To my knowledge, most of the war plans made by both main camps of the cold war were defensive (one notable exception being "7 Days to the Rhine"), and both sides believed that the "big one" would come from the other side launching a major offensive in Europe. The "Fulda Gap" is a good example of this massive-invasion-from-the-enemy school of thought that pervaded much of NATO and the Warsaw Pact's thinking. With the power of hindsight we know that neither side really desired to perform such an attack against each other, with the circumstances of OTL.
How different would the Cold War have to have been for either side (or both) to give serious consideration for launching a major offensive against the other? If one side had discounted the idea of a conventional war and reduced their military spending, would NATO try for an Operation Barbarossa 2.0, or the Soviets pull a Red Alert? Would both sides have been against a war, regardless of an imbalance in conventional forces, as long as the friendly atom was in play? Would a lack of nuclear weapons have changed the calculus and emboldened the hardliners?
What were the conditions under which either NATO or the Warsaw Pact have said "we can win, let's go for it!"
How different would the Cold War have to have been for either side (or both) to give serious consideration for launching a major offensive against the other? If one side had discounted the idea of a conventional war and reduced their military spending, would NATO try for an Operation Barbarossa 2.0, or the Soviets pull a Red Alert? Would both sides have been against a war, regardless of an imbalance in conventional forces, as long as the friendly atom was in play? Would a lack of nuclear weapons have changed the calculus and emboldened the hardliners?
What were the conditions under which either NATO or the Warsaw Pact have said "we can win, let's go for it!"