Lonely At the Top
Excerpt from Master of the House: Stalin in the 1950s by Konstantin Chernakov
Following the America nuclear attacks and the end of the Korean War Sino-Soviet relations entered a deep freeze. The first signs of a break came in June, when Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi traveled to Moscow to request aid. It was a disastrous meeting. Zhou and Liu asked that “in the name of Socialist fraternity” the Soviets give the Chinese a $50 million loan at 2% interest, as well as send more technical advisors and machinery. Upon hearing these demands Stalin reportedly told Liu “What you are asking for is nothing more than a handout.” Liu’s protests to the contrary only made Stalin angrier and angrier, until he finally left the room in a fit of rage. For the next two days the Chinese delegates were unable to get a meeting with anyone. “We spent our time playing xiangqi[1] and waiting for Stalin to call” Zhou later recalled. On the advice of several of his magnates Stalin eventually did meet with them, however he was only willing to offer $30 million at 5% interest. Zhou and Liu, recognizing that this was the best deal they could get, agreed. For Mao the agreement was nothing more than Stalin treating China like a colony. “We ask him to help us recover from a war we fought for him, and yet Stalin has the gall to call our requests a hand out!” Mao told Peng Duhai.
Ideologically the two nations had begun splitting as well. Mao had never seen the Soviet model of economic development, which emphasized the industrial workforce and building up heavy industry, as applicable in China. Instead Mao believed that only by mobilizing the peasantry would China achieve full Communism. On November 1st, 1954 Mao outlined this theory in an official editorial for People’s Daily, titled “From Chinese Socialism to Chinese Communism.” In it Mao declared “China is at the precipice of an enormous change. There are over 600 million Chinese, and through the mobilization of that 600 million we can surpass the UK in steel production within 20 years[2], end famine, and make the transition from Socialism to Communism.” Stalin was infuriated by such notions, which he saw as an attack on the Soviet model of economic development, and sent a telegram to Mao explaining that “You have made several practical and theoretical errors in your analysis.” It seems that Mao never responded to the telegram directly, but in December he had Liu Shaoqi published another article called “The Basic Principles of Mao Zedong Thought.” For Stalin the message was clear: Mao considered himself an equal and demanded respect. “We have another Tito on our hands” he told Malenkov. Stalin fired off a twenty page letter to the CCP, accusing the party of “Titoism, deviationism, and failure to be a vanguard of the Revolution.” For the next 5 months both dictators’ underlings sought to keep the split from worsening, but by that point neither Stalin nor Mao were willing to listen. Finally in April 1955 Stalin withdrew all of the Soviet technical advisors and the Soviet ambassador. He then announced that if China refused to fall in line they would be expelled from all international Communist organizations. On April 12th Mao responded by issuing the first public criticism of Stalin: a speech titled “The Political and Ideological Failures of Stalinism.” The delegates who heard it were stunned; Peng Duhai later wrote that “I could feel the hairs on the back of my neck stand up on end. We were now adrift without an anchor, a state with no friends.”
Excerpt from Ruthless Hegemon: Stalin’s Quest to Control the Communist World by Anne Applebaum
After the Sino-Soviet Split Stalin set out to destroy Mao. In the mind of the Soviet dictator Mao had become as dangerous a rival as Trotsky or Tito. According to Soviet propaganda Mao commanded a vast network within the USSR, whose agents launched missions of sabotage, assassination, and terrorism. The network (dubbed the “Maoist-Titoist Front”) even had its tentacles in the highest reaches of the Soviet government, counting amongst its members Lazar Kaganovich and Alexei Kosygin[3]. While in many ways this campaign was created to justify further purges, Stalin’s demonization of Mao was meant to harden hearts and justify any act he took to defeat the Chinese. It was fairly obvious that Stalin was preparing for a war with China. Several dozen divisions were moved to the East, where they participated in massive military exercises on the Sino-Soviet border. Soviet Special Forces sometimes crossed into China on raids, and Soviet planes flew into Chinese airspace frequently. The result was a series of border battles, like the ones fought between the Soviets and the Japanese in the 1930s, which resulted in both countries being brought to the brink of war.
Meanwhile Stalin sought to brink the Chinese to their knees through economic warfare. The Soviet Union was China’s largest trading partner, exporting $752 million worth of goods and importing about $573 million. The USSR was also China’s main source of oil, machine/factory parts, and other industrial goods, which Mao desperately needed to modernize China. In September the Soviets launched what became known in China as the Three Blows. The first blow was an oil embargo, the second was a series of tariffs (known as the Saburov Tariffs after Maksim Saburov, head of Gosplan), and the third was a massive increase in the price of machinery and steel. Together the Three Blows crippled the Chinese economy. Due to a US embargo and a shortage of foreign exchange the Chinese lacked a viable alternative to the Soviets for these goods. China’s industrial growth slowed to a crawl, and in some areas (for instance steel production) actually shrunk. However China’s agriculture sector wasn’t nearly as hard hit, with the 1955 harvest yielding 168 million tons of grain (a decrease of 2 million tons from the previous year). However experts recognized that future harvests were likely to be much poorer. Lack of oil forced many farms to abandon their tractors and combines, while without oil or imports from the USSR there would be far less fertilizer. Neither of these things were large parts of China’s agricultural sector (about 800,000 HPs of farm machinery and 240,000 tons of fertilizer were used in 1955), but the loss of both hurt farm productivity. Mao compounded the problem by ordering more grain shipped abroad, hoping to gain hard currency to buy machinery and build up the Chinese industry. He also began a collectivization campaign and a massive irrigation scheme to improve productivity. The result, of course, was one of the largest disasters in Chinese history.
[1] A Chinese game similar to chess
[2] Slightly more realistic than his OTL prediction of 15 years
[3] Both of whom were executed in September 1955 after a show trial.