I don't think you mean Antiochus III here since he hasn't been born yet - Alexander?
And both the Ptolemies and Seleucids need to realise that the forever war in Coele-Syria benefits neither of them.
'the Victorious': Seleucus Nicator and the world after Alexander
- Thread starter ClaustroPhoebic
- Start date
- Status
And both the Ptolemies and Seleucids need to realise that the forever war in Coele-Syria benefits neither of them.
Anyone hoping Pyrrhus's adventure ends early at Beneventum?
As I think it would be cool to subvert the usual (if borderline cliche) 'What if Pyrrhus was victorious' schtick discussed repeatedly
As I think it would be cool to subvert the usual (if borderline cliche) 'What if Pyrrhus was victorious' schtick discussed repeatedly
Dang, things are not goin well for Antiochus, but also they aren't going as bad as they could be. Shame about the Gauls not being useful at the moment,
How extreme will the Vengeance of Antiochus be? And has he done something of state building during his reign?
How extreme will the Vengeance of Antiochus be? And has he done something of state building during his reign?
I feel like Ptolemy (his son) would have to die too in that case, since my reading seems to indicate he was largely cut from the same cloth as his father.
Chapter Nine
Chapter Nine: From the Meander to Pergamon (October 275-July 269 BCE)
The Reconquest of Anatolia (October 275- July 269 BCE):
In October 275 BCE, Eumenes began marching East, apparently with the goal of putting down the Gallic raids along the Meander Valley. By this point, the Ionian rebels undoubtedly knew of Antiochus' preparations for a campaign into Anatolia and it is possible that Eumenes' campaign at least had this in mind; bringing the Meander under control might provide the rebels with some leeway. His target was Brennus who had spent the last year or so launching raids in the Meander valley and, otherwise, starting to bring the region under his own authority by one means or another. At his command, we are told Eumenes was fielding perhaps 20-30,000 soldiers maximum, the vast majority of whom, however, were infantry or skirmishers. The exact numbers of warriors under Brennus' command isn't known particularly well but some historians have estimated perhaps 20-25,000 Gallic warriors and maybe some levies from local populations along the Meander (although this isn't especially well known). As was the case at Pella some three years earlier, Brennus' army was mostly comprised of light skirmishing troops with a small core of heavy infantry and a rather large number of cavalrymen (primarily light cavalry but with a few heavier cavalrymen thrown in).
The First Battle of the Meander took place, apparently, in January or February 274 BCE. During winter, the region around the Meander can get quite rainy and wet and, supposedly, it had rained the night before. The Meander river, while quite narrow, is also very deep, allowing Eumenes to anchor his left flank up against the river with reasonably little fear of being outflanked there. The rain had left the ground itself rather muddy and, as the battle began, it became quickly apparent that the fighting would privilege lighter armed skirmishers. The three years between the Battle of Pella and the First Battle of the Meander had given the Gauls time to adjust somewhat to the realities of Greek warfare. Whether by strategy or by accident, the Battle of the Meander took full advantage of this knowledge and, as the fighting commenced, the heavier Greek phalanx found itself bogged down and less able to move.
By contrast, the lighter-armed skirmishers on both sides of the field could cross the muddy terrain far more successfully than the heavier infantry. As the fighting went on, the better Gallic skirmishers outfought their rivals and began to launch raids against the Greek infantry lines. For hours, Eumenes' phalanx was bombarded, falling back behind shields to try and protect against the onslaught of slings and arrows and javelins. As time went on, the Gallic cavalry was able to defeat their rebel counterparts and, finally, outflank the phalanx. What followed was an absolute slaughter; Eumenes' soldiers fled but the mud slowed them down, many casting off their armour and weaponry in an attempt to outpace the Gallic skirmishers. Eumenes survived, retreating west with a contingent of perhaps 7000 survivors but much of his army had been either killed or captured.
To date, it was the greatest victory achieved by Brennus' army and in the aftermath, they began to expand their raids and attacks beyond just the Meander, even entering parts of Cappadocia and Ptolemaic territory. This short period between the First and Second Battles of the Meander marks the height of Brennus' career and time as king. This was the point at which the Gallic threat was sometimes said to have reached its peak for many Greek onlookers. By the time Antiochus crossed the Tauros mountains over a year later, Brennus had carved out his own small kingdom right in the heart of Anatolia and was beginning to drive west and south towards the coast.
Gallic rule in Anatolia is an interesting but, unfortunately understudied, part of ancient history. Brennus' kingdom unfortunately only lasted about two years maximum and, while several Greek authors were interested in writing about it, a lot of the details are now lost. Supposedly, Brennus ruled from a city known to some Greek authors as Prausopolis (literally 'City of the Prausi'- the tribe Brennus came from). Certainly, it was here that he set up as king. What we also know is that Gallic rule here was entirely centred on kingship which, by the late 270s, was entirely invested in Brennus himself. What is interesting is that, while the tribal divisions that had existed in 279 BCE still existed, the last few years of resettlement had apparently gone a long way to unifying the tribes. Unfortunately, we know little of their self-perception or identity but several coins have been unearthed from the region which appear to imitate Seleucid issues. The coins bear Brennus' face on one side and usually some form of horseman or rider image on the reverse with the very occasional presence of another coin type bearing Greek gods, often Apollo. Some Greek authors refer to them as 'Pannonians' in imitation of the region they had first come from but on occasion we hear more specific terms such as 'Prausi' or even broader terms such as 'Celt'. The result is that a lot of Gallic identity is lost during this period and is usually only reconstructed through their identity and presence in later accounts dealing with the Gauls after the Second Battle of the Meander.
What has also been of interest to some is the relationship between Brennus' kingdom and the communities of Anatolia. We know that, by the Second Battle of the Meander, Brennus was able to field some 35-38,000 warriors and that, for the first time, he was able field his own phalanx, albeit comprised largely of levied soldiers. What appears to have taken place is a situation not unfamiliar to that of the Seleucids themselves. Some communities were, apparently, directly under Brennus' rule and paid tribute and provided soldiers. Other communities, however, seem to have had looser connections with Prausopolis by which they were officially 'allies' but provided their own soldiers, usually infantry, sometimes as volunteer or sometimes in return for pay. We also know that Brennus, by 273, had amassed a rather large court comprised of Gauls, Greeks, and a few indigenous Anatolians. These 'friends', as they were termed, acted as an advisory council, political environment and military bodyguard for the king as well as interpreters and important links between the Gallic king and local communities.
What might have happened with the Gallic kingdom is unfortunately unknown. In August 273 BCE, Antiochus I crossed the Tauros mountains into Anatolia and began marching towards the Meander Valley. The army he led was a far cry from that which Brennus had fought a year and a half earlier. Antiochus came with some 40-45,000 soldiers, many of whom had been fighting with him in Syria over the last few years. He had also made sure to bring elephants, something Eumenes hadn't had at his disposal and which were a lot more able to move across muddy fields (if only due to their sheer size) than the average Macedonian infantryman. He had also come prepared with a large force of Persian archers, likely to counter the Gallic advantage in skirmishers which had won them the day against Eumenes. The result was a rather lopsided victory for the Seleucids. On the day of battle, the two skirmishing forces fought to a standstill while the Seleucid elephant and cavalry forces drove back the Gallic cavalry before finally outflanking the Gauls and routing them en masse.
This time, there was no retreat. In his victory, Antiochus pursued Brennus to Prausopolis and sacked the city, capturing the king in the process. Between November 273 and March 272 BCE, Antiochus largely remained here in Central Anatolia, probably dismantling Brennus' kingdom and reintegrating the land into his own territory. The Gauls were once again disarmed and to be punished for their revolt. While they were allowed to remain in Prausopolis and keep some of their land along the Meander, much of it was also confiscated. A new Seleucid garrison was to set up inside the city and Brennus' family removed as king to be brought back to Syria. In his place was the so-called Prausarch, an official charged with the job of keeping the Gauls in line and subject to the governor of the region. Alongside this was the collection of hostages, usually the eldest sons of the Gallic elites who were to join Antiochus' court for education. Over time, of course, much of these restrictions would be lifted and land returned but, until the death of Antiochus, this was the general structure of the relationships between the Seleucids and the Gauls. Brennus himself didn't survive much longer, dying only a few months later in western Anatolia of a fever, although some have suspected that Antiochus had him executed once they were away from Gallic territory where the death of the king might trigger another revolt.
Marching west, Antiochus liberated Sardes in June or July 272 BCE and began preparations for the reconquest of Ionia. Just as Philetairos and Eumenes had feared, Sardes quickly became the base of operations for a much larger war of reconquest. Over the next year and a half, Seleucid forces set about recapturing much of Ionia. In the South, the governments of Miletus and Priene seem to have been restored to power by May 271 BCE at the latest and the former exiles rewarded for their loyalty to the Seleucid throne. Other cities faced stringent punishments or harsher terms of peace although, as with the Gauls, these would be stripped back over time. Pergamene dedications often remained in place but a few seem to have been re-carved and renamed to fit Seleucid ideology, often with Antiochus' (or rarely Seleucus') name placed on to recast them as Seleucid benefactions.
The real culmination, however, came in 270 BCE when, after a long campaign to shut down the rebels in Ionia, Antiochus met the Pergamene army in battle, routing them and laying siege to the fortress of Pergamon. Famously, the siege of Pergamon was to last nearly a year although Antiochus was not around for all of it. In the end, however, the fortress surrendered in July 269 BCE and Philetairos and Eumenes were captured and executed. In their place, a new Seleucid hyparch was set up and a Seleucid garrison installed to keep watch surrounding area. By this point, Antiochus was no longer in Anatolia, having left the previous year to fight for the throne of Macedon and the siege was likely carried out by one of his subordinates, although we are not sure who.
Empire Building (277-270 BCE):
At this point, I feel it only right to pause the narrative to begin talking somewhat about other topics in Seleucid history. Until now, we have largely covered the basic narrative events of Seleucus I and Antiochus I but, as we approach the end of the crisis in the early 3rd Century, it is worth taking the time to begin discussing the actual structures and workings of the Seleucid Empire under Antiochus. Simply, Antiochus had not been spending the last seven years solely fighting wars and reconquering land. On the contrary, much of this time had also been spent ruling and, largely, building. The war in Syria seems to have driven Antiochus to put a lot off stock in infrastructure, especially around Antioch and down towards the South. Much of the actual work done here, largely between 276 and 273 BCE, seems to have been simply maintenance work to make sure the old Persian royal road was still functioning. In 272 BCE, this process was expanded in the wake of the victory the Meander to fix up many of the roads in Anatolia. During this stretch, however, Antiochus had also begun the construction of several new forts along the road, likely in response to the Gallic raids, as well as new watchtowers and a whole slew of fortifications around many smaller settlements in Central Anatolia. The culmination of these building works came between 272 and 270 BCE when Antiochus continued fixing the roads as far as Sardes.
Perhaps the largest project of Antiochus' reign, however, was the Syrian necropolis near Antioch which began construction in 274 BCE. Upon his return to Syria in 276, Antiochus had buried Seleucus not far from the city, beginning a brand new royal burial ground. Initially, the tomb of Seleucus appears to have been rather simple but, with the conclusion of the war in 274, Antiochus took the time to elaborate it. The tomb of Seleucus itself took significant influence from Macedonian precedents back at Aigai, incorporating a large mound under which was buried a built tomb. As with many Macedonian precedents, the tomb incorporates many illusionistic techniques such as painted friezes, architectural facades and a mixed Ionic and Doric style. However, unlike its Macedonian precedents, the tomb also incorporates some of the more eclectic building styles found in pre-Hellenistic Anatolian structures, especially the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus. This includes the use of an Ionic doorframe (almost unheard of in Macedonian tombs) as well as more sculptural decoration than we might expect from what we see at Aigai. This was the tomb as it existed in 276.
In 274, Antiochus began the process of architecturally elaborating the whole site. The new 'Seleucid Necropolis' was to be more clearly delineated and a grand temple to Apollo erected near the entryway to the site. This grand temple, largely following the Ionic order as was typical for the Hellenistic, was to overlook the whole area and was oriented to be directly visible from Antioch itself. In addition to this, Antiochus ordered a series of games to be held in August every year with a larger game every four years, probably in direct imitation of the Panathenaeum. One theory is that this was Antiochus directly lifting from the intended games he had promised to be held in Macedonia back in 277 BCE and, accordingly, the games were known as the Antiochic Games (named after the city despite some confusion by many students of the subject!).
While we are discussing years, it is worth talking about the other major innovation of Antiochus' rule (although some of the inspiration likely came from Seleucus himself). Sometime around 280, Antiochus had introduced a brand new dating system known as the 'Seleucid Era'. What is entirely unique about the Seleucid Era was that it was a continuous, absolute dating system beginning in 312 BCE when Seleucus I reconquered Babylon. As such, the year 280 BCE (for example) became 32 SE and the year 270 became 42 SE and so on. This is one of the most unique innovations of the Seleucid empire and one which many do not know about but it was an extraordinarily important innovation. What the 'Seleucid Era' did was create a system of perceiving time intimately tied to the Seleucid dynasty. In time, most of the empire would come to use the dating system alongside, or even in place of, their existing dating systems. Everywhere you went, every inscription was now characterised and dated according to the years of the dynasty. What this was was a huge ideological development, one which promised that the Seleucids were not going anywhere anytime soon. The Seleucid calendar could go on forever... just as the Seleucids could. With every building programme, with every inscription and dedication and with every year, the Seleucid dynasty began to imprint itself more and more on the environment of its empire.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Out of Context: Fun fact for any interested readers: The Seleucid Era is a very real innovation which outlived the Seleucid Empire in many places. The calendar was still popular in Syria and Central Asia until the 15th Century and was used in some Jewish communities until modern times. In fact, the Seleucid Era calendar even appears on the Xi'an Stela, erected in Tang Dynasty China somewhere in Xian and unearthed by the Ming several hundred years later which says that it was erected in the 'Year of the Greeks 1092'.
The Reconquest of Anatolia (October 275- July 269 BCE):
In October 275 BCE, Eumenes began marching East, apparently with the goal of putting down the Gallic raids along the Meander Valley. By this point, the Ionian rebels undoubtedly knew of Antiochus' preparations for a campaign into Anatolia and it is possible that Eumenes' campaign at least had this in mind; bringing the Meander under control might provide the rebels with some leeway. His target was Brennus who had spent the last year or so launching raids in the Meander valley and, otherwise, starting to bring the region under his own authority by one means or another. At his command, we are told Eumenes was fielding perhaps 20-30,000 soldiers maximum, the vast majority of whom, however, were infantry or skirmishers. The exact numbers of warriors under Brennus' command isn't known particularly well but some historians have estimated perhaps 20-25,000 Gallic warriors and maybe some levies from local populations along the Meander (although this isn't especially well known). As was the case at Pella some three years earlier, Brennus' army was mostly comprised of light skirmishing troops with a small core of heavy infantry and a rather large number of cavalrymen (primarily light cavalry but with a few heavier cavalrymen thrown in).
The First Battle of the Meander took place, apparently, in January or February 274 BCE. During winter, the region around the Meander can get quite rainy and wet and, supposedly, it had rained the night before. The Meander river, while quite narrow, is also very deep, allowing Eumenes to anchor his left flank up against the river with reasonably little fear of being outflanked there. The rain had left the ground itself rather muddy and, as the battle began, it became quickly apparent that the fighting would privilege lighter armed skirmishers. The three years between the Battle of Pella and the First Battle of the Meander had given the Gauls time to adjust somewhat to the realities of Greek warfare. Whether by strategy or by accident, the Battle of the Meander took full advantage of this knowledge and, as the fighting commenced, the heavier Greek phalanx found itself bogged down and less able to move.
By contrast, the lighter-armed skirmishers on both sides of the field could cross the muddy terrain far more successfully than the heavier infantry. As the fighting went on, the better Gallic skirmishers outfought their rivals and began to launch raids against the Greek infantry lines. For hours, Eumenes' phalanx was bombarded, falling back behind shields to try and protect against the onslaught of slings and arrows and javelins. As time went on, the Gallic cavalry was able to defeat their rebel counterparts and, finally, outflank the phalanx. What followed was an absolute slaughter; Eumenes' soldiers fled but the mud slowed them down, many casting off their armour and weaponry in an attempt to outpace the Gallic skirmishers. Eumenes survived, retreating west with a contingent of perhaps 7000 survivors but much of his army had been either killed or captured.
To date, it was the greatest victory achieved by Brennus' army and in the aftermath, they began to expand their raids and attacks beyond just the Meander, even entering parts of Cappadocia and Ptolemaic territory. This short period between the First and Second Battles of the Meander marks the height of Brennus' career and time as king. This was the point at which the Gallic threat was sometimes said to have reached its peak for many Greek onlookers. By the time Antiochus crossed the Tauros mountains over a year later, Brennus had carved out his own small kingdom right in the heart of Anatolia and was beginning to drive west and south towards the coast.
Gallic rule in Anatolia is an interesting but, unfortunately understudied, part of ancient history. Brennus' kingdom unfortunately only lasted about two years maximum and, while several Greek authors were interested in writing about it, a lot of the details are now lost. Supposedly, Brennus ruled from a city known to some Greek authors as Prausopolis (literally 'City of the Prausi'- the tribe Brennus came from). Certainly, it was here that he set up as king. What we also know is that Gallic rule here was entirely centred on kingship which, by the late 270s, was entirely invested in Brennus himself. What is interesting is that, while the tribal divisions that had existed in 279 BCE still existed, the last few years of resettlement had apparently gone a long way to unifying the tribes. Unfortunately, we know little of their self-perception or identity but several coins have been unearthed from the region which appear to imitate Seleucid issues. The coins bear Brennus' face on one side and usually some form of horseman or rider image on the reverse with the very occasional presence of another coin type bearing Greek gods, often Apollo. Some Greek authors refer to them as 'Pannonians' in imitation of the region they had first come from but on occasion we hear more specific terms such as 'Prausi' or even broader terms such as 'Celt'. The result is that a lot of Gallic identity is lost during this period and is usually only reconstructed through their identity and presence in later accounts dealing with the Gauls after the Second Battle of the Meander.
What has also been of interest to some is the relationship between Brennus' kingdom and the communities of Anatolia. We know that, by the Second Battle of the Meander, Brennus was able to field some 35-38,000 warriors and that, for the first time, he was able field his own phalanx, albeit comprised largely of levied soldiers. What appears to have taken place is a situation not unfamiliar to that of the Seleucids themselves. Some communities were, apparently, directly under Brennus' rule and paid tribute and provided soldiers. Other communities, however, seem to have had looser connections with Prausopolis by which they were officially 'allies' but provided their own soldiers, usually infantry, sometimes as volunteer or sometimes in return for pay. We also know that Brennus, by 273, had amassed a rather large court comprised of Gauls, Greeks, and a few indigenous Anatolians. These 'friends', as they were termed, acted as an advisory council, political environment and military bodyguard for the king as well as interpreters and important links between the Gallic king and local communities.
What might have happened with the Gallic kingdom is unfortunately unknown. In August 273 BCE, Antiochus I crossed the Tauros mountains into Anatolia and began marching towards the Meander Valley. The army he led was a far cry from that which Brennus had fought a year and a half earlier. Antiochus came with some 40-45,000 soldiers, many of whom had been fighting with him in Syria over the last few years. He had also made sure to bring elephants, something Eumenes hadn't had at his disposal and which were a lot more able to move across muddy fields (if only due to their sheer size) than the average Macedonian infantryman. He had also come prepared with a large force of Persian archers, likely to counter the Gallic advantage in skirmishers which had won them the day against Eumenes. The result was a rather lopsided victory for the Seleucids. On the day of battle, the two skirmishing forces fought to a standstill while the Seleucid elephant and cavalry forces drove back the Gallic cavalry before finally outflanking the Gauls and routing them en masse.
This time, there was no retreat. In his victory, Antiochus pursued Brennus to Prausopolis and sacked the city, capturing the king in the process. Between November 273 and March 272 BCE, Antiochus largely remained here in Central Anatolia, probably dismantling Brennus' kingdom and reintegrating the land into his own territory. The Gauls were once again disarmed and to be punished for their revolt. While they were allowed to remain in Prausopolis and keep some of their land along the Meander, much of it was also confiscated. A new Seleucid garrison was to set up inside the city and Brennus' family removed as king to be brought back to Syria. In his place was the so-called Prausarch, an official charged with the job of keeping the Gauls in line and subject to the governor of the region. Alongside this was the collection of hostages, usually the eldest sons of the Gallic elites who were to join Antiochus' court for education. Over time, of course, much of these restrictions would be lifted and land returned but, until the death of Antiochus, this was the general structure of the relationships between the Seleucids and the Gauls. Brennus himself didn't survive much longer, dying only a few months later in western Anatolia of a fever, although some have suspected that Antiochus had him executed once they were away from Gallic territory where the death of the king might trigger another revolt.
Marching west, Antiochus liberated Sardes in June or July 272 BCE and began preparations for the reconquest of Ionia. Just as Philetairos and Eumenes had feared, Sardes quickly became the base of operations for a much larger war of reconquest. Over the next year and a half, Seleucid forces set about recapturing much of Ionia. In the South, the governments of Miletus and Priene seem to have been restored to power by May 271 BCE at the latest and the former exiles rewarded for their loyalty to the Seleucid throne. Other cities faced stringent punishments or harsher terms of peace although, as with the Gauls, these would be stripped back over time. Pergamene dedications often remained in place but a few seem to have been re-carved and renamed to fit Seleucid ideology, often with Antiochus' (or rarely Seleucus') name placed on to recast them as Seleucid benefactions.
The real culmination, however, came in 270 BCE when, after a long campaign to shut down the rebels in Ionia, Antiochus met the Pergamene army in battle, routing them and laying siege to the fortress of Pergamon. Famously, the siege of Pergamon was to last nearly a year although Antiochus was not around for all of it. In the end, however, the fortress surrendered in July 269 BCE and Philetairos and Eumenes were captured and executed. In their place, a new Seleucid hyparch was set up and a Seleucid garrison installed to keep watch surrounding area. By this point, Antiochus was no longer in Anatolia, having left the previous year to fight for the throne of Macedon and the siege was likely carried out by one of his subordinates, although we are not sure who.
Empire Building (277-270 BCE):
At this point, I feel it only right to pause the narrative to begin talking somewhat about other topics in Seleucid history. Until now, we have largely covered the basic narrative events of Seleucus I and Antiochus I but, as we approach the end of the crisis in the early 3rd Century, it is worth taking the time to begin discussing the actual structures and workings of the Seleucid Empire under Antiochus. Simply, Antiochus had not been spending the last seven years solely fighting wars and reconquering land. On the contrary, much of this time had also been spent ruling and, largely, building. The war in Syria seems to have driven Antiochus to put a lot off stock in infrastructure, especially around Antioch and down towards the South. Much of the actual work done here, largely between 276 and 273 BCE, seems to have been simply maintenance work to make sure the old Persian royal road was still functioning. In 272 BCE, this process was expanded in the wake of the victory the Meander to fix up many of the roads in Anatolia. During this stretch, however, Antiochus had also begun the construction of several new forts along the road, likely in response to the Gallic raids, as well as new watchtowers and a whole slew of fortifications around many smaller settlements in Central Anatolia. The culmination of these building works came between 272 and 270 BCE when Antiochus continued fixing the roads as far as Sardes.
Perhaps the largest project of Antiochus' reign, however, was the Syrian necropolis near Antioch which began construction in 274 BCE. Upon his return to Syria in 276, Antiochus had buried Seleucus not far from the city, beginning a brand new royal burial ground. Initially, the tomb of Seleucus appears to have been rather simple but, with the conclusion of the war in 274, Antiochus took the time to elaborate it. The tomb of Seleucus itself took significant influence from Macedonian precedents back at Aigai, incorporating a large mound under which was buried a built tomb. As with many Macedonian precedents, the tomb incorporates many illusionistic techniques such as painted friezes, architectural facades and a mixed Ionic and Doric style. However, unlike its Macedonian precedents, the tomb also incorporates some of the more eclectic building styles found in pre-Hellenistic Anatolian structures, especially the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus. This includes the use of an Ionic doorframe (almost unheard of in Macedonian tombs) as well as more sculptural decoration than we might expect from what we see at Aigai. This was the tomb as it existed in 276.
In 274, Antiochus began the process of architecturally elaborating the whole site. The new 'Seleucid Necropolis' was to be more clearly delineated and a grand temple to Apollo erected near the entryway to the site. This grand temple, largely following the Ionic order as was typical for the Hellenistic, was to overlook the whole area and was oriented to be directly visible from Antioch itself. In addition to this, Antiochus ordered a series of games to be held in August every year with a larger game every four years, probably in direct imitation of the Panathenaeum. One theory is that this was Antiochus directly lifting from the intended games he had promised to be held in Macedonia back in 277 BCE and, accordingly, the games were known as the Antiochic Games (named after the city despite some confusion by many students of the subject!).
While we are discussing years, it is worth talking about the other major innovation of Antiochus' rule (although some of the inspiration likely came from Seleucus himself). Sometime around 280, Antiochus had introduced a brand new dating system known as the 'Seleucid Era'. What is entirely unique about the Seleucid Era was that it was a continuous, absolute dating system beginning in 312 BCE when Seleucus I reconquered Babylon. As such, the year 280 BCE (for example) became 32 SE and the year 270 became 42 SE and so on. This is one of the most unique innovations of the Seleucid empire and one which many do not know about but it was an extraordinarily important innovation. What the 'Seleucid Era' did was create a system of perceiving time intimately tied to the Seleucid dynasty. In time, most of the empire would come to use the dating system alongside, or even in place of, their existing dating systems. Everywhere you went, every inscription was now characterised and dated according to the years of the dynasty. What this was was a huge ideological development, one which promised that the Seleucids were not going anywhere anytime soon. The Seleucid calendar could go on forever... just as the Seleucids could. With every building programme, with every inscription and dedication and with every year, the Seleucid dynasty began to imprint itself more and more on the environment of its empire.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Out of Context: Fun fact for any interested readers: The Seleucid Era is a very real innovation which outlived the Seleucid Empire in many places. The calendar was still popular in Syria and Central Asia until the 15th Century and was used in some Jewish communities until modern times. In fact, the Seleucid Era calendar even appears on the Xi'an Stela, erected in Tang Dynasty China somewhere in Xian and unearthed by the Ming several hundred years later which says that it was erected in the 'Year of the Greeks 1092'.
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It is always great to read an Hellenistic timeline, especially if it is as well-written as this one. Really curious to see how well Antiochus will fare against Antigonus.
Regarding sources, one book that I would really recommend about the Seleucids is Land of the Elephant Kings by Paul J. Kosmin, but re-reading your updates and some of the points you make (about the Seleucids not really having a capital, for example) I suspect you already have read it.
Regarding sources, one book that I would really recommend about the Seleucids is Land of the Elephant Kings by Paul J. Kosmin, but re-reading your updates and some of the points you make (about the Seleucids not really having a capital, for example) I suspect you already have read it.
Oh absolutely I’ve read it! I don’t think you can do any work on the Seleucids without reading Kosmin at some point. But that’s a good shout that I should add to the bibliography while I remember.
And thank you for the feedback!
Galatia Delanda Est
Antiochus really went to town with the gauls, and finally has managed to end the crisis for now. I'm interested on how the mythology on Seleucus will develop now that his son is building him and their dinasty a titanic tomb.
This is quickly becoming one of my favourite timelines! It's hard to find good Hellenistic ones.
The focus on structure is interesting because in such a massive realm speed is crucial in dealing with any potential rebellions or outside threats. It's very interesting that you mentioned the seleucid era and how it lasted so long.
How's the relationship between The Seleucids and their mesopotamian subjects?
Antiochus really went to town with the gauls, and finally has managed to end the crisis for now. I'm interested on how the mythology on Seleucus will develop now that his son is building him and their dinasty a titanic tomb.
This is quickly becoming one of my favourite timelines! It's hard to find good Hellenistic ones.
The focus on structure is interesting because in such a massive realm speed is crucial in dealing with any potential rebellions or outside threats. It's very interesting that you mentioned the seleucid era and how it lasted so long.
How's the relationship between The Seleucids and their mesopotamian subjects?
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Beautiful timeline @ClaustroPhoebic. The Seleucids are so interesting, in a sense they tried what Alexander probably had in mind when ruling his empire, a syncretism of Greek and Persian. In the end, they were as successful as he would have been. I think the centrifugal forces in an empire which included such diverse peoples as the Epirotan tribes, the Greek city states, the haughty Babylonians and the inaccessible Sogdians and Bactrians were probably too much for any person to handle.
Chapter Ten
Chapter Ten: Antigonus and Athens (276 - 270 BCE)
By the time Antiochus was laying siege to Pergamon, Antigonus had been king in Macedonia for six years. By June 276 BCE, he had taken control of Pella and overrun much of Lower Macedonia. For the most part, his arrival seems to have been met with reasonably little opposition. For sure, there was an anti-Antigonid faction in Macedonia but many of them either left Pella upon his approach or found themselves politically outnumbered. What anti-Antigonid faction there was, however, was quite quickly rubbed out in the years that followed. Now invested in Pella, Antigonus set about re-arranging matters to suit his needs. First was ensuring the loyalty of the actual kingdom itself. Most cities in Lower Macedonia were quick to join the new king save for the notable examples of Amphipolis and Thessalonike, both of which were besieged until their surrenders in November and December of that year. In July, seeking allies in Greece, he had sent out messengers seeking allies across the Greek world (and looking for submission in Thrace).
The reaction was mixed at best. Seuthopolis had Antigonid ambassadors removed from the city and Athens even refused them entry. The Aetolian league seems to have taken a more neutral stand but, by October, had apparently refused Antigonid approaches for a military alliance. It is quite likely that some of their impetus for this came from the encouragement of Athens, in turn encouraged at a distance from Antiochus. The rise of Antigonus was a matter of some concern in Athens, so recently having fought against the Antigonids alongside Seleucus. The fear of another oligarchy, or tyranny, was a major worry for the Athenian demos who were now hurriedly seeking military or political allies. Sure, the Ptolemies and Seleucids both said they were going to try and preserve Athenian independence, after all, but who was to say they were actually in a position to do so.
In truth, of course, the independence of Athens was one of the few areas that Seleucid, Ptolemaic, and even Rhodian foreign interests aligned on. The independence of Attica was not only ideologically important but made sure that Antigonus did not control Greece too much. It is quite likely within this framework that the Aetolians found themselves quickly arrayed against the Macedonians, supporting Athenian independence and championing the Greek cause against Antigonid 'tyranny' over Greece. This, of course, was a cause that Antiochus was only too happy to get behind. The result was that, just as Antigonus set about consolidating his control over Macedonia, the Athenians set about consolidating their own diplomatic position. The Aetolians were one side of this, as was the rest of the 'Hellenic League'. Athens also seems to have made overtures to several of the Aegean islands but, until 274 BCE, the Ptolemies seem to have tried to keep the Nesiotic cities from providing too much assistance.
Another thorn in the side of Athens came, however, in 275 BCE with the Ionian revolt. Despite some very real sympathies amongst the Ionian cities for the Athenian position, their own revolt required to some extent the promise of Macedonian support. As such, while several of the revolting cities seem to have entertained Athenian diplomats, pressure from Antigonus quickly ended any hope of receiving any military or political support from that front. In Thrace, cities such as Byzantium also entertained Athenian requests for help but similarly backed down out of fear of Macedonian military might. The Achaean cities were more helpful. Since being founded in 280 BCE, the Achaean league had found its enemy in many of the pro-Antigonid tyrannies of the Eastern Peloponnese, most notably Argos and Megalopolis, as well as the Antigonid-garrisoned city of Corinth. As such, the Athenian alliance promised a serious opportunity to weaken Antigonid power in the Peloponnese.
Perhaps the final chain in all of this was Antiochus himself. Until 270 there were no Seleucid soldiers in Greece but Athens had clearly made a statement. By falling back on the Hellenic League against the Macedonians, the Athenians had provided a clear sign that they were willing to stay in the Seleucid corner if it helped protect them. In March 275 BCE, a Seleucid ambassador to the city declared Athens a 'true friend' of King Antiochus and promised grand dedications once the king returned to Greece. One scholar, writing a few years ago, has argued that this was the turning point in Antiochus' involvement in Greece. Indeed, to some degree it certainly seems to have been. This was an invitation, an opportunity for the Seleucid king to retake Macedonia and do so with the support of a whole slew of Greek cities. That isn't to say that this was the only thing that drove Antiochus. Indeed, the other side of the coin was opportunity; 270 BCE was a chance for the Seleucids to make a move against the Antigonids, the first time in years that Antiochus had been free from major conflict with an army in the field.
Back in Macedonia, Antigonus wasted no time in responding. His first target was Thrace and Upper Macedonia, both of which he sought to bring conclusively into the fold of his kingdom once again. Of particular interest were the many silver mines in Thrace which, he hoped, would help to fund his future campaigns. At the same time, he put his navy to work. Having captured much of the Seleucid fleet at Thessaloniki, it is possible that Antigonus sought to re-establish himself as the supreme naval power of the Aegean. In 275 BCE, the Antigonid fleet sailed East to receive the submission of Byzantium and much of coastal Thrace. At the same time, they threatened to cut the grain trade from the Bosporus to Athens in an attempt to force the Athenians to back down from their alliance with the Aetolians. In response, however, Athens sent diplomats east to Rhodes and south to Egypt, receiving positive responses to their requests to help keep the grain flowing, as well as further funds from Philadelphus (albeit officially only for building works in the city). Later that year, the Antigonid fleet also contributed to the Ionian revolt.
Then came yet another new (or old) player. In mid-late 275 BCE, Phyrrus of Epirus was defeated at the Battle of Beneventum in Italy and returned to Epirus. As with Antiochus some five years later, Phyrrus found a region ripe with opportunity. His sudden return threw a new spanner in the works for Antigonus and offered a serious potential ally to those arrayed against him. And they knew it too. In 274 BCE, at the invite of either the Athenians or Aetolians, Phyrrus threw himself into the conflict against Antigonus. Raising his own soldiers alongside a group of Gallic and Illyrian mercenaries, and joined by a small force from the Aetolian League, he invaded Macedonia at the beginning of the year, crossing over into Lower Macedonia and defeating Antigonus in battle near Pella, occupying the city and sweeping across much of the region.
At the instigation of the Athenians, he pursued the Antigonids further into Thrace, defeating their army at Amphipolis but neglecting to pursue the retreating king any further. Back in Pella, his army quickly began making local enemies; the Gauls and Illyrians were entirely unwelcome and the memory of their raids and attacks only a few years earlier did Phyrrus no favours in this regard. For the aristocrats, the Epirotian king was no more welcome; perceived as yet another foreign invader intent on plundering their cities and stealing their land. This may well be why Phyrrus retreated from Amphipolis in the first place; having already run Antigonus off, he was concerned of a major revolt in his rear and being cut off from home. Or, perhaps, he hoped to make himself king of Macedon and realised that he needed to return to Pella to stem the increasingly bad reputation he and his army were making in the region. Or, just as likely, he saw opportunity to the South. Certainly, by 273 BCE, Phyrrus was back on the move, cutting a bloody swathe through Thessaly but (as Seleucus had been), being turned away at Demetrias without naval support. Instead, he entered Attica, receiving a warm welcome from the demos and meeting with representatives from the Achaean League who encouraged him to dislodge Antigonid support in Achaea.
Back in Thrace, Antigonus desperately trying to reorganise and reform. News had reached him in 274 BCE that the war in Syria was over and, over the next few months, the situation only really went from bad to worse as requests for help grew from Philetairos in Asia Minor and the pressure from Phyrrus mounted. What Antigonus did have going for him was his fleet and, for the time being, control over the Acrocorinth, parts of the Peloponnese, and the city of Chalcis. On top of that, Demetrias had once again held its own, so long as Antigonus held control of the sea. In Macedonia, Phyrrus had done little to win local support and, in his absence, Antigonus was able to return just as quickly in 273 BCE and re-establish control. What that didn't do was actually put a stop to Phyrrus' rampage. And a rampage it was. Down South, Phyrrus threw himself straight into Peloponnesian politics, besieging the garrison on the Acrocorinth and, by January 272 BCE at the latest, driving the Macedonians out.
Over the next year, Phyrrus campaigned rather extensively in the Peloponnese. Argos was captured and the pro-Antigonid government overthrown and Antignod power quite fatally weakened in general. A failed attack on Sparta took place in late 272 BCE but, by the end of the year, Phyrrus was at the height of his power in Greece. It is, to some degree, almost a shame what happened next. The problem for Phyrrus was, in all honesty, an inability to manage city politics. As a general, Phyrrus was excellent but, as a politician his skills were sometimes lacking. This was especially obvious between 272 and 270 BCE. Phyrrus had failed to gain any support in Macedonia and while his campaigns in Thessaly and the Peloponnese had initially been popular, they hadn't exactly remained that way. Initial enthusiasm quickly gave way to a mounting concern that Phyrrus effectively intended to establish himself as yet another Antigonid-style ruler of Greece.
In person, Phyrrus is actually rather renowned for being quite kind and generous. As a politician, his endless search for more battles and glory left much to be desired. Rather than consolidating in Macedonia, he had allowed his army to take loot and then simply pursued the next opportunity. In the Peloponnese, his campaigns often accompanied quite serious looting as he sought to help keep funding his (very expensive) army, creating opposition amongst local populations. Sure, a certain amount of looting was expected but the presence of Gallic mercenaries taking money from homes was not an especially good look. Perhaps the political situation could have been fixed but, by 271 BCE, Phyrrus was already off once again to fight Antigonus in the North.
In his absence, the Achaean League stepped in. Over the course of 271 BCE, Argos, Sicyon, and Megalopolis both joined the league, greatly boosting its power and consolidating its increasing status as the major power of the Peloponnese. In the North, Phyrrus' campaign against Antigonus was another huge success but, once back in Macedonia, it was very clear that he had no hope of actually making himself king; the aristocracy already disliked him. In Athens, there was a certain disquiet about Phyrrus' exact relationship with the city and at least one orator is known to have questioned the very idea that any king would benefit the demos of Athens in any meaningful manner. For sure, the Athenians seem to have started to pull away from Phyrrus, just as the Achaeans were doing in the South.
The result was that, by the end of 271 BCE, Phyrrus had amounted a whole slew of victories and a lot of loot but had made very few lasting conquests. Sure, he could take control of Lower Macedonia but there were at least two other claimants (Antigonus and Antiochus) who could pose a threat just as soon as he left and the Macedonian aristocracy decided to call one of them in. Antigonus had lost some of his allure (repeated defeats will do that), but he was still the most popular option when the alternative was Phyrrus, an Epirotian (not Macedonian) who had amassed a reputation for expensive and damaging campaigns and who rarely stayed long enough to actually consolidate or secure his position.
This was the environment into which Antiochus would arrive in 270 BCE. By June of that year, the situation doesn't seem to have changed all that dramatically. Phyrrus launched a campaign into Thrace at the beginning of the year, probably hoping to finally chase down Antigonus himself. Sometime between January and March, he captured the city of Amphipolis where he appears to have still been when Antiochus crossed the Bosporus with his army. Antigonus' meanwhile, was apparently still in Thrace at Byzantium with both his army and fleet. We might rightly ask why, if he had his fleet with him at Byzantium, Antigonus actually let Antiochus cross. The answer is rather simple if surprising: Antigonus and Antiochus had a common enemy. By 270, Antigonus had well learned the lesson that Phyrrus was not about to lose on the battlefield, not to Antigonus' army at any rate. He had also largely ran out of soldiers. His treasury was dry and while his fleet was still in the field, it was not about to dislodge the Epirotian army should Phyrrus advance.
Antigonus surely knew that by allowing Antiochus to cross the Bosporus, he was effectively surrendering the throne of Macedon. He probably also knew, however, that the throne was lost. So, as his father and grandfather had both done on several occasions, now was the time to fall back and restock. Antigonus couldn't defeat Phyrrus here and now but experience had told him that the Seleucids perhaps could be dislodged. Philadelphus was hardly likely to provide support against Phyrrus but against Antiochus? Maybe he would. It is also quite possible that Antigonus simply didn't rate his chances of preventing Antiochus from crossing particularly highly. He could have done so now but, as Phyrrus advanced, he would need his fleet, even if only to slow the Epirotian army or to allow a getaway. This was a far cry from an alliance. Instead, in June or July, Antigonus simply abandoned Byzantium and once again retreated to the city of Demetrias to await his next opportunity. Within days of his departure, the Byzantines had welcomed Antiochus who had brought perhaps 35-40,000 soldiers with him. For the first time in six years, there was a Seleucid army back in Maceodnia.
By the time Antiochus was laying siege to Pergamon, Antigonus had been king in Macedonia for six years. By June 276 BCE, he had taken control of Pella and overrun much of Lower Macedonia. For the most part, his arrival seems to have been met with reasonably little opposition. For sure, there was an anti-Antigonid faction in Macedonia but many of them either left Pella upon his approach or found themselves politically outnumbered. What anti-Antigonid faction there was, however, was quite quickly rubbed out in the years that followed. Now invested in Pella, Antigonus set about re-arranging matters to suit his needs. First was ensuring the loyalty of the actual kingdom itself. Most cities in Lower Macedonia were quick to join the new king save for the notable examples of Amphipolis and Thessalonike, both of which were besieged until their surrenders in November and December of that year. In July, seeking allies in Greece, he had sent out messengers seeking allies across the Greek world (and looking for submission in Thrace).
The reaction was mixed at best. Seuthopolis had Antigonid ambassadors removed from the city and Athens even refused them entry. The Aetolian league seems to have taken a more neutral stand but, by October, had apparently refused Antigonid approaches for a military alliance. It is quite likely that some of their impetus for this came from the encouragement of Athens, in turn encouraged at a distance from Antiochus. The rise of Antigonus was a matter of some concern in Athens, so recently having fought against the Antigonids alongside Seleucus. The fear of another oligarchy, or tyranny, was a major worry for the Athenian demos who were now hurriedly seeking military or political allies. Sure, the Ptolemies and Seleucids both said they were going to try and preserve Athenian independence, after all, but who was to say they were actually in a position to do so.
In truth, of course, the independence of Athens was one of the few areas that Seleucid, Ptolemaic, and even Rhodian foreign interests aligned on. The independence of Attica was not only ideologically important but made sure that Antigonus did not control Greece too much. It is quite likely within this framework that the Aetolians found themselves quickly arrayed against the Macedonians, supporting Athenian independence and championing the Greek cause against Antigonid 'tyranny' over Greece. This, of course, was a cause that Antiochus was only too happy to get behind. The result was that, just as Antigonus set about consolidating his control over Macedonia, the Athenians set about consolidating their own diplomatic position. The Aetolians were one side of this, as was the rest of the 'Hellenic League'. Athens also seems to have made overtures to several of the Aegean islands but, until 274 BCE, the Ptolemies seem to have tried to keep the Nesiotic cities from providing too much assistance.
Another thorn in the side of Athens came, however, in 275 BCE with the Ionian revolt. Despite some very real sympathies amongst the Ionian cities for the Athenian position, their own revolt required to some extent the promise of Macedonian support. As such, while several of the revolting cities seem to have entertained Athenian diplomats, pressure from Antigonus quickly ended any hope of receiving any military or political support from that front. In Thrace, cities such as Byzantium also entertained Athenian requests for help but similarly backed down out of fear of Macedonian military might. The Achaean cities were more helpful. Since being founded in 280 BCE, the Achaean league had found its enemy in many of the pro-Antigonid tyrannies of the Eastern Peloponnese, most notably Argos and Megalopolis, as well as the Antigonid-garrisoned city of Corinth. As such, the Athenian alliance promised a serious opportunity to weaken Antigonid power in the Peloponnese.
Perhaps the final chain in all of this was Antiochus himself. Until 270 there were no Seleucid soldiers in Greece but Athens had clearly made a statement. By falling back on the Hellenic League against the Macedonians, the Athenians had provided a clear sign that they were willing to stay in the Seleucid corner if it helped protect them. In March 275 BCE, a Seleucid ambassador to the city declared Athens a 'true friend' of King Antiochus and promised grand dedications once the king returned to Greece. One scholar, writing a few years ago, has argued that this was the turning point in Antiochus' involvement in Greece. Indeed, to some degree it certainly seems to have been. This was an invitation, an opportunity for the Seleucid king to retake Macedonia and do so with the support of a whole slew of Greek cities. That isn't to say that this was the only thing that drove Antiochus. Indeed, the other side of the coin was opportunity; 270 BCE was a chance for the Seleucids to make a move against the Antigonids, the first time in years that Antiochus had been free from major conflict with an army in the field.
Back in Macedonia, Antigonus wasted no time in responding. His first target was Thrace and Upper Macedonia, both of which he sought to bring conclusively into the fold of his kingdom once again. Of particular interest were the many silver mines in Thrace which, he hoped, would help to fund his future campaigns. At the same time, he put his navy to work. Having captured much of the Seleucid fleet at Thessaloniki, it is possible that Antigonus sought to re-establish himself as the supreme naval power of the Aegean. In 275 BCE, the Antigonid fleet sailed East to receive the submission of Byzantium and much of coastal Thrace. At the same time, they threatened to cut the grain trade from the Bosporus to Athens in an attempt to force the Athenians to back down from their alliance with the Aetolians. In response, however, Athens sent diplomats east to Rhodes and south to Egypt, receiving positive responses to their requests to help keep the grain flowing, as well as further funds from Philadelphus (albeit officially only for building works in the city). Later that year, the Antigonid fleet also contributed to the Ionian revolt.
Then came yet another new (or old) player. In mid-late 275 BCE, Phyrrus of Epirus was defeated at the Battle of Beneventum in Italy and returned to Epirus. As with Antiochus some five years later, Phyrrus found a region ripe with opportunity. His sudden return threw a new spanner in the works for Antigonus and offered a serious potential ally to those arrayed against him. And they knew it too. In 274 BCE, at the invite of either the Athenians or Aetolians, Phyrrus threw himself into the conflict against Antigonus. Raising his own soldiers alongside a group of Gallic and Illyrian mercenaries, and joined by a small force from the Aetolian League, he invaded Macedonia at the beginning of the year, crossing over into Lower Macedonia and defeating Antigonus in battle near Pella, occupying the city and sweeping across much of the region.
At the instigation of the Athenians, he pursued the Antigonids further into Thrace, defeating their army at Amphipolis but neglecting to pursue the retreating king any further. Back in Pella, his army quickly began making local enemies; the Gauls and Illyrians were entirely unwelcome and the memory of their raids and attacks only a few years earlier did Phyrrus no favours in this regard. For the aristocrats, the Epirotian king was no more welcome; perceived as yet another foreign invader intent on plundering their cities and stealing their land. This may well be why Phyrrus retreated from Amphipolis in the first place; having already run Antigonus off, he was concerned of a major revolt in his rear and being cut off from home. Or, perhaps, he hoped to make himself king of Macedon and realised that he needed to return to Pella to stem the increasingly bad reputation he and his army were making in the region. Or, just as likely, he saw opportunity to the South. Certainly, by 273 BCE, Phyrrus was back on the move, cutting a bloody swathe through Thessaly but (as Seleucus had been), being turned away at Demetrias without naval support. Instead, he entered Attica, receiving a warm welcome from the demos and meeting with representatives from the Achaean League who encouraged him to dislodge Antigonid support in Achaea.
Back in Thrace, Antigonus desperately trying to reorganise and reform. News had reached him in 274 BCE that the war in Syria was over and, over the next few months, the situation only really went from bad to worse as requests for help grew from Philetairos in Asia Minor and the pressure from Phyrrus mounted. What Antigonus did have going for him was his fleet and, for the time being, control over the Acrocorinth, parts of the Peloponnese, and the city of Chalcis. On top of that, Demetrias had once again held its own, so long as Antigonus held control of the sea. In Macedonia, Phyrrus had done little to win local support and, in his absence, Antigonus was able to return just as quickly in 273 BCE and re-establish control. What that didn't do was actually put a stop to Phyrrus' rampage. And a rampage it was. Down South, Phyrrus threw himself straight into Peloponnesian politics, besieging the garrison on the Acrocorinth and, by January 272 BCE at the latest, driving the Macedonians out.
Over the next year, Phyrrus campaigned rather extensively in the Peloponnese. Argos was captured and the pro-Antigonid government overthrown and Antignod power quite fatally weakened in general. A failed attack on Sparta took place in late 272 BCE but, by the end of the year, Phyrrus was at the height of his power in Greece. It is, to some degree, almost a shame what happened next. The problem for Phyrrus was, in all honesty, an inability to manage city politics. As a general, Phyrrus was excellent but, as a politician his skills were sometimes lacking. This was especially obvious between 272 and 270 BCE. Phyrrus had failed to gain any support in Macedonia and while his campaigns in Thessaly and the Peloponnese had initially been popular, they hadn't exactly remained that way. Initial enthusiasm quickly gave way to a mounting concern that Phyrrus effectively intended to establish himself as yet another Antigonid-style ruler of Greece.
In person, Phyrrus is actually rather renowned for being quite kind and generous. As a politician, his endless search for more battles and glory left much to be desired. Rather than consolidating in Macedonia, he had allowed his army to take loot and then simply pursued the next opportunity. In the Peloponnese, his campaigns often accompanied quite serious looting as he sought to help keep funding his (very expensive) army, creating opposition amongst local populations. Sure, a certain amount of looting was expected but the presence of Gallic mercenaries taking money from homes was not an especially good look. Perhaps the political situation could have been fixed but, by 271 BCE, Phyrrus was already off once again to fight Antigonus in the North.
In his absence, the Achaean League stepped in. Over the course of 271 BCE, Argos, Sicyon, and Megalopolis both joined the league, greatly boosting its power and consolidating its increasing status as the major power of the Peloponnese. In the North, Phyrrus' campaign against Antigonus was another huge success but, once back in Macedonia, it was very clear that he had no hope of actually making himself king; the aristocracy already disliked him. In Athens, there was a certain disquiet about Phyrrus' exact relationship with the city and at least one orator is known to have questioned the very idea that any king would benefit the demos of Athens in any meaningful manner. For sure, the Athenians seem to have started to pull away from Phyrrus, just as the Achaeans were doing in the South.
The result was that, by the end of 271 BCE, Phyrrus had amounted a whole slew of victories and a lot of loot but had made very few lasting conquests. Sure, he could take control of Lower Macedonia but there were at least two other claimants (Antigonus and Antiochus) who could pose a threat just as soon as he left and the Macedonian aristocracy decided to call one of them in. Antigonus had lost some of his allure (repeated defeats will do that), but he was still the most popular option when the alternative was Phyrrus, an Epirotian (not Macedonian) who had amassed a reputation for expensive and damaging campaigns and who rarely stayed long enough to actually consolidate or secure his position.
This was the environment into which Antiochus would arrive in 270 BCE. By June of that year, the situation doesn't seem to have changed all that dramatically. Phyrrus launched a campaign into Thrace at the beginning of the year, probably hoping to finally chase down Antigonus himself. Sometime between January and March, he captured the city of Amphipolis where he appears to have still been when Antiochus crossed the Bosporus with his army. Antigonus' meanwhile, was apparently still in Thrace at Byzantium with both his army and fleet. We might rightly ask why, if he had his fleet with him at Byzantium, Antigonus actually let Antiochus cross. The answer is rather simple if surprising: Antigonus and Antiochus had a common enemy. By 270, Antigonus had well learned the lesson that Phyrrus was not about to lose on the battlefield, not to Antigonus' army at any rate. He had also largely ran out of soldiers. His treasury was dry and while his fleet was still in the field, it was not about to dislodge the Epirotian army should Phyrrus advance.
Antigonus surely knew that by allowing Antiochus to cross the Bosporus, he was effectively surrendering the throne of Macedon. He probably also knew, however, that the throne was lost. So, as his father and grandfather had both done on several occasions, now was the time to fall back and restock. Antigonus couldn't defeat Phyrrus here and now but experience had told him that the Seleucids perhaps could be dislodged. Philadelphus was hardly likely to provide support against Phyrrus but against Antiochus? Maybe he would. It is also quite possible that Antigonus simply didn't rate his chances of preventing Antiochus from crossing particularly highly. He could have done so now but, as Phyrrus advanced, he would need his fleet, even if only to slow the Epirotian army or to allow a getaway. This was a far cry from an alliance. Instead, in June or July, Antigonus simply abandoned Byzantium and once again retreated to the city of Demetrias to await his next opportunity. Within days of his departure, the Byzantines had welcomed Antiochus who had brought perhaps 35-40,000 soldiers with him. For the first time in six years, there was a Seleucid army back in Maceodnia.
Thank you! The Seleucid empire is so fascinating because they are such a unique imperial power for the ancient world and one that rather few people really understand!
Fun, fun, fun. And from what I understand of the period, entirely in keeping with the wars of the Successors. Sweeping through the hinterland could gain large areas quickly, but taking fortified cities was hard, and winning a decisive victory against an opponent who could always fall back on his strongholds and wait you out was often tantalisingly out of reach. Throw in an array of minor/vassal powers all switching allegiances according to their interests and you have a recipe for a lot of sound and fury but few gains that last after the army marches on.
The major strategic problem facing the Seleucids is that while they have the military muscle to be dominant (at least on land) in any theatre they choose, they face threats in at least four (Greece/Macedon, Asia Minor, Syria and the East), the king and the royal army cannot be everywhere and once the cat's away... At the back of Antiochus's mind must be the thought of how long it's been since the satraps beyond the Zagros last saw the Great King, and how long until they stop answering their mail.
Oh, and nitpick - it's Pyrrhus, rather than Phyrrus. (and probably Epirote rather than Epirotian).
The major strategic problem facing the Seleucids is that while they have the military muscle to be dominant (at least on land) in any theatre they choose, they face threats in at least four (Greece/Macedon, Asia Minor, Syria and the East), the king and the royal army cannot be everywhere and once the cat's away... At the back of Antiochus's mind must be the thought of how long it's been since the satraps beyond the Zagros last saw the Great King, and how long until they stop answering their mail.
Oh, and nitpick - it's Pyrrhus, rather than Phyrrus. (and probably Epirote rather than Epirotian).
What a cool timeline, and clearly well-researched too! As a big Indo-Greek fan, I’m also fascinated to see what will happen out on the Eastern frontier. Obviously Menandros Soter and his successors are butterflied away, but maybe Baktria will instead remain a more integral part of the Seleucid Empire? That probably butterflies significant Indo-Greek interaction altogether.
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I am honest astounded at how fast you are posting new chapters. Have you been planning out this timeline in advance?
That was always a problem for the Seleucids, even in our timeline they were always having to contend with just a bit too much stuff going on. With that in mind, it’s always astonishing to me how will their imperial system actually worked despite the sheer distances and logistical challenges.
The other thing I’ve been wanting to talk about a lot with this timeline is how empire actually works in the ancient world because I feel like modern media (video games especially) kinda encourages us to view ancient empires as fundamentally similar to modern states. But the Seleucid empire, out of all the successors, always feels like the clearest example of how they really isn’t the case.
One of my favourite anecdotes comes from Arrian where he talks about how the Persian king is so weak that he had to pay tribute to this one mountain tribe just to travel through his kingdom. Of course, when Antigonus tried to subjugate them by force) army almost got annihilated (in Diodorus, I think).
What interested me was that, when you look at it, the Persians didn’t see any contradiction whatsoever. They paid these people who, in turn, fought in their armies and kept their roads safe (at least for a bit). Sure, if you’d asked that tribe, they’d probably have told you they weren’t part of the Persian empire but if you’d asked the Persian king, of course he’d say they were. I think it’s these little inconsistencies, those bits and pieces that don’t work how we think they should, that makes these periods of history so interesting to me.
(And also no excuse for typing Phyrrus, I’m honestly just stupid!)
Man, I promise I really can’t wait to discuss Indo-Greek interaction (that’s my specialism after all!), right now I’m just following where the narrative takes me so hopefully we’ll get there soon enough.
What I can say is that Indo-Seleucid interaction was pretty big at the beginning IOTL. The Seleucids even maintained an ambassador at the Mauryan court and Ashoka apparently sent Buddhist missionaries (if that’s the right term) to the Seleucids.
Right now, I think the Seleucids will have more of a western/southern focus but I do foresee a stronger Seleucid empire also having more to do with India in the long run.
Oh I wish I had the patience for planning. No I pretty make it up as I go along! I just sit down and write a chapter then give it a cursory proof-read and post!
I can't help but wonder if a better seleucid presence in Greece-Macedonia-Thrace means that eventually they will make Byzantium their western-most 'capital', since it would let them keep an eye on their European holdings but still have quick access to the East
Chapter Eleven
Chapter Eleven: The Battle of Mount Pangaios (July - October 270 BCE).
By July 270 BCE, Antiochus was in Byzantium. Antigonus had fled for Demetrias with the remains of his forces and his royal bodyguard. Pyrrhus was in Amphipolis. The arrival of Antiochus in Byzantium had been something of a cause for celebration. His partisans in Greece had eagerly awaited his approach and either rushed to meet the Seleucid king, assuring him of their continued loyalty, or remained wherever they had taken cover in Greece during the Antigonid period. The city of Byzantium had no issues letting him in (after all, he was the nearest major army in the field and Pyrrhus didn't have a particularly stellar reputation by this point). With Antigonus out of the way, Antiochus' crossing proved rather smooth. With him came the now-largest army in Greece or Macedonia. In the last few years of campaigning, the army had dwindled somewhat but Antiochus had made sure to raise some more soldiers, probably shortly after the beginning of the siege of Pergamon.
The Seleucid army in July 270 BCE numbered some 35-40,000 soldiers. As per usual, the core of the army was the Macedonian phalanx, made up of both Macedonians and Greeks. At the core of this was a contingent of, by now, very veteran soldiers. One source claims that, sometime in 275/4 , he had re-instituted the 'Hypaspists', the elite infantry unit headed by his father under Alexander III. Into this, he had folded many of the veterans of Seleucus' campaigns as well as many of his own veterans. Upon his crossing into Thrace, one historian places their number at maybe 6000 infantrymen. In total, the phalanx probably numbered 16-20,000. Alongside this was a skirmisher force comprising largely of Persians and Cretans, as per usual, but soon bolstered by Greek and Thracian peltasts. Then there was the cavalry. Persian cavalry was preferred and so too were the Greco-Macedonian 'companions'. However, for the first time, Antiochus actually fielded some 400 Gallic cavalrymen, largely to be used as scouts or raiding forces as per need. Finally there came the elephants. No Seleucid king would go to war without war elephants, numbered at 50.
Pyrrhus' army is more complicated. His initial invasion of Macedonia four years earlier was reasonably small, possibly approaching only 20,000. However, over time he had taken pains to increase his military force. Exactly what numbers he had in 270 are very much uncertain but estimates place it at a maximum of 32,000, mostly Greco-Macedonian infantry but with Gallic and Illyrian mercenaries, Agrianians, Thracians, and a reasonable contingent of Thessalian cavalry. Elephants too, of course though probably only 10-15 maximum (and possibly fewer). All of this placed him at a distinct advantage but it was far from enough to necessarily throw the entire war in Antiochus' favour. If anything, the months that followed would prove that rather dramatically. News of Antiochus' arrival would have reached Pyrrhus rather early on. However, while he knew of the king's arrival, he seems not to have worried all that much about it. On the contrary, he instead focussed mostly on bringing food into Amphipolis and repairing any breaches in the walls. Antiochus could cross into Macedonia without going through Amphipolis, but it would require him to take longer routes through Thrace and Upper Macedonia which might leave Byzantium undefended.
Similarly, he also diverted resources towards ensuring the defence of Eion closer to the sea, another crucial crossing-point along the Strymon which Pyrrhus hoped to hold against the Seleucid king. Pyrrhus didn't plan on letting this come to a siege but he also knew that the fortified locations of both Amphipolis and Eion gave him a crucial military advantage; Antiochus mostly had to come through this way and so, as long as Pyrrhus held them, he could have a strong defensive location to fall back to should he need it. With that said, he clearly had no intention of actually needing to use the city defences whatsoever. On 17th August, as Antiochus began his march on Amphipolis, Pyrrhus sent ahead a set of ambassadors informing Antiochus that he had no intention to fight and that he would be willing to surrender Thrace to the Seleucid king and recognise Amphipolis as an inviolable boundary between the two. Antiochus refused.
Sure enough, in early September, the Seleucid army made its first attempt to approach, apparently angling for Eion from which it could cut off Amphipolis, a rather harder siege, from any support from the west. The result was an absolute catastrophe. As the Seleucid army marched, the rough terrain of the Pangaion hills made formations difficult to maintain, the Seleucid columns got broken up and, while their war elephants had very little trouble, the heavy Seleucid infantry found the march rather more difficult. For Pyrrhus, the hills offered his slew of lighter infantry and skirmishers a very real opportunity. Sure Antiochus had plenty of the same, but his army had spent the last while largely fighting in traditional Hellenistic battles, not against an army ready for warfare in the hills.
On the morning of the 8th September, Antiochus' scouts informed him that Pyrrhus' phalanx was approaching from the east. Antiochus marched to give battle, both armies meeting the next day. On the first day, Antiochus offered battle but was refused. On the second, he offered battle once again and was refused a second time. Only on the third day did Pyrrhus finally prepare for battle. At first, the fighting seemed rather skewed in Antiochus' favour; Pyrrhus' skirmishers fell back before the assault of the Seleucid archers and the Seleucid cavalry was able to drive Pyrrhus' Thessalians into a retreat although were prevented from giving chase by the Epirote elephants. Both phalanxes had difficulty manoeuvring and keeping formation on the rough terrain so, for the time being, the battle remained largely in the hands of the various skirmishers. It is said that, during these first few hours, the Gallic cavalry also distinguished itself on several occasions for their bravery, darting in to harass Pyrrhus' lines before escaping any retribution.
Just when Antiochus might have felt the battle going his way, however, the trap closed. Pyrrhus had spent the last two nights getting his army into place, sending some 4000 light infantry around longer paths to take up a position behind the Seleucid lines. Now, with the Seleucid army largely committed, the Epirote skirmishers swung into the fight with as much noise and fervour as they could muster. Descending upon Antiochus' army, they began harassing the rear of his infantry lines causing significant disruption and breaking the Seleucid infantry, allowing Pyrrhus to lead a cavalry charge into the gap which began breaking the Seleucid morale. His cavalry, returning from their bout with the Persians, once again engaged their Seleucid foes in an attempt to keep Antiochus from leveraging his greater cavalry forces to cover their retreat while Pyrrhus' infantry surged forward, largely abandoning their pikes in favour of their short-swords which would now give them much better flexibility in the hills.
The Seleucid infantry began to rout. At this stage, Antiochus had probably his most ingenious idea. Leading from atop a war elephant, he brought his own elephants (until now placed on the flanks in an attempt to check Pyrrhus' cavalry) around just ahead of his infantry. There is an important point to be noted about elephant warfare. Elephants weren't actually that good in battle. For all that is made of their weight and size, these attributes were most often countered by their tendency to panic and flee as well as the fact that horses could easily outspeed them. A commander who knew what he was doing, like Pyrrhus, could even use javelins or other skirmishers to annoy, or kill, elephants. Typically elephants didn't march unsupported; they usually had warriors on their back (sometimes in small towers) as well as small groups of soldiers by their side to help protect against skirmishers.
What elephants were good at was a variety psychological and tactical factors. People, and horses, were often scared of elephants so they could drive an enemy to rout on occasion and were often very good at providing a check against enemy cavalry forces, at least those not used to fighting with elephants. In this instance, both cavalry forces seem to have been plenty experienced; Antiochus' Persian cavalry had been turned back by Pyrrhus' elephants but largely because of the support of his own Thessalian cavalrymen and the skirmishers on the back of those elephants. Antiochus had probably placed his elephants on the flanks intending to use them in the same way both he and Seleucus had done against the Gauls, keeping one flank safe against cavalry and giving him an extra field of manoeuvre over his enemy, or as a final charge to help break a routing foe.
The other advantage to elephants was that they provided very helpful command towers. From atop an elephant, Antiochus could both see the battlefield and be seen by his soldiers. Now seeing his forces begin to rout, he swung his elephants ahead of the infantry lines to provide a temporary relief from the advance of Pyrrhus' infantry. Alone, the elephants wouldn't hold but, for now, the arrival of his elephants provided another barrier between Pyrrhus and his infantry and, just as importantly, between Pyrrhus' infantry and his flanking forces. Fearing that Antiochus' elephants were about to cut off his retreat, Pyrrhus swung around to reunite with his forces to prepare a larger assault which might finish off the Seleucid army.
However, the retreat of Pyrrhus' cavalry gave the Seleucids vital time; seeing their king at the head of the army and encouraged by the hypaspists who had still held their ground, the Seleucid infantry was able to begin rallying and, along with Antiochus' skirmishers, drive off the Epirote flanking force with the Gallic cavalrymen giving chase to ensure they wouldn't simply reform and return to the fight. Still, Antiochus had suffered heavy casualties and had no guarantee that his elephants were about to swing the battle in his favour, especially now that his movement of the elephants away from his flank had freed up Pyrrhus and is bodyguard as well as forcing the Seleucid Persian cavalry to compete both with Pyrrhus' Thessalians and deal with the Epirote elephants (although his companions, on the other flank, remained equally matched against their enemies, even driving the Thessalians back). The biggest problem was Pyrrhus' skirmishers; Antiochus' archers seem to have taken heavy casualties (due to their being behind the Seleucid line when Pyrrhus' flanking force arrived), leaving him with less ability to actually counter the raids of Pyrrhus' infantry. Not to mention, the placement of his elephants ahead of the Seleucid infantry posed the very real threat that, should they flee, his infantry lines would be shattered, allowing Pyrrhus to carry the day and slaughter his army.
Instead, he fell back. Here, on the Pangaion Hills, his army stood no chance. What he still had was a reasonably intact cavalry force (Persians on one flank and Companions on the other) and an infantry contingent that could still fight. Here, Antiochus was playing with fire; Pyrrhus had prepared for this encounter, his army was more flexible than Antiochus' phalanx, his skirmishers more numerous and effective, and his cavalry (although possibly outnumbering Pyrrhus') was not in a position to actually outflank anything. While Pyrrhus prepared his infantry, Antiochus gave orders for his own infantry to begin a fighting retreat, less veteran infantry first. At the rear came his hypaspists. Finally, the skirmishers and elephants pulled back together; the skirmishers screened the elephants against Pyrrhus' own javelins while the elephants formed a wall to help protect the retreating infantry. His cavalry rode alongside, pushing back several attempts by Pyrrhus' own cavalry to harass the Seleucid lines and ensuring that the majority got away.
The Battle of Mount Pangaios has often been seen as a stalemate but, if it was a stalemate, it was a costly one. Pyrrhus had largely carried the day; most of his army was intact and he had dealt Antiochus a very bloody nose. While the Seleucid army had retreated, they had lost a significant number of infantrymen, at least some cavalry and had certainly lost a fair amount of prestige. Retreating to Philippi, Antiochus began bracing for a potential counter-attack but none came. Pyrrhus had also learned lessons from the battle; Antiochus' army had plenty of veterans (just as his did) and any fight fought on Antiochus' terms was bound to be a bloodbath. Pyrrhus was almost certainly a better commander than Antiochus but that didn't mean that his rival was weak and he certainly still had plenty of extra elephants and cavalrymen who, in a regular battle, could very easily swing the engagement in his own favour. The battle had been won but the war was just beginning.
Significance:
The Battle of Mount Pangaios is an interesting one which has drawn a lot of comment by a lot of different scholars over the years. The first point to note is the tactics. Pyrrhus had completely abandoned the pike phalanx in favour of short-swords, a lesson apparently learned from his run-ins with the Romans. In the rough terrain, the phalanx often got broken up which could provide opportunities to shatter the formation entirely. The cavalry charge against the infantry front was bold but taken straight from Alexander's playbook. Instead, Pyrrhus had opted to focus on the short-swords, betting on the ability of his infantry to adjust and the disunity of the Seleucid phalanx to provide an opening into which he could pour. This was a battle built on flexibility and manoeuvrability, a battle which focussed more on skirmishers and lighter, more flexible infantry than the pike phalanx.
Such tactics were not new in Greece. Indeed, Aetolian warfare had used flexible infantry and skirmisher-based armies for centuries, as had Cretan warfare. Isocrates, the Athenian general, had made good use of skirmishers in several campaigns in the 4th Century. It is important to remember that the pike phalanx was far from the only tactic used in Greek warfare at the time. What is often significant for people, however, is that Mount Pangaion set the tone for much of the rest of the war. Antiochus too learned from his lessons. When he next attempted to cross the Pangaion Hills, several months later, he did so with a much larger force of skirmishers. In March 269 BCE, Antiochus once again entered the Pangaion Hills after having spent time travelling in Thrace. With his army came a large contingent of Thracian skirmishers.
By July 270 BCE, Antiochus was in Byzantium. Antigonus had fled for Demetrias with the remains of his forces and his royal bodyguard. Pyrrhus was in Amphipolis. The arrival of Antiochus in Byzantium had been something of a cause for celebration. His partisans in Greece had eagerly awaited his approach and either rushed to meet the Seleucid king, assuring him of their continued loyalty, or remained wherever they had taken cover in Greece during the Antigonid period. The city of Byzantium had no issues letting him in (after all, he was the nearest major army in the field and Pyrrhus didn't have a particularly stellar reputation by this point). With Antigonus out of the way, Antiochus' crossing proved rather smooth. With him came the now-largest army in Greece or Macedonia. In the last few years of campaigning, the army had dwindled somewhat but Antiochus had made sure to raise some more soldiers, probably shortly after the beginning of the siege of Pergamon.
The Seleucid army in July 270 BCE numbered some 35-40,000 soldiers. As per usual, the core of the army was the Macedonian phalanx, made up of both Macedonians and Greeks. At the core of this was a contingent of, by now, very veteran soldiers. One source claims that, sometime in 275/4 , he had re-instituted the 'Hypaspists', the elite infantry unit headed by his father under Alexander III. Into this, he had folded many of the veterans of Seleucus' campaigns as well as many of his own veterans. Upon his crossing into Thrace, one historian places their number at maybe 6000 infantrymen. In total, the phalanx probably numbered 16-20,000. Alongside this was a skirmisher force comprising largely of Persians and Cretans, as per usual, but soon bolstered by Greek and Thracian peltasts. Then there was the cavalry. Persian cavalry was preferred and so too were the Greco-Macedonian 'companions'. However, for the first time, Antiochus actually fielded some 400 Gallic cavalrymen, largely to be used as scouts or raiding forces as per need. Finally there came the elephants. No Seleucid king would go to war without war elephants, numbered at 50.
Pyrrhus' army is more complicated. His initial invasion of Macedonia four years earlier was reasonably small, possibly approaching only 20,000. However, over time he had taken pains to increase his military force. Exactly what numbers he had in 270 are very much uncertain but estimates place it at a maximum of 32,000, mostly Greco-Macedonian infantry but with Gallic and Illyrian mercenaries, Agrianians, Thracians, and a reasonable contingent of Thessalian cavalry. Elephants too, of course though probably only 10-15 maximum (and possibly fewer). All of this placed him at a distinct advantage but it was far from enough to necessarily throw the entire war in Antiochus' favour. If anything, the months that followed would prove that rather dramatically. News of Antiochus' arrival would have reached Pyrrhus rather early on. However, while he knew of the king's arrival, he seems not to have worried all that much about it. On the contrary, he instead focussed mostly on bringing food into Amphipolis and repairing any breaches in the walls. Antiochus could cross into Macedonia without going through Amphipolis, but it would require him to take longer routes through Thrace and Upper Macedonia which might leave Byzantium undefended.
Similarly, he also diverted resources towards ensuring the defence of Eion closer to the sea, another crucial crossing-point along the Strymon which Pyrrhus hoped to hold against the Seleucid king. Pyrrhus didn't plan on letting this come to a siege but he also knew that the fortified locations of both Amphipolis and Eion gave him a crucial military advantage; Antiochus mostly had to come through this way and so, as long as Pyrrhus held them, he could have a strong defensive location to fall back to should he need it. With that said, he clearly had no intention of actually needing to use the city defences whatsoever. On 17th August, as Antiochus began his march on Amphipolis, Pyrrhus sent ahead a set of ambassadors informing Antiochus that he had no intention to fight and that he would be willing to surrender Thrace to the Seleucid king and recognise Amphipolis as an inviolable boundary between the two. Antiochus refused.
Probably between the 25th and 30th of August, Antiochus arrived at, and took control of, the city of Philippi on the other side of the Pangaion hills from Amphipolis. Here was the trouble. To the North of Amphipolis and Eion was Lake Cercinitis, to the South was the Aegean, to the West was the Strymon River and, to the east, the Pangaion hills and Mount Pangaios itself. Amphipolis sat on a ridge at the base of Mount Pangaios, protecting one route around the Southern bank of Lake Cercinitis. Eion protected the route around the Southern side of Mount Pangaios and along the sea. Crossing the Strymon required taking one or the other, but it also required Antiochus to march his army through at least two very narrow chokepoints. It also put him in the position of having to deal with some very rough terrain.Sure enough, in early September, the Seleucid army made its first attempt to approach, apparently angling for Eion from which it could cut off Amphipolis, a rather harder siege, from any support from the west. The result was an absolute catastrophe. As the Seleucid army marched, the rough terrain of the Pangaion hills made formations difficult to maintain, the Seleucid columns got broken up and, while their war elephants had very little trouble, the heavy Seleucid infantry found the march rather more difficult. For Pyrrhus, the hills offered his slew of lighter infantry and skirmishers a very real opportunity. Sure Antiochus had plenty of the same, but his army had spent the last while largely fighting in traditional Hellenistic battles, not against an army ready for warfare in the hills.
On the morning of the 8th September, Antiochus' scouts informed him that Pyrrhus' phalanx was approaching from the east. Antiochus marched to give battle, both armies meeting the next day. On the first day, Antiochus offered battle but was refused. On the second, he offered battle once again and was refused a second time. Only on the third day did Pyrrhus finally prepare for battle. At first, the fighting seemed rather skewed in Antiochus' favour; Pyrrhus' skirmishers fell back before the assault of the Seleucid archers and the Seleucid cavalry was able to drive Pyrrhus' Thessalians into a retreat although were prevented from giving chase by the Epirote elephants. Both phalanxes had difficulty manoeuvring and keeping formation on the rough terrain so, for the time being, the battle remained largely in the hands of the various skirmishers. It is said that, during these first few hours, the Gallic cavalry also distinguished itself on several occasions for their bravery, darting in to harass Pyrrhus' lines before escaping any retribution.
Just when Antiochus might have felt the battle going his way, however, the trap closed. Pyrrhus had spent the last two nights getting his army into place, sending some 4000 light infantry around longer paths to take up a position behind the Seleucid lines. Now, with the Seleucid army largely committed, the Epirote skirmishers swung into the fight with as much noise and fervour as they could muster. Descending upon Antiochus' army, they began harassing the rear of his infantry lines causing significant disruption and breaking the Seleucid infantry, allowing Pyrrhus to lead a cavalry charge into the gap which began breaking the Seleucid morale. His cavalry, returning from their bout with the Persians, once again engaged their Seleucid foes in an attempt to keep Antiochus from leveraging his greater cavalry forces to cover their retreat while Pyrrhus' infantry surged forward, largely abandoning their pikes in favour of their short-swords which would now give them much better flexibility in the hills.
The Seleucid infantry began to rout. At this stage, Antiochus had probably his most ingenious idea. Leading from atop a war elephant, he brought his own elephants (until now placed on the flanks in an attempt to check Pyrrhus' cavalry) around just ahead of his infantry. There is an important point to be noted about elephant warfare. Elephants weren't actually that good in battle. For all that is made of their weight and size, these attributes were most often countered by their tendency to panic and flee as well as the fact that horses could easily outspeed them. A commander who knew what he was doing, like Pyrrhus, could even use javelins or other skirmishers to annoy, or kill, elephants. Typically elephants didn't march unsupported; they usually had warriors on their back (sometimes in small towers) as well as small groups of soldiers by their side to help protect against skirmishers.
What elephants were good at was a variety psychological and tactical factors. People, and horses, were often scared of elephants so they could drive an enemy to rout on occasion and were often very good at providing a check against enemy cavalry forces, at least those not used to fighting with elephants. In this instance, both cavalry forces seem to have been plenty experienced; Antiochus' Persian cavalry had been turned back by Pyrrhus' elephants but largely because of the support of his own Thessalian cavalrymen and the skirmishers on the back of those elephants. Antiochus had probably placed his elephants on the flanks intending to use them in the same way both he and Seleucus had done against the Gauls, keeping one flank safe against cavalry and giving him an extra field of manoeuvre over his enemy, or as a final charge to help break a routing foe.
The other advantage to elephants was that they provided very helpful command towers. From atop an elephant, Antiochus could both see the battlefield and be seen by his soldiers. Now seeing his forces begin to rout, he swung his elephants ahead of the infantry lines to provide a temporary relief from the advance of Pyrrhus' infantry. Alone, the elephants wouldn't hold but, for now, the arrival of his elephants provided another barrier between Pyrrhus and his infantry and, just as importantly, between Pyrrhus' infantry and his flanking forces. Fearing that Antiochus' elephants were about to cut off his retreat, Pyrrhus swung around to reunite with his forces to prepare a larger assault which might finish off the Seleucid army.
However, the retreat of Pyrrhus' cavalry gave the Seleucids vital time; seeing their king at the head of the army and encouraged by the hypaspists who had still held their ground, the Seleucid infantry was able to begin rallying and, along with Antiochus' skirmishers, drive off the Epirote flanking force with the Gallic cavalrymen giving chase to ensure they wouldn't simply reform and return to the fight. Still, Antiochus had suffered heavy casualties and had no guarantee that his elephants were about to swing the battle in his favour, especially now that his movement of the elephants away from his flank had freed up Pyrrhus and is bodyguard as well as forcing the Seleucid Persian cavalry to compete both with Pyrrhus' Thessalians and deal with the Epirote elephants (although his companions, on the other flank, remained equally matched against their enemies, even driving the Thessalians back). The biggest problem was Pyrrhus' skirmishers; Antiochus' archers seem to have taken heavy casualties (due to their being behind the Seleucid line when Pyrrhus' flanking force arrived), leaving him with less ability to actually counter the raids of Pyrrhus' infantry. Not to mention, the placement of his elephants ahead of the Seleucid infantry posed the very real threat that, should they flee, his infantry lines would be shattered, allowing Pyrrhus to carry the day and slaughter his army.
Instead, he fell back. Here, on the Pangaion Hills, his army stood no chance. What he still had was a reasonably intact cavalry force (Persians on one flank and Companions on the other) and an infantry contingent that could still fight. Here, Antiochus was playing with fire; Pyrrhus had prepared for this encounter, his army was more flexible than Antiochus' phalanx, his skirmishers more numerous and effective, and his cavalry (although possibly outnumbering Pyrrhus') was not in a position to actually outflank anything. While Pyrrhus prepared his infantry, Antiochus gave orders for his own infantry to begin a fighting retreat, less veteran infantry first. At the rear came his hypaspists. Finally, the skirmishers and elephants pulled back together; the skirmishers screened the elephants against Pyrrhus' own javelins while the elephants formed a wall to help protect the retreating infantry. His cavalry rode alongside, pushing back several attempts by Pyrrhus' own cavalry to harass the Seleucid lines and ensuring that the majority got away.
The Battle of Mount Pangaios has often been seen as a stalemate but, if it was a stalemate, it was a costly one. Pyrrhus had largely carried the day; most of his army was intact and he had dealt Antiochus a very bloody nose. While the Seleucid army had retreated, they had lost a significant number of infantrymen, at least some cavalry and had certainly lost a fair amount of prestige. Retreating to Philippi, Antiochus began bracing for a potential counter-attack but none came. Pyrrhus had also learned lessons from the battle; Antiochus' army had plenty of veterans (just as his did) and any fight fought on Antiochus' terms was bound to be a bloodbath. Pyrrhus was almost certainly a better commander than Antiochus but that didn't mean that his rival was weak and he certainly still had plenty of extra elephants and cavalrymen who, in a regular battle, could very easily swing the engagement in his own favour. The battle had been won but the war was just beginning.
Significance:
The Battle of Mount Pangaios is an interesting one which has drawn a lot of comment by a lot of different scholars over the years. The first point to note is the tactics. Pyrrhus had completely abandoned the pike phalanx in favour of short-swords, a lesson apparently learned from his run-ins with the Romans. In the rough terrain, the phalanx often got broken up which could provide opportunities to shatter the formation entirely. The cavalry charge against the infantry front was bold but taken straight from Alexander's playbook. Instead, Pyrrhus had opted to focus on the short-swords, betting on the ability of his infantry to adjust and the disunity of the Seleucid phalanx to provide an opening into which he could pour. This was a battle built on flexibility and manoeuvrability, a battle which focussed more on skirmishers and lighter, more flexible infantry than the pike phalanx.
Such tactics were not new in Greece. Indeed, Aetolian warfare had used flexible infantry and skirmisher-based armies for centuries, as had Cretan warfare. Isocrates, the Athenian general, had made good use of skirmishers in several campaigns in the 4th Century. It is important to remember that the pike phalanx was far from the only tactic used in Greek warfare at the time. What is often significant for people, however, is that Mount Pangaion set the tone for much of the rest of the war. Antiochus too learned from his lessons. When he next attempted to cross the Pangaion Hills, several months later, he did so with a much larger force of skirmishers. In March 269 BCE, Antiochus once again entered the Pangaion Hills after having spent time travelling in Thrace. With his army came a large contingent of Thracian skirmishers.
Given that Sardis had a mention of being a royal city, it likely will be the closest thing to a western capital. Or Ephesus.
- Status