TLIAW: Memorias de nuestros padres
- Thread starter Nanwe
- Start date
Some kind of foretelling...?
Nope
The foretelling are the mentions to a party called Partit Democràtic de Catalunya, led by Trias, winning the election in 1999 with the support of CC-UCD
Aixequem Catalunya!
The elections of 1980 were a watershed moment for Catalonia and for Spain. They were a shock. Neither polls nor pundits had expected the under-performance of the PSUC, which had practically ran a campaign wanting to lose, the division of the left in various groups, the rise of CiU from its position as fourth political party to first by a slim margin, nor its capacity to surpass the UCD as the main centre-right party in Catalonia – by a slim margin. It had only been expected that CiU would surpass Heribert Barrera’s ERC.
But these things must be understood in the context. And for that, a certain degree of backwards look is needed, into the origins of Convergència and Jordi Pujol’s history. CDC – unlike Unió – does not stem from the two – or three - main traditional strains of Catalanism that existed in the Second Republic: the conservative traditionalism of the Lliga and the federal republicanism of Esquerra Republicana. Instead, CDC is the result of the existential crisis which Catalanism underwent in the 1940s and 1950s combined with the increase in religiosity. Indeed, if anything, CDC started out, when created in 1974, as a secularised version of the Catholic Catalanism of the Group Torres i Bages which had espoused some of the basis of the peculiar nationalism of Convergència.
Intellectually, however, Convergència, which stood as a centre-left party in 1977 and 1979 –worth remembering as the party took a rapid turn to the right in 1980 – the party and Pujol drew from Vicens Vives concept of the Catalan nation and while having its origins in the most reactionary forms of Catalanism, the deeply pro-Francoist, ultramontane forms associated with the adoration of the Virgin of Montserrat, it went beyond the traditional postures of the most conservative version of Catalanism, the quasi-Carlism of the Bases de Manresa (1). There was however one major component that Convergència did take from these movements: the rejection of the class-based struggle between Spanish-speaking working classes in and around the main industrial cities and the Catalan-speaking rural world and middle and upper classes. Instead, the version of Catalan nationalism espoused by Jordi Pujol saw the struggle not as a class-based one, but rather one between the Catalan nation and the Spanish State, ever since it ended Catalonia’s traditional – feudal – freedoms and embarked on a programme of cultural homogenisation.
There are two major elements, however, that set apart the particular Pujolist brand of Catalan nationalism from other, either left- or right-wing versions, espoused in the ideological debates that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. One of them was the Pujolist perception of the concept of ‘being Catalan’. For the future leader of Convergència as well as the rest of the Catalan intelligentsia, the massive amount of Spanish-speaking immigrants from outside of Catalonia threatened the linguistic and national integrity and inner homogeneity of Catalonia and a response was required. The quirk of Pujol’s vision was that, unlike what others proposed, Spanish-speaking immigrants should be excluded or assimilated, but rather integrated. That is to say, in order for Catalonia to be a nation it would have to be able to adapt itself (and not just the immigrants) to the new realities and perspectives that these working-class immigrants were bringing (2). It is very important to note the term ‘working-class’ here as in Catalan nationalism, Spanish-speaking inhabitants were divided into two groups, the industrial workers in the peripheries of the cities, who worked for Catalonia, whether they realised it or not, and hence could be integrated – or at least their children – and the middle-class immigrants, civil servants, teachers or liberal professionals who came to Catalonia with an “invader mentality” and hence could not be integrated into Catalonia.
Not that the concept of linguistic identity did not play a major role in Pujolist nationalism, the opposite. Pujol embraced Jaume Vicens Vives’ ideas of nationhood based on language. Indeed, in Pujolist nationalism, although Catalan nationhood should adjust itself to integrate the new immigrants, the Catalan-speaking character of the Catalan nation was non-negotiable.
Pujol developed a major buzzword: Normalisation. For Pujol, Catalonia was not a normal nation, because since the 18th century it had the means to enforce its own laws, institutions, defend its interests or its culture, under the yoke of rent-extracting Spanish State and furthermore, 20th century bilingualism further endangered the ‘Catalanity’ of Catalonia, risking it becoming a Spanish-speaking, normal region of the Spanish nation, and not a nation on its own. To avoid that, Pujol would propose for Catalonia to normalise itself as a nation: Education and language policies were key (3), hence the conflicts within the government coalition and with the UCD Governments of Calvo Sotelo and Lavilla over a Catalan television station or the control of RTVE Catalunya and the use of Catalan as the main language in schooling in Catalonia.
Banca Catalana’s lavish headquarters, Barcelona
In this normalisation of Catalonia, economics played a key role, even before Pujol started a political career. That is the story of Banca Catalana, Pujol’s first Catalanist adventure before even being a Catalanist politician. Banca Catalana sought to remedy the lack of Catalan banks, traditionally Catalan industry had been self-financing and not reliant on loans which meant a small banking sector (4). In his plans for a Catalonia as autonomous and self-financing as possible, Pujol aimed to develop a Catalan bank, to expand across Catalonia first and later in Madrid and which would finance all sorts of enterprises in order to make Catalonia’s industry as diverse as possible, even if that investment was not financially sound. Indeed, the history of Jordi Pujol’s demise is the story of Banca Catalana’s demise, due to risky borrowing and over-expansion in a short span of it for political reasons.
However, the political career of Jordi Pujol cannot be understood without the initial success of Banca Catalana, which gave him credit and an image of a practical patriot and good manager who had surged from a payés family to the highest levels of the financial industry. But his political appeal and image is far more linked to two major political scandals (5) from the 1960s and his brief imprisonment and the campaign to free him, which turned Pujol into a nationalist symbols of the fight against the Francoist regime and for a democratic Catalan nationalism.
With the political and socio-economic pedigree gained through Banca Catalana and his brief time in the Francoist prison for his political manifestations in the Palau, chanting El Cant de la Senyera in an auditorium which included Franco himself, Pujol had become a major symbol of the new Catalan nationalism, much like Tarradellas represented the continuity with the historical Generalitat. Pity that both men hated each other with passion, at best.
After his years in Banca Catalana, and in 1973, as the Francoist regime showed signs of its incapacity to continue without Franco – even the aged and useless 1970s Franco – while it aimed for a more open policy to regional minorities (6), Pujol created a political organism. Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya. It was not yet a party, or at least not a proper party, with an organisation, cadres, symbols, etc. This would come to happen following the February 1976 demonstrations in Catalonia organised by the democratic opposition organ, the Assemblea de Catalunya, which grouped all the anti-Francoist parties (from Carlists to Maoists). It happened on the 16th of February.
On that fateful day, the two main groups within CDC, the Pujolist GASC (Grup d’Acció al Servei de Catalunya), led by Esquirol, Casajoana and Sellarès and Miquel Roca’s centre-left Grup d’Independents auto-dissolve. At this moment, the sudden decision forces Unió to take a stance regarding a group over which it has previously enjoyed considerable influence. Within Unió, there’s a tremendous debate between those arguing for a coalition or merger with Pujol’s party, led by Anton Cañellas and Josep Miró (7) and those opposed, Coll i Alentorn and Vila d’Abadal. Those opposed win the day, although the rancour would grow deeper within the party leading to the break-off of the factions lead by the pro-integrationists.
In its Third Assembly, the new party’s statutes define it as a nationalist and social-democratic party, in the political centre-left but at the centre of Catalan society, able to rebuild Catalonia both socially and ‘nationally’. In a division of power reminiscent of the Lliga (8), Pujol would lead the party in Catalonia while Roca would lead it in Madrid, trying to gain as much influence for the party in Congress as possible. Despite this vision, the constitution of the party’s executive committee showed a clear Pujolist majority.
CDC would obtain good results, if below their expectations in 1977 and 1979. If in 1977, CDC’s Pacte Democratic coalition had been the second force in Catalonia in terms of seats and the third in votes (behind the PSUC) and the main centre-right force, in 1979, the success of the Constitution and the popularity of Suárez meant that CDC would drop to the fourth position in seats and votes behind the communists, the Catalanist socialists of CSC-FPS and the centrists of Centristes de Catalunya-UCD. Following the 1979 general elections and especially the local ones, when an internal crisis erupts between Pujolists and Roquists (9) over the person to lead CDC as the candidate to the mayoralty of Barcelona, CDC would follow a path of approaching to Unió as it shifted its positions into the political centre and centre-right of the Catalan spectrum.
To the right of Convergència there was a myriad of forces, but in 1977, the main one was Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana, formed by Unió and Centre Català. That is until something unexpected happened. In Catalonia, Areilza and Pio Cabanillas’ Partido Popular had remained loyal to Areilza and so, most of its members have gone with him to Fraga’s party. As a result, there was no UCD in Catalonia. As it happens, the lists in the four provinces were created in the two days before the time limit to present the candidates with a few members from Concòrdia Catalana and a few Suarist independent politicians, chiefly Manuel Jiménez de Parga.
Despite the bad start, given that the Catalan UCD lacked the local implantation, democratic or even Catalanist pedigree that all forces – even Fraga’s – had in Catalonia, it came as a major shock, its impressive results in the elections of 1977. The UCD obtained 18% of the votes and 9 deputies from Catalonia, a surprising result. It was a political earthquake, especially when combined with the failure of the UCDC to be the main centre-right force of Catalan nationalism in 1977 (10).
After the election, then, the majority of Catalan parties to the right of Convergència, including Unió became attracted to the allure of power and prestige of Suárez and his party, while in UCD, it was felt there was a need to create a party, develop cadres, members and to improve the party’s Catalan and democratic image, which was felt as lacking, not to mention that the party itself had been built up in two days and was therefore, not much more than its parliamentarians. This was a particular problem for most of the UCD in general, but particularly in Catalonia.
During 1978 and 1979, there was a sort of gravitational pull around the Catalan UCD that pulled Centre Català and Unió towards the party. The initiative was taken by Centre Català. The party had pro-European, liberal Catalanist party and came from social circles close to the Cercle d’Economia, which became self-evident when the party self-described as politically ‘Giscardian’ (11), that is socially and economically liberal. The party was led by such political heavyweights as Joaquim Molins, Joan Mas Cantí, Carles Ferrer Salat (12) or Carles Güell de Sentmenat. After the party’s failed breakthrough in 1977, obtaining only one of the two deputies elected from the joint candidature with Unió, the party would seek to build a new and large party that would be “Catalan and close to the social reality it sought to represent, centrist and progressive” according to the CC’s Congress in 1977. In doing so, it would try to bring together the UCD as well as Unió, as well as some failed shootouts to Convergència and Esquerra Democràtica. Although the project would fail due to the internal crises of Unió, and the opposition of Suárez to losing the UCD’s branch in Catalonia as well as opposition from within the Catalan UCD.
Without Unió, Centra Català, Unió dels Demòcrata-Cristians de Catalunya – a UDC split - as well as the Lliga de Catalunya – a UCD splinter – and the Partit del Poble Català went ahead with their pro-UCD direction and formed the Unió de Centre de Catalunya (UCC). The new group would constitution a joint liaison committee with the UCD in June 1978 in order to coordinate political action – as two independent groups – and to run common candidates in the upcoming general and local elections.
The last element that would join the incipient Centristes de Catalunya group would be yet another splinter from Unió in November 1978. During 1977 and 1978, after the pro-UCD elements of what was to be UDCC, the right-wing of Unió, led by Anton Cañellas would take an increasingly more pro-UCD line as opposed to the left-wing – and majority – line which promoted an electoral coalition with Pujol’s Convergència. However, even though Cañellas and his followers, representing about a fifth of Unió’s members, would remain in Unió hoping for an understanding, this possibility disappear following the 7th UDC Congress held on the 11th and 12th November of 1978, when the party decided to ally to Convergència for the upcoming election for what was to be Convergència i Unió. Furthermore, on the same Congress, the party decided to expel Cañellas form its ranks as well as pro-UCD party members and cadres. The expelled group would go to create Unió Democràtica/Centre Ampli (UDCA), which would, after a few weeks, join the liaison committee between UCC and UCD and resulted in the formation of Centristes de Catalunya-UCD on time for the 1979 general and local elections.
The result was a tremendous success, thanks to its new Catalan image, thanks to the reinforcement from the ranks of Unió – Güell, Molins, Cañellas - , the appeal of the government’s management of the Transition and the strength of the campaign itself meant that Centristes de Catalunya-UCD would become the 2nd most voted party in both the general and the local elections of 1979. However, the party was to be blocked from most local power in the main Catalan cities – Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona – due to the “Municipal Progress Pacts” between CDC, PSUC and FPS.
However, and as usual in the UCD, a big success did not mean a united party. The great unifying Congress of what-was-to-be Centristes de Catalunya, to be held on the 22nd December 1979, in Girona, in it, the three main forces would merge. But the UCD being the UCD, it was not be a seamless process: Besides the divisions between the more Spanish nationalist members, represented by Madrid’s permanent influence and the members of the original UCD and the Catalanists from UDCA and – especially – UCC. On top of this there was a division between the ‘old guard’ ideologues and the young technocrats, like Joan Josep Folchi. But most disputes were – as ever – between various factions and personalities with regards as to how to organise the party within Catalonia and its relationship to the main UCD in Madrid.
***
That was the situation of the Catalan right-wing ahead of the first Catalan elections held since 1932. But Catalonia, if one were to follow the results of the general and local elections of 1977 and 1979 was not a land for the right. The combined weight of the three main political forces of the left, the PSUC, CSC-FPS and the PS’s Catalan branch hovered just over 50% - 55% if one included ERC - of the votes, with areas, like the red belt of Barcelona, where the left obtained two thirds of the vote (Baix Llobregat) and in which Maoist parties obtained over 3% of the vote. As a result, press and political pundits alike did not predict the result of the 1980 election.
Perhaps because the outcome was thought to be pre-determined was why it was so unexpected. Although the referendum on the Catalan Statute should have given a clue. The large masses of Spanish-speaking immigrants living in the industrial outskirts of Barcelona and Tarragona did not identify with the quest for Catalan self-government, and so whereas they turned out to vote for general elections and to ratify the Constitution, they did not for the referendum on the Catalan statute, where turnout was much lower, 59.7%. Indeed, compared to the turnout from 1979, in 1980’s regional election turnout fell by 4 pp., and particularly so in the industrial outskirts and neighbourhoods, whereas it did not fall in the more Catalanist countryside and middle class neighbourhoods of the main cities.
The 1980 Catalan elections’ campaign was the first one in which the employers took a very pro-active approach in the fear of a Communist government. Foment del Treball would undertake a double campaign, donating over 600 million pesetas to Centristes de Catalunya, 50 million to CiU and soared the various minor left-wing parties with money and spaces in newspapers in an attempt to divide the left-wing voters not just between the main left-wing parties, the PSUC, CSC, ERC and PS, but also to even minor parties to the left of the PSUC to divide the left. Furthermore, the employers would buy space in the radio waves to spread a message of fear, assuring listeners that a vote for the PSUC was a vote for unemployment.
While it is obviously unfair to make such a statement, unemployment in Catalonia, traditionally Spain’s foremost industrial region, had skyrocketed. The crisis in the traditional industries, which dominated Catalonia’s economic landscape, combined with meekness of the unions, with the partial exception of USO, after the Moncloa Pacts to reduce inflation, meant that the average left-wing voter was tremendously dissatisfied with his natural party and the trade unions, which seemed to bend over backwards to the employers whenever employees saw their incomes reduced or were fired.
As a result, the campaign had a double edge: Clear, offensive anti-communism on the right and a lacklustre campaign on the left. Indeed, the campaigns of Centristes and of CiU were quite different. While CiU ran a nationalist and optimistic campaign, with an emphasis on the leader, a very American campaign, whose democratic, Catalanist credentials were highlighted. In order to differentiate itself from Centristes, CiU would equally ran a campaign in which it painted itself – and ERC – as the only true Catalan party and attacking PSUC and Centristes equally for being ‘subsidiaries’ of Madrid’s parties and hence untrustworthy of developing Catalonia’s autonomy and of being entrusted of the revival of Catalonia’s economy and language.
Centristes, instead, ran a typically conservative campaign, which an emphasis on their technocratic capacity as able hands to lead to economic recovery in Catalonia, as Punset – their second in Barcelona’s list – had been the Economy and Finances conseller under Tarradellas, while attacking Pujol for his inexperience. Furthermore, Centristes, ran a campaign also highlighting, as they had in 1979, their link to Suárez and the values of the Transition, their capacity to reach compromises; while attacking CiU for its alliances with communist sand socialists in the main cities. It was however, a far cry from CiU’s campaign. But it was, nevertheless, a harbinger of the standard UCD electoral campaign in the 1980s: Anti-communism, social moderation and good economic management.
Perhaps the biggest shock to anyone was the poor campaign of the left. The Communists, being attacked on the economic front by Centristes-UCD and on the national one by CiU did not quite cope and failed to develop their own optimistic campaigns that could attract their already unhappy voters in the industrial areas of Catalonia. It was so bad that Tarradellas himself was quoted to have said “My God! These people want to lose! They aren’t saying anything that interests their people”. And it was true, for some unexplainable issue, instead of focusing on the issues of unemployment, social issues and such, the PSUC was dragged into a passive campaigns, where it failed to create frames of reference and was instead forced time and time again to prove its independence from Carrillo and to show off that it was actually a worthy Catalan party. This did not help its natural voters to flock to the party.
The electoral results were a great surprise. CiU exceeded its own best expectations by obtaining 36 seats, whereas even their own analysists never predicted more than 25. Pujol would be greeted by its followers to cries of “Pujol, president!” and he declared that Catalonia was no more just a piece in Madrid politicians’ chess game. The results, while below expectations, were good for UCD and the added numbers of both parties added up to a majority and such piece of news was welcomed with enthusiasm and happiness by Madrid to such a degree that the delegate of the Government to Catalonia congratulated himself and the winners by proclaiming that the "Western mode of governance" had triumphed over the Communists and their ideology. After the election, the close and personal connection between Pujol and Cañellas (13) and the good relations between Pujol and Suárez meant that a government deal was quickly reached. CiU would tone somewhat its nationalism while UCD ensured itself power and the capacity to shift policy in the region and to showcase that the party accepted the variety of Spain. For Suárez, this was very important, as given the violence in the Basque Country, Catalonia needed to be the region where Spain could show itself to the Basques and the world as a new, liberal, tolerant and democratic society.
Electorally speaking, the map of Catalonia has remained somewhat static. Southern Tarragona and Lleida are electoral strongholds of Centristes de Catalunya, just like they were for the Lliga in the 1910s through 30s and of the Carlists before that. Meanwhile, CiU was strongest in the countryside of Barcelona and all of Girona. Broadly-speaking, CC was and is stronger where conservatism trumps Catalanism and CiU – and its successors – where the opposite is true. CiU also did quite well in Barcelona itself, where the city was a close match between PSUC and CiU, with the former gaining by less than a percentage point. The PSUC was – obviously – strongest in the heavily industrial areas around the provincial capitals of Barcelona and Tarragona with the odd exception of the county of Maresme.
But these things must be understood in the context. And for that, a certain degree of backwards look is needed, into the origins of Convergència and Jordi Pujol’s history. CDC – unlike Unió – does not stem from the two – or three - main traditional strains of Catalanism that existed in the Second Republic: the conservative traditionalism of the Lliga and the federal republicanism of Esquerra Republicana. Instead, CDC is the result of the existential crisis which Catalanism underwent in the 1940s and 1950s combined with the increase in religiosity. Indeed, if anything, CDC started out, when created in 1974, as a secularised version of the Catholic Catalanism of the Group Torres i Bages which had espoused some of the basis of the peculiar nationalism of Convergència.
Intellectually, however, Convergència, which stood as a centre-left party in 1977 and 1979 –worth remembering as the party took a rapid turn to the right in 1980 – the party and Pujol drew from Vicens Vives concept of the Catalan nation and while having its origins in the most reactionary forms of Catalanism, the deeply pro-Francoist, ultramontane forms associated with the adoration of the Virgin of Montserrat, it went beyond the traditional postures of the most conservative version of Catalanism, the quasi-Carlism of the Bases de Manresa (1). There was however one major component that Convergència did take from these movements: the rejection of the class-based struggle between Spanish-speaking working classes in and around the main industrial cities and the Catalan-speaking rural world and middle and upper classes. Instead, the version of Catalan nationalism espoused by Jordi Pujol saw the struggle not as a class-based one, but rather one between the Catalan nation and the Spanish State, ever since it ended Catalonia’s traditional – feudal – freedoms and embarked on a programme of cultural homogenisation.
There are two major elements, however, that set apart the particular Pujolist brand of Catalan nationalism from other, either left- or right-wing versions, espoused in the ideological debates that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. One of them was the Pujolist perception of the concept of ‘being Catalan’. For the future leader of Convergència as well as the rest of the Catalan intelligentsia, the massive amount of Spanish-speaking immigrants from outside of Catalonia threatened the linguistic and national integrity and inner homogeneity of Catalonia and a response was required. The quirk of Pujol’s vision was that, unlike what others proposed, Spanish-speaking immigrants should be excluded or assimilated, but rather integrated. That is to say, in order for Catalonia to be a nation it would have to be able to adapt itself (and not just the immigrants) to the new realities and perspectives that these working-class immigrants were bringing (2). It is very important to note the term ‘working-class’ here as in Catalan nationalism, Spanish-speaking inhabitants were divided into two groups, the industrial workers in the peripheries of the cities, who worked for Catalonia, whether they realised it or not, and hence could be integrated – or at least their children – and the middle-class immigrants, civil servants, teachers or liberal professionals who came to Catalonia with an “invader mentality” and hence could not be integrated into Catalonia.
Not that the concept of linguistic identity did not play a major role in Pujolist nationalism, the opposite. Pujol embraced Jaume Vicens Vives’ ideas of nationhood based on language. Indeed, in Pujolist nationalism, although Catalan nationhood should adjust itself to integrate the new immigrants, the Catalan-speaking character of the Catalan nation was non-negotiable.
Pujol developed a major buzzword: Normalisation. For Pujol, Catalonia was not a normal nation, because since the 18th century it had the means to enforce its own laws, institutions, defend its interests or its culture, under the yoke of rent-extracting Spanish State and furthermore, 20th century bilingualism further endangered the ‘Catalanity’ of Catalonia, risking it becoming a Spanish-speaking, normal region of the Spanish nation, and not a nation on its own. To avoid that, Pujol would propose for Catalonia to normalise itself as a nation: Education and language policies were key (3), hence the conflicts within the government coalition and with the UCD Governments of Calvo Sotelo and Lavilla over a Catalan television station or the control of RTVE Catalunya and the use of Catalan as the main language in schooling in Catalonia.
Banca Catalana’s lavish headquarters, Barcelona
In this normalisation of Catalonia, economics played a key role, even before Pujol started a political career. That is the story of Banca Catalana, Pujol’s first Catalanist adventure before even being a Catalanist politician. Banca Catalana sought to remedy the lack of Catalan banks, traditionally Catalan industry had been self-financing and not reliant on loans which meant a small banking sector (4). In his plans for a Catalonia as autonomous and self-financing as possible, Pujol aimed to develop a Catalan bank, to expand across Catalonia first and later in Madrid and which would finance all sorts of enterprises in order to make Catalonia’s industry as diverse as possible, even if that investment was not financially sound. Indeed, the history of Jordi Pujol’s demise is the story of Banca Catalana’s demise, due to risky borrowing and over-expansion in a short span of it for political reasons.
However, the political career of Jordi Pujol cannot be understood without the initial success of Banca Catalana, which gave him credit and an image of a practical patriot and good manager who had surged from a payés family to the highest levels of the financial industry. But his political appeal and image is far more linked to two major political scandals (5) from the 1960s and his brief imprisonment and the campaign to free him, which turned Pujol into a nationalist symbols of the fight against the Francoist regime and for a democratic Catalan nationalism.
With the political and socio-economic pedigree gained through Banca Catalana and his brief time in the Francoist prison for his political manifestations in the Palau, chanting El Cant de la Senyera in an auditorium which included Franco himself, Pujol had become a major symbol of the new Catalan nationalism, much like Tarradellas represented the continuity with the historical Generalitat. Pity that both men hated each other with passion, at best.
After his years in Banca Catalana, and in 1973, as the Francoist regime showed signs of its incapacity to continue without Franco – even the aged and useless 1970s Franco – while it aimed for a more open policy to regional minorities (6), Pujol created a political organism. Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya. It was not yet a party, or at least not a proper party, with an organisation, cadres, symbols, etc. This would come to happen following the February 1976 demonstrations in Catalonia organised by the democratic opposition organ, the Assemblea de Catalunya, which grouped all the anti-Francoist parties (from Carlists to Maoists). It happened on the 16th of February.
On that fateful day, the two main groups within CDC, the Pujolist GASC (Grup d’Acció al Servei de Catalunya), led by Esquirol, Casajoana and Sellarès and Miquel Roca’s centre-left Grup d’Independents auto-dissolve. At this moment, the sudden decision forces Unió to take a stance regarding a group over which it has previously enjoyed considerable influence. Within Unió, there’s a tremendous debate between those arguing for a coalition or merger with Pujol’s party, led by Anton Cañellas and Josep Miró (7) and those opposed, Coll i Alentorn and Vila d’Abadal. Those opposed win the day, although the rancour would grow deeper within the party leading to the break-off of the factions lead by the pro-integrationists.
In its Third Assembly, the new party’s statutes define it as a nationalist and social-democratic party, in the political centre-left but at the centre of Catalan society, able to rebuild Catalonia both socially and ‘nationally’. In a division of power reminiscent of the Lliga (8), Pujol would lead the party in Catalonia while Roca would lead it in Madrid, trying to gain as much influence for the party in Congress as possible. Despite this vision, the constitution of the party’s executive committee showed a clear Pujolist majority.
CDC would obtain good results, if below their expectations in 1977 and 1979. If in 1977, CDC’s Pacte Democratic coalition had been the second force in Catalonia in terms of seats and the third in votes (behind the PSUC) and the main centre-right force, in 1979, the success of the Constitution and the popularity of Suárez meant that CDC would drop to the fourth position in seats and votes behind the communists, the Catalanist socialists of CSC-FPS and the centrists of Centristes de Catalunya-UCD. Following the 1979 general elections and especially the local ones, when an internal crisis erupts between Pujolists and Roquists (9) over the person to lead CDC as the candidate to the mayoralty of Barcelona, CDC would follow a path of approaching to Unió as it shifted its positions into the political centre and centre-right of the Catalan spectrum.
To the right of Convergència there was a myriad of forces, but in 1977, the main one was Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana, formed by Unió and Centre Català. That is until something unexpected happened. In Catalonia, Areilza and Pio Cabanillas’ Partido Popular had remained loyal to Areilza and so, most of its members have gone with him to Fraga’s party. As a result, there was no UCD in Catalonia. As it happens, the lists in the four provinces were created in the two days before the time limit to present the candidates with a few members from Concòrdia Catalana and a few Suarist independent politicians, chiefly Manuel Jiménez de Parga.
Despite the bad start, given that the Catalan UCD lacked the local implantation, democratic or even Catalanist pedigree that all forces – even Fraga’s – had in Catalonia, it came as a major shock, its impressive results in the elections of 1977. The UCD obtained 18% of the votes and 9 deputies from Catalonia, a surprising result. It was a political earthquake, especially when combined with the failure of the UCDC to be the main centre-right force of Catalan nationalism in 1977 (10).
After the election, then, the majority of Catalan parties to the right of Convergència, including Unió became attracted to the allure of power and prestige of Suárez and his party, while in UCD, it was felt there was a need to create a party, develop cadres, members and to improve the party’s Catalan and democratic image, which was felt as lacking, not to mention that the party itself had been built up in two days and was therefore, not much more than its parliamentarians. This was a particular problem for most of the UCD in general, but particularly in Catalonia.
During 1978 and 1979, there was a sort of gravitational pull around the Catalan UCD that pulled Centre Català and Unió towards the party. The initiative was taken by Centre Català. The party had pro-European, liberal Catalanist party and came from social circles close to the Cercle d’Economia, which became self-evident when the party self-described as politically ‘Giscardian’ (11), that is socially and economically liberal. The party was led by such political heavyweights as Joaquim Molins, Joan Mas Cantí, Carles Ferrer Salat (12) or Carles Güell de Sentmenat. After the party’s failed breakthrough in 1977, obtaining only one of the two deputies elected from the joint candidature with Unió, the party would seek to build a new and large party that would be “Catalan and close to the social reality it sought to represent, centrist and progressive” according to the CC’s Congress in 1977. In doing so, it would try to bring together the UCD as well as Unió, as well as some failed shootouts to Convergència and Esquerra Democràtica. Although the project would fail due to the internal crises of Unió, and the opposition of Suárez to losing the UCD’s branch in Catalonia as well as opposition from within the Catalan UCD.
Without Unió, Centra Català, Unió dels Demòcrata-Cristians de Catalunya – a UDC split - as well as the Lliga de Catalunya – a UCD splinter – and the Partit del Poble Català went ahead with their pro-UCD direction and formed the Unió de Centre de Catalunya (UCC). The new group would constitution a joint liaison committee with the UCD in June 1978 in order to coordinate political action – as two independent groups – and to run common candidates in the upcoming general and local elections.
The last element that would join the incipient Centristes de Catalunya group would be yet another splinter from Unió in November 1978. During 1977 and 1978, after the pro-UCD elements of what was to be UDCC, the right-wing of Unió, led by Anton Cañellas would take an increasingly more pro-UCD line as opposed to the left-wing – and majority – line which promoted an electoral coalition with Pujol’s Convergència. However, even though Cañellas and his followers, representing about a fifth of Unió’s members, would remain in Unió hoping for an understanding, this possibility disappear following the 7th UDC Congress held on the 11th and 12th November of 1978, when the party decided to ally to Convergència for the upcoming election for what was to be Convergència i Unió. Furthermore, on the same Congress, the party decided to expel Cañellas form its ranks as well as pro-UCD party members and cadres. The expelled group would go to create Unió Democràtica/Centre Ampli (UDCA), which would, after a few weeks, join the liaison committee between UCC and UCD and resulted in the formation of Centristes de Catalunya-UCD on time for the 1979 general and local elections.
The result was a tremendous success, thanks to its new Catalan image, thanks to the reinforcement from the ranks of Unió – Güell, Molins, Cañellas - , the appeal of the government’s management of the Transition and the strength of the campaign itself meant that Centristes de Catalunya-UCD would become the 2nd most voted party in both the general and the local elections of 1979. However, the party was to be blocked from most local power in the main Catalan cities – Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona – due to the “Municipal Progress Pacts” between CDC, PSUC and FPS.
However, and as usual in the UCD, a big success did not mean a united party. The great unifying Congress of what-was-to-be Centristes de Catalunya, to be held on the 22nd December 1979, in Girona, in it, the three main forces would merge. But the UCD being the UCD, it was not be a seamless process: Besides the divisions between the more Spanish nationalist members, represented by Madrid’s permanent influence and the members of the original UCD and the Catalanists from UDCA and – especially – UCC. On top of this there was a division between the ‘old guard’ ideologues and the young technocrats, like Joan Josep Folchi. But most disputes were – as ever – between various factions and personalities with regards as to how to organise the party within Catalonia and its relationship to the main UCD in Madrid.
***
That was the situation of the Catalan right-wing ahead of the first Catalan elections held since 1932. But Catalonia, if one were to follow the results of the general and local elections of 1977 and 1979 was not a land for the right. The combined weight of the three main political forces of the left, the PSUC, CSC-FPS and the PS’s Catalan branch hovered just over 50% - 55% if one included ERC - of the votes, with areas, like the red belt of Barcelona, where the left obtained two thirds of the vote (Baix Llobregat) and in which Maoist parties obtained over 3% of the vote. As a result, press and political pundits alike did not predict the result of the 1980 election.
Perhaps because the outcome was thought to be pre-determined was why it was so unexpected. Although the referendum on the Catalan Statute should have given a clue. The large masses of Spanish-speaking immigrants living in the industrial outskirts of Barcelona and Tarragona did not identify with the quest for Catalan self-government, and so whereas they turned out to vote for general elections and to ratify the Constitution, they did not for the referendum on the Catalan statute, where turnout was much lower, 59.7%. Indeed, compared to the turnout from 1979, in 1980’s regional election turnout fell by 4 pp., and particularly so in the industrial outskirts and neighbourhoods, whereas it did not fall in the more Catalanist countryside and middle class neighbourhoods of the main cities.
The 1980 Catalan elections’ campaign was the first one in which the employers took a very pro-active approach in the fear of a Communist government. Foment del Treball would undertake a double campaign, donating over 600 million pesetas to Centristes de Catalunya, 50 million to CiU and soared the various minor left-wing parties with money and spaces in newspapers in an attempt to divide the left-wing voters not just between the main left-wing parties, the PSUC, CSC, ERC and PS, but also to even minor parties to the left of the PSUC to divide the left. Furthermore, the employers would buy space in the radio waves to spread a message of fear, assuring listeners that a vote for the PSUC was a vote for unemployment.
While it is obviously unfair to make such a statement, unemployment in Catalonia, traditionally Spain’s foremost industrial region, had skyrocketed. The crisis in the traditional industries, which dominated Catalonia’s economic landscape, combined with meekness of the unions, with the partial exception of USO, after the Moncloa Pacts to reduce inflation, meant that the average left-wing voter was tremendously dissatisfied with his natural party and the trade unions, which seemed to bend over backwards to the employers whenever employees saw their incomes reduced or were fired.
As a result, the campaign had a double edge: Clear, offensive anti-communism on the right and a lacklustre campaign on the left. Indeed, the campaigns of Centristes and of CiU were quite different. While CiU ran a nationalist and optimistic campaign, with an emphasis on the leader, a very American campaign, whose democratic, Catalanist credentials were highlighted. In order to differentiate itself from Centristes, CiU would equally ran a campaign in which it painted itself – and ERC – as the only true Catalan party and attacking PSUC and Centristes equally for being ‘subsidiaries’ of Madrid’s parties and hence untrustworthy of developing Catalonia’s autonomy and of being entrusted of the revival of Catalonia’s economy and language.
Centristes, instead, ran a typically conservative campaign, which an emphasis on their technocratic capacity as able hands to lead to economic recovery in Catalonia, as Punset – their second in Barcelona’s list – had been the Economy and Finances conseller under Tarradellas, while attacking Pujol for his inexperience. Furthermore, Centristes, ran a campaign also highlighting, as they had in 1979, their link to Suárez and the values of the Transition, their capacity to reach compromises; while attacking CiU for its alliances with communist sand socialists in the main cities. It was however, a far cry from CiU’s campaign. But it was, nevertheless, a harbinger of the standard UCD electoral campaign in the 1980s: Anti-communism, social moderation and good economic management.
Perhaps the biggest shock to anyone was the poor campaign of the left. The Communists, being attacked on the economic front by Centristes-UCD and on the national one by CiU did not quite cope and failed to develop their own optimistic campaigns that could attract their already unhappy voters in the industrial areas of Catalonia. It was so bad that Tarradellas himself was quoted to have said “My God! These people want to lose! They aren’t saying anything that interests their people”. And it was true, for some unexplainable issue, instead of focusing on the issues of unemployment, social issues and such, the PSUC was dragged into a passive campaigns, where it failed to create frames of reference and was instead forced time and time again to prove its independence from Carrillo and to show off that it was actually a worthy Catalan party. This did not help its natural voters to flock to the party.
The electoral results were a great surprise. CiU exceeded its own best expectations by obtaining 36 seats, whereas even their own analysists never predicted more than 25. Pujol would be greeted by its followers to cries of “Pujol, president!” and he declared that Catalonia was no more just a piece in Madrid politicians’ chess game. The results, while below expectations, were good for UCD and the added numbers of both parties added up to a majority and such piece of news was welcomed with enthusiasm and happiness by Madrid to such a degree that the delegate of the Government to Catalonia congratulated himself and the winners by proclaiming that the "Western mode of governance" had triumphed over the Communists and their ideology. After the election, the close and personal connection between Pujol and Cañellas (13) and the good relations between Pujol and Suárez meant that a government deal was quickly reached. CiU would tone somewhat its nationalism while UCD ensured itself power and the capacity to shift policy in the region and to showcase that the party accepted the variety of Spain. For Suárez, this was very important, as given the violence in the Basque Country, Catalonia needed to be the region where Spain could show itself to the Basques and the world as a new, liberal, tolerant and democratic society.
Electorally speaking, the map of Catalonia has remained somewhat static. Southern Tarragona and Lleida are electoral strongholds of Centristes de Catalunya, just like they were for the Lliga in the 1910s through 30s and of the Carlists before that. Meanwhile, CiU was strongest in the countryside of Barcelona and all of Girona. Broadly-speaking, CC was and is stronger where conservatism trumps Catalanism and CiU – and its successors – where the opposite is true. CiU also did quite well in Barcelona itself, where the city was a close match between PSUC and CiU, with the former gaining by less than a percentage point. The PSUC was – obviously – strongest in the heavily industrial areas around the provincial capitals of Barcelona and Tarragona with the odd exception of the county of Maresme.
Notes:
(1) I don't want to get too much into detail about a document from 1892. It was the first proposal for an autonomous status for Catalonia, a weird mix of modernity, like the 1932 Estatuto and fueros-style traditional rights. Link here.
(2) Like you know, speaking Spanish or folklore other than Catalan rumbas. Although of course, always looking to their integration into good Catalan-speaking castellers.
(3) More in the next Catalan chapter. But let's just say Pujol is_not_happy about La 3.
(4) During the Catalan Industrial Revolution, Catalan industrialists either relied on their own money - usually the result of investment overseas, chiefly Cuba - or on the power Madrid or - especially - Basque banking sectors. It's a strange anomaly of Catalonia's economic history that no major bank appeared and lasted.
(5) Pujol going to prison, that's one. The other is the Galinsoga affair.
(6) Best example is that for the last "elections" to the Francoist Cortes, there were posters in Catalan and people where no told to fuck off if they spoke Catalan before state authorities. It was all more polite.
(7) Josep Miró i Ardèvol. Very conservative, Christian-democratic member of UCC, whom OTL did not join UCD, instead joining CiU in 1981. TTL, he's a major members of Centristes' right (on the socio-economic slide) but very much a Catalanist, which is a rare combo.
(8) In the Lliga, Prat de la Riba led the party in Barcelona and Catalonia, as President de la Mancomunitat, and Cambó led the party in Madrid, even becoming a Minister. Can you imagine a Catalan nationalist as a Minister of anything nowadays?!
(9) The left-wing faction of CiU, basically social democrats/socio-liberals. Followers of Miquel Roca i Junyent (hence the name), usually former members of the GdI.
(10) 2 deputies is a bad result, especially in comparison to CDC or UCD's, either OTL or TTL.
(11) As in Valéry Giscard d'Estaign, the liberal French President between 1974 and 1981 OTL, maybe longer TTL.
(12) Later President of CEOE, major liberal within UCD, hated Suárez with fervour and passion.
(13) They both were members of the Torres i Bages group and Cañellas was married to Miquel Roca's sister.
(2) Like you know, speaking Spanish or folklore other than Catalan rumbas. Although of course, always looking to their integration into good Catalan-speaking castellers.
(3) More in the next Catalan chapter. But let's just say Pujol is_not_happy about La 3.
(4) During the Catalan Industrial Revolution, Catalan industrialists either relied on their own money - usually the result of investment overseas, chiefly Cuba - or on the power Madrid or - especially - Basque banking sectors. It's a strange anomaly of Catalonia's economic history that no major bank appeared and lasted.
(5) Pujol going to prison, that's one. The other is the Galinsoga affair.
(6) Best example is that for the last "elections" to the Francoist Cortes, there were posters in Catalan and people where no told to fuck off if they spoke Catalan before state authorities. It was all more polite.
(7) Josep Miró i Ardèvol. Very conservative, Christian-democratic member of UCC, whom OTL did not join UCD, instead joining CiU in 1981. TTL, he's a major members of Centristes' right (on the socio-economic slide) but very much a Catalanist, which is a rare combo.
(8) In the Lliga, Prat de la Riba led the party in Barcelona and Catalonia, as President de la Mancomunitat, and Cambó led the party in Madrid, even becoming a Minister. Can you imagine a Catalan nationalist as a Minister of anything nowadays?!
(9) The left-wing faction of CiU, basically social democrats/socio-liberals. Followers of Miquel Roca i Junyent (hence the name), usually former members of the GdI.
(10) 2 deputies is a bad result, especially in comparison to CDC or UCD's, either OTL or TTL.
(11) As in Valéry Giscard d'Estaign, the liberal French President between 1974 and 1981 OTL, maybe longer TTL.
(12) Later President of CEOE, major liberal within UCD, hated Suárez with fervour and passion.
(13) They both were members of the Torres i Bages group and Cañellas was married to Miquel Roca's sister.
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Goldstein
Banned
Glad to see this back, David. The quality of writing and the amount of research are still astounding and very convincing. I had to look for the OTL 1980 Catalan election to fully grasp the divergence. It's more or less subtle, but suggests deep implications. I guess CC is there to stay, that the Red Belt has an opportunity to still be a thing, and that the Pujolista hegemony won't happen... at least not in such a sharp way as IOTL.
Thanks man. Glad to be back. Next chapter should either be about the PCE (about time
) or the part 2 of the Catalan drama. Not sure yet. Yeah, Centristes is going to stay around, this will have very deep implications, as you indicate, but perhaps even moreso, after all CiU won't be able to willy-nilly build up the Generalitat's bureaucratic apparatus as yet another base of support and pseudo-clientelar employment (there's a reason why Catalonia is amongst the worst-governed regions of Spain), while what it can do in power is limited by being in a coalition. The red belt remains and actually voted more than OTL, which also helped UCD.
By the way, I know there was a lot of very similar acronyms and such in this update, what with UDC, UCD, UDCA, UCC, CC, etc. Hopefully it's relatively clear, if not, I am happy to explain.
***
As a note and before I forget, in the map itself, darker tones show a difference of over 5 pp. between the first and the second party. Lighter tones, less than 5 pp.
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So, CiU is a bit weaker than in OTL, UCD quite stronger "in its own curious manner" and I lost track of AP...
BTW, there are two (12)...
and I lost track of AP...BTW, there are two (12)...
So, CiU is a bit weaker than in OTL, UCD quite stronger "in its own curious manner"
That's because AP didn't run either OTL or TTL in the 1980 Catalan elections, and instead backed CC-UCD. I should have probably included it to be honest.
CiU is indeed weaker, but moreso that its numbers indicate. If we recap, CiU won't have TV3, won't have La Vanguardia and won't have the full apparatus of the Generalitat to weather the storm of Banca Catalana...
Thanks for spotting that!
It's a very great AH about the Spanish Transition.
I really like the way you has established a italianization of the nascent Spanish democracy (a strong UCD, although with large internal conflicting tendencies; PCE is the main party of the left-wing; and no unity in the socialist-social democratic option), but I expect a longer period of government of the Suarist sector (Suarez's successor in the post of Prime Minister was one of his tendency), due to its independent foreign policy and its refusal to Spanish industrial restructuring means deindustrialization of the country.
As to the first Catalan elections, I would have preferred a pyrrhic victory of PSUC (one seat above CiU), but the resulting government would be a coalition between CiU and CC-UCD (could be seen as a kind of political karma, because to municipalities won by the PCE by coalitions with the various socialist parties as the largest party was the UCD). There is also the fact that I expect the PS had taken a great result -the only person who was able to mobilize migrant workers from other Spanish regions was Felipe Gonzalez-; without a Catalanist sector, the PS could have taken a lot of potential votes, able to fight for fourth place.
I hope you can update it very very soon.
PS: the number of seats in the Catalan parliament is 135, but the sum of the seats won by the various political parties represented in your AH 1980 Catalan elections is 136.
I really like the way you has established a italianization of the nascent Spanish democracy (a strong UCD, although with large internal conflicting tendencies; PCE is the main party of the left-wing; and no unity in the socialist-social democratic option), but I expect a longer period of government of the Suarist sector (Suarez's successor in the post of Prime Minister was one of his tendency), due to its independent foreign policy and its refusal to Spanish industrial restructuring means deindustrialization of the country.
As to the first Catalan elections, I would have preferred a pyrrhic victory of PSUC (one seat above CiU), but the resulting government would be a coalition between CiU and CC-UCD (could be seen as a kind of political karma, because to municipalities won by the PCE by coalitions with the various socialist parties as the largest party was the UCD). There is also the fact that I expect the PS had taken a great result -the only person who was able to mobilize migrant workers from other Spanish regions was Felipe Gonzalez-; without a Catalanist sector, the PS could have taken a lot of potential votes, able to fight for fourth place.
I hope you can update it very very soon.
PS: the number of seats in the Catalan parliament is 135, but the sum of the seats won by the various political parties represented in your AH 1980 Catalan elections is 136.
It's a very great AH about the Spanish Transition.
I really like the way you has established a italianization of the nascent Spanish democracy (a strong UCD, although with large internal conflicting tendencies; PCE is the main party of the left-wing; and no unity in the socialist-social democratic option), but I expect a longer period of government of the Suarist sector (Suarez's successor in the post of Prime Minister was one of his tendency), due to its independent foreign policy and its refusal to Spanish industrial restructuring means deindustrialization of the country.
Thanks!
Truth be told AP was also highly fractured until Aznar took hold over it in 1989, so someone from the OTL 80s would see clear similarities if the government's ideology was inverted.
Not quite. Calvo Sotelo was not a proper Suarist. He was a conservative azul. And I think it is important to note that he was an obscure figure with clear Atlanticist and bureaucratic outlook, and it was hoped he could salvage the party and prevent a party civil war precisely because of his low profile and conservative credentials (beyond the surname I mean).
I'm not sure de-industrialisation could be avoided. Spain's industry was already outdated in the early 70s and capital investment and labour productivity were extremely low. The UCD might manage to salvage some areas better than the PSOE because they have more experience and they are more tied to traditional industrial lobbies, but basically the main economic goal will be to join the EEC and all else essentially is less important than that.
Yes, but that was a González that led an important party that was radical and counted with the support of the well-organised Catalanist socialists like Maragall, TTL it is not so, the PS is not a very important party (with an UCD absolute majority especially) and so González is a noteworthy politician but not much else. So the PSUC is better able to maintain its predominant position amongst the working class, which it always had anyway.
Another issue is that in the Catalan elections of 1980 OTL and TTL (to a lesser degree) turnout in industrial areas went down because for many workers those elections were unimportant for them, which means that the options to have 3 large industrial parties are limited.
Next week, about the PCE.
I'll try and fix that.
That was the problem with Calvo-Sotelo. He was too independent, not linked to any "family" and when he tried to do his own politics and the barones and the CEOE saw they had still the same trouble as they had with Suarez, they were determined to make him fall, too.
But being independents was also a good thing. Being too tied to any one clear faction would have been worse. And given the situation he had to take care of, he did quite well at governing party and country. TTL that's even more so the case. Although he was more amenable to the CEOE and the right-wing barones's obsession with the natural majority.
Actually CiU-UCD (1) was his preferred coalition. He just lacked one deputy to get the absolute majority.
Foment del Treball will suffer a massive, collective orgasm though.
(1) Keep in mind that the UCD in Catalonia was very different from the PPC, Centristes de Catalunya may have put the stress on conservative over Catalan, but they still came from Unió (a splinter from the least catalanist factions), and many of them, Cañellas included, came from the exact same ideological and social background as Pujol, so CC and payeses. The main difference here is who supports them, UCD was stronger in rural Lleida and Tarragona, CiU in Girona and rural Barcelona, UCD was supported by the great families (Güell and so and such), while CiU was a more upper-middle class affair. When Banca Catalana explodes (and there will be no La Vanguardia, no TV3 to rescue Pujol), PSUC is going to be sooooooooo happy.
I just re-read your AH, and I had forgotten this comment of yours. It look great.
I hope your update very soon your great AH, especially as affect the presence of national private television channels in future cases of political and economic corruption.
Personally, I would have preferred the creation of four private channels broadcast in open during the 80s (a channel for Antena 3 -managing to avoid a stance pro-Catalan nationalist in the Grupo Godo; so, La Vanguardia can maintain its position as the leading Spanish newspaper center-right, because it was the main Spanish daily in the final years of Franco regime-, a channel for PRISA Group, a channel for Diario 16 and Berlusconi's Tele5 -Berlusconi managed to set up his own channels in France and Germany in those years, although he only succeeded in Spain beyond the Italian borders-), while a private channel payment (as Canal+) is created, without underestimating the opportunity to create two new channels broadcast in open in the late 90s, which would be similar to La Sexta and Intereconomia TV, and a new private channel payment (perhaps Murdoch's or Telefonica's, if the latter has already been privatized). You imagine the panorama.
By the way, what happened with the imminent Toxic oil syndrome (Colza oil)?
No worries, Nanwe; we'll wait. Good luck with that master's thesis.
PS: Two doubts:
PS: Two doubts:
- Will we soon see a Jacobin (centralist) path by the Socialists led by Felipe Gonzalez? It would be a good original element in an AH about the Spanish transition: see a Spanish leftist party without any sympathy towards any regionalism or nationalism that seeks inequality among Spaniards, and this way alienate much more to PS of the PCE.
- Did UCD maintain the fiscal independence of Navarre and the Basque provinces as actually occurred, or there is no foral regime regarding tax matters? Right now I don't remember if you mentioned it.
Hey guys, so this TL has been rebooted into one with a less TLIAW feel to it. In Memorias de Nuestros Padres 2.0, with more info, more cool graphics and longer posts and more access to material (hopefully). First post will be next week. So please do check it out
PS: The thesis is finished, I 'll get the results in late September, it was 73 pages.
PS: The thesis is finished, I 'll get the results in late September, it was 73 pages.