I really thought that TVE-3 (La 3) would be a mix of generalist and folkloric programming approach.
What would happen again to Radio 5?
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TLIAW: Memorias de nuestros padres
- Thread starter Nanwe
- Start date
Most likely either not exist or simply a continuation of Radiocadena Española, itself built on the foundations of several old Francoist networks. Now there's something worth pursuing by anyone, even if it got de-commercialized, no matter what the TL.
One doubt. I'm having some trouble deciding on the name of the PCE after the end the Cold War, I've been thinking of Partido Democrático de la Izquierda (PDI), Partido de la Izquierda Democrática (PID) or something like that, but I feel it's too similar to the rebranding operation of the PCI. Any suggestions?
There's always aping Mexico from the late '80s in OTL, with first the FDN (Frente Democrático Nacional) for a time before it settled on the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática).
I like this. Might also suggest something like "Izquierda Progresista y Democrática" (if that's correct - I don't really speak Spanish) as a sort of halfway house.
Goldstein
Banned
Nice, but using "Progresistas" might be way too much for a party of recycled eurocommies. I like PID.
***
Extract from "Spanish Politics: An Introduction" by José María Domínguez Castro
Although traditional analyses of the UCD have tended to divide the UCD's left-wing between the social-democrats and the social-liberals, this division proves itself rather unwieldy and complicated to test. Social liberalism is already a hard ideology to define, and if the terminology is used in an ambiguous enough term it could incorporate the majority of the members of the liberal current of the party, like Celia Villalobos, as well as the social democrats, who are far more economically interventionist and more social progressive than the majority of their counterparts within the UCD. For this reason, this work tries instead to re-categorise this group into what shall de denominated as 'izquierda centrista' (1) and can be ascribed to the traditional faction of Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, later led by former Prime Minister Miguel Boyer as well as former Ministers Carlos Solchaga or Juan Antonio García Díez but also including important figures such as Pedro Solbes (2). Traditionally, their opponents within the party have termed this group the 'El Pais fan club', as the relationship between the newspaper's editorial line, economically liberal and socially progressive, is close to that espoused by this internal current.
It is important to mark the differences between the izquierda centrista and the socialist parties that exist in between the UCD and the former Communist Party, later renamed PID (3), namely the PS and the FPS. The left-wing of the UCD not only does it reject Marxism or any kind of Marxist inspiration for the policies it defends, but rather it seeks to justify them in the basis of social democracy, a nebulous term in Spanish democracy, where traditionally the social democratic parties employ the term 'socialist' instead. Economically speaking, the izquierda centrista does propose a more interventionist, or at least more socially aware policy, clamouring for the universality of the welfare state - such as the creation of a NHS-style health care system, or a reform of Social Security - although without rejecting policies that introduce further labour market flexibility to deal with Spain's high levels of structural unemployment. In this regard, however, the policies of this faction are not so different from those of the left-wing of the Christian-democratic current, namely the Christian left, spiritual descendant of Manuel Giménez Fernández's Izquierda Democrática and currently led by Javier Rupérez. However, the major difference between this group is the socially progressive line characteristic of this tendency, and best exemplified by its energetic and loud defence of a more liberal divorce law in 1981 and for its campaigns throughout the 80s for the party to decide in favour of legalising abortion in limited occasions, as opposed to the party's line during the decade (4).
Within the party itself, the social democrats have tended to particularly antagonise the Christian democratic wing and are the 'natural' supporters (or rather, the other way around these days) of the Suarists and have tended to receive the support of certain elements within the centrists and also from certain elements of the other various families depending on the issues at hand. Most interestingly, the social democrats, during the majority of the 80s and 90s controlled two key ministries as if it were their faction's patrimony: the Ministry of Economy, with a series of successive ministers who introduced the modern fiscal system during the 80s and set down the framework for the financing of the autonomous regions, and the Ministry of Education where it played a leading role in defining and shaping Spain's education system, with the passage of the LAU (5), the LOECE (6) and successive laws ever since. More importantly for the UCD as a whole, the social democrats have tended to serve as the bridge the party and the various parties to its left and has helped to build up a series of transversal pacts with the post-Communist PID.
The Christian democratic wing has traditionally been the strongest within the party, at least in terms of size and has also been the one most opposed to the Suarist schemes. But precisely because of its strength, it has also been the most divided of the various factions composing the UCD. On rare occasions, like it happened with the so-called 'jóvenes turcos', some of the inner conflicts within the faction have resulted in the creation of new factions, and in this particular example, in the core of the modern-day liberal conservatives. As previously mentioned in this work, the Christian democrats can be divided into two main sections, a more right-wing faction, associated with the followers of Óscar Alzaga or Jaime Mayor Oreja (and previously Álvarez de Miranda) and the more left-wing faction, with such members as Íñigo Cavero or Javier Rupérez. Besides them are there a few independent personalities, such as José María García-Margallo or Miguel Herrero de Miñón, who has traditionally tread the line between the Christian-democrats and the liberals (7).
The faction is primarily characterised by its social conservatism, perhaps best exemplified by its refusal to permit what it describes as 'excessive state overview' over religious schools and having a close-knit relation to the Church and the ecclesiastical world in general. However, and much in line with the Italian and German political Catholicism doctrines, it has put it traditionally at odds with the neo-liberal economic policies of other factions of the party, usually characterised as to its left (8).
In its attempt to create an alliance with parties to the right of the UCD to represent a so-called 'natural majority', although without going as far as claiming to represent 'sociological Francoism', the faction has traditionally been very hostile to opening to the party to the left or with deals with the Communists beyond some key and unavoidable pactos de Estado.
Although traditional analyses of the UCD have tended to divide the UCD's left-wing between the social-democrats and the social-liberals, this division proves itself rather unwieldy and complicated to test. Social liberalism is already a hard ideology to define, and if the terminology is used in an ambiguous enough term it could incorporate the majority of the members of the liberal current of the party, like Celia Villalobos, as well as the social democrats, who are far more economically interventionist and more social progressive than the majority of their counterparts within the UCD. For this reason, this work tries instead to re-categorise this group into what shall de denominated as 'izquierda centrista' (1) and can be ascribed to the traditional faction of Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, later led by former Prime Minister Miguel Boyer as well as former Ministers Carlos Solchaga or Juan Antonio García Díez but also including important figures such as Pedro Solbes (2). Traditionally, their opponents within the party have termed this group the 'El Pais fan club', as the relationship between the newspaper's editorial line, economically liberal and socially progressive, is close to that espoused by this internal current.
It is important to mark the differences between the izquierda centrista and the socialist parties that exist in between the UCD and the former Communist Party, later renamed PID (3), namely the PS and the FPS. The left-wing of the UCD not only does it reject Marxism or any kind of Marxist inspiration for the policies it defends, but rather it seeks to justify them in the basis of social democracy, a nebulous term in Spanish democracy, where traditionally the social democratic parties employ the term 'socialist' instead. Economically speaking, the izquierda centrista does propose a more interventionist, or at least more socially aware policy, clamouring for the universality of the welfare state - such as the creation of a NHS-style health care system, or a reform of Social Security - although without rejecting policies that introduce further labour market flexibility to deal with Spain's high levels of structural unemployment. In this regard, however, the policies of this faction are not so different from those of the left-wing of the Christian-democratic current, namely the Christian left, spiritual descendant of Manuel Giménez Fernández's Izquierda Democrática and currently led by Javier Rupérez. However, the major difference between this group is the socially progressive line characteristic of this tendency, and best exemplified by its energetic and loud defence of a more liberal divorce law in 1981 and for its campaigns throughout the 80s for the party to decide in favour of legalising abortion in limited occasions, as opposed to the party's line during the decade (4).
Within the party itself, the social democrats have tended to particularly antagonise the Christian democratic wing and are the 'natural' supporters (or rather, the other way around these days) of the Suarists and have tended to receive the support of certain elements within the centrists and also from certain elements of the other various families depending on the issues at hand. Most interestingly, the social democrats, during the majority of the 80s and 90s controlled two key ministries as if it were their faction's patrimony: the Ministry of Economy, with a series of successive ministers who introduced the modern fiscal system during the 80s and set down the framework for the financing of the autonomous regions, and the Ministry of Education where it played a leading role in defining and shaping Spain's education system, with the passage of the LAU (5), the LOECE (6) and successive laws ever since. More importantly for the UCD as a whole, the social democrats have tended to serve as the bridge the party and the various parties to its left and has helped to build up a series of transversal pacts with the post-Communist PID.
[...]
The Christian democratic wing has traditionally been the strongest within the party, at least in terms of size and has also been the one most opposed to the Suarist schemes. But precisely because of its strength, it has also been the most divided of the various factions composing the UCD. On rare occasions, like it happened with the so-called 'jóvenes turcos', some of the inner conflicts within the faction have resulted in the creation of new factions, and in this particular example, in the core of the modern-day liberal conservatives. As previously mentioned in this work, the Christian democrats can be divided into two main sections, a more right-wing faction, associated with the followers of Óscar Alzaga or Jaime Mayor Oreja (and previously Álvarez de Miranda) and the more left-wing faction, with such members as Íñigo Cavero or Javier Rupérez. Besides them are there a few independent personalities, such as José María García-Margallo or Miguel Herrero de Miñón, who has traditionally tread the line between the Christian-democrats and the liberals (7).
The faction is primarily characterised by its social conservatism, perhaps best exemplified by its refusal to permit what it describes as 'excessive state overview' over religious schools and having a close-knit relation to the Church and the ecclesiastical world in general. However, and much in line with the Italian and German political Catholicism doctrines, it has put it traditionally at odds with the neo-liberal economic policies of other factions of the party, usually characterised as to its left (8).
In its attempt to create an alliance with parties to the right of the UCD to represent a so-called 'natural majority', although without going as far as claiming to represent 'sociological Francoism', the faction has traditionally been very hostile to opening to the party to the left or with deals with the Communists beyond some key and unavoidable pactos de Estado.
Notes:
(1) That is, "centrist left-wing". Yes it is an oxymoron if you think about it. But the UCD' adjective was 'centrista', not 'ucedetista', which let's be honest sounds bad.
(2) Has anyone else noticed the pattern here?
(3) I think I'll stick to that for now. While including progressive is perhaps too much (although there was a Federación Progresista within IU back in the day), I feel that using the term socialism would be too complicated. It'd be hard for the former Communists to brand themselves in a world with at least two socialist parties in the national scene, not to mention regionally.
(4) Which, based on the 1982 programme was that they supported family planning centres, but did not mention abortion itself. Basically in-definition to make everyone equally unhappy.
(5) Ley de la Autonomía Universitaria. More to come.
(6) Ley Orgánica por la que se regula el Estatuto de Centros Escolares.
(7) This is, much like OTL, because Herrero de Miñon has a extremely particular, for the Spanish right-wing, vision of Spain as a plurinational entity, even open to self-determination. He's such a special snowflake of Spanish politics.
(8) This is the main reason, btw, why the PDP broke with Alianza Popular in 1986. They said it had been a grave mistake for Christian democrats to ally with conservatives. Yes, that was the world of the Spanish right-wing before Aznar came and changed everything.
(2) Has anyone else noticed the pattern here?
(3) I think I'll stick to that for now. While including progressive is perhaps too much (although there was a Federación Progresista within IU back in the day), I feel that using the term socialism would be too complicated. It'd be hard for the former Communists to brand themselves in a world with at least two socialist parties in the national scene, not to mention regionally.
(4) Which, based on the 1982 programme was that they supported family planning centres, but did not mention abortion itself. Basically in-definition to make everyone equally unhappy.
(5) Ley de la Autonomía Universitaria. More to come.
(6) Ley Orgánica por la que se regula el Estatuto de Centros Escolares.
(7) This is, much like OTL, because Herrero de Miñon has a extremely particular, for the Spanish right-wing, vision of Spain as a plurinational entity, even open to self-determination. He's such a special snowflake of Spanish politics.
(8) This is the main reason, btw, why the PDP broke with Alianza Popular in 1986. They said it had been a grave mistake for Christian democrats to ally with conservatives. Yes, that was the world of the Spanish right-wing before Aznar came and changed everything.
Goldstein
Banned
Wait, wait, wait, wait a minute. Does that mean that there's no Sistema Nacional de Salud ITTL?
I'll reread it again and I'll comment it again, but...
Prime Minister Miguel Boyer?
Prime Minister Miguel Boyer?
There is universal healthcare, but it evolves in a more Franco-German basis, with an insurance-centred system (as Spain had until 1985 or so iirc), although the governments of the UCD are going to expands oversight, expenditure to improve and widen the state coverage, perhaps with something close to what Jospin implemented in 2000. So basically, quite close to the French system, which I think fits better the ideological frame of the UCD. What these ppl and the socialists (and post-communists) want is a British-like Beveridge model.
That being said, I haven't researched this much, so I am more than happy to change it.
I'll reread it again and I'll comment it again, but...
Prime Minister Miguel Boyer?
Yes, he always had presidential ambitions OTL prior to meeting la Preysler. And OTL he worked for Fernandez Ordoñez in the INI before 1975 so with a PS that simply is not important enough, I can easily see him following the steps of his mentor (same for Solchaga).
Yes, I know that, but I don't think he had any presidential stuff, that is, unless my memory had forgotten him somehow, he lacked charisma and something else to be "presidenciable".
Anyway, your butterflies may had managed to changed him more that I can imagine.
De cainismo y divorcios
Most historians can agree on one particular facet of Suárez's political personality: That there were three political personae: Suárez, the magician who turned Spain into a democracy through the same laws of the dictatorship which it abolished without causing a coup (1976-78), unable Suárez, who couldn't work in the parliamentary setting nor fix the economy (79-81) and the Suárez of the post-premiership days, who returned to his original persona, charming and persuading, but instead from within UCD but outside of Government. It is not quite clear how Suárez, the magician became Suárez, the unable Prime Minister, what is clear however, is that in 1979, Suárez, if personally popular (1), was unable to reign in his party's conflicts, was absent from Parliament and when he was present, he was clearly uncomfortable and he seemed out of place in dealing with the economic crisis and the accelerating process of regional devolution. In short, there is a certain consensus that Suárez was well fitted for operating within the byzantine politics of the dictatorships, but less capable for the kind of politics demanded by a parliamentary system. As a result, Suárez became increasingly isolated in Moncloa, close to a small group of close friends and members of his current within the party, and increasingly distant from the rest of the party, which permitted the development of a 'critical' current that brought together those who sought a different, less personalised party.
The problems started already following the local elections of 1979, the traditional social institutions (Army, Church, the employers) were unhappy about an electoral system that permitted the left to control the main cities of the country and personally blamed Suárez for it. Chiefly though, it was the employers that deeply disliked Suárez, and through the CEOE they would seek to undermined the position of someone they saw as dangerously open to left-wing ideas (2), such as the nationalisation of the banks in case they proved unable to provide credit. This already energised the critics within the party, who sought to give the UCD a more clear ideological profile, in particular the liberals and the Christian democrats within the party. Furthermore, the economic situation remained very worrying, with high inflation (if lower than before 1977) and rising unemployment in the aftershock of the 1979 oil crisis when Spain was yet to recover from the 1973 one, which affected Spain late, but rather forcefully anyway. To add to the mounting conflicts within the various factions, there was the factor of the drafting of various of pieces of legislation that aroused great internal conflict in the party, like the Ley de Autonomía Universitaria, which sought to modernise the structures of the Spanish university, which in the period 1960-80 had quintupled in size, and especially the Divorce Law. Drafted by the Christian democrats following a gentleman's agreement between Suárez and the Cardinal Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, Archbishop of Madrid and which angered a large number of social democrats within the party (not to mention the socialists or the Communists) for its perceived conservatism compared to the Second Republic's legislation on the same topic. Suárez had also taken decisions that did sit well with the -very Atlanticist - party's right-wing, such as rejecting NATO membership, the continuance of the Islero project or the approximation of the country's foreign policy to the Non-Aligned Movement.
In this already difficult environment, Suárez seemed to become more and more distant from everyone, firstly from Parliament where he rarely attended and which strained the relationship between the party's apparatus, the Government and the parliamentary party. But the Prime Minister's isolation jst got worse when he dismissed Fernando Abril Martorell, one of the key men of the UCD and personal friend of Suárez from his time as civil governor of Segovia.
The situation only worsened in 1980. The economic and political malaise continued. The internal struggles within the Government's party were reported daily by the main national press, and a feeling of alienation from the institutions amongst the common person was felt among the political and intellectual classes, which worried about its consequences. As it turns out, the most shocking thing to happen on that year within Spain would be the vote held by the UCD's parliamentary party in October. In it, there were two main candidates to become the new party's Congress spokesperson, Santiago Rodríguez-Miranda (3), supported by Suárez and his current, some azules and the social democrats, and Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, member of the party's right and supported by the liberals, the Christian democrats as well as parts of the azules. The result was a tremendous defeat for the President, whose candidate only received the support of a third of the parliamentarians. (4) This was particularly worrying as the party's Second Congress was to held in Palma de Mallorca in February of 1981.
In order to stop the fighting within the party and to try and calm down the various party leaders after its important defeat within the party (5). This was the final part of Suárez's abandonment of the conception of the UCD as a party to support him in his task of governing. Suárez would summon the party's Political Council, one of its two main executive bodies and tried to strike a deal with the main faction leaders that opposed him: He was to offer them what they sought within the party, the use of open lists and internal democracy in determining the lists and the party's apparatus (6) in exchange for their support of the Government in the future delicate bills to be passed until the end of the legislature.
As it turns out, the barones accepted the deal, but failed to deliver. With such a reduced authority within the party, Suárez began to ponder the idea of resigning, in order to further his own faction and party's stability (by removing himself) from the political scene before the Congress. This was a smart move, although the party leadership was, broadly speaking, contrary to Suárez's authoritarian management of the party and the Government, the party's card-carrying members were largely faithful. For the same reasons, Suárez sough to designate a successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo.
Calvo Sotelo was everything Suárez was not and viceversa. Calvo Sotelo was the patrician and grey scion of a great Madrilenian family with political pedigree dating back to the 19th century, spoke French (and some English) and lacked any kind of charisma or telegenic quality (7). Furthermore he was a low-key figure, if also Deputy Prime Minister, and would not arouse strong reactions within the party. However, the press -and especially El Pais - saw in him the first step of the rightwards shift of the UCD. As Prime Minister, he would prove, instead, far more able than most anticipated (8).
The problems started already following the local elections of 1979, the traditional social institutions (Army, Church, the employers) were unhappy about an electoral system that permitted the left to control the main cities of the country and personally blamed Suárez for it. Chiefly though, it was the employers that deeply disliked Suárez, and through the CEOE they would seek to undermined the position of someone they saw as dangerously open to left-wing ideas (2), such as the nationalisation of the banks in case they proved unable to provide credit. This already energised the critics within the party, who sought to give the UCD a more clear ideological profile, in particular the liberals and the Christian democrats within the party. Furthermore, the economic situation remained very worrying, with high inflation (if lower than before 1977) and rising unemployment in the aftershock of the 1979 oil crisis when Spain was yet to recover from the 1973 one, which affected Spain late, but rather forcefully anyway. To add to the mounting conflicts within the various factions, there was the factor of the drafting of various of pieces of legislation that aroused great internal conflict in the party, like the Ley de Autonomía Universitaria, which sought to modernise the structures of the Spanish university, which in the period 1960-80 had quintupled in size, and especially the Divorce Law. Drafted by the Christian democrats following a gentleman's agreement between Suárez and the Cardinal Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, Archbishop of Madrid and which angered a large number of social democrats within the party (not to mention the socialists or the Communists) for its perceived conservatism compared to the Second Republic's legislation on the same topic. Suárez had also taken decisions that did sit well with the -very Atlanticist - party's right-wing, such as rejecting NATO membership, the continuance of the Islero project or the approximation of the country's foreign policy to the Non-Aligned Movement.
In this already difficult environment, Suárez seemed to become more and more distant from everyone, firstly from Parliament where he rarely attended and which strained the relationship between the party's apparatus, the Government and the parliamentary party. But the Prime Minister's isolation jst got worse when he dismissed Fernando Abril Martorell, one of the key men of the UCD and personal friend of Suárez from his time as civil governor of Segovia.
The situation only worsened in 1980. The economic and political malaise continued. The internal struggles within the Government's party were reported daily by the main national press, and a feeling of alienation from the institutions amongst the common person was felt among the political and intellectual classes, which worried about its consequences. As it turns out, the most shocking thing to happen on that year within Spain would be the vote held by the UCD's parliamentary party in October. In it, there were two main candidates to become the new party's Congress spokesperson, Santiago Rodríguez-Miranda (3), supported by Suárez and his current, some azules and the social democrats, and Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, member of the party's right and supported by the liberals, the Christian democrats as well as parts of the azules. The result was a tremendous defeat for the President, whose candidate only received the support of a third of the parliamentarians. (4) This was particularly worrying as the party's Second Congress was to held in Palma de Mallorca in February of 1981.
In order to stop the fighting within the party and to try and calm down the various party leaders after its important defeat within the party (5). This was the final part of Suárez's abandonment of the conception of the UCD as a party to support him in his task of governing. Suárez would summon the party's Political Council, one of its two main executive bodies and tried to strike a deal with the main faction leaders that opposed him: He was to offer them what they sought within the party, the use of open lists and internal democracy in determining the lists and the party's apparatus (6) in exchange for their support of the Government in the future delicate bills to be passed until the end of the legislature.
As it turns out, the barones accepted the deal, but failed to deliver. With such a reduced authority within the party, Suárez began to ponder the idea of resigning, in order to further his own faction and party's stability (by removing himself) from the political scene before the Congress. This was a smart move, although the party leadership was, broadly speaking, contrary to Suárez's authoritarian management of the party and the Government, the party's card-carrying members were largely faithful. For the same reasons, Suárez sough to designate a successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo.
Calvo Sotelo was everything Suárez was not and viceversa. Calvo Sotelo was the patrician and grey scion of a great Madrilenian family with political pedigree dating back to the 19th century, spoke French (and some English) and lacked any kind of charisma or telegenic quality (7). Furthermore he was a low-key figure, if also Deputy Prime Minister, and would not arouse strong reactions within the party. However, the press -and especially El Pais - saw in him the first step of the rightwards shift of the UCD. As Prime Minister, he would prove, instead, far more able than most anticipated (8).
Notes:
(1) And massively so. With an approval rate around 70%, he was the most popular leader of a country in late 70s Europe.
(2) Same as OTL, except less so, because the other option are the communists.
(3) Member of the social-democratic faction. He was the Minister of Labour in the last Calvo Sotelo Government OTL.
(4) Just like OTL's result: 103 votes for Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, 45 for Rodríguez-Miranda.
(5) OTL Suárez considered this defeat to be a major loss of face for him, as it proved to him that he had no authority within the party.
(6) Damn it, Podemos already existed in 1980, shameful.[
(7) Suárez was charismatic and charming. And most importantly for this comparison, he came from a rural lower-middle class from a father who had suffered a great deal because of his membership of Izquierda Republicana before the Civil War. Calvo Sotelo instead once said (and I'm paraphrasing since I haven't read his autobiography) that "he could not have believed that socialists could appreciate wine". That's some top-notch elitism.
(8) Also true OTL, except the situation OTL was much worse.
(2) Same as OTL, except less so, because the other option are the communists.
(3) Member of the social-democratic faction. He was the Minister of Labour in the last Calvo Sotelo Government OTL.
(4) Just like OTL's result: 103 votes for Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, 45 for Rodríguez-Miranda.
(5) OTL Suárez considered this defeat to be a major loss of face for him, as it proved to him that he had no authority within the party.
(6) Damn it, Podemos already existed in 1980, shameful.[
(7) Suárez was charismatic and charming. And most importantly for this comparison, he came from a rural lower-middle class from a father who had suffered a great deal because of his membership of Izquierda Republicana before the Civil War. Calvo Sotelo instead once said (and I'm paraphrasing since I haven't read his autobiography) that "he could not have believed that socialists could appreciate wine". That's some top-notch elitism.
(8) Also true OTL, except the situation OTL was much worse.
Well, they have not changed him. What they have changed, however, is Spain's political culture. The UCD will avoid messianic leaders, sort of like Suárez, instead opting for somewhat more low-key leaders who can administer well. It's boring, but then again, they won't be facing charismatic González either.
Hope that at some point, a very complete National Health System can be implemented ITTL Spain.
Keep it up, Nanwe!
We'll see, but the system proposed is not terrible either
And we'll do.
As for tomorrow (which I hope I can post, it's either Thursday or Saturday), I'm doubting, should I start with the first months/year of the Calvo Sotelo government or instead focus on the autonomic process, covering the elections in Catalonia, Euskadi, Galicia, Andalucia and so on as well as the drafting of the Estatuts?
Dr. Strangelove
Banned
I'll reread it again and I'll comment it again, but...
Prime Minister Miguel Boyer?
And First Lady Isabel Preysler?
Strangelove posing the important questions here.
So far, so good, Nanwe. Liking what I see. The inner tumult within a large party like the UCD is very interesting to say the least. As for tomorrow, my suggestion between the two options is whichever one you feel like you're on solid ground more - i.e. if Calvo Sotelo's Government is one where you are more confident on, then go ahead with it and at least explain to the rest of us not in tune with 1980s Spanish politics who Preysler is.
Quoting González : !Pero es una mujer pública! Emmm...Quiero decir famosa.
Presyler has little to do with politics
Queridos corazones, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isabel_Preysler, mother of Enrique Iglesias, ex-wife of Julio Iglesias, widow of Miguel Boyer and gf of Vargas Llosa. She seems to do rather well in terms of men, a musical idol, a minister and a highly regarded writer.