Chapter Four: The Battle of Pella (Autumn 279- February 278 BCE)
By Autumn 279 BCE, Seleucus was in full swing preparing for his next confrontation with the Gauls. In October, he returned from Thessaly to Pella where he began consolidating his forces. The campaign of that summer had provided ample opportunity to put his army through its paces and very publicly show his dedication to protecting Greece against the Gallic threat. At the same time, he had begun leveraging his diplomatic connections, both in Greece and in Asia Minor, to bolster his forces in preparation for the inevitable confrontation with Brennus and Bolgias. Apparently convinced by the threat posed by the Gauls, the Aetolian Legaue had sent some 3000 soldiers in September. These had been joined by reinforcements from Thessaly, from the recently formed Achaean League of the Northern Peloponnese and even a few exiles from Athens and Corinth.
Politically, the image of the Gallic invasion was gold for Seleucus. In October or November, upon his return to Pella, he stated his intention to lead the Greeks in their defence against the Gallic threat. The allusions to the Persians, the last major outside threat to Greek independence some 200 years earlier, were clear enough. Now, Seleucus could recast himself as a modern-day Leonidas, or even Themistocles, a heroic defender of Greek interests against the marauding barbarian. To underline this, he publicly paraded his Gallic captives, displaying treasures stolen from their camps and exhorting his Greek allies to rally around him.
Here was an opportunity for Seleucus to place himself very clearly at the head of the Greek states, to assert his rightful position as king of Macedon and underline his status as the last, and greatest, of Alexander’s successors. Incidentally, it also gave him the opportunity to harden his position and resolve against Antigonus. In November, Seleucus publicly lambasted Antigonus’ attacks on Greek territories earlier that year as a sign that he intended to betray the Greek states. In Seleucus’ story, Antigonus was a modern-day Ephialtes, not only betraying the Greeks to their enemies, but even launching attacks against Greek cities.
That isn’t to say that everyone necessarily bought into this. On the contrary, Antigonus responded by doubling down on his assertion that Seleucus intended to enslave the Greek cities. Indeed, in the 270s, Antigonid propaganda seems to have leaned rather heavily on the image of Seleucus as a modern-day Xerxes; another ‘great king’ from the East intent on enslaving and conquering Greece for his own benefit. The problem was that Antigonus simply could not compete with the very real image of the Gallic army poking around at the borders of Macedonia.
Then there was the issue of Antigonid garrisons. He couldn’t simply give up his garrisons in Athens, Corinth or Chalcis without abandoning his ability to command these cities and access their resources. So long as he maintained these garrisons (and Demetrias), he could strike at the interior of Thessaly, control the sea lanes running down the western coast of Eretria, and control the Isthmus of Corinth. Control over these was essential for control over Greece.
However, maintaining the garrisons appeared only to give credence to Seleucus’ own statements. Why, if Antigonus intended to protect the Greeks against Seleucus’ ambitions, would he maintain garrisons in apparently autonomous Greek cities? In contrast to the Nesiotic League, currently without many major garrisons, Antigonus’ control over Greece must have seemed reasonably harsh. In effect, Antigonus could neither gain any political capital from the war against the Gauls nor do much to disarm the accusations of Hellenophobia levelled against him by Seleucus.
The real problems, however, wouldn’t come until later that winter. In December, Brennus’ army entered Lower Macedonia. Rallying his army around him, Seleucus went out to meet the Gallic army, probably somewhere in the flatter lands west of Pella. In the last year, Seleucus had had ample time to study and fight Gallic forms of warfare. Of particular concern was the lightness of Gallic soldiers; relatively few Gallic soldiers were heavily armoured and the majority were lightly armed with spears, javelins, slings or whatever they could find. In a direct hand-to-hand confrontation between the Macedonian phalanx and the Gallic soldiers, there was no doubt who would likely come out on top. The worry was warfare on broken ground.
The other issue was the Gallic cavalry, of which Brennus had significant numbers. In preparation for this, Seleucus had spent the last year working on joining his Thessalian and Persian cavalry forces into one. Or, at least, on ensuring that the two could work together. In addition, he had brought an extra countermeasure of bringing over some 30 of his war elephants from Apamea. Tactically, the battle was well chosen; Seleucus made his move only once Brennus had entered Lower Macedonia where the hills gave way to somewhat flatter terrain. This privileged both cavalry forces, allowing Seleucus to rely upon his cavalry to a greater extent. Where the real advantage lay was in giving Seleucus a better chance at avoiding terrain which might break up his formations and provide opportunities for the Gauls to move in.
For Seleucus’ part, the army was arrayed in a reasonably conventional manner for the Hellenistic period. A variety of skirmishers, including Cretan and Persian archers as well as Aetolian peltasts, were placed ahead of the army, helping screen its movements. His most veteran infantry was largely placed on the centre and right with his elephants and Persian cavalry (more used to fighting alongside elephants) at the end. On the left he placed mostly a variety of local and less experienced forces with his Thessalian cavalry at the other end. The exact disposition of the Gallic army is unknown except that their fighting style was a lot more fluid, with a heavier focus on skirmishing and with their larger cavalry forces taking up either flank.
The first few hours of the battle could have gone either way; the back and forth between Gallic and Seleucid skirmishers largely ending in something of a stalemate. According to one source, Seleucus’ archers were more skilled than many of the Gallic skirmishers but often outdone in sheer reckless bravery by Brennus’ army, who would launch daring raids to harass Macedonian forces and inflict casualties. When, finally, the Seleucid and Gallic infantry met, the fighting was exceptionally fierce. Seleucus is claimed to have had some 45,000 soldiers to maybe 50-55,000 Gallic warriors. On the right, the fighting seems to have skewed in favour of the better trained, and heavier armed, Seleucid infantry. On the left, however, the powerful Gallic swords and better morale of Brennus’ soldiers made incremental gains against the less experienced recruits placed there.
The real advantage for Seleucus, however, was the elephant contingent placed on the right flank. Beyond their propaganda value, elephants had several strategic values. Firstly, for men unfamiliar with them, they were a serious source of anxiety; throughout the battle, Brennus’ warriors tended to steer clear of the beasts, making only a few short sorties to harass them and usually driven off rather quickly. Secondly, untrained horses veered away from elephants. While Seleucus’ Persian cavalry had been better trained to fight alongside elephants, the Gallic horses were not so lucky. The result was that, as the Gallic cavalry attempted to engage Seleucus’ right flank, they soon found themselves unable to rally their horses, giving the Persian cavalry the upper hand and, ultimately, routing the Gallic horse.
With the Gallic cavalry routed, Seleucus’ cavalry was able to sweep around begin outflanking the infantry. On the left, Brennus’ cavalry had gained the upper hand but had done too little too late, by the time they were able to attack the Seleucid infantry, much of the Gallic infantry had already fled. With the Gallic left already broken, the rout began to spread throughout the rest of the army. As they fled, the Seleucid cavalry went on the offensive, driving the fleeing Gauls for miles before nightfall put an end to their pursuit. The battle of Pella was over, thousands of Gallic soldiers lay dead, and the rest scattered. Alongside them were Bolgias and Acichorius, both slain during the battle.
What the battle had not quite achieved was the total defeat of the Gauls. Aside from the fact that Cerethrius was still active in Thrace, the remains of Brennus’ army were able to reform in the weeks immediately following their defeat at Pella. With that said, there is no doubt that the battle was a huge victory and, politically, one of Seleucus’ greatest. Brennus’ defeat had, at least temporarily, raised the threat of invasion from Greece’s doorstep and brought with it a whole slew of captives and captured treasure for Seleucus to parade. Certainly, he played the victory for everything it was worth. In the weeks that followed, Seleucus made a series of huge dedications at Delphi, sending letters across the entire Greek world publicising his victories to any who would listen. The publicisation of the victory went further than this, too. Coins minted in 278/7 BCE celebrated the victory, depicting Seleucus with an elephant headdress on one side and defeated Gauls on the other.
In early 278 BCE, Seleucus began the construction of a new altar to Athene Nike in Pella, also providing funds for new temples and shrines all across Macedonia and coastal Thrace. Down South, he sent money for the erection of a series of statues depicting famous Greek victories over 'barbarian' peoples to be set up in the forum at Athens, although none of these would actually be erected until the expulsion of Antigonus' garrison later that year. Dedications and celebrations were ordered elsewhere too; a series of grand sacrifices thanking the gods for victory took place throughout several cities of Asia Minor and Syria alongside orders for new dedications and building programmes. It is here that Seleucus' love of building really shows; the defeat of the Gauls at Pella was simply an excuse to continue policies that Seleucus had been pushing for years. All across his empire, Seleucus was literally building a network of images confirming, reinforcing, and publicising his victory.
In Greece, the hope was to reinforce the image of Seleucus as the saviour and defender of the Greek world. Sure enough, the months following the victory at Pella saw a whole slew of cities offering thanks and public dedications in honour of Seleucus. Alongside this, he took the opportunity to tour many of these same Greek cities, building support, establishing personal connections, making benefactions and otherwise taking the opportunity to integrate himself into the political environment of Greece and the Greek cities. Back in Thrace and Macedonia, however, his work was far from done. As it stood there were perhaps as many as 40,000 Gallic soldiers still active in Thrace and Macedonia. Currently, however, these soldiers were split; Brennus' army was still recovering in Macedonia while Cerethrius was active in the interior of Thrace.
