TL-191: Navy Blue and Gray - Naval Forces of the USA and CSA
- Thread starter Sierra
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how about basing that off of the maximum battleship proposals
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximum_battleship
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Bismarck was only 42,000 tons, and reasonably if built by anyone but the Germans/Japanese would have been 35,000 tons, going from that to 80,000 is ludicrous. Especially since the CSA is in a far worse position to build capital ships than the Germans
Reasonably I'd see the CSA with some sort of battlecruiser of 30,000 tons, as something they could reasonably build and even that is pushing it considerably
A battlecruiser or two similar to the Scharnhorst class would not be unreasonable for the CSN. Maybe they did have plans for their own full-up battleships, but they either never proceeded past the paper stage, or were laid down, but construction suspended, then formally cancelled and the material broken up for other uses.
I can imagine Whig Administrations (especially under Gabriel Semmes) putting some sort of Bismarck analogue on their wish list, but I have serious difficulty imagining Jake Featherstone putting more than the bare minimum into the CS Navy - as an Army Man and a man whose interests end in the Confederate back yard, he's likely to favour a Jeune École approach, with multiple smaller ships intended to make life as difficult for the US Navy as possible without risking a decisive battle (In fact, one can imagine him treating the Mexican Navy as his own and cheerfully palming off the expense of maintaining battleships off onto the Emperor, so far as that may be possible).
Heck, he'd probably make the CS Navy wear Army Butternut if he could, to save on the extra expense of grey uniforms!
Heck, he'd probably make the CS Navy wear Army Butternut if he could, to save on the extra expense of grey uniforms!
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RamscoopRaider
Donor
He needs some sort of battleship if he wants to pretend the CSA is a great power, because that's the kind of thing great powers have. It's a prestige thing just like having the Olympics in Richmond, the CSA had battleships in the First Great War, ergo the Freedomite CSA needs battleships to show they are back, otherwise they look weak. Of course they don't need a 42,000 ton vessel like Bismarck, or even a 35,000 ton actual treaty battleship, a 25,000 ton or so vessel just slightly bigger than what they had in the FGW would be enough
A pair or more of light battleships like that would actually fit in a Jeune Ecole approach even if they just sit in port, because they force the US to deploy its battleships forward where CS submarines, aircraft and torpedo craft can get at them, whereas without them the US could use more expendable cruisers for that and keep their battleships in reserve
bguy
Donor
I would think Featherston would see the CSA building battleships before the FGW as a perfect example of everything that was wrong with the Whigs (i.e. that they spent a fortune trying to ape the European powers and look like a great power rather than buying weapons that the CSA could have actually used.)
Does a Jeune Ecole approach even makes sense for the Confederates? It's not as though the US is likely to have a lot of seaborne commerce in any Great War scenario since Britain (and Gibraltar) block it off from trading with most of Europe, and Japan blocks it off from trading with Asia. There will probably be some US seaborne trade with the Pacific nations of South America, but that isn't likely to be big enough to justify any major effort by the Confederates to suppress it (and especially since the Confederates don't exactly have a large Pacific presence and the Pacific naval base they do have in Guaymas is easily blockaded.) The US is much more likely to be doing commerce raiding than doing its own seaborne commerce in any such conflict, and as such the most useful naval asset the Confederates could build are destroyers to protect its own trade routes with Europe from US and German submarines.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
He might think that, but his regime still needs to look strong, that's part of his schtick and we know the CSA did build Deutschland equivalents. If he doesn't have battleships and nations like Brazil, Chile and Argentina do, well he looks weaker than them and his base doesn't really like that, any battleships ready for GW II basically have to have been ordered in the early 30's before he actually managed absolute power within the CSA and thus is somewhat sensitive to pressure
Juene Ecole has two parts, small units for defense and long range raiders for attacking enemy commerce, the CSA would make use of the former to keep the US from attacking their coastwide trade with more than just subs, and doing the same to the US coastwise trade with subs. The Confederates can't trade overseas either, because outside the Caribbean they can't stop a fast capital ship from the USN from coming in and butchering a whole convoy, and in the Caribbean only from the Juene Ecole tactic of massed smaller units supported by aircraft. The British can stop the US from sending capital ships close to Europe, but they can't really stop a US hunting group from going down to the South Atlantic and butchering convoys, save by sending their ships to escort convoys, and that runs the risk of them either running their fleet to the ground, or having a battleship be jumped at 3 or 4 to 1 by the US
bguy
Donor
If Featherston with complete control of the Confederate States media is insisting that national strength comes from armor divisions and bomber formations rather than from having battleships do you really think the Confederate population is going to disbelieve him? (And especially since the Confederate people know that having battleships did jack for them in the First Great War.)
Or to look at it another way, did anyone IOTL circa 1939 think Germany was weak because it barely had a surface navy? As long as Featherston builds up his army and air force and in particular so long as he has a large force of bombers (remember the prevailing worry at the time IOTL was that "the bomber always gets through"), no one is going to think the CSA is weak just because it lacks battleships.
Why wouldn't the British use their older dreadnoughts and battlecrusiers to help protect convoys coming from the CSA and Mexico from surface raiders? Older dreadnoughts that are too slow to keep up with carriers and thin skinned battlecruisers aren't going to be of much use in a fleet action in the North Sea but would be able to provide valuable service on convoy duty and given how much Britain and France need Confederate and Mexican oil, it makes sense for them to send some capital ships to protect that vital trade link.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Germany in 1939 had as many modern battleships as France, with more building depending on the month, and more than Italy, it had a much weaker navy overall then the French or Italians, but people counted battleships. It was a national pride thing, like holding the Olympics, which was something Featherston did but arguably a waste of money that could have been spent on more tanks/planes
Featherston didn't if I remember correctly get complete control until '36, any CS battleships ready for SGW have to be ordered before 1935 in a realistic timeline, they'd have to be equivalent of the ugly sisters ordered in early '34, or at most the Bismarcks ordered mid '35, worse as the CS naval industry would be in worse shape than the German, so they'd be ordered before he finished consolidating power
Because anything but a heavily rebuilt Admiral or an early 20's ship would die horribly to a 30's built US capital ship. A QE, R, Iron Duke or Tiger is dead meat against a modern capital ship that gets to control the range, which a raider fighting an escort would be able to, as they don't have the deck armor to survive 16" shells or the guns to penetrate the deck armor of a modern 16" armed raider at range.
bguy
Donor
It's mentioned in The Victorious Opposition that the Confederates aren't allowed to have any warships bigger than coastal defense battleships (that are about half the size of real battleships). Featherston in the early part of his administration at least pretended to abide by the military restrictions the CSA was under (witness him asking Hoover for permission to increase the size of the Confederate Army) and IIRC didn't really start openly flouting the military restrictions until the Smith Administration was in power. Thus I think it would be very unlikely Featherston would start building battleships (a treaty violation that would be impossible to hide) as early as 1934/35.
The older British capital ships would be capable though of fighting off marauding armed merchantmen, destroyers, and cruisers which are the most likely US surface commerce raiders. And is it really likely the US would send its battleships out to try and attack Entente convoys? Dispersing your main force fleet elements like that goes against the Mahanic principle of not dividing the fleet and would make those battleships very vulnerable to getting picked off one by one.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Presumably there was an equivalent of the AGNA at the same time as the army limitations, it's not like we have the full details of the agreement with the US over the relaxation of treaty limits, and honestly the hawks in the US probably don't mind the CSA spending money on battleships compared to tanks/planes. You can't necessarily hide the keel laying, but you can hide all the stuff that goes on before it that takes a year or two before the steel gets cut, for first steel in say 1936, you need an order in 1934 or 35, closer to the former in the CS case as they have more to do to prepare than OTL Germany
The US has the strategic initiative in this case, it's not trying to win or even maintain control of the Atlantic. They can always decide to stay home if the odds are unfavorable or run if they see a force that could beat them. They have no vital duties in the Atlantic beyond keeping the British from interfering with the coastwise traffic. The worst thing losing a battleship or two on a raid is to them is maybe having to pull back from Bermuda or an equivalent exposed possession. By contrast having to escort those forces with modern capital units makes the British violate the Mahanic principle as well, and that matters to them because they need control of the sea, if they lose a modern battleship or two against the US, that risks losing the North Sea, which is a game over for them. The Germans have the initiative there because to quote Sun Tzu "they have no choice but to give battle for I attack a position they must succor", the Germans can choose when to sortie, thus the British need a substantial edge so that at their lowest ebb they can still fight the Germans at their highest. Taking losses in modern units against the US risks that. No amount of lost naval battles on their own would lose the war for the US, the same is not true for Britain
The Pacific is different, but no Panama means any ship in a given ocean is basically stuck there
I may be misusing the term, not being very knowledgeable on naval affairs, but what one meant to convey was a "Less is more" approach intended to do the job as inexpensively and un-fussily as possible (Very much seeking to avoid the appalling expense of a battleship-heavy fleet); quite frankly I'd be surprised if the Featherston Regime wouldn't have preferred to use Cuba as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" to keep US ships out of the Gulf of Mexico (since those aircraft could, in a pinch, be turned to inland defence in a way that warships could not), though I'm not sure the Pacific War would have provided enough precedents to make any government think that aircraft alone could be a serious threat to capital ships.
Having said that, it does make a lot of sense that Confederate naval objectives would be built on coast defence and, perhaps even more so, on convoy protection duty (since the CSA is likely to have needed British munitions shipments quite as much as the RN needed oil & reliable bases in the Western Hemisphere); I'd imagine any 'prestige piece' warships would still have had to work for a living in one or more of those roles before Featherston was willing to sign off on them (He being something of a utilitarian), no matter how desperate his base are to have them.
I wonder what the precise disposition of the US navy at the start of the Second Great War would have been? Having the Royal Navy to worry about in one ocean and the Imperial Japanese Navy in the other is likely to breed a certain numbers of arguments on which is the higher priority ...
bguy
Donor
Why do you think there was an AGNA equivalent? I would think the limitations on the Confederate Navy were part of the peace treaty from the FGW. (And US hawks would presumably not be ok with the Confederates violating any aspect of that treaty, since once you establish the precedent that you aren't going to enforce the treaty it becomes a lot harder to justify enforcing the remainder of the treaty.)
The problem with that is the threat to US dreadnoughts prowling around the middle of the Atlantic might not come from enemy surface combatants. Instead it could come from Entente submarines or aircraft (we know the British had carriers operating in the Atlantic) in which case that US hunter group might not even know its in danger until it is much too late to run.
I don't know if that follows.
Japan bombed Los Angeles with carrier aircraft in the Pacific War and early in the SGW the US tried carrier strikes on Charleston, so the US Navy is certainly aware of the possibility that the British could use their carriers to bomb Boston or New York. That is something the Navy is really going to want to prevent.
Likewise if the British achieved naval superiority in North American waters, then the Royal Navy could assist a Confederate offensive against Maryland/Philadelphia. Britain's older dreadnoughts wouldn't be of much use in the North Sea but in Chesapeake Bay (if properly screened by destroyers and minesweepers) they could provide an incredible amount of fire support for advancing Confederate forces which could be the difference between victory or defeat on that front.
And of course, like Tiro mentioned, the Confederates are likely importing a great deal of war material from Britain. The US government and populace is going to expect the Navy to do something about that and that becomes a lot harder if the Atlantic Fleet is too weak to face the Royal Navy in battle.
Thus I think the US Navy has a lot more on its plate than just protecting the US coastwise traffic.
How much do the British really need capital ships in the North Sea? They aren't going to attempt a close blockade of Germany and a distant blockade can be maintained by light forces. Moreover, if the German High Seas Fleet sorties it's going to be within range of British (and French) land based air. That's always a bad situation for warships and it's especially bad for the TL-191 Germans since per the novel canon they don't actually have any aircraft carriers which means their ships will be hideously vulnerable to air attack if they come out into the North Sea.
Now political realities may force the British to keep most of their capital ships in home waters (and especially since, as Tiro suggested, it's very possible that no one in TL-191 circa 1941 really appreciates that aircraft can now kill battleships), but from a purely military perspective the British could use their advantageous geographic position and air power to keep the German High Sea Fleets at bay which would free up their surface fleet to operate in force in the Atlantic.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Because if Hoover agreed to let the Confederate Army grow bigger, why not the navy? And if the Confederates did not get such an agreement, it's not like the US would get more mad
Submarines against warships are hit or miss, warships are a lot faster than merchantmen, as fast as the fast liners that ran across the Atlantic unescorted without fear of subs in OTL. As for carriers, that runs into the same dispersal of forces as the capital ships. More of a threat one supposes, especially given that those aren't needed in the North sea as much. Generally speaking a raiding group would be using floatplanes for scouting and not have that much less ability that a carrier group for that, Japanese carrier groups relied on theirs rather than carrier launched planes, so getting caught without warning is not that likely
And what did any of those strikes accomplish strategically speaking? Basically nothing. Basically pure propaganda, in Japan's case a surprise attack with low risk, and for the US a manageable one, because again the US can afford to lose carriers. No real damage to the war effort was made, the US can afford that to happen, they prefer not to but a few dozen single engines planes do not do much damage. Not preventing these does not lose the war or seriously hurt the US
Protecting US coastwise traffic is the only thing the USN absolutely has to do, as in don't do this and the war effort is fucked. Other things might sting, but as long as they can do that the war continues. And of course being able to run coastwise traffic means at least naval parity if not superiority in local waters, which the US can achieve with a fleet in being. The US has bases on the Eastern Seaboard, after GWI the UK does not, the RN can't stick around, once the ships have to go home the USN has superiority back by default. One supposes Britain could operate out of Confederate bases, but that runs into concentration of forces issue, they can't send too much away without running risks at home, they can get away with short periods, but the modern stuff has to leave
Nobody's getting anything into the Chesapeake, the entry strait is narrow enough US guns can hold it closed from the part of Virginia they hold, it's short enough that some period torpedoes can reach the whole distance from the bit of Virginia cut off by the bay the US held since GWI
So your saying that the US population wants to stop the CS from importing British war material. Like say by busting British convoys? With which modern capital ships are the best answer as they can overpower any escort the British can spare
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The British need capital ships in the North Sea because they need to keep their supply lines to the continent clear and to prevent the Germans from screwing their coastal traffic, or landing an army on Britain. The first means the front in France collapses, the second means their war economy collapses and the third opens up another front in a place that they can't afford, any of these are war losers for Britain. The relevant parts of the North Sea are also within range of German land based air so the German lack of carriers is irrelevant to them. And of course bad weather grounds aircraft but doesn't stop warships, and the North Sea is not famous for its clear skies. Thus to keep this from happening the British need enough heavies in the North Sea, a 5:3 superiority to account for ships in maintenance as the attacker can chose to attack when all ships are working, the defender is stuck with what is available
bguy
Donor
Hoover let the Confederates increase their army to deal with the uprising from the African-Confederate population and specifically said he would not permit the increase if he thought there was any chance the Confederates would use their army against the US. Increasing the size of the Confederate Navy isn't necessary to deal with an internal revolt. It can only be used to harm the US. Therefore there is no reason for Hoover to allow the Confederates to increase their navy.
That's true but submarines still did pretty good hunting capital ships in OTL World War 2 as US, German, and Japanese subs all bagged carriers.
The morale impact on getting caught by a surprise air raid can have an impact all out of proportion to the actual damage inflicted though. (Look at how Japan IOTL overreacted to the pinprick Doolittle Raid.) And the TL-191 US is probably particularly sensitive to this as between what happened to the US coast in the Second Mexican War and the raid on Los Angeles in the Pacific War, US port cities coming under attack is a very sensitive subject for the US people.
Also if a British carrier raid struck the main US fleet bases it could potentially do a great deal of damage to the US Navy. (Battleships tied up in a harbor are a lot easier to kill than battleships out on the ocean.) The US Navy is certainly going to want to avoid having its fleet Copenhagened by a surprise air attack.
On the concentration of forces issue, the problem is the strategy you are suggesting the British employ (keep their main fleet concentrated in home waters and thus effectively cede the western Atlantic to the US) is the strategy the British employed in the FGW, and it ended with Britain on the brink of starvation. And if anything the British are even more vulnerable to being strangled by the US and German navies in the SGW since submarine technology has greatly improved since the FGW (meaning US submarines will now have the range to operate off the British Isles which is something they wouldn't have been able to do in the FGW), and British has a much greater need for oil in the SGW (which has to come by sea) than it had in the FGW. Thus if the British are to have any chance in this conflict at all, they are going to have to be more aggressive with their fleet than they were in the FGW and seriously contest the western Atlantic.
And you don't think the Entente could suppress those defenses with air strikes and naval gunfire? Given the potential advantages to the Entente cause from the Confederates being able to advance up Maryland supported by naval gunfire, forcing the strait would seem to be worth risking the loss of some of your older dreadnoughts.
Submarines are a far better answer for busting British convoys than capital ships. (IOTL World War 2, US submarines were responsible for the majority of Japanese merchant marine losses and killed 10 times as much Japanese merchant tonnage as US surface craft did.)
https://www.history.navy.mil/resear...nese-naval-merchant-shipping-losses-wwii.html
Which again is why the Confederates need to focus on building destroyers as that is the best counter to the US weapon platform that will actually cut the link between Europe and the CSA if it is not countered.
Submarines, mines, and torpedo boats can keep German raiders at bay should the weather be too bad for aircraft to operate. Its also not as though the British have to deploy all their dreadnoughts to American waters. They could certainly leave some behind in case the Germans send out a heavy raiding force. (That would violate Mahanic principles, but its probably a political necessity as Parliament is never going to be ok with the entire Grand Fleet being sent to the western Atlantic unless the German Navy has been eliminated.)
Indeed given the political realities involved, the best British deployment might be to send the carriers and older dreadnoughts to the west Atlantic while the newer dreadnoughts stay in the North Sea. The carriers give them the ability to strike at the American Navy on the high seas should it come out to play while the older dreadnoughts can perform convoy duty and provide naval gunfire support when the Entente goes after Bermuda, the Bahamas and Haiti (all of which will need to be retaken or at least neutralized to secure the sea links between the CSA and Europe). Conversely Parliament and the British public should be satisfied that Britain is still protected since the dreadnoughts (supported by British and French land based air) should be enough to keep the German High Seas Fleet at bay. It's not an ideal solution from a Mahanic standpoint, but it's probably the only option that gives the British any chance of keeping the supply line to the Americas open without triggering a political crisis at home.)
The problem with the Germans relying on land based air to cover their fleet is, just as you said, the attacker gets to choose the moment they attack. It's going to be much more difficult for the Germans to maintain a constant land based CAP over their fleet sufficiently large enough to fight off the massed power of the RAF than it is going to be for the RAF to decide to mass its air power at one specific moment to attack the German fleet.
(You also have to keep in mind that the British war plan for fighting Germany involves the British Army invading northwest Germany. The German Air Force won't be providing any cover for the German Navy if British tanks are sitting on its runways.)
RamscoopRaider
Donor
I haven't reread the books in over a decade
In any case what Hoover says and what the final legal document between the two nations say are two different things. We don't have the latter, and I can see some bright mind in State going, if we give the CSA 10-20% our Cap ship tonnage for them to blow on prestige ships that could improve relations enough and doesn't threaten US. Of course there is no evidence such exists, but I think it logical. Even if it doesn't
Submarine kills of carriers generally happened in confined waters, of damaged ships with a smoke plume as a beacon or of escorts attached to slow convoys. In the wide open spaces of the mid Atlantic submarines generally worked best when vectored in from other spotters, otherwise blundered into ships be sheer luck
The way to avoid a surprise carrier attack on a land target is long range patrols of MPAs, which outrange carrier aircraft, not having carriers or other ships doing patrols themselves. And such an attack still doesn't change the actual strategic calculus
Britain would adopt the same strategy in the SGW as the FGW as her enemies are still the same, her fundamental strategic position is still the same and neither the British isles, nor the European continent have moved significantly. Italy's neutral so they'd be getting their oil via Persia this go round, or possibly Russia, British dependence on Western Hemisphere oil is something that did change, at least OTL. One of the things that likely lead to starvation in FGW was an interruption of British coastal trade by German light units out of northern France, at least OTL the commander of the British coastal convoys pointed out if they stopped running London would need 25% of its population dispersed to avoid starvation
Eventually such defenses could be suppressed, eventually. Average depth of the bay is less water than even an old battleship draws (21 ft, HMS Dreadnought 29 ft at load, I class BC 30 feet, the actual ships they would be using are 32-33 feet, even a Catherine'd R class conversion would be 22 ft.) They can advance into Pennsylvania via the shipping channel, but that can be blocked by virtue of the US scuttling a few barges, which they have time to do while the defenses are being suppressed, use barges so small craft can ride over them, which means they aren't a later obstacle for a US offensive. Don't see them getting within gun range of the front unless it collapses on the CS side
Surface raiders make submarines far more effective. Convoys make it harder for submarines to find a target, it's not significantly easier to find a 100 ship convoy than 1 ship and the number of targets are reduced. Surface raiders can spot for the subs and unlike subs they have enough killing power that if the convoy stays together they can butcher the lot. Thus a surface raider that can defeat the escorts makes the convoy scatter, and thus the Subs much more effective. Submarines did most of the killing in OTL for a few reasons, they could operate in areas where surface fleets could not or against enemies with superiority, and the fact that convoys often did not run at all when there was a threat of a surface raider. The CSA isn't going to be building ocean going convoy escorts (smaller stuff for the Caribbean/coast is different) as convoys are only getting through if Britain protects them from US heavies, and in that case they can provide the escorts
Notably submarines, mines and torpedo craft did not work against the German raiders in OTL WWI, what stopped the raids was the risks of interception of I scouting group by the BCF and the subsequent interception of the HSF by the GF. In any case the carriers have to be based out of Britain, as that is where the bases are, though they could also be based out of Gibraltar (or Malta, Alexandria, Aden or Sydney but those don't matter for the Atlantic), they can sortie into the Western Atlantic, but they can't stay there due to lack of basing infrastructure (by the same token the US fleet can sortie into the Eastern Atlantic but can't stay there, nobody in 191 has an equivalent of the fleet train supporting TF 38/58). Same's true for basically anything, only alternative is to rely on a CS port, but the CS isn't going to have the infrastructure to maintain a major fleet anywhere, meaning only a detachment can be supported
While it is true land based air has its limitations, aircraft are more limited than ships, attacking in say the winter means most days aircraft can't fly and the days they can fly are shorter (specialized night attack squadrons being a relatively scarce resource), which makes it easier for the Germans to provide cover if the RAF has less of a window
Edit: At this point we're derailing the thread I think, I'm probably not going to respond to another post on this particular topic. Double Edit: Sorry if I sounded impolite there
In any case what Hoover says and what the final legal document between the two nations say are two different things. We don't have the latter, and I can see some bright mind in State going, if we give the CSA 10-20% our Cap ship tonnage for them to blow on prestige ships that could improve relations enough and doesn't threaten US. Of course there is no evidence such exists, but I think it logical. Even if it doesn't
Submarine kills of carriers generally happened in confined waters, of damaged ships with a smoke plume as a beacon or of escorts attached to slow convoys. In the wide open spaces of the mid Atlantic submarines generally worked best when vectored in from other spotters, otherwise blundered into ships be sheer luck
The way to avoid a surprise carrier attack on a land target is long range patrols of MPAs, which outrange carrier aircraft, not having carriers or other ships doing patrols themselves. And such an attack still doesn't change the actual strategic calculus
Britain would adopt the same strategy in the SGW as the FGW as her enemies are still the same, her fundamental strategic position is still the same and neither the British isles, nor the European continent have moved significantly. Italy's neutral so they'd be getting their oil via Persia this go round, or possibly Russia, British dependence on Western Hemisphere oil is something that did change, at least OTL. One of the things that likely lead to starvation in FGW was an interruption of British coastal trade by German light units out of northern France, at least OTL the commander of the British coastal convoys pointed out if they stopped running London would need 25% of its population dispersed to avoid starvation
Eventually such defenses could be suppressed, eventually. Average depth of the bay is less water than even an old battleship draws (21 ft, HMS Dreadnought 29 ft at load, I class BC 30 feet, the actual ships they would be using are 32-33 feet, even a Catherine'd R class conversion would be 22 ft.) They can advance into Pennsylvania via the shipping channel, but that can be blocked by virtue of the US scuttling a few barges, which they have time to do while the defenses are being suppressed, use barges so small craft can ride over them, which means they aren't a later obstacle for a US offensive. Don't see them getting within gun range of the front unless it collapses on the CS side
Surface raiders make submarines far more effective. Convoys make it harder for submarines to find a target, it's not significantly easier to find a 100 ship convoy than 1 ship and the number of targets are reduced. Surface raiders can spot for the subs and unlike subs they have enough killing power that if the convoy stays together they can butcher the lot. Thus a surface raider that can defeat the escorts makes the convoy scatter, and thus the Subs much more effective. Submarines did most of the killing in OTL for a few reasons, they could operate in areas where surface fleets could not or against enemies with superiority, and the fact that convoys often did not run at all when there was a threat of a surface raider. The CSA isn't going to be building ocean going convoy escorts (smaller stuff for the Caribbean/coast is different) as convoys are only getting through if Britain protects them from US heavies, and in that case they can provide the escorts
Notably submarines, mines and torpedo craft did not work against the German raiders in OTL WWI, what stopped the raids was the risks of interception of I scouting group by the BCF and the subsequent interception of the HSF by the GF. In any case the carriers have to be based out of Britain, as that is where the bases are, though they could also be based out of Gibraltar (or Malta, Alexandria, Aden or Sydney but those don't matter for the Atlantic), they can sortie into the Western Atlantic, but they can't stay there due to lack of basing infrastructure (by the same token the US fleet can sortie into the Eastern Atlantic but can't stay there, nobody in 191 has an equivalent of the fleet train supporting TF 38/58). Same's true for basically anything, only alternative is to rely on a CS port, but the CS isn't going to have the infrastructure to maintain a major fleet anywhere, meaning only a detachment can be supported
While it is true land based air has its limitations, aircraft are more limited than ships, attacking in say the winter means most days aircraft can't fly and the days they can fly are shorter (specialized night attack squadrons being a relatively scarce resource), which makes it easier for the Germans to provide cover if the RAF has less of a window
Edit: At this point we're derailing the thread I think, I'm probably not going to respond to another post on this particular topic. Double Edit: Sorry if I sounded impolite there
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IJN Carriers as of 2022
The Imperial Japanese Navy is the 2nd Largest Navy in the world. It is currently in a massive build-up after a decade of negligence. It is currently supporting rebels in Burmese Civil War in form of air support.
Quick question, are any of the German or Japanese aircraft carriers nuclear powered? Just wondering, because you had shown it with the American carriers.