Und der Zukunft zugewandt - an alternate history of the GDR

[Alexniko]

Chapter I - The Rise and Fall of Erich Honecker: 1971 to 1984​

The 8th party congress of the SED in 1971 proved to be a watershed event in the economic developent of the GDR, since it marked the end of the NÖSPL (,,Neues ökonomisches System der Planung und Leitung" - "New Economic System of Planning and Administrating"), the economic strategy adopted by the 6th party congress in 1963.

The underlying goals of NÖSPL had been to grant the individual enterprises more autonomy and to establish an efficient system of economic incentives. And in fact, during the first years of it's existence, the program had yielded very promising results. Between 1963 and 1970, the GDR's Gross Nation Product (GNP) grew by an annual average of 6%. At the 7th party congress in 1967, this system was further developed into the ÖSS (,,Ökonomisches System des Sozialismus" - "Economic System of Socialism"). Individual enterprises were given even more autonomy, the number of planning targets was drastically reduced and huge efforts were taken in order to overtake the west in the field of high technology (or in Ulbricht's words: ,,Überholen ohne Aufzuholen" - "Overtaking without Catching Up"). From the mid 1960s onwards, wages and pensions increased drastically. However in 1970, it became clear that the program was also responsible for serious economic difficulties. Skyrocketing investment in some key sectors (namely those of high technology) had caused investment rates in other sectors to drop, and in the end many enterprises failed to meet their planning targets. Shortages resulted and, combined with increased purchasing power, increasingly created a dangerous monetary overhang. Dissatisfaction spread amongst the populace and the efficiency of the ÖSS, every since a controversial topic in the party, began to be seriously questioned. Ulbricht remained stubborn though, and insisted on the continuation of the program. His friendly policy towards the FRG also caused a lot of dissent in the party. On 29th of March 1971, a group of dissatisfied Politburo members sent a secret letter to Leonid Brezhnev, basically asking for permission to replace Ulbricht. Brezhnev supported this proposal, and on May 3rd 1971, Ulbricht was forced to officially announce his resignation from the post of General Secretary of the SED (allthough he would remain Chairman of the Council of State untill his death two years later), ostensibly due to "old age". The Central Commitee elected Erich Honecker as his successor.

In this situation, between the 15th and 19th of June 1971, the 8th party congress of the SED took place. It was widely expected that this congress would mark a sharp turn in the field of economic policy, and these expectations proved to be right. The congress officially decided upon a new economic strategy, namely that of ,,Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik" ("Unity of Economic and Social Policy"). This strategy was a direct result of the problems that came up as a result of the ÖSS, it's main goal beeing for economic growth to parallel the actual rise of living standarts. In order to guarantee the economic growth neccessary to fund the planned social programs, the change from primarily extensive to intensive reproduction was tackled from the early 1970s onwards. At the same time, individual enterprises were allowed to keep direct control over more of their profits in order to make an efficient and decentralized rationalization of production processes possible.

Overall, it was expected that this strategy would strenghen the party's popular support, while also increasing labour morale and therefore productivity. As part of this strategy a number of programs were launched, the most ambitious of these perhaps beeing the housing program. In 1971, the party promised that three million news flat were to be built untill 1990 in order to finally solve the GDR's chronic housing shortage - a result from the devastation caused by WW2 and the mass immigration of people from Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia during the mid to late 1940s. Apart from that, subsidies on basic products were massively increased, to a point at which West Germans would travel to the GDR just to buy books en masse, which would be three to four times more expensive in the FRG. The "Unity of Economic and Social Policy" was largely successfull in increasing popular support during the 1970s, however labour moral actually decreased due to allmost total job security, aswell as lax controls and insufficient economic incentives. As a result productivity declined. However, this was not the only negative side effect of the strategy. The high costs of simultaneous economic inputs and far-reaching social programs increasingly had to be covered by foreign credits (imports of spare parts from the west proved to be especially costly). In the end, the "Unity of Economic and Social Policy" proved to be a failure as economic growth proved to be utterly insufficient to provide for these high expenditures. Foreign debt skyrocketed as a result. The underlying causes lay, for the most part, outside of the GDR's cotrol. The primary reason for the failure was the lack of a common economic strategy of the COMECON countries. Lofty dreams of socialist economic integration had long given way to a disempowerment of COMECON organs, which hurt the economic developent of all socialist nations. Another reason was the reduction of Soviet oil imports from the early 1980s onwards, begun under Brezhnev and continued under Andropov, Chernenko and eventually Gorbachev himself. Energy shortages caused interuptions in the production process and dealt serious damage to the allready stricken productivity. Last but not least, there was the escalating arms race from the late 1970s onwards, which forced the GDR to divert valuable ressources from the civilian to the military sector. All these factors combined caused the strategy's key goals to fall by the wayside and lead to a point at which debt repayment was the single most important expenditure of hard currency.

During the early to mid 1980s, it had become obvious that a new strategy was needed. However the state and party leadership faced a dilema. There were basically three ways to go on: 1.) Continue the strategy of "Unity of Economic and Social Policy", become increasingly more indebted to the west and eventually suffer bancruptcy. This way was completely unacceptable for it would lead to the collapse of the GDR's economy. 2.) Reduce the amount of inputs in order to safe money. However this would cause economic growth rates to decline even further, the technological disparity to the west to increase further, and at some point the party would innevitably be unable to afford the expensive social policies. This way was completely unacceptable aswell, for it would also lead to the collapse of the GDR's economy. 3.) Cut back the social policies - increase rents, reduce subsidies, and curb imports of consumer goods. In one rude word: austerity. This last way was the only one that could, in the long run, lead to the recovery of the economic situation, however it would be immensly unpopular with the people - it would have to be admited that the promises the party made could not be kept.

From 1983 onwards, with the events in Poland serving as a catalyst, the "Unity of Economic and Social Policy" would be criticized increasingly openly in the Central Commitee. Honecker rebuked all of it, stating that the strategy was and still is the way forward, depite temporary setbacks. However this was obviously false, and the majority of the Central Commitee recognized this fact. In the Politburo itself, a split became increasingly more visible (of course not to outside observers, the conflict was for the most part resolved behind closed doors). Günter Mittag, Joachim Hermann, and Hermann Axen backed Honecker, while Willi Stoph, Horst Sindermann, Horst Dohlus and Harry Tisch rallied around Egon Krenz, the newly elected Central Committee Secretary for Questions of Security, State and Law. Krenz increasingly became the face of the Central Commitee tendency that realized where the wind was blowing. On April 13th 1984, Krenz faction openly opposed Honecker in the Politburo and after a quick vote the later was removed from the post of General Secretary. The vote was not unanimous, with 14 votes for the removal and 7 against. 7 members of the Politburo abstained. At an extraordinary meeting of the Central Commitee three days later, Honecker officially anounce his resignation due to "reasons of health". Egon Krenz was unanimously elected as the new General Secretary of the SED. Ironically, Erich Honecker eventually lost power for the same reason he gained it: A failed economic policy.

 

[ComradeHuxley]

Nice to see a DDR timeline. So far its been mostly OTL until 1984 correct? Looking forward to see what Krenz can do with a few years of actual power.

 

[Alexniko]

Nice to see a DDR timeline. So far its been mostly OTL until 1984 correct? Looking forward to see what Krenz can do with a few years of actual power.

Thank you very much. Yes, it's OTL untill 1984.

 

[Alexniko]

Chapter II - The Early Krenz Years and the Adoption of the Strategy of "New Realism": 1984 to 1986​

Krenz' ascention to power was actually for the most part well received in Moscow. Honeckers policy towards the FRG had allways been a bit too friendly in the eyes of the Kremlin, and there had been fears of the GDR "drifting into the west's orbit". The day after his election to the post of General Secretary of the SED, Krenz got a personal call from the General Secretary of the CPSU and Chairman of the Council of State of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Chernenko. Chernenko gratulated Krenz, but also spoke quite frankly about how he and his party were hoping for the new East German administration to pursue a more "rational" foreign policy. On April 16th, Krenz flew to Moscow to meet with Chernenko personally. Talks went on for hours, but in essence Chernenko agreed to slightly increase oil exports to the GDR in return for a "freezing of inter-German relations". The Soviet Union was in dire straits economically, and the increase of valuable oil exports in this situation (even if only as a sign of goodwill) made it clear that Moscow wanted to avoid a situation in which inter-German relations could potentially become better than East German-Soviet relations, and badly so. Krenz agreed to abstain from going on an official state visit to the FRG, as Honecker had planned to do. He eventually left Moscow in a good mood, convinced that the USSR would support his administration and the measures neccessary to revitalize the economy. He only hoped that the people would do the same. Krenz actually had had a pretty close personal relationship with Honecker, and it had made him genuinely sad that things had to end like that. However he firmly believed the well-beeing of his country to be more important than a friendship, no matter how close.

There were still two years left to go untill the 11th party congress of the SED, therefore the most radical of the reform plans would have to wait. However the new administration allmost immediately began with the expulsion of remaining conservatives from the Central Commitee. Günter Mittag was relieved of his duties, and made manager of a coal mine near Suhl. Herman Axen was retired and an article was published in "New Germany" on April 9th in which General Secretary Krenz thanked him for his dutifull work (which was pretty ironic for those who knew about the reality in the party leadership). The new administration also began to prepare the populace for what was to come. The "Unity of Economic and Social Policy" was increasingly criticized in the media, and reports about the reality of the situation slowly started to appear (though all of them hastily emphasized that the reasons for the strategy's failure lay outside of the GDR's control). Yet, it was pretty clear to the reformers that policy changes could not be isolated to, or even begin in, the field of economics. A critical and honest societal discourse was neccessary if the people were to go by with the planned austerity measures. On September 2nd, the People's Chamber adopted a new media law, officially abolishing the censorship of the press. From September onwards the state began to approach local independent peace and environmentalist groups, proposing a dialogue between them and regional government representatives. On September 27th, Krenz publicly decleared that "an honest exchange between the socialist state and the various spontaneous intitiatives of the working masses is neccessary". This was the first time the GDR's party and state leadership had approached members of the opposition (it was in fact the first time that the party and state leadership had even recognized the existence of a legitimate opposition movement), and the local dialogues proved to be a pollitical bombshell. More and more groups cautiously accepted and in many places "joint resolutions" on environmental issues and issues of peace and disarmament were adopted. In November, an extraordinary party conference on the matter of defense policy and the posibility of unilateral disarmament was hosted in the Palace of the Republic in East Berlin. Truly shocking to the public, however, was the fact that some representatives of both the independent and state-sanctioned peace movement were invited as observers. In the end, the conference decided upon a reduction of military spending by 5% in 1986 and the reduction of NVA personal by 10.000 men untill 1990. Within the ranks of the party quite some people, especially amongst the conservatives, were aghast by Krenz' "virtual capitulation before the enemies of the state". However most within and outside of the SED were genuinely relieved that the "we and them" attitude towards spontanous movements of the people was slowly beeing overcome. Reformist elements in the party had long criticized the virtual suppression of individual initiatives, no matter how constructive they were (though such criticism was seldomly formulated in public). Either way, this new policy of dialogue certainly restored some of the lost confidence in the party.

These events took Moscow completely off guard and immediately sparked fears of Krenz turning out to be a "German Dubček". However at this point, Chernenko could allready hardly leave the Central Clinical Hospital in Moscow, and the reings of power had for the most part gone over to his deputy, a certain Michail Gorbachev who was a known reformist and openly lauded the SED's attempts to negotiate. Reactions from the other socialist countries were mixed. The press and many politicians in the west lauded these developements aswell, though with the ulterior motive of "softening" the socialist order in the GDR. The new and more open political climate also caused the other National Front organisations to slowly pursue a more independent course, though they would still for the most part follow the party's line. First instances of individual deputies of the local, and eventually even the higher, parliamentary bodies voting against the party's proposals took place. Gorbatchev would state in early 1989 that "Glasnost was first implemented not in the USSR, but in East Germany".

However the political opening had limits. Though the repression of independent organisations by the MfS (more commonly known as the "Stasi") was reduced to openly anti-communist groups, the paragraph 106 (,,Staatsdeindliche Hetze" - "Anti-State Propaganda") was still enforced regularly.

1985 would also see a number of new laws and legislations beeing passed. In March the People's Chamber established a constitutional court and in August a law on the democratization of state enterprises was passed, which would increase the influence of trade union commitees on production processes and management. These changes coincided with Gorbachevs rise to power in the Soviet Union and the first reforms in the cradle of world socialism. Demonstration and rallies became increasingly more common in the GDR from late 1985 and early 1986 onwards, though the Volkspolizei would make sure that no anti-communist slogans were shouted. As Krenz said in his new years interview with "New Germany" on January 1st 1986: "Though our people's newly found self-confidence is in any case commendable, we have to be cautious, for otherwise the general enthusiasm and the demand for change could easily be misused by reactionary elements for their own anti-democratic purposes. We will openly talk to all those who wish to make our country a better place, yet we will not tolerate those who wish to turn the clock back to a time of greatest human suffering".

At this point, austerity measures were slowly beeing implemented. Prices for many goods rose and shortages began to increase in frequency (goods that had allready been in short supply before, like spare parts, technical equipment and furniture, were even harder to get) . These measures didn't go unnoticed by the public, however the government quickly went to portray these measures as "neccesary sacrifices to balance out the state budged". Then, in April of 1986, at the 11th party congress of the SED, came the open break with the past administration. The "Unity of Economic and Social Policy" was officially abandoned in favour of a strategy called "New Realism". The strategy's key assumption was that, in order to get foreign debt under control and increase economic growth once again, a drastic reduction of social spending was neccessary. At the same time more effective economic incentives were to be created, while labour controls were to be tightened. This way, it was hoped, could productivity finally be increased by a notable margin.

The results of the party congress were obviously ill received by the populace. The Central Commitee received thousands of angry letters from all over the country, and there even was a demonstration in front of the Palace of the Republic. The press went on the offensive, all but every newspaper published articles justifying the strategy of "New Realism" as neccessary, and emphasizing over and over again that the current situation was mainly caused by factors outside the GDR's control.

Over the following months, the full extend of the austerity measures became visible. Prices for allmost everything rose, wages were frozen, rents and public transportation became more expensive, the housing program was canceled (allthough the envisaged construction of three million new flats wince 1971 had all but been archived by that point) and imports of foreign consumer goods were drastically cut back. Living standarts fell sharply as a result. Yet, large scale opposition to these measures was absent. Krenz and the party had successfully convinced most of the populace that these temporary hardships were neccessary in order to guarantee a bright and just socialist future (the absolute majority of the people was supportive of the socialist system). The opening of the political discourse helped massively to contain popular unrest. Despite all the hardships, people felt enfrenchised, people felt that their government cared for them even in these difficult times. Krenz personally contributed to this immage. On July 16th, he and his family officially left the government village of Wandlitz, and moved into a 40m² flat in Prenzlauer Berg. A few days later, pictures of him waiting in line in front of an HO store filled the headlines of not only the East German press. Krenz was increasingly regarded as a man of the people.

And as the year 1986 came to a close, the first positive results became visible. Per capita GDP had grown by 3.4%, and labour productivity had also increased by 1.2%. The countries overall foreign debt had actaully declined by 2.3 billion USD compared to 1985. It seemed as if everything was going to be all right once again very soon. However rapid changes in the USSR would swiftly squash these dreams.

 

[Sam R.]

Trading austerity for public domain bourgeois political freedoms is interesting. I mean trading workers democracy for the same is a Tank sentence, and also opposed to nomenklatura power. So basically this is the nomenklatura aligning with the progressive bourgeois internal opposition against the Soviet Union and working class. More Gomulka than Nagy.

 

[NoMommsen]

Can't help but to point to some ... IMHO 'inconsistencies' of your TL so far out of own experiences of some of the times depicted.

Well, generally the changes introduced/caused by this new Krenz-regime ...
The shortages of "consumer goods" ... stuff like spare-parts for cars, furniture, electric or electronic goods (radio, TY, etc.), building material for "home usage" (Tiles, building lime, bricks construction, lumber, etc., sometimes even nails and screws), textiles of every kind, ... tbh : nothing new maybe only a gradually change to OTL increasing 'black market' prices before as well as after the 'official' announcements. Otherwise everything WAS already IOTL short to nonexistant to get.

The shortage on living space ... well this WAS all the time of the GDR an extremly rare and asked for good and a rather basic good. Aside few people in rural areas and even fewer in urban ones almost everbody had to rely on state owned living space.Their distribution VERY much depending on your individual ... 'networking', membership in party organisations and esp. your records at the Normannenstreet (adress of Stasi headquarter and synonym for the whole domestic security organisation).
Reputational suicide for everyone publically withdrawing/cancelling whatever "efforts" to remedy this. It will NOT be forgotten by whatever propaganda stunt as the "small-flat-stunt" you depict what will be seen through regarded as such. Esp. since due to security reasons the whole building very likely will be quickly occup- ... erhm inahbited by Stasi-agents - openly or covered- and/or 150% party-followers. ... and be sure : everybody will know of throughout the whole GDR. There was a failry effective "bush-drums" system working.
Krenz : a man of the people ... only already before being believers would believe in this but not the general populace.
(Are you one of these Krenz adolaters still around ?)
Same might happen if your Krenz in TTL will increase food prieces. Shortages of ... well known to the people but price increases ... together with loan-shortenings - even if only compared to prices - another way to public reputational suicide in the GDR of the 2nd half of the 80ies.

The positive results you 'calculate' aside their debatebility would say nothing and be rendered as nothing by the populace well habited to official numbers being untrue and cheated for propaganda.


As I've already mentioned its adress ... what about the Ministry for State Security (MfS) in your TL ?
What happened to Erich Mielke ? You haven't mentioned him at all.
In the 2nd half of the 80ies there was kinda "place of the Republic"-incident a'la Tian'anmen 1989 well in the cards with Mielke at the helm of the MfS.

 

[Alexniko]

Well, generally the changes introduced/caused by this new Krenz-regime ...
The shortages of "consumer goods" ... stuff like spare-parts for cars, furniture, electric or electronic goods (radio, TY, etc.), building material for "home usage" (Tiles, building lime, bricks construction, lumber, etc., sometimes even nails and screws), textiles of every kind, ... tbh : nothing new maybe only a gradually change to OTL increasing 'black market' prices before as well as after the 'official' announcements.

You're absolutely right about that. I presumed this to be self-evident, though I should've explicetly mentioned it. I'll add a paragraph dealing with that.

Otherwise everything WAS already IOTL short to nonexistant to get.

That's a bit of an overstatement. Though many goods, especially industrial ones, were in short supply (a direct result of decreased oil imports from the Soviet Union beginning in the early 1980s), the supply of consumer goods was still way better than in, say, Spain or Greece. In the late 1980s, one in four East German citizens owned a personal car. The problem was that there was a heavy monetary overhang. Wages increased a lot faster than the supply of consumer goods did, leading to such famous instances as one having to wait for a personal car for 12 years.

The shortage on living space ... well this WAS all the time of the GDR an extremly rare and asked for good and a rather basic good. Aside few people in rural areas and even fewer in urban ones almost everbody had to rely on state owned living space.Their distribution VERY much depending on your individual ... 'networking', membership in party organisations and esp. your records at the Normannenstreet (adress of Stasi headquarter and synonym for the whole domestic security organisation). Reputational suicide for everyone publically withdrawing/cancelling whatever "efforts" to remedy this.

This was certainly true in some cases. However the degree of politicization of goods distribution depended heavily on the local party secretary.

It will NOT be forgotten by whatever propaganda stunt as the "small-flat-stunt" you depict what will be seen through regarded as such. Esp. since due to security reasons the whole building very likely will be quickly occup- ... erhm inahbited by Stasi-agents - openly or covered- and/or 150% party-followers. ... and be sure : everybody will know of throughout the whole GDR. There was a failry effective "bush-drums" system working.

Extensive personal security for leading politicians is very common all over the world.

Krenz : a man of the people ... only already before being believers would believe in this but not the general populace.
(Are you one of these Krenz adolaters still around ?)
Same might happen if your Krenz in TTL will increase food prieces. Shortages of ... well known to the people but price increases ... together with loan-shortenings - even if only compared to prices - another way to public reputational suicide in the GDR of the 2nd half of the 80ies.

Here, I disagree with you. Krenz certainly would've had a public immage very different form that of Honecker. By the late 1980s, Honecker had become pld and out of touch with reality. He refused to admit the existence of the country's acute problems and pretended that everything was all right. Krenz was different in OTL (just as he is in this TL). He was more honest and pragmatic when dealing with the country's problema, and this would give him a lot of sympathy point. The same is true for him living in a Plattenbau and standing in line like everybody else (if only for PR reasons). Furthermore, most East Germans did support the socialist system all the way untill mid to late 1989 (which is well documented).

As for me beeing a "Krenz adolator", well, I don't think that history is made by a bunch of "great men". Krenz was a spokesman of a tendency in the party in OTL. The same is true in this TL. Personally, I do think that his policies could've done a lot of good had they been implemented earlier.

The positive results you 'calculate' aside their debatebility would say nothing and be rendered as nothing by the populace well habited to official numbers being untrue and cheated for propaganda.

Don't get me wrong, there certainly is widespread dissatisfaction. However at this point, most people are convinced that sacrifices have to be made in order to retain the socialist system.

As I've already mentioned its adress ... what about the Ministry for State Security (MfS) in your TL ?
What happened to Erich Mielke ? You haven't mentioned him at all.
In the 2nd half of the 80ies there was kinda "place of the Republic"-incident a'la Tian'anmen 1989 well in the cards with Mielke at the helm of the MfS.

I'll talk about Mielke and the MfS in the next chapters.

 

[NoMommsen]

... Furthermore, most Esst Germans did support the socialist system all the way untill mid to late 1989 (which is well documented).

THAT documentation I would be very interested in. ...

... I'll talk about Mielke and the MfS in the next chapters.

... waiting with

 

[Alexniko]

THAT documentation I would be very interested in. ...

In 1964 the Central Committee of the SED founded an institute for opinion polling. Between 1964 and 1979 it carried out around 200 surveys among all classes, strata and other population groups in the GDR, and gave the secret results directly to the SED Politburo. The surveys took place mainly in VEB and LPG, but sometimes also in high schools and small-scale private enterprises. In order to guarantee the anonymity of the respondents, the surveys were only conducted in written form. The names of the individual respondents did not appear on the questionnaires, of course. Every year around ten to twelve surveys were carried out with 2.500 to 3.000 subjects each. The employees of the institute were strictly forbidden to influence the subjects in any way, as otherwise the result of the survey could lose its informative value [1]. The sole purpose of the surveys was to give the SED party leadership a realistic picture of the situation in the country. No state has an interest in lying to itself behind closed doors.

In a survey in May / June 1965, when asked "Which social order do you think the future belongs to in all of Germany?", 74.8% of those questioned answered with "The socialist social Order". 5.4% answered "The capitalist social order", while 3.6% answered the question with "Both". 16.2% did not provide any information. The result of the survey confirmed the cross-sectional survey in eight districts of May 1965, in which 78% of the subjects were of the opinion that the future belonged to the socialist order of society in all of Germany [2]. In the early summer of 1970, the following question was asked in a survey: "If you compare the social conditions in the two German states, which social conditions would you prefer?". 67.7% of the subjects answered "GDR", 6.9% answered "FRG", 21.6% answered "I cannot judge", and 3.8% gave no information [3]. When asked, "Do you believe that socialism will also win in West Germany?", 20.0% of those questioned answered in the same year with "Yes, I am quite sure", 31.4% with "I think so". 33.0% with "I doubt it", and 12.2% with "No, this will not happen". 3.4% gave no information [4].

Secret reports from the MfS to the party and state leadership also show that the majority of the population was generally positive about the state and socialism [5].

The Saxon longitudinal study, which is published almost annually, confirms this thesis. Especially the study results from the years 1987 to 1989 are of great interest - the study was of course carried out anonymously. In 1987, 88% of the young people surveyed agreed with the statement "I feel closely connected to the GDR as my socialist fatherland". Although the approval rate for this question fell to 74% in 1988 and 67% in 1989, it still shows that the majority of young people (in this case exemplarily for the population as a whole) supported the existence of the GDR as an independent country. Furthermore, 87% of the respondents agreed with the statement "The future belongs to socialism, despite temporary setbacks" in 1987. In 1988 the number fell to 79% and in 1989 to 63%. These results prove that, despite the falling approval rate, the majority of young people supported socialism as a social system [6].

I would also like to mention the result of the free and secret state elections in the Soviet Zone in 1946. In these elections, the SED won 47.5% of the votes in the area of the entire Soviet Zone. The CDU, which also supported the land reform in the Soviet Zone and advocated a planned economy, received 24.5% of the vote. This result proves that as early as 1946 the absolute majority of the population in the Soviet occupation zone was in favor of socialism, or at least a post-capitalist social order [7].

It can therefore be said with a fair degree of certainty that between 1946 and 1989 (with the possible exception of the years 1952/53) the vast majority of the population by and large supported the policies of the party and state leadership. Even the majority of the opposition (like the "New Forum" and "Democracy Now!") advocated for the reformation of socialism, not it's abolition.


• Sources: •

[1] Heinz Niemann: ,,Meinungsforschung in der DDR - Die geheimen Berichte des Instituts für Meinungsforschung an das Politbüro der SED".

[2] Ibid, p. 34.

[3] Ibid, p. 42.

[4] Ibid, p. 43.

[5] The list of reports in question is very long and covers the entire period between 1953 and 1989. Here are just a few searches from different decades: Bericht O/49, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 4119, Bl. 1–8. ; Bericht O/69a, BStU, MfS, ZAIG
4158, Bl. 42–48. ; Info Nr. 200/61, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 397, Bl. 13–63 (5. Expl.). ; Bericht O/101a, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 4152, Bl. 31–36.

[6] Saxon longitudinal study, 1987 to 1989.

[7] Jörg Roesler: ,,Geschichte der DDR".

 

[NoMommsen]

As Niemanns materials end in 1976 well before the time in question ... do you have a link or the german title of the "Saxon longitudinal study" to enable me to get a look or two at ?

edit 1 : found it
edit 2 : and found it another time

 

[Sam R.]

This result proves that as early as 1946 the absolute majority of the population in the Soviet occupation zone was in favor of socialism, or at least a post-capitalist social order

If only the SED has agreed with them.

 

[tukaram bhakt]

However the political opening had limits. Though the repression of independent organisations by the MfS (more commonly known as the "Stasi") was reduced to openly anti-communist groups,

I can sleep soundly at night with that!
Good to see an east german timeline, and one that appreciates that reform in the soviet union needs more than purely internal factors to succeed.
EDIT: after reading the last sentences...uhhh things will be interesting.
PS: when it comes to media ''liberalisation'', it's fun to see the media establishment become a mirror to what happens in our capitalist world, one that can actually work for the east long term.
No censorship at all, but the media always follows similar, slightly divergent lines.
Would be fun to see that happening in the volkskammer too.

 

[CHKeeley]

Looking forward to seeing how the GDR deals with liberalizing tendencies at the top and subsequent opposition from the state security organs, while at the same time needing to maintain these same security organs in order to keep the inevitable anti-GDR agitation to a minimum in the face of political reform!

 

[Alexniko]

A short author's Note: The policy changes implemented in the GDR in this TL are actually based on Krenz' OTL plans (as formulated in statements at the time aswell as his books). They are not products of my immagination. In OTL history would not give him the time to implement them, yet in this TL it does.

There were quite some people in the GDR leadership which were not completely out of touch with reality (ala Honecker). Krenz, Stoph, Sindermann, etc. However it took them untill the autumn of 1989 (when the crisis was allready severe) to act. The POD is these elements having the guts to oppose Honecker earlier (once it became obvious that the "Unity of Economic and Social Policy" has failed), leading to his downfall in 1984.

 

[Alexniko]

Chapter III - Initial Stabilisation and Eventual Breakdown: 1989 to 1992​

At first, the Soviet policies of Perestroika and Glasnost were overwhelmingly supported by both the SED's leadership and the rank and file members of the party. Many hoped for the eventual democratization of socialism and the elimination of it's distortions in the Soviet Union, and, as a result, in the other countries of the socialist camp aswell. However over the course of the late 1980s, the economic situation in the country of Lenin continued to worsen, a developement that affected the GDR aswell. Furthermore, doubts about the noble intentions of Gorbachev and his supporters arose as one key tenet of socialism after the other was thrown overboard. The USSR cut back aid to socialist countries and movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Instead of attempting to develope a common strategy aimed at overcoming the accute crisis that confronted the whole socialist camp, Gorbachev seemed to be primarily interested in developing good relations with the US and it's NATO allies. There was talk of "universal human interests" that were ostensibly more important than class interests. The systematic destruction of socialist property (like the 1987 "Law on State Enterprises" and the 1988 "Law on Cooperatives") increasingly made Gorbachev seem more like the wrecker of socialism than it's saviour. The situation in the other countries of the Eastern Bloc became more bleak by the day, with the events in Poland and Hungary in particular causing some serious headaches in East Berlin. The worsening economic situation and Gorbachev's endless speeches about the "historical mistakes" and "deformations" of socialism caused popular support for the local communist parties to virtually evaporate.

The GDR was an exception of this trend. During the late 1980s, the economic strategy of "New Realism" lead to a remarkable recovery of the economic situation. By 1989, foreign debt had declined to 12.6 billion USD and productivity had risen sharply. While shortages of even the most basic goods aswell as endless lines in front of stores became part of everyday life in the USSR, the first of the austerity measures were allready beeing reversed once again in the GDR, giving rise to hopes of a better tomorrow and further increasing the party's popular support. In 1987, far reaching efforts to reform the administrative system, meant to increase popular participation and transparency, while also reducing "management errors", were launched. After allegations of electoral fraud conducted by local state functionaries during the 1986 People's Chamber elections, a new electoral law was ratified in June of 1987. From now on, candidates for the parliamentary bodies (from the City Council all the way to the People's Chamber) were to be nominated not by the National Front, but by local voters' meetings (which ever since had the de-jure right to edit the National Fronts' proposals, a right that was in practice seldomly applied) in a non-partisan fashion. This had the effect of eliminating the established system of proportional class representation that had been in place ever since 1950, and de-jure seperated the organisations of the National Front (including the SED) from state power. In practical terms, however, many of the elected deputies were SED members, and it would take many more years for the practice of substitution to end in it's entirety. The new law also introduced mandatory secret voting. Slowly but surely, a participative-democratic culture developed and workers increasingly began to actually identify themselves with their "People's Property".

However other elements, reinforced by the overall collapse of the socialist camp, began to grow in strengh aswell. After fall of socialism in Hungary and Poland during the early months of 1989, the People's Police was increasingly forced to break up protests and assemblies due to their anti-communist character. Overall, society became increasingly polarized between the supporters and opponents of the socialist system (the former still constituting the clear majority). Fiery speeches by West German politicians didn't make things any better.

After Gorbachev's open rejection of the Bratislava Declaration, a rift between East Berlin and Moscow began to emerge. More and more often the words "Gorbachev" and "revisionism" would appear in the same sentence, first in private conversations, then in party debates and eventually even in the media. This shook East German society to the core, as the USSR had ever since been regarded as the "big brother of the socialist family". The slogan "learning from the Soviet Union means learning to win" had allways been a core tenet of party propaganda.

As Hungary opened it's borders to Austria, even the most optimistic members of the party realized that socialism in the GDR was in accute danger. The government swiftly closed the border to Hungary and heavily increased the hurdles of traveling abroad. This was met with outrage by both the western press and the anti-communist opposition in the GDR, however the party and state leadership managed to convince most of the populace that this action was absolutely neccessary if the socialist system was to remain in place between Oder and Elbe. Over the following months, the borders to Poland and Czechoslovakia were closed aswell. The upcoming society-wide debate about the question of the Berlin wall and the liberalization of personal-traffic was thus aprubtly ended.

As the new year began, the GDR found itself to be the only socialist country left in Eastern Europe (with the exception of the decaying USSR). As traditional supply chains broke down, the economy entered a period of free fall. Austerity measures were implemented once again and, over the course of 1990 and 1991, became harsher than ever before. Rationing began to emerge, at first only for some luxuries but very quickly for many basic goods aswell. Soon anything but the most basic neccesities was in short supply.

For the average East German, the world as he knew it had just collapsed over the course of mere two years. Everything broke down so quickly and so unexpectedly. In the prelude to the People's Chamber elections in August of that year, the anti-communist opposition attempted to nominate their own people in some areas, leading to the arrest of multiple would-be candidates. Newspapers and TV called upon the people to remain calm and to back the party in these trying times. This didn't prevent violent clashes between the security organs and anti-communist protestors during the autumn of 1991 however that lead to the arrest of hundreds of people. Krenz had a complicated relationship with the MfS and it's chief Erich Mielke, seeking to decrease it's powers and end the state penetration of people's personal lives, however he was increasingly forced to fall back on what was called " sword and shield of the party" by state propaganda. Plans to reform the security aparatus were postphoned.

Things only got worse after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of 1991. Political graffitis began to appear in the downtown areas of major cities, including Swastikas and Reichseagles. The crisis culminated in March of 1992, when Chairman of the Council of Ministers Willi Stoph was assasinated by neo-fascist terrorists. The assasination was widely covered in the media and there even was an official three-day period of mourning. The Murder, combined with the economic collapse of the former socialist countries due to what was called the "capitalist shock-therapy", caused the anti-communist opposition to slowly loose support however, and from 1992 onwards the political situation of the GDR began to stabilize. State propaganda heavily covered not only the evils of capitalism in the west, but in particular the horrible conditions in Poland and Russia that resulted from the abrupt transition from a planned economy to a market economy. To many, the shadow of mass unemployment was looming over Eastern Germany in the event of a transition to capitalism. "It'll be just like in Poland" was a common line of thought. And while the economy was still in shambles, at least the state had kept it's promise of full employment.

A question historians, and many ordinary people aswell, have asked themselves ever since 1990 is, why did socialism fall in the USSR and the other Eastern European countries, but survive in the GDR, this small dot in the middle of Europe with it's slightly over sixteen million inhabitants? The survival of socialism in Eastern Germany can for the most part be attributed to an intelligent media policy by the party, the increased enfrenchisement of the populace during the 1980s and an honest dialogue about societal perspectives between the leadership and the people. In the end, the GDR only survived because the majority of the people continued to support socialism as a system, despite all the hardships that obviously caused widespread dissatisfaction. Of course immages of western consumerism only furthered this dissatisfaction, however most people agreed whole-heartedly when Volker Braun wrote in "New Germany" on 11th of November 1992:

"PEOPLE'S PROPERTY PLUS DEMOCRACY, this has never been tried, nowhere in the world. This is what people will mean when they say: made in GDR. THE POWER OF DISPOSAL OF THE PRODUCERS". [1]









[1] This quote is taken from the actual article of Volker Braun, published in "New Germany" on 11th of November 1989.

 

[Sam R.]

"It'll be just like in Poland" wqs a common line of thought. And while the economy was still in shambles, at least the state had kept it's promise of full employment.

A serious line of thought. Can European Cuba survive? To sell ourselves better to the west than the west itself could demand: a real problem; a real possiblity.

Because 53 doesn't count. This is the Nagy or Gomulka or Dubcek moment: and the soviet tanks have evaporated. The population may even keep its desires for actual socialism under control when the look at Poland. The DDR will have a shortage of foreign correspondants to former fraternal states..

 

[Rajveer Naha]

The government is able to effectively shift any blame to Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. Now DDR has no backers and a turn towards capitalism slowly is their best bet. If carried out successfully they can become a capitalist democratic country with great welfare system and join the EU or stay in a relation like Norway. The collapse of the USSR erases any plans that the DDR had and a cheen sheet plan has to be made. If they join the Schengen area then practically Germany is united.

 

[Deleted member 143777]

IThe people support socialism so unless economic isolation takes too much of a toll (which. to be fair, is not unlikely) they will probably only be moving in the direction of more genuine/"complete" socialism.

 

[tukaram bhakt]

Trading austerity for public domain bourgeois political freedoms is interesting. I mean trading workers democracy for the same is a Tank sentence, and also opposed to nomenklatura power. So basically this is the nomenklatura aligning with the progressive bourgeois internal opposition against the Soviet Union and working claI'm not qualified to debate, but at least when it comes to media freedom, we see east german media becoming a fun mirror o

The government is able to effectively shift any blame to Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. Now DDR has no backers and a turn towards capitalism slowly is their best bet. If carried out successfully they can become a capitalist democratic country with great welfare system and join the EU or stay in a relation like Norway. The collapse of the USSR erases any plans that the DDR had and a cheen sheet plan has to be made. If they join the Schengen area then practically Germany is united.

Who's to know what will happen in russia and the east of europe with the DDR factor.
What will this inspire in latin america and africa, and in the communist strongholds in Kolkata and Kannur?
Some serious soul searching will happen all over the left, in a different way than otl.

 

[Sceonn]

Is this then a late Unification or a North Korean style holding out?