution, Tukhachevsky was noted as being not particularly favorable of it, and sources from both inside the Soviet government and from independent accounts before and after the revolution (notably during his arrest) paint the picture of a nationalist strongman, not a dedicated defender of the revolution: he anecdotally prayed to Perun when imprisoned, and less anecdotally had a history of flirting with right-wing nationalist political movements before and in the earlier days of the revolution: he believed Slavs were of a purer race than the rest of Europe, and when he shared a cell with Charles de Gaulle in WW1 de Gaulle later wrote in his diary that Tukhachevsky was a raving anti-Semite that blamed Jews for bringing Christianity and Marxism to Russia. It's very unlikely that he survives the purges, no matter who's put in charge of them; Yezhov, Yagoda, Beria, Kirov, Sverdlov, what-have-you. According to Remy Roure, he asked Tukhachevsky if he was a socialist and Tukhachevsky replied:

Socialist? Certainly not! What a need for classification you have! Besides, the great socialists are Jews and the socialist doctrine is a branch of universal christianity. I laugh at money, and whether the land is divided up or not is all one to me. The barbarians, my ancestors, lived in common, but they had chiefs. No, I detest socialists, Jews and Christians.
Even putting aside my biases, looking at his confession and his personal politics (as well as his active rivalry with members of the general staff like Voroshilov and his hatred of Stalin's economic policy---he hated balanced economics, and wanted to focus on military industrialism as much as possible) leads me to believe he was undeniably part of the conspiracy to overthrow the government: which did provably exist, as proven by letters between Trotsky and his son in 1937. I find it incredibly unlikely that Tukhachevsky survives the purges. His confession was almost the length of a full novel! It's hard to beat something that extensive out of somebody.

Even if he does survive, by time time WW2 rolls around Zhukov is largely everything Tukhachevsky is but better. Tukhachevsky's performance as a general was middling at best, and his overextension at the Kherzon line during the Polish-Soviet war led to one of the largest strategic failures for the Bolsheviks during the Civil War. I think the biggest blame for the USSR's poor performance goes to Marshal Grigory Kulik, who dismissed innovations in tanks and artillery and led the Red Army to unmitigated embarrassments in the Winter War and early days of WW2. This went as far as intentionally sabotaging and delaying the production of KV-1 and T-34 tanks, leading to only 12% having reliable ammunition in 1941: the vast majority had to be abandoned when they ran out of ammo. He also hated minefields, hated automatic small arms (he famously refused to give his troops PPsH-41 submachine guns), and ultimately ended his military career by letting Leningrad be encircled and put under siege.

You don't need an doctrinal change: you need an organizational change of the Red Army much sooner than the war's beginning. One of the biggest problems the Red Army had during the Winter War and in the early days of WW2 is that political commissars could exercise operational authority. You'd have to significantly limit the influence of commissars in the Red Army: perhaps limiting them solely to roles of oversight and ideological correctness, removing their operational authority.
 
Also most of the Soviet forces are destroyed, or crippled in the opening days while attempting to carry out their operational response so having an army to do anything is the main issue. The Soviets actually imposed very significant levels of attrition through 41 and early 42 with essentially a mass of semi trained proletarians. There was a whole other school of interwar thought that this was the way to go.

Then totally fucked up ( as in losing whole armies) when they attempted to do Deep Battle in 42 and 43. Which tends to lead credence to the idea that the RKKA was not able to carry out the concept due to lack of training.

You'd have to significantly limit the influence of commissars in the Red Army: perhaps limiting them solely to roles of oversight and ideological correctness, removing their operational authority.
Ah Bonapartism, this is why Commissars are necessary and must reach their arrest quotas Comrade.

Its easy to blame Kulik, mostly because he was proven wrong most of the time but how to deploy tanks is totally unclear pre war, and there is little to no information on how the mass of Panzer 1 and 2 defeat the French army unless you are a French POW or German. And everyone gets it wrong with their initial establishments of tank formations. Including the Germans, at least according to their Infantry Corps commanders who were demanding the break up of Panzer formation to provide protection to the helpless infantry in 41.

Its also easy to glorify Tukachevsky who as pointed out has a patchy record himself. His reputation recovers post war when the Soviet state is adopting military industrialism and a totally unbalanced economy and lo he is a supporter of this.
 
Even putting aside my biases, looking at his confession and his personal politics (as well as his active rivalry with members of the general staff like Voroshilov and his hatred of Stalin's economic policy---he hated balanced economics, and wanted to focus on military industrialism as much as possible) leads me to believe he was undeniably part of the conspiracy to overthrow the government: which did provably exist, as proven by letters between Trotsky and his son in 1937. I find it incredibly unlikely that Tukhachevsky survives the purges. His confession was almost the length of a full novel! It's hard to beat something that extensive out of somebody.
What?!
You think letters between two completely different people and a bogus confession which has a blood splatter on it is conclusive proof of some actual vast conspiracy?

And seriously, the length of a full novel? This looks like a full novel?

May_25_1937_Tukhachevsky_recognition.jpg


That's two paragraphs at most.

I can buy the argument that Tukhachevsky is overrated - and when most people talk about the loss to the USSR by his execution, they are really just using his name as a short-hand for the entire doctrinal development apparatus of the Soviet military who were also shot in those days - but to say he was actually engaged in a Trotskyist conspiracy reeks of tankie apologia.
 
but to say he was actually engaged in a Trotskyist conspiracy reeks of tankie apologia.
To be fair, everything I've heard about Trots (basically) amounts to "tankies who are livid they didn't get to be tankies" so. 乁⁠(⁠ ⁠•⁠_⁠•⁠ ⁠)⁠ㄏ
 
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