The Spanish Heir (What if Carlos II had a son?)

[Archduke]

XI: The Grand Alliance

Michiel ten Hove, Grand Pensionary of Holland​

1689 was supposed to be a difficult year for France. As the year began, France found itself ill-prepared for a serious war. In 1688, Louis XIV and Louvois had allowed their agents in the east and in the British Isles to delude them into thinking that a repeat of the War of the Reunions was possible, but this time against the likes of the Holy Roman Emperor and the Dutch Republic rather than Spain. The French thought that the Germans were weak and without the will to fight, and they expected that William of Orange would embroil himself in a new series of English civil wars. Instead, in the face of a French assault, the Germans rallied and declared a Reichskrieg, a war of the entire Holy Roman Empire, against France, and James II of England folded at the first sign of danger. By the beginning of 1689, the Germans were standing strong and England was fully in the grasp of William of Orange. To fight this powerful alliance of England, the Dutch Republic, and Germany, France did not even half of its armed forces mobilized. The warehouses and depots were not stockpiled. The regiments had not been called up. The ships were laid away. France was not ready for anything more than a few sharp actions. In contrast, the English seemed to embrace their new king, the Dutch were letting go of their inhibitions against war and were buying every mercenary they could, and German princes of every rank were raising soldiers for the Emperor. The only German who seemed to have a modicum of sympathy toward the French, Elector Max Emanuel of Bavaria, had been sent far away to the frontiers of Christendom where he could not be reached by the temptations of France. In every way, France seemed destined for setback.

1689 was not a difficult year for France.

1689 was a horrific year for the enemies of France. On almost every front, France was outnumbered and outgunned by its enemies because of Louis XIV and Louvois' self-deception. In Ireland, as soon as Marshal Schomberg arrived, the Franco-Jacobites were supposedly outmatched and immediately the security of Derry was restored. But after Derry, Schomberg accomplished nothing but his own humiliation. Not only was the rebellious city of Dublin not burned, it was not even reached. Instead, Schomberg stalled at Cú Chulainn's home, Dundalk, and just like men of Ulster, Schomberg's army seemed to be afflicted by the ces noínden. What other excuse can be offered for the fact that he did not advance and attack the lesser army of James II of Ireland? After losing thousands, Schomberg finally relented but then managed to bungle the siege of Charlemont so severely as to lose thousands more. Upon moment Schomberg arrived in Ireland it seemed almost impossible for him to lose and yet by the end of 1689, he had put into question whether his army would survive another year on the Emerald Isle. As egregious as they were Schomberg's mishaps paled in comparison to the German front where the coalition against France suffered nothing short of catastrophe. Three, three whole separate German armies had been assembled to match the singular and inferior French army of the ill-experienced Grand Dauphin of France. Led by Charles V of Lorraine, the supposed hero of the East, Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden, the grizzled veteran of the Turkish wars, and Friedrich III of Brandenburg, son of the Great Elector, the Germans should managed a great many feats against the Grand Dauphin. They did not. The three separate armies remained separate and separately they failed. Charles of Lorraine ran headfirst into the walls of Mainz and shattered his army in the process. Ludwig Wilhelm gave up his eastern aggression for western reticence and did not even dare to contest Philippsburg. Friedrich III took Cologne and held on Koblenz but failed to move past Bonn. Minor victories like Cologne and Derry could not make up for tragic mistakes like Charlemont and Mainz.

The only enemies of France to avoid embarrassment were Spain and the Dutch Republic, and the reason for that was a defeat in itself for France's opponents. After decades of having its honor and pride besieged, Spain stood by the mother of the future King of Spain, Luis Carlos. Spain refused to give up its allegiance to Queen Marie Louise's uncle and Prince Luis Carlo's great-uncle, King James II of England. Even as he was run out of his country (by himself in all honesty), Spain stayed loyal and true. For that reason alone, Spain spat in the face of the would-be king of England, William III, and refused his hand. But without the firm support of the Dutch, Spain could in no way risk war against France. Instead, for the time being, it put aside its differences and declared the Spanish Netherlands neutral grounds while giving Louis XIV thousands of men to use against William III. Afterward, Spain continued to abscond from another war against France and altogether neglected its obligations. Through these means, Spain saved the Dutch Republic from French armies but also locked the grand army that the Dutch were building behind a wall of neutrality. On the other side of that wall, the prospective opponent of the Dutch, Duc de Humieries liberally sent his men away to reinforce France’s other front, Germany. Humieries's southern counterpart, the Duc de Noailles similarly sent men away from the Catalonian frontier to fight against the Germans. These men played pivotal roles in saving Bonn and Mainz. Thus, Spain's neutrality enabled France to wreak havoc on its belligerent enemies. Altogether, France’s enemies had managed only a series of mild successes and messy failures. If this series of mild successes and messy failures was all that France’s enemies could manage while France was not even half-mobilized then what hope did they have once Louis XIV and Louvois fully activated their war machine? As it was, the Sun King shone brilliantly and the rest of Europe was at risk of being burnt.

Under this heat, some of the enemies contemplated peace after no more than a year of fighting with Louis XIV. Even the man who was supposed to be Louis XIV’s primary antagonist, William III, questioned the wisdom of further war against France. He could afford to have such thoughts. His lands on the Continent were untouched by war thanks to the Spanish buffer and he had already accomplished his goal of being crowned King of England. All that remained for him was the complete defeat of James II, which might only become possible after France dropped its support of the exiled Jacobite king. However, William III knew that Louis XIV would not abandon James II lightly, at least not until his Continental ambitions were sated. Those Continental ambitions at the very least included nothing less than a fulfillment of France’s September 1688 ultimatum. In other words, the full recognition of Furstenberg as the Archbishop of Cologne, a settlement of Elisabeth Charlotte’s claims to the Palatinate, and the permanent cession of numerous Imperial border towns and fortresses to France. Even if France’s army was close to accomplishing all three of these goals through a force of arms, France's Continental enemies in the Dutch Republic and Germany were not willing to succumb, They understood that giving in to these demands would only enable Louis XIV to continue with his rabid expansionism. Cologne, Bonn, and Heidelberg would be the bases for the next wave of French attacks and these ones would drive even deeper into the Dutch Republic and Germany. As terrible as things had gone in 1689, the enemies of France could not give up just yet. As frightening as the repercussions of further conflict and further defeat might be, the price of peace was too dear. They had to fight on, they had to find a way to win.

The inability to conceive an acceptable peace in 1689 forced France’s enemies to redouble their commitment to the war. Earlier in the summer of 1689, the Dutch Republic had formed two alliances with William III’s England and Emperor Leopold’s Austria, respectively. The new Anglo-Dutch alliance was built off the previous Treaty of Defensive Alliance signed in 1678. Under the new “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance”, William III and the Staten-Generaal forged “close Alliance and faithful League in order to maintain and continue mutually Order, Peace, Friendship, and Neutrality at sea and on land .... and to defend, assist and maintain, keeping in possession the Lands, Towns and Places that belong at present and that will belong later both to His Majesty and His Successors as Kings of Great Britain and to the said Lords States General, the said Treaties wherever those Lands, Towns and Places be located.” In simpler words, England and the Republic agreed to defend one another’s territories as they were currently understood. This document was augmented by Treaty on Combined Fleets, which clarified the means of joint-naval campaigns between England and the Dutch Republic. Between the two treaties, the English and Dutch had been meant to fight together in the British Isles, on the high seas, and the Continent. However, the precarious situation in Ireland and the neutral setting for the Spanish Netherlands prevented any deployment of English soldiers to the Continent and also forced William III to keep thousands of elite Dutch soldiers constrained to the British Isles. The Austro-Dutch alliance was considerably more aggressive in its goals. While the Anglo-Dutch treaty was supposed to defend what the English and Dutch held, the Austro-Dutch treaty was supposed to reclaim lands lost years before. This both defensive and offensive alliance was explicitly targeted against France and precluded either country from finding a separate peace. The objective of this alliance was nothing less than restoring the borders set by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Peace of Pyrenees of 1659. In other words, the Dutch and Austrians meant to undo all of Louis XIV’s conquests from the War of Devolution, the Franco-Dutch War, and the War of Reunions. Also, the Dutch promised to support the election of Holy Roman Emperor Leopold’s eldest son, Joseph, as King of the Romans. In December 1689, the Dutch organized for these two bilateral alliances to be joined in one, the Grand Alliance of Vienna. Together, they promised to eject France from Germany, including Alsace, the Spanish Netherlands, and Lorraine. Additionally, they would force France to accept William III’s accession to the English throne.

Although this agreement in late 1689 cemented a triple alliance between three of Europe’s mightiest powers, it did not actually improve the strength and coordination of the enemies of France. The Dutch Republic, England, and the Emperor had all already been at war with France in 1689 and each was less successful than the last. Perhaps it was beneficial to paint a clear picture of what world the Grand Alliance wanted to live in if victorious. However, the Grand Alliance still needed to find a way to become victorious, and each member of the Grand Alliance knew that this victory started with Spain. Naturally, the Dutch placed the greatest importance on securing Spain’s admission to the Grand Alliance. Austria too felt compelled to bring Spain into the war after the trouble at Mainz. However, in England, William III remained firm in the idea that Spain’s admission must be accompanied by the recognition of his kingship. This desire had been the block to any sort of Anglo-Dutch-Spanish reconciliation in 1689 and at the beginning of 1690, that remained true. Rather boldly, William III attempted to appoint a new English ambassador to Madrid, Alexander Stanhope. Spain's response was rather cold. Spain deliberately ignored every letter that announced Stanhope's appointment but did not outright reject it. Thus, Stanhope sailed to Spain thinking that there was a chance at reconciliation. He was denied entry at the port and asked to leave immediately. As far as the Spanish government was concerned, John Stafford, James II’s last ambassador to Spain, remained the only valid representative of the English government in Spain.

The fact of the matter was that Spain did not feel any pressure to reach an understanding with William III and his England. 1689 had seen James II take over most of Ireland and put himself in a solid position to overcome Marshal Schomberg’s army in 1690. At the same time, the Great Dundee had decimated the Williamite forces in Scotland, including the supposedly top-notch Anglo-Scot Brigade. All the while, John Stafford was delivering report after report to Queens Mariana and Marie Louise of the widespread support in England that remained for James II. To Madrid, William of Orange’s rule seemed unsettled, unstable, and on the verge of collapse. For Spain, it simply did not sense to move toward friendliness with William’s England when their true friend, James II, was edging toward total restoration. At that point, Spain would desperately need to retain James II’s goodwill or they would risk being the victims of his retaliation. This idea that William of Orange's reign had already passed its apex gave Queen Marie Louise, the Jacobite of Spain, serious sway within the royal council. In another victory for Marie Louise, one of Scotland's emigres, Alexander Cannon, was brought before both King Carlos II of Spain and his heir, Infante Luis Carlos of Asturias, in a public audience [1]. In front of the most important officials of Spain and a number of foreign dignitaries, including the Dutch Republic’s ambassador, Coenraad van Heemskerck, Cannon was openly received as the envoy of Balcarres' Scottish government. So rather than step toward an understanding with England, Spain took a leap away from William’s extended hand.

William III was furious over both Stanhope's denial of admission and Cannon’s reception. In that moment, he absolutely wanted to end diplomatic overtures to Spain. He wanted to damn the Spaniards to Hell and wished for the French to drag them there. However, William III had bound himself to the interests of the Dutch Republic and Austria through the Grand Alliance, and both the Staten-Generaal and Emperor Leopold remained determined to win Spain’s help. In 1689, Michiel ten Hove, the Republic’s Grand Pensionary, had folded to William III’s demands and made Dutch-Spanish military cooperation contingent on Spain’s acceptance of William III as King of England. In 1690, Hove chose to be stubborn with William III instead of with Spain. Hove exchanged a flurry of letters with William III to convince him of the necessity of the Spanish alliance with or without a recognition of Williamite rule. With each reply, William III denied Hove’s pleas and told him to remain strong because Spain would bend. Spain was weak he promised and the Jacobite Queen could not beat out the Austrian Queen forever. However, the ambassador in Spain, Heemskerck, though differently. Marie Louise was the mother of the future of Spain. Luis Carlos was Spain's miracle and Marie Louise, was his mother. Certainly, Carlos II defied every scientific explanation by continuing to live another day, but still he was expected to die before Luis Carlos came of age. When he did, Marie Louise, not Mariana, would be the Queen Mother and with that she would become the most powerful person in Spain. The Spaniards understood that and feared it even. The Orleans Queen remained French at heart and the Spanish government did not know what to do with that. What if she made her son an agent of Louis XIV, just as she seemed to be? What could be done? He was going to be their king and they would have no other. Some ministers even conjured up ideas about sending Luis Carlos away from his mother so he might be raised away from her influence. Those plans were stillborn. The boy was just six years old and his life could not be risked at sea. So for the time being, every indication pointed to Marie Louise raising her own son and being every part of the future of Spain. So long as that remained true, Marie Louise would retain enough power within Spain's government to keep the Jacobite agenda afloat, even if a French agenda remained out of reach.

Heemskerck's confirmation that the Jacobite sentiment in Spain showed no signs of weakening resolve forced Michiel ten Hove into a dramatic standoff with William III. Since William refused to listen to Hove's reason, the Grand Pensionary resorted to rather aggressive defiance. In a letter that left William III stunned, Hove reprimanded William III for abandoning the Dutch Republic for England. With a boldness that bordered on temerity, Hove accused William of subjecting Dutch interests to his personal English ambitions. Hove brought back up Manuel de Coloma and Escolano and James II's assurances of England's friendliness and suggested that William's invasion had no military merit. The adventure was nothing more than William abusing his powers as a Stadtholder to claim a personal kingship for himself. Hove reminded William III that the authorization for his invasion had been withdrawn at the last moment and that the legality of the continued use of Dutch soldiers in the British Isles was in question. Hove even hinted at the fact that William's usurping of James II had not been part of the plan he had revealed to the Staten-Generaal, and thus was never approved. On a more open note, Hove remonstrated William for stealing the best soldiers of the Dutch Republic and for losing some of them (the Anglo-Scots Brigade) to Scottish clansmen. Pointedly Hove pointed out, as William III’s own letters to James II illustrated, the Anglo-Scots Brigade belonged to the Dutch Republic, especially when the Dutch Republic was under the threat of invasion. To add one final flourish to his letter, Hove inquired when the thousands of English soldiers that the Dutch Republic had been promised would arrive. The total insubordination of Hove shocked and appalled William III [2].

Upset at Hove’s Loevestein-esque threats [3], William III considered having Hove removed and replaced by a more helpful Grand Pensionary. William III thought that Anthonie Heinsuis would be this figure, but Heinsuis shied away from participation in William III’s scheme to replace Hove. Surprisingly, the man who volunteered to help William III was Govert van Slingelandt, cousin of the de Witts’ whom William III had had murdered. However, Govert’s price was that his 26-year-old son be made Grand Pensionary in Hove’s stead. William III’s personal friend and adviser, Hans Willem Bentinck was in favor of the Slingelandt plot, but William III hesitated. Although stubborn and unbearably proud, William III at his core understood pragmatism. The thought of putting the inexperienced Simon at the head of the Dutch Republic worried William and so too did Simon’s de Witt heritage. Bentinck did not seem concerned about Simon's family, but even Hove, the cousin and personal choice of Gaspar Fagel, was leaning into Loevestein politics. While William hesitated, his plots against Hove were uncovered and Hove defeated them in a surprisingly efficient manner. First, Hove appointed Simon as secretary of the Council of State to buy Govert’s compliance. As it turned out, Govert was on his deathbed, and with his waning energy, he was content with securing his family’s legacy. Second, Hove began discussions about the military situation and a Spanish alliance before an assembly of the Staten-Generaal. Of course, the fear-prone Dutch statesmen fell in line with Hove’s thinking that the Spanish alliance was completely necessary. Naturally, the Dutch were also too afraid to directly challenge William III over the issues of the Dutch soldiers in the British Isles and the lack of English soldiers on the Continent. However, Hove did elicit a weak resolution that effectively begged William III to seriously consider how he used Dutch military resources in 1690. Even if this resolution lacked teeth, it showed which way the Staten-Generaal leaned. Soon afterward, William received a carefully worded letter from Emperor Leopold that asked for him to put aside his demands for recognition from Spain and to put defeating France first. Emperor Leopold reminded William of his frustration at the removal of James II’s Catholic daughter, Mary Louisa, from the line of succession. Undoubtedly, William’s attacks on the prestige of the future Queen of Spain did immense harm to his relations with Madrid. Between the Staten-General’s display of approval for Hove, Slingelandt’s defection, and Leopold’s lecture, William was clearly defeated. Finally, William III consented to negotiations with Spain being re-opened to the exclusion of the English topic.

In this new light, Coenraad van Heemskerck met with Carlos II’s favorite, Manuel Joaquin Alvarez de Toledo, to discuss the nature of Dutch-Spanish military cooperation. Marie Louise briefly considered intervening to stop the standing Dutch-Spanish alliance and German-Spanish alliances from coming into effect against her native France. However, the Orleans queen was still young and learning. Before she moved, Mariana and the war party had already taken control of negotiations. As soon as Heemskerck made it clear that Spain would not need to recognize William III’s kingship nor even sign any agreement with his English government, the Spanish dropped all objections to working with the Dutch and Germans. Rather quickly, Heemskerck and the Spanish agreed that the Dutch field army should enter the Spanish Netherlands immediately and join Marques de Gastanaga’s defense. Furthermore, Spain affirmed that it would keep its ports open to both Dutch ships of commerce and ships of war for the duration of the conflict. In general, Spain advocated for quick and complete cooperation in the Spanish Netherlands and the Mediterranean. The Dutch, for their part, were fully willing to send soldiers to the Spanish Netherlands, ships to the Mediterranean, and money to Spain. Against this furious rush, Marie Louise and her Orleanistas were helpless. Spain’s innate desire for war with France could not be stopped. Mariana even agreed to permit English soldiers to serve in the Spanish Netherlands so long as they did so as soldiers of the Dutch Republic rather than as soldiers of William III’s England. The only concession that the Orleanistas won was thanks to Don Pedro Ronquillo, still technically the official Spanish ambassador to James II even though Don Pedro was residing in Madrid at the moment [4]. Ronquillo took note of how the Treaty on Combined Fleets gave precedence to England rather than the Dutch Republic. Therefore, English ships could not serve under the Dutch and fly Dutch colors as English soldiers on a Continental battlefield might. Although to most landlubbers this was a technicality, at sea precedence was considered hugely important. Ronquillo took full advantage of this fact to prevent Spain’s open-port policy from extending to English ships. At the time, this seemed to be an innocuous concession for both Mariana’s war party and Heemskerck to make.

Within a few weeks, Spain not only agreed to join the war against France but had already outlined some of the ways in which it would help fight France. Officially, Spain was doing no more than fulfilling its pre-existing obligations to both the Dutch Republic and the League of Augsburg. This fulfillment amounted to coordinating with the Dutch and Germans in the Low Countries for the defense of the Spanish Netherlands and Rhineland against France. Spain abstained from official admission to the Grand Alliance due to Williamite England’s participation. Spain also avoided any new treaty of alliance with the Dutch Republic that clearly outlined a joint Dutch-Spanish approach to the war. William III wanted to wait until he could turn the tides against James II and then from a position of power, he would negotiate with Spain. Austria felt no need for a new treaty with Spain and Spain was not looking for one either as it remained sore from the Bavarian Netherlands scheme. In this manner, Spain did not bind itself to the same commitments as the three members of the Grand Alliance. Specifically, Spain was not restricted from negotiating a separate peace with France. Although Mariana made loose statements to that effect, nothing on paper bound Spain to fight at the leisure of the Grand Alliance. Still, Spain would benefit if the Grand Alliance won as its war goals specifically included the recovery of Luxembourg, Franche-Comte, and the southern environs of the Spanish Netherlands. Altogether, Spain could not have been happier with the outcome. Or at least, the war party could not be happier. The peace party was less enthusiastic about the prospect of war, especially with Catalonia unsettled. At the end of April 1690, after the lapsing of the Brussels Convention, Spain officially declared war on France and with that, the next phase of the Louis' war began.

[1] Carlos II and both Luis Carlos being both put on public display is a significant symbolic action. Carlos II did not attend every possible function due to his ill-health and was often represented by proxies. So to have both of them (as well as the two Queens) receive someone is a major sign of respect. The fact that they showed this level of respect toward the unofficial envoy of the Scots while not even letting William III's ambassador into the country is a demonstration of the lasting ill-will toward William III's government in England and how Spain's clings to James II.
[2] Not a lot is known about Michiel ten Hove because he died so quickly after succeeding Gaspar Fagel and effectively was sandwiched between two titans in Fagel and Anthonie Heinsius. I'm leaning into the fact that he's a middle-aged man with fully formed opinions and perspectives, so he isn't going to just bend like a reed in the wind. I'm also leaning into his background with the Dutch East India Trading Company as him having a more international background and with him being more understanding of commerce issues. Altogether, I've decided to have him be a bit more independent-minded and willing to stand up to William to defend the Republic's own interests.
[3] For clarity, Loevestein is the liberty, statist alignment in the Dutch Republic. Hove is officially an Orangist, but in this case is showing Loevestein tendencies.
[4] As a reminder, Don Ronquillo left England during William's invasion and facilitated the Scottish escape at the time. Since then, Ronquillo has returned to Spain. He officially remains ambassador to the Court of St. James as another example of Spain's reluctance to let go of James II.

 

[Archduke]

In honor of the Turtledove nom, here's an update.

Also forgot to say thanks to @Andristan for his quick read of the entire TL

I'll try to make comments on replies I missed tomorrow

 

[X Oristos]

Congratulations for the nomination! The "Spanish Heir" deserves a Turtledove!

Excellent update! Indeed, it seems the most plausible development: the Dutch could not simply let Willem's pride to doom the war effort.

In other words, the full recognition of Furstenberg as the Archbishop of Cologne

Speaking of which, has the electorate's army survived the 1689 campaign?

What is a ballpark difference in casualties of the French and Allies compared to OTL 1689?

The new Anglo-Dutch alliance was built off the previous Treaty of Defensive Alliance signed in 1678.

Force allocation will be a constant issue in 1690. I think without an english army in the Flanders, the Dutch will become again vocal of having 7,000 of their best men in Ireland and the Anglo-Scots Brigade in Scotland.

Ronquillo took full advantage of this fact to prevent Spain’s open-port policy from extending to English ships. At the time, this seemed to be an innocuous concession for both Mariana’s war party and Heemskerck to make.

Very interesting. The ability of the Allies to contest the Mediterranean would be somewhat restricted. If I remember correctly 1694 and 1695 William sent the bulk of the Royal Navy in spanish ports.

This means that Courtrai, Dixmude, and Beaumont are taken by France rather than returned to Spain

In the positional warfare we are about to watch in the Spanish Netherlands, those acquisitions have some effect, although not a dramatic one.

Beaumont sits on the road connecting Maubeuge with Philippeville and Dinant. All of them major french fortresses and magazines. Walcourt will be very difficult for the Allies to hold. The French will have a greater flexibility moving forces from the Sambre to the Meyse in a faster more direct manner. Likewise, Boussière is difficult to hold. They can also project power towards Charleroi or Namur easier than in OTL. Overall, the French will be in a position to build there lines similar to those of 1697, although with a Conde-Maubege axis instead of Conde-Mons-Sambre.

Courtrai and Dixmyude are also of some singificance. Instead of starting with Lines as in OTL 1689 :

The French can prepare their future "defensive box/ staging ground" and the Lines they had in 1695. Knokke (just 7km from and Furnes are exposed now and cannot be defended by the Allies at the start of the war. That's the Lines of the 1695 campaign.

Overall, the French start the war in the Spanish Netherlands from a more advantageous position, that allows them greater flexibility than OTL 1689/90 and even the opportunity to economize forces in some occasions.

 

[Dragonboy]

@Archduke . Thanks For this! Wish spain the Best

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

Great chapter, intrigues run wild again and William finally gets a dressing down of sorts to make him reasonable. Spain will certainly add to the war but with Catalonia still unresolved and the French army growing by the day, it also essentially opens up the Netherlands (both Spanish and Dutch) for a direct attack and we'll see if Spain's decision to enter the war will be worth anything in the long run.

 

[Andristan]

say thanks to @Andristan for his quick read of the entire TL

Well, thank you for writing a gripping story that kept me hooked and feeling like James II actually has a chance even if he is pretty gutless

 

[Archduke]

Speaking of which, has the electorate's army survived the 1689 campaign?

What is a ballpark difference in casualties of the French and Allies compared to OTL 1689?


Force allocation will be a constant issue in 1690. I think without an english army in the Flanders, the Dutch will become again vocal of having 7,000 of their best men in Ireland and the Anglo-Scots Brigade in Scotland.


Very interesting. The ability of the Allies to contest the Mediterranean would be somewhat restricted. If I remember correctly 1694 and 1695 William sent the bulk of the Royal Navy in spanish ports.


In the positional warfare we are about to watch in the Spanish Netherlands, those acquisitions have some effect, although not a dramatic one.

Beaumont sits on the road connecting Maubeuge with Philippeville and Dinant. All of them major french fortresses and magazines. Walcourt will be very difficult for the Allies to hold. The French will have a greater flexibility moving forces from the Sambre to the Meyse in a faster more direct manner. Likewise, Boussière is difficult to hold. They can also project power towards Charleroi or Namur easier than in OTL. Overall, the French will be in a position to build there lines similar to those of 1697, although with a Conde-Maubege axis instead of Conde-Mons-Sambre.
View attachment 887067

Courtrai and Dixmyude are also of some singificance. Instead of starting with Lines as in OTL 1689 :
View attachment 887073

The French can prepare their future "defensive box/ staging ground" and the Lines they had in 1695. Knokke (just 7km from and Furnes are exposed now and cannot be defended by the Allies at the start of the war. That's the Lines of the 1695 campaign.
View attachment 887075

Overall, the French start the war in the Spanish Netherlands from a more advantageous position, that allows them greater flexibility than OTL 1689/90 and even the opportunity to economize forces in some occasions.

Yes, Cologne's army has survived the year and is still attached to the French army.

The French have probably suffered a few more casualties than OTL due to Mainz being a little more exciting. Bonn and the battles around there would have taken roughly the same number of casualties. I guess the French avoided Walcourt but that was inconsequential in terms of casualties. The French might have a thousand more casualties than OTL. The Allies are closer to probably what 5,000-ish more in Ireland at least, 3,000 more in Scotland, and at least 5,000 more in Germany. So the allies are definitely worse off.

This next phase should definitely be interesting. The Allies are in a worse position and the French are in a better position, but how the allies try to recover is in question, because they still have resources that they can call upon. England can ramp much faster than OTL and the Dutch can do the same.

 

[A_simple_pilgrim]

Another wonderful chapter, and finally a tipping point in a war that France somehow managed to successfully blunder their way into.

Spanish entry will make a significant impact, though how large is questionable considering their commitments to James in Ireland, along with the trouble in Catalonia. The Catalan situation could be settled quickly, but helping out their friendly English monarch could take up a few thousand elite troops for years to come. The English likewise will probably struggle to decisively intervene in the short term, William is, even assuming every success, still a year away from really crushing the rebellions in Scotland and Ireland, and to do so men have to be re-routed there, little would be left over for a continental expedition, despite the ardent wishes of the Dutch.

William has no choice really, because as it currently stands, his Irish army is in tatters and at risk of destruction, and his Scottish army is only slightly better off due to holding some major fortifications. If he doesn't reinforce them, James will take full control of Ireland, reinforce the Scottish, and in a years time there could be tens of thousands of enemy soldiers marching into the north of England. Luckily the demands on the English navy are much less severe, so they can contribute significantly to the war, though the lack of Spanish bases, means their impact in the Mediterranean will be highly curtailed.

The greatest impact will be the Dutch entry, in my opinion. The Dutch have recruited a large mercenary army, and have had time to prepare due to their forced neutrality. With the opening of the Spanish Netherlands, a new major front against the French is open, and their navy is going to fight hard. That will relieve a lot of pressure on the Germans, and keep the French on their toes. With the French also building up who knows how that will work out in the end.

Edit: By the way would a successful royalist uprising/civil war on the part of James, against a William backed by parliament, be able to reverse the gains made by parliament during the English civil war? I'm not an expert in this period of English history, but have heard the arguments that the English civil war is probably when the parliament gained a decisive edge over the king as to who is the real power in the country. Would basically another civil war in the 1690s be able to undo that and change the arc of British history, or is the inflection point already too far gone?

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

The greatest impact will be the Dutch entry, in my opinion. The Dutch have recruited a large mercenary army, and have had time to prepare due to their forced neutrality. With the opening of the Spanish Netherlands, a new major front against the French is open, and their navy is going to fight hard. That will relieve a lot of pressure on the Germans, and keep the French on their toes. With the French also building up who knows how that will work out in the end.

Indeed, France will be forced to redirect their best troops and commanders to not only assault the Spanish Netherlands but the United Provinces themselves, giving a much needed breathing room for the Germans and allowing movement of Spain into southern France. The French will need to try and crush one or the other quick enough so they can focus on either the Germans or the Dutch, since with the Spaniards it's a question of capturing the Spanish Netherlands ASAP and then holding them in the Pyrenees and the fortress in the Savoyan mountains

 

[X Oristos]

England can ramp much faster than OTL and the Dutch can do the same

What do you mean regarding the english and dutch war effort compared to the OTL Nine Years War ?

little would be left over for a continental expedition, despite the ardent wishes of the Dutch

And also the treaty-bound promises of England that was to provide 10,000 men.

The greatest impact will be the Dutch entry, in my opinion. The Dutch have recruited a large mercenary army, and have had time to prepare due to their forced neutrality. With the opening of the Spanish Netherlands, a new major front against the French is open, and their navy is going to fight hard. That will relieve a lot of pressure on the Germans, and keep the French on their toes. With the French also building up who knows how that will work out in the end.

I would guess that the subsidy troops of the Dutch would have fought in the 1689 campaign against Cologne. Certainly, the Brandenburgers did so. Considering the limitations in manpower, I doubt that the Dutch could have amassed an bigger army than in OTL and kept it inactive while Elector Frederick was campaigning at the lower Rhine, a most important region for dutch security, especially post-1672. In OTL 1689, at least 5,000 Dutch had joined the subsidized forces of the Elector in the Cologne Campaign.

The Dutch can break the bank - and they dug very deep in their pockets in the OTL war, but there are simply not enough sources of soldiers to raise more men. The policy of Charles XI will continue to be one of restraint in foreign conflicts and I doubt he will send more than in OTL. Moreover, when the Anglo-Dutch tried to stop neutral ships trading with France in 1689, they arrested something like 150 swedish ships. That wasn't very helpful and that policy was soon abandonded. With Charles XI keeping more of his army away from the french battlefieds, there is little chance Denmark can send more men than in OTL, without leaving themselves unprotected.

Another issue the Allies will face in the coming years, is that of leadership, if William is not allowed by the Spanish to become the theater commander in the Spanish Netherlands. Childs mentions the issues between Waldeck and the Elector of Brandenburg. The former resented Frederick and the latter was often putting ahead his own agenda rather than the Allied one. For example, in 1690 Frederick sent only 6,000 of the 24,000 men he commanded (Brandenburgers, other north Germans and Swedes) to Waldeck while himself was quite inactive, without facing a french army. Basically, he was garrisoning Julich, assisting Liege and occupying Cologne. Frederick was looking after his own interests in Rhineland, even though he was receiving subsidies from the Dutch. William is the only man to outrank the German Princes and keep them - relatively at least- in line. But having the usurper acting as the regent in Spanish Netherlands will be a huge no-no. Likewise, the whole Spanish Netherlands affair with Max, make the Elector a very not suitable choice for overall command there. So... Waldeck it will be.

Having said that, I think the culmination of the french war effort will be in 1693, when Vauban himself, calculated the french army at 438,000 men. Of them, 166,000 would be garrisons in fortressed and fortified positions. However the 438,000 was a paper number and Lynn calculates 340,000 effectives.

 

[Archduke]

Another wonderful chapter, and finally a tipping point in a war that France somehow managed to successfully blunder their way into.

Spanish entry will make a significant impact, though how large is questionable considering their commitments to James in Ireland, along with the trouble in Catalonia. The Catalan situation could be settled quickly, but helping out their friendly English monarch could take up a few thousand elite troops for years to come. The English likewise will probably struggle to decisively intervene in the short term, William is, even assuming every success, still a year away from really crushing the rebellions in Scotland and Ireland, and to do so men have to be re-routed there, little would be left over for a continental expedition, despite the ardent wishes of the Dutch.

William has no choice really, because as it currently stands, his Irish army is in tatters and at risk of destruction, and his Scottish army is only slightly better off due to holding some major fortifications. If he doesn't reinforce them, James will take full control of Ireland, reinforce the Scottish, and in a years time there could be tens of thousands of enemy soldiers marching into the north of England. Luckily the demands on the English navy are much less severe, so they can contribute significantly to the war, though the lack of Spanish bases, means their impact in the Mediterranean will be highly curtailed.

The greatest impact will be the Dutch entry, in my opinion. The Dutch have recruited a large mercenary army, and have had time to prepare due to their forced neutrality. With the opening of the Spanish Netherlands, a new major front against the French is open, and their navy is going to fight hard. That will relieve a lot of pressure on the Germans, and keep the French on their toes. With the French also building up who knows how that will work out in the end.

Edit: By the way would a successful royalist uprising/civil war on the part of James, against a William backed by parliament, be able to reverse the gains made by parliament during the English civil war? I'm not an expert in this period of English history, but have heard the arguments that the English civil war is probably when the parliament gained a decisive edge over the king as to who is the real power in the country. Would basically another civil war in the 1690s be able to undo that and change the arc of British history, or is the inflection point already too far gone?

In terms of England politics, any quick version of victory for James II means him getting swept back into power by many traitors. Like people such as Churchill or even Douglas-Hamilton switching sides and hand delivering the kingdoms to James II. in this case, James II will still have to contend with a powerful noble class. Likely, he gets his way with religious tolerance and gets a standing army, but still has to call upon a parliament. James II was particular about having a subservient parliament cement his rule, most likely because he saw how parliament could rise up and disrupt the monarchial order. So if James II is restored quickly, I don't think you have the parliamentary settlement broken completely. However, if James II takes longer to regain power and has to rely more on the Irish, Scots, and foreigners then I think it directly gets worse for the English. The harder they make him fight for it, the harder James II will retaliate.

Indeed, France will be forced to redirect their best troops and commanders to not only assault the Spanish Netherlands but the United Provinces themselves, giving a much needed breathing room for the Germans and allowing movement of Spain into southern France. The French will need to try and crush one or the other quick enough so they can focus on either the Germans or the Dutch, since with the Spaniards it's a question of capturing the Spanish Netherlands ASAP and then holding them in the Pyrenees and the fortress in the Savoyan mountains

I think the important thing about Germany is that the French won themselves breathing room and space to work with unlike OTL. In OTL, the Germans were already on the Rhine at this point and were threatening the French perimeter. In TTL, the French are still in Germany and living off German land. So even if the French can't focus on breaking the Germans, they can afford to defer fighting the Germans.

What do you mean regarding the english and dutch war effort compared to the OTL Nine Years War ?


And also the treaty-bound promises of England that was to provide 10,000 men.


I would guess that the subsidy troops of the Dutch would have fought in the 1689 campaign against Cologne. Certainly, the Brandenburgers did so. Considering the limitations in manpower, I doubt that the Dutch could have amassed an bigger army than in OTL and kept it inactive while Elector Frederick was campaigning at the lower Rhine, a most important region for dutch security, especially post-1672. In OTL 1689, at least 5,000 Dutch had joined the subsidized forces of the Elector in the Cologne Campaign.

The Dutch can break the bank - and they dug very deep in their pockets in the OTL war, but there are simply not enough sources of soldiers to raise more men. The policy of Charles XI will continue to be one of restraint in foreign conflicts and I doubt he will send more than in OTL. Moreover, when the Anglo-Dutch tried to stop neutral ships trading with France in 1689, they arrested something like 150 swedish ships. That wasn't very helpful and that policy was soon abandonded. With Charles XI keeping more of his army away from the french battlefieds, there is little chance Denmark can send more men than in OTL, without leaving themselves unprotected.

Another issue the Allies will face in the coming years, is that of leadership, if William is not allowed by the Spanish to become the theater commander in the Spanish Netherlands. Childs mentions the issues between Waldeck and the Elector of Brandenburg. The former resented Frederick and the latter was often putting ahead his own agenda rather than the Allied one. For example, in 1690 Frederick sent only 6,000 of the 24,000 men he commanded (Brandenburgers, other north Germans and Swedes) to Waldeck while himself was quite inactive, without facing a french army. Basically, he was garrisoning Julich, assisting Liege and occupying Cologne. Frederick was looking after his own interests in Rhineland, even though he was receiving subsidies from the Dutch. William is the only man to outrank the German Princes and keep them - relatively at least- in line. But having the usurper acting as the regent in Spanish Netherlands will be a huge no-no. Likewise, the whole Spanish Netherlands affair with Max, make the Elector a very not suitable choice for overall command there. So... Waldeck it will be.

Having said that, I think the culmination of the french war effort will be in 1693, when Vauban himself, calculated the french army at 438,000 men. Of them, 166,000 would be garrisons in fortressed and fortified positions. However the 438,000 was a paper number and Lynn calculates 340,000 effectives.

In OTL, by 1695, the English army had a paper strength of 100,000 whereas in late 1691 it had a paper strength of 80,000. The Dutch army was of similar strength over the same time period. Given the exigency of the situation, it's conceivable that both the English and Dutch push to create these massive towering armies even sooner. If the English and Dutch are to raise these massive armies, then you're right they can't do it on their own. Although financially they can afford it, you're right that the manpower has to come from somewhere. Which means even more reliance on mercenary states like Denmark, Hesse, and Brunswick. But many of those states were maxed out. So they will have to turn to other states that historically didn't get massive subsidies until later. Bavaria would be an ideal choice if Bavaria was on the right front. But that means that Saxony might instead become a candidate. However, paying electors is tricky business as it can be seen as unwelcome interference by the Emperor. it's one thing giving some poor principality without power lots of money for a few thousand soldiers. Its anther thing when you're giving one of the most important princes in the Empire significant wealth. So if the allies want to ramp up then they'll have to do so carefully. The other possibility is giving more money to Spain than OTL and motivating Spain to maximize its own potential. During the Nine Years War, the Spanish Army of Flanders was half the strength of itself during the Dutch War. The other Spanish armies are also undersized. But then that means giving money to the pro-Jacobite Spaniards.

The Dutch were definitely helping the Brandenburgers against Cologne because the Brandenburgers were helping them against England. As a reminder, the Elector of Brandenburg's brother, Ludwig is in England at the head of a battalion of Brandenburgers supporting William III.

William for the time being is not necessarily welcome in the Spanish Netherlands, but luckily he has commitments in the British Isles to avoid the awkwardness of him wanting to lead in the Low Countries. As situations shift, that awkwardness could become a problem. In the meantime, the allies will have to hope that they can coordinate without William.

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

I think the important thing about Germany is that the French won themselves breathing room and space to work with unlike OTL. In OTL, the Germans were already on the Rhine at this point and were threatening the French perimeter. In TTL, the French are still in Germany and living off German land. So even if the French can't focus on breaking the Germans, they can afford to defer fighting the Germans.

Indeed, it however remains to be seen if France can take advantage of such window to their advantage

 

[Andristan]

However, if James II takes longer to regain power and has to rely more on the Irish, Scots, and foreigners then I think it directly gets worse for the English. The harder they make him fight for it, the harder James II will retaliate.

I, for one, am very intrigued by the thought of an actual federation of Great Britain, where it is imposed by James and his Irish, Scots and English sympathisers on England, could lead to all sorts of interesting things. For one, maybe now that this future James is ruling a federation, he would be interested in weakening the biggest and least loyal part of his territory, maybe keeping Wales (if there is or could be created significant support for the Stuarts there) separate and raising up another parliment there, like the Irish one, doing something similar with Cornwall, Mann or (and this is a stretch) Northumbria, too, maybe with the goal being to split up the wealth and power of the parliment of England by creating separate distinct parts/kingdoms(?) governed by him in personal union, definitely no Union act passing in TTL.

You have already mentioned in TTL that that the Nonconformists that should be natural allies for James' religious tolerance plan have been a steadfast thorn in his side, well this could be a way to woo them to his side via specifically giving them legal rights now that they dont have under the anglicans.

 

[Archduke]

XII: Plan 1690

Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I​

Spain’s entry into the war against France was a necessary condition for the Grand Alliance’s survival. Without Spain clearing the roads of Flanders for the Dutch army, the Dutch would have remained practically locked out of the Continental war except for minor expeditions into Germany. With Spain’s entry, the French were immediately confronted with an enemy bulwark to their north that had to be dealt with. The alternative was allowing the Spanish Netherlands to be the base of invasions and raids against France. However, Spain’s empire also gave rise to a potential challenge from Italy. Ever since France’s defeat in the Italian wars, Spain had been the preeminent power in the land of Romans. That preeminence commanded respect among all the Italian princes and was defended by the well-trained Army of Lombardy. If Spain chose, it might rally the Italians against the French interlopers at Casale and Pinerolo and then threaten France’s southeastern corner. Finally, Spain itself could birth an offensive against France through either the narrow of Fuenterrabia or out of Catalonia. In this fashion, France went from having just one Continental front, Germany, to having up to four, the Low Countries, Germany, Italy, and Iberia. This dramatic expansion of the war was necessary for the Grand Alliance to survive or even win its struggle against France. Without Spain’s aid, the fully mobilized French could have rolled back the minor German gains of the previous year and probably gone on to sack towns as illustrious as Frankfurt and Munich. At the same time, they would have been free to send even more help to James II’s expedition. If last year was anything to go by, then a little help was all the Jacobites needed to topple the Williamites in Ireland and Scotland. Alternatively, the French could have sent no more help at all and watched the British Isles remain embroiled in internecine conflict. Spain’s armies and bases avoided that fate, but they alone were insufficient to cause victory over France. Spain gave the Grand Alliance a fighting chance, but turning that chance into reality came down to the wits and discipline of the allies. So as happy as the allies were about bringing Spain into the war, their minds were instantly engaged in designing a war plan that might overcome the terrifying martial machine of France.

One place where Spain’s belligerence only improved the mood moderately was London, the home of the Williamite government. Reigning from the Palace of Saint James, William III understood that Spain’s help on the Continental meant little to nothing for his war in the British Isles. William could only pray that Spain’s Continental commitments prevented both it and France from sending any soldiers or arms the way of Ireland or Scotland. William III’s success depended on that spiteful Jacobite Queen being held in check by her Austrian mother-in-law. If Mariana failed to stop Maria Louise then the Williamites would be in grave danger of suffering some horrid defeat. For the still-new King of England, this reality was hard to stomach. Just a year before, William III had been so confident in his triumph over James II’s lingering supporters that he had put his sword away for the year. Rather than commanding his armies from the saddle, William III had stayed in London to set up his new government and ensure that everything was in the order he wanted it in. Although his wife, Mary II, might have accomplished this all on her own, William wanted to make sure that it was he, not her, who was established as the new monarch of England, Scotland, and Ireland. In William’s stead, he sent Marshal Schomberg to Ireland and General Hugh Mackay to Scotland. Schomberg was among the most sought-after generals in Europe and formerly was at the top of the famed Brandenburger military. Meanwhile, Mackay had spent the past years stationed in the Dutch Republic and had talked up the fine Anglo-Scots Brigade at every opportunity. William had been so confident that Marshal Schomberg would crush the poorly armed and barely trained Irish with his army of more than 30,000 men that William had raised Schomberg to the title of Duke of Schomberg in anticipation of his victories. But in 1689, neither Schomberg nor Mackay gave the churches of London anything to ring for. Instead, the Duke and the General embarrassed themselves and William III in a horrific fashion. After a smart start retaking Carrickfergus and saving Derry, Schomberg had lost thousands of men waiting at Dundalk, and for what? To botch the Siege of Charlemont? This man came with the highest recommendation from Brandenburg and yet he was losing to Irish cattle raiders. However, if Brandenburg’s struggles at Bonn and Cologne were anything to go by, then that recommendation should be valued very little. Meanwhile, the Scottish general, Hugh Mackay had accomplished an even larger mishap. The famed Anglo-Scots Brigade, one of the finest formations in Europe they said, and yet they lost to clansmen armed with swords and shields. Unlike Schomberg, Mackay could not hide behind his unfamiliarity with the landscape because not only was he a Scotsman but he was a goddamn Highlander. How did he realize that he was walking into a trap in his own home country? How incompetent does one have to be?

As much as William III despised the late Duke of Monmouth, at the very least James Scott did not struggle against ragtag collections of rabble. At Bothwell Brig, Monmouth had smashed the Scottish Covenanters in one good strike and that is exactly what both Schomberg and Mackay should have done. Instead, both professional generals had suffered significant casualties and now required reinforcement, but also leadership. Since William III had finally sorted out England’s politics, he felt secure enough to leave London and take charge of an army. The question William III had to answer was which army. Theoretically, Schomberg should be the least in need of help as he retained a large and intact army and near parity with the Irish army. However, the nasty issue of Dumbarton’s Scots and Carlingford’s Irish Brigade existed. Unlike the Anglo-Scots Brigade, these formations seemed to be both competently led and well-drilled. The combination of them had already delivered defeats to the Williamites in Ireland and in time, they might bring about the complete defeat of Schomberg. Under this consideration, William should have dashed toward Ireland and salvaged Schomberg’s missteps before Dumbarton and Carlingford made a fool again out of the German general. However, the letters from Scotland offered nothing but doom and gloom. Duke William Douglas-Hamilton was convinced that Viscount Dundee would roll down from the Highlands and sweep through the streets of Edinburgh. From there, a Scottish invasion of northern England would have followed. Although Mackay disputed Douglas-Hamilton’s exaggerations, Mackay still considered the situation poor and requested thousands of reinforcements. From the sounds of it all, it appeared that the Williamites had already lost their numerical advantage in Scotland and that they were in every way on the backfoot. If this were indeed the case then Scotland needed William III’s firm figure more than anywhere else.

Unfortunately, Ireland and Scotland were not the only places in need of William’s attention. Michiel ten Hove standing up for himself and for the interests of State-Generaal was beyond alarming for William III. For the first time since he was thrust into power during the French invasion, his power in the Republic was seriously threatened. The Staten-Generaal overall remained loyal to him and even Hove assured William that he remained supportive of the Stadtholder. However, those words of friendship had not stopped Hove and the Staten-Generaal from passing a resolution that essentially questioned William’s decision-making. As it was, the Staten-Generaal seemed to be drifting away from Orangism and back toward more Statist thinking. The worry for the Prince of Orange was that the longer he remained away from the Dutch Republic, the more it drifted. Specifically, in this time of war, the Dutch were looking for someone to rally around. During the French invasion of 1672, they had rallied around William and that is how he built up his power. But in 1690, with the Low Countries again becoming a battleground, William was still in England and if he remained in England then it would not be him who the Dutch rallied around. Instead, in all likelihood they would rally around Michiel ten Hove. The more they went to him and depended upon him, the more bold he might become. However, if William left England to become the rallying point of the Dutch Republic then who would be the rallying point of England? Would it be his wife, Mary? Perhaps, perhaps not. Perhaps if William left England, it would be viewed as a flight just as James II’s exit had been. Perhaps, just as in 1688, the English would panic and would flutter to the banner of the king leading the army. In this case, that would be James II rather than William III. If nothing else, William III would not lose his royal crown. The other concern with campaigning on the Continent was William’s “difficult” relationship with Spain. He seriously doubted that Spain would refuse him the right to command his own army if he personally led it into the Spanish Netherlands. However, he fully expected the Spanish to kick up some needless mess over how he addressed, over his precedence in councils, and over what flags he flew. The Spaniards would not deal with his would-be ambassador Stanhope, so William knew that they would not brook with him calling himself “King of England” while he stood on their soil. Still, with how brilliant the French had been during their 1689 campaigns, William III had to take the possibility of another, impending French invasion of the Dutch Republic very seriously.

As William III grappled with his decision over where to command, Emperor Leopold and his new President of Hofkriegsrat, Ernst Rudiger von Starhemberg, had to decide who would command their armies. With the death of Charles of Lorraine, the Imperial army in the west was left without a supreme commander. When it came to naming a new supreme commander, the most logical choice was Max Emanuel who had shared in many of Charles of Lorraine’s triumphs. The problem with giving command to the Elector of Bavaria was twofold. First, bringing him west meant bringing the Bavarian army west. Thus not only would the Imperial army be delayed waiting for its new general but also waiting for that general’s regiments. Those Bavarian soldiers would have to be replaced, which meant sending some soldiers back from the west. As these soldiers were in transit, the Holy Roman Empire and Hungary would both be vulnerable. The second problem was more simple: Emperor Leopold did not like Max Emanuel. Already, Emperor Leopold was left disgruntled by Max Emanuel’s robbery of honors and wealth in 1688. For a prince to demand such a price just to do his duty was uncouth and suspicious. Leopold not only worried that the vain Elector of Bavaria might one day turn himself over to the French for the inevitable bribe they offered, but Leopold worried that Max Emanuel was setting his sights on Leopold’s own titles, including that of Holy Roman Emperor. Max’s recent activities in the east only compounded Leopold’s suspicions of him. Leopold had begrudgingly granted the Bavarian command of the east as a way of containing his ambitions while making use of Bavaria’s army. However, with that supreme command, Max Emanuel showed far too many streaks of independent thought. To the incredulity of the Emperor, Max Emanuel’s first order was to belay the Emperor’s orders. Leopold had ordered his armies to march into Wallachia and subject it to his authority just as they had done in Transylvania. With bold insubordination, Max told the Emperor’s armies no. In his “authority” as supreme commander of the east, he halted the Emperor’s plans against Wallachia and redirected those soldiers to capture some basic forts in Serbia. He left Wallachia completely unmolested despite it holding out from joining the Holy League. Emperor Leopold was furious over Max’s actions and reprimanded severely for it. The mere Elector had the gall to stand his ground against the august Emperor and refuse to re-authorize the Wallachian plan on account of it being militarily unnecessary and strategically unsound. With these remarks, Ferdinand Bonaventura I of Harrach advised the Emperor to strip Max Emanuel of command and send him home. Only the interventions of Charles of Lorraine, Hermann von Baden, and Dominik Andreas I of Kaunitz stayed Emperor Leopold’s hand long enough for his anger to cool.

Max Emanuel’s further actions in 1689 only added to Leopold’s displeasure with him. Considering Max’s unwillingness to attack Wallachia, Leopold made it very clear to the prince that he expected major victories and conquests in the Balkans. If Max Emanuel really needed soldiers that badly then he better make use of them. The preliminary reports of the campaign led Leopold to think that the Imperial army of Aeneas Sylvius von Caprara would end the year in Skopje while Max Emanuel conquered Sofia. Instead, Count Caprara stopped at Sarajevo and Max stopped at Nis. Their marches stopped at these cities despite them taking these cities with plenty of light in the campaign season left and without any major opposing field army close by. Apparently, the young Elector of Bavaria, with all his few years of war experience, thought it was more apt to halt at these points than to continue the offensives. Max Emanuel insisted that if these conquests were to be held then the regional fortifications had to be repaired, firm lines of communication had to be set up, and the armies had to be given rest. Emperor Leopold strongly disagreed. The best way to defend conquests was to keep the enemy on the run, to push the enemy back and away from those conquests. The Ottoman army was still in some state of turmoil and so Max Emanuel was obliged to take advantage of that. Also, Marco d’Aviano and Johann Friedrich Ambrosius von Veterani assured Leopold that further conquests were within easy reach. They said that the defenses of Skopje and Sofia were inadequate and that the Albanians and Bulgarians were ready to rise up in the name of Emperor Leopold. Still, Max Emanuel refused to charge deeper into the Balkans in 1689. Had it not been for the fact that Charles of Lorraine had made such a mess in the west, then Leopold might have retaliated against Max Emanuel’s questionable decisions. Only the crisis of the west prevented Leopold from punishing Max Emanuel. Even then, when Charles of Lorraine was called back to Vienna after failing at Mainz, the thought of sending him back east to control Max Emanuel was floated. If Charles had lived through the winter then there was a very real chance that he would have been sent east to act as the Emperor’s direct representative and ensure that Max Emanuel campaigned as the Emperor wished. Charles of Lorraine’s death deprived Leopold of that possibility. Instead, Emperor Leopold and his council chose to leave Max Emanuel in the east unbothered. So long as Max kept the east safe, the Austrians would have to allow him to continue to test the extent of his authority as an independent commander. Still, Emperor Leopold made clear his disdain for Max Emanuel’s style of campaigning by not awarding him with many new honors or prizes for his victory at Nis. Only the bare minimum celebration was allowed in Vienna.

With Charles of Lorraine dead, Max Emanuel excluded, and Starhemberg already serving in the Hofkriegsrat, there was a drop off to the rest of the Imperial commanders. That is not to say that the next commanders were not as brilliant as the first. In fact, many of them such as Prince Eugene had shown flashes of even brighter brilliance. Nor is that to say that the next class lacked the experience. Generals such as Count Aeneas Sylvius de Caprara and Count Antonio von Caraffa could bathe themselves in laurels and battle stories. The issue is that none of this next class had the necessary combination of brilliance, experience, and stature. Charles, Max, and Ernst all had a combination of all three in different parts. Charles’s brilliance had been inconsistent as it was fueled by persistent stubbornness. At some points that stubbornness was an immense boon such as when he defied Emperor Leopold’s plan for the relief of Vienna. Other times that stubbornness cost Charles dearly as it led to him overstaying at Buda in 1684 and Mainz in 1689. But Charles’s stature as the titular Duke of Lorraine and experience in countless battles for Austria had always made him the obvious successor to the great Montecuccoli, his mentor. Charles’s successor in the east, Max Emanuel lacked in years of experience as he only started fighting at Vienna in 1683. But in the years since, he had been the focal point of Buda twice, then Sabac, and finally Belgrade. In each of those trials, Max Emanuel had proved himself to be one of the most resilient leaders of men. Although short in quantity of experience, there was no question about the quality of Max Emanuel’s short experience. On top of this brilliant experience, Max Emanuel was also one of Germany’s premier princes as Elector of Bavaria and he happened to command one of the best armies in Europe, even if it was far from the largest. Through this brilliant experience and unquestionable stature, Max Emanuel was able to reign as supreme commander in the east to go mostly unchallenged by his more experienced subordinates. Finally, Starhemberg could not claim to be an Elector or a Duke, but he had fought under Montecuccoli. Then using those lessons, Starhemberg had commanded the defense of Vienna, which permanently marked as one of Austria’s greatest commanders. The savior of Vienna was its own appellate that allowed him to stand side by side with an Elector and Duke. For this reason, Starhemberg could expect that any Imperial commander would adhere to his orders. However, Leopold wanted Starhemberg in Vienna more than on the Rhine, which is why he named him as the replacement for the troublesome Hermann of Baden.

After these three commanders, Prince Eugene sparkled but he did not have the experience to overcome his lack of independent title and his scandal-ridden mother. It could hardly be expected that Prince Eugene could command authority over the likes of Elector Friedrich III of Brandenburg, Elector Johann Georg III of Saxony, or even his own cousin, Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden. Regarding those three great princes of Germany, each of them certainly had the stature. However, Johann Georg lacked an overwhelming brilliance, Ludwig lacked adequate experience as a leading commander, and Friedrich III was deficient in both. As a consequence, if Emperor Leopold chose any one of them, he could expect the other two to find an issue with that choice. Additionally, each of the three princes had some additional complication to being the Imperial commander. Friedrich III had contracted so much of his army out to the Dutch Republic that he was obliged to stay close to the Dutch front. Friedrich III’s brother Prince Ludwig being in England at the head of Brandenburger detachment stood as further evidence of the Dutch-Brandenburger connection. Next, Johann Georg had never escaped the suspicion of Emperor Leopold for the French preferences of his father. Whatever degree of separation he had achieved from French suspicion was replaced with suspicion for his association with Max Emanuel of Bavaria. The two had bonded in fighting alongside each other at Vienna and their bond had led to joint defiance against the Emperor previously. Finally, Ludwig’s status as a Swabian made him naturally predisposed to defend Swabia or at least fight close to it. Already, Ludwig had shown how that predisposition could be to the detriment of the Empire. Had Ludwig sacrificed Swabia’s safety then he might have saved Charles of Lorraine’s Mainz incident. Outside of these princes, Emperor Leopold had several veterans including the aforementioned Caprara and Caraffa. However, none of these men had built a resume that could overcome their lack of stature like Montecuccoli had. Caprara had only been an Imperial Marshal since 1683 and Caraffa since 1687. The latter also carried the notoriety of the Eperjes Blood Court. Thus, Emperor Leopold wavered in picking a commander for the western army.

Besides picking commanders, there was also the issue of coordinating an overall allied campaign that would turn the tides against France. For this express purpose, William III set up a standing conference at the Hague where the diplomats and military planners of the Dutch Republic, Austria, and Spanish Netherlands could all meet, share ideas, and settle on a unified plan. The Brandenburgers as agents of the Dutch Republic were also invited to this conference. However, with William III remaining in England, this conference failed to be as effective as desired. The Dutch clearly set out a plan for Prince Georg Friedrich von Waldeck to enter the Spanish Netherlands and contest Marechal d’Humieres’ expected invasion but not all of the allies were willing to help. Although the Austrians sent a representative, Charles de Lorraine, Prince de Commercy, his input was limited to echoing previously extolled Austrian opinions. Commercy did not participate in discussions or debates on strategy beyond repeating known Austrian positions. Commercy also declined to facilitate the coordination of the Imperial army with the Dutch beyond telling the Dutch that they should do their utmost to support the Imperial army in whatever action it ultimately took. The Brandenburgers vacillated throughout the initial sessions of the conference when the Dutch asked for direct support. The Dutch first asked for the Brandenburgers to send an army into the Low Countries and when that proved too much, the Dutch only asked for the Brandenburgers to threaten the Moselle valley. Although the Brandenburgers offered support one day, the next they would claim that it was necessary for them to take Bonn first before risking a Moselle campaign. Occasionally, the Brandenburgers even asked the Dutch to abandon their positions to support a siege of Bonn. Finally, in mid-March, the Brandenburgers issued a firm promise to march down the Moselle using Koblenz as a base. However, within two weeks, Friedrich III had countermanded that promise by writing that Brandenburg would besiege Bonn. As a consolation, Friedrich III would send 6,000 men to reinforce Prince Georg Friedrich von Waldeck. Only the Spanish agreed fully with the Dutch plans for a Spanish strike against the French lines around Menin and Dixmude and a Dutch strike against Dinant. Marques de Gastanaga, the Governor-General of the Spanish Netherlands, was very willing to put the recent Dutch-Spanish troubles behind him by supporting the Dutch plans. However, the Spanish Army of Flanders was only around 30,000 strong and would be too weak to do anything more than distract the French if Humieres was seriously reinforced. Furthermore, many of the Spanish soldiers were tied down defending the fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands.

One reason that the Imperial representative, Commercy, was reluctant to discuss the Imperial plans in detail was because there were no Imperials plans to discuss yet. The Hofkriegsrat was uncertain over which direction to deploy its resources with Bonn, Mainz, and Philippsburg all still in French hands. Naturally, Friedrich III wanted the Imperial army to focus on covering or even assisting in the siege of Bonn. Friedrich III went on to say that if the Imperial army assisted him at Bonn then it would free up soldiers to help implement the Dutch plans. Further down the Rhine, Ludwig of Baden argued that Philippsburg needed to be the focus. If the Holy Roman Empire was to prevent further French depredations then it needed to retake the Upper Rhine bridgeheads. Starhemberg and Emperor Leopold were partial to the late Charles of Lorraine’s preference for Mainz. Mainz remained the holiest city in Germany as well as a major Rhenish transit point. Additionally, if Mainz was retaken then the Hofkriegsrat predicted that Bonn would fall as a consequence. However, after the events of last year when the Brandenburgers had stalled their siege of Bonn to help Charles of Lorraine at Mainz, Friedrich III argued that the Imperial army should focus on Bonn and then Mainz. The other question that the Imperial high command had to ask was whether they could allocate enough men to Germany. Emperor Leopold was reluctant to strip the army of Max Emanuel for fear of losing Hungary, but the German army in the west was in desperate need of reinforcement. A further complication for the Imperial army arose when Emperor Leopold sold an Imperial diploma to the Duke of Savoy for one million lire in February 1690. This diploma invested Duke Vittorio Amedeo II with new Imperial rights and titles. This diploma backed up a previous one by which the Emperor agreed to address the Duke of Savoy as Royal Highness. This royal address naturally upset numerous rulers who felt more deserving of one. In particular, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo III d’Medici, believed that a Duke should never be given a higher address than a Grand Duke. However, the real issue with this diploma had nothing to do with Tuscany and everything to do with France. Louis XIV immediately scolded Vittorio Amedeo for giving money to his enemies, which was contrary to Savoy’s alliance with France. Worse yet, Louis XIV read into this diploma as a precursor to a Savoyard-Imperial alliance. As a consequence, Louis XIV announced that he would be sending an army into Piedmont to handle the Vaudois emigres who had returned in 1689 and had even crossed the border into France to try to ferment a Huguenot rebellion. The news of an approaching French army alarmed Vittorio Amedeo who feared that after the French dealt with the Vaudois they would descend on Turin to punish Vittorio Amedeo for his innocent flirtation with Emperor Leopold. As a consequence, Vittorio Amedeo felt forced to actually initiate honest negotiations with the Grand Alliance.

More accurately, Vittorio Amedeo initiated negotiations with Spain through its Governor of Milan, Antonio Lopez de Ayala Velasco y Cardenas, Count of Fuensalida. The Spanish Army of Lombardy was by far the closest allied formation near Savoy and would be the only one able to help the Savoyards on quick notice. And on quick notice, Vittorio Amedeo would need help if he chose to defy France. In March 1690, the French army of General Nicholas Catinat arrived and instantly defeated the Vaudois army, although it did escape. Afterward, Catinat made it clear that Louis XIV expected Vittorio Amedeo to declare Savoy a belligerent ally to France in this war, or face consequences. Vittorio Amedeo suggested compliance as Catinat marched toward Turin but the Savoyard ruler also deepened his negotiations with Spain by making a direct appeal to Queen Marie Louise. Whether these negotiations succeeded and brought Savoy into the folds of the Grand Alliance or whether cowardice got the best of Vittorio Amedeo and he reconfirmed his subservience to France, in either case, war was bound to break out in Italy. This spiraling of a simple diploma sale into the opening of a new front in the war against France further stretched the resources of Austria. Already Austria was trying to fight a two-front war in Germany and in Hungary, but now it also found itself obliged to fight in Italy. Although Spain’s Milan or perhaps the Duchy of Savoy would stand as the first lines of defense against a French attack on Italy, the Emperor’s claim to sovereignty over Italy as well as its alliances obligated Austria to designate an army for Italy in 1690. Additionally, the Austrians would have to designate a commander for that army, one who could manage the complex politics of Italy but also competently resist Catinat’s army.

The unending series of complications and miscoordination for the Grand Alliance were not paralleled in France where Louis XIV, Louvois, and Croissy reigned supreme over the military-diplomatic apparatuses of France. When the French intervention in Germany had first expanded into a greater war, France found itself ill-prepared for the conflict. All of France’s plans had revolved around the idea of a repeat of the quick and decisive War of Reunions. Thus, for much of 1689, France was reacting rather than following through on well-thought-out plans. In Germany, the French decided to hold the line against the German offensive. In Ireland, the French answered Tyrconnell’s request for help with soldiers and arms to keep England distracted. In Catalonia, reports of rebellion and talks initiated by those rebels were ignored in favor of avoiding any commitment. Finally, in Flanders, the French had declared a truce with Spain just to buy some breathing room. Good fortune and resilience rather than sound strategic planning allowed France to survive the trials of 1689. For 1690, Louis XIV and Louvois had still not formulated a complete vision for the post-war settlement, but in regards to the war itself, Louis XIV and Louvois wanted to bring it to a decisive conclusion in 1690. While the Grand Alliance was still in the midst of designing its approach to the war in the Spring of 1690, France had already figured out its own strategy. In the Spanish Netherlands, Marechal Humieres would no longer be the source of reinforcements but instead would be a major receiver of them. The favorite of Louvois was going to be given every resource to break the Dutch-Spanish army and open Flanders to French conquest [1]. In Germany, the successes at Bonn and Mainz meant that the Rhineland remained a theater that France needed to defend but also one that could be defended. Ludwig Wilhelm’s decision to build defensive lines both precluded an aggressive campaign against Swabia and indicated an unwillingness of the Swabians to launch an offensive against Philippsburg. Thus, Marechal Lorges and the Grand Dauphin’s army at Philippsburg would be transferred north to join Marechal Duras’s army in keeping hold over Bonn and Mainz. Louis XIV made it clear that he expected great things of his son and heir. To Ireland, 6,000 French regulars were to be sent in exchange for an equivalent number of Irishmen. These French regulars were expected to match up better against Schomberg’s army of English regulars. In Spain, the French would make their move and punish the Spanish for their insolent declaration of war. Finally, in Italy, Catinat would enforce Savoy’s adherence to the French alliance by descending into the heart of Piedmont and occupying Turin. This contrast of clear plans and agreed objectives for France to the disputed leadership and multiple contrary schemes suggested that 1690 might be no better for the Grand Alliance than 1689. In fact, it could be far far worse.

[1] Importantly, the Duc de Luxembourg is still at home. Without Humieres stumbling into the Battle of Walcourt, his reputation remains intact and he remains in command of the French army of the Low Countries. So Humieres will be the one leading the French rather than Luxembourg as the fighting in the Low Countries escalates.

 

[Dragonboy]

@Archduke , amazing work.

Leopold is still salty but leaving max in the east was the correct choice, the scourge of the turks needs to keep hammering at them.

Wishing the alliance the best.

 

[King of Danes]

Damn, the empire’s command structure is a mess… Hopefully they can get it together to smash the Sun King to the moon

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

Great chapter as always, the Grand Alliance is once again divided by politics and personal grudges that prevent it from better using it's advantages and resources, contrast that with France who has laid out a very clear attack plan that is meant to exploit their advantages whenever they can, they might not have the Duc de Luxembourg here(for now) but they still have enough soldiers and officers to cause some serious damage, although Savoy I feel will truly be the coin toss that will either really help France or the Alliance. Either way, it will be fascinating to watch it go down and of course waiting for French victory.

 

[Nuraghe]

XII: Plan 1690

Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I​

Spain’s entry into the war against France was a necessary condition for the Grand Alliance’s survival. Without Spain clearing the roads of Flanders for the Dutch army, the Dutch would have remained practically locked out of the Continental war except for minor expeditions into Germany. With Spain’s entry, the French were immediately confronted with an enemy bulwark to their north that had to be dealt with. The alternative was allowing the Spanish Netherlands to be the base of invasions and raids against France. However, Spain’s empire also gave rise to a potential challenge from Italy. Ever since France’s defeat in the Italian wars, Spain had been the preeminent power in the land of Romans. That preeminence commanded respect among all the Italian princes and was defended by the well-trained Army of Lombardy. If Spain chose, it might rally the Italians against the French interlopers at Casale and Pinerolo and then threaten France’s southeastern corner. Finally, Spain itself could birth an offensive against France through either the narrow of Fuenterrabia or out of Catalonia. In this fashion, France went from having just one Continental front, Germany, to having up to four, the Low Countries, Germany, Italy, and Iberia. This dramatic expansion of the war was necessary for the Grand Alliance to survive or even win its struggle against France. Without Spain’s aid, the fully mobilized French could have rolled back the minor German gains of the previous year and probably gone on to sack towns as illustrious as Frankfurt and Munich. At the same time, they would have been free to send even more help to James II’s expedition. If last year was anything to go by, then a little help was all the Jacobites needed to topple the Williamites in Ireland and Scotland. Alternatively, the French could have sent no more help at all and watched the British Isles remain embroiled in internecine conflict. Spain’s armies and bases avoided that fate, but they alone were insufficient to cause victory over France. Spain gave the Grand Alliance a fighting chance, but turning that chance into reality came down to the wits and discipline of the allies. So as happy as the allies were about bringing Spain into the war, their minds were instantly engaged in designing a war plan that might overcome the terrifying martial machine of France.

One place where Spain’s belligerence only improved the mood moderately was London, the home of the Williamite government. Reigning from the Palace of Saint James, William III understood that Spain’s help on the Continental meant little to nothing for his war in the British Isles. William could only pray that Spain’s Continental commitments prevented both it and France from sending any soldiers or arms the way of Ireland or Scotland. William III’s success depended on that spiteful Jacobite Queen being held in check by her Austrian mother-in-law. If Mariana failed to stop Maria Louise then the Williamites would be in grave danger of suffering some horrid defeat. For the still-new King of England, this reality was hard to stomach. Just a year before, William III had been so confident in his triumph over James II’s lingering supporters that he had put his sword away for the year. Rather than commanding his armies from the saddle, William III had stayed in London to set up his new government and ensure that everything was in the order he wanted it in. Although his wife, Mary II, might have accomplished this all on her own, William wanted to make sure that it was he, not her, who was established as the new monarch of England, Scotland, and Ireland. In William’s stead, he sent Marshal Schomberg to Ireland and General Hugh Mackay to Scotland. Schomberg was among the most sought-after generals in Europe and formerly was at the top of the famed Brandenburger military. Meanwhile, Mackay had spent the past years stationed in the Dutch Republic and had talked up the fine Anglo-Scots Brigade at every opportunity. William had been so confident that Marshal Schomberg would crush the poorly armed and barely trained Irish with his army of more than 30,000 men that William had raised Schomberg to the title of Duke of Schomberg in anticipation of his victories. But in 1689, neither Schomberg nor Mackay gave the churches of London anything to ring for. Instead, the Duke and the General embarrassed themselves and William III in a horrific fashion. After a smart start retaking Carrickfergus and saving Derry, Schomberg had lost thousands of men waiting at Dundalk, and for what? To botch the Siege of Charlemont? This man came with the highest recommendation from Brandenburg and yet he was losing to Irish cattle raiders. However, if Brandenburg’s struggles at Bonn and Cologne were anything to go by, then that recommendation should be valued very little. Meanwhile, the Scottish general, Hugh Mackay had accomplished an even larger mishap. The famed Anglo-Scots Brigade, one of the finest formations in Europe they said, and yet they lost to clansmen armed with swords and shields. Unlike Schomberg, Mackay could not hide behind his unfamiliarity with the landscape because not only was he a Scotsman but he was a goddamn Highlander. How did he realize that he was walking into a trap in his own home country? How incompetent does one have to be?

As much as William III despised the late Duke of Monmouth, at the very least James Scott did not struggle against ragtag collections of rabble. At Bothwell Brig, Monmouth had smashed the Scottish Covenanters in one good strike and that is exactly what both Schomberg and Mackay should have done. Instead, both professional generals had suffered significant casualties and now required reinforcement, but also leadership. Since William III had finally sorted out England’s politics, he felt secure enough to leave London and take charge of an army. The question William III had to answer was which army. Theoretically, Schomberg should be the least in need of help as he retained a large and intact army and near parity with the Irish army. However, the nasty issue of Dumbarton’s Scots and Carlingford’s Irish Brigade existed. Unlike the Anglo-Scots Brigade, these formations seemed to be both competently led and well-drilled. The combination of them had already delivered defeats to the Williamites in Ireland and in time, they might bring about the complete defeat of Schomberg. Under this consideration, William should have dashed toward Ireland and salvaged Schomberg’s missteps before Dumbarton and Carlingford made a fool again out of the German general. However, the letters from Scotland offered nothing but doom and gloom. Duke William Douglas-Hamilton was convinced that Viscount Dundee would roll down from the Highlands and sweep through the streets of Edinburgh. From there, a Scottish invasion of northern England would have followed. Although Mackay disputed Douglas-Hamilton’s exaggerations, Mackay still considered the situation poor and requested thousands of reinforcements. From the sounds of it all, it appeared that the Williamites had already lost their numerical advantage in Scotland and that they were in every way on the backfoot. If this were indeed the case then Scotland needed William III’s firm figure more than anywhere else.

Unfortunately, Ireland and Scotland were not the only places in need of William’s attention. Michiel ten Hove standing up for himself and for the interests of State-Generaal was beyond alarming for William III. For the first time since he was thrust into power during the French invasion, his power in the Republic was seriously threatened. The Staten-Generaal overall remained loyal to him and even Hove assured William that he remained supportive of the Stadtholder. However, those words of friendship had not stopped Hove and the Staten-Generaal from passing a resolution that essentially questioned William’s decision-making. As it was, the Staten-Generaal seemed to be drifting away from Orangism and back toward more Statist thinking. The worry for the Prince of Orange was that the longer he remained away from the Dutch Republic, the more it drifted. Specifically, in this time of war, the Dutch were looking for someone to rally around. During the French invasion of 1672, they had rallied around William and that is how he built up his power. But in 1690, with the Low Countries again becoming a battleground, William was still in England and if he remained in England then it would not be him who the Dutch rallied around. Instead, in all likelihood they would rally around Michiel ten Hove. The more they went to him and depended upon him, the more bold he might become. However, if William left England to become the rallying point of the Dutch Republic then who would be the rallying point of England? Would it be his wife, Mary? Perhaps, perhaps not. Perhaps if William left England, it would be viewed as a flight just as James II’s exit had been. Perhaps, just as in 1688, the English would panic and would flutter to the banner of the king leading the army. In this case, that would be James II rather than William III. If nothing else, William III would not lose his royal crown. The other concern with campaigning on the Continent was William’s “difficult” relationship with Spain. He seriously doubted that Spain would refuse him the right to command his own army if he personally led it into the Spanish Netherlands. However, he fully expected the Spanish to kick up some needless mess over how he addressed, over his precedence in councils, and over what flags he flew. The Spaniards would not deal with his would-be ambassador Stanhope, so William knew that they would not brook with him calling himself “King of England” while he stood on their soil. Still, with how brilliant the French had been during their 1689 campaigns, William III had to take the possibility of another, impending French invasion of the Dutch Republic very seriously.

As William III grappled with his decision over where to command, Emperor Leopold and his new President of Hofkriegsrat, Ernst Rudiger von Starhemberg, had to decide who would command their armies. With the death of Charles of Lorraine, the Imperial army in the west was left without a supreme commander. When it came to naming a new supreme commander, the most logical choice was Max Emanuel who had shared in many of Charles of Lorraine’s triumphs. The problem with giving command to the Elector of Bavaria was twofold. First, bringing him west meant bringing the Bavarian army west. Thus not only would the Imperial army be delayed waiting for its new general but also waiting for that general’s regiments. Those Bavarian soldiers would have to be replaced, which meant sending some soldiers back from the west. As these soldiers were in transit, the Holy Roman Empire and Hungary would both be vulnerable. The second problem was more simple: Emperor Leopold did not like Max Emanuel. Already, Emperor Leopold was left disgruntled by Max Emanuel’s robbery of honors and wealth in 1688. For a prince to demand such a price just to do his duty was uncouth and suspicious. Leopold not only worried that the vain Elector of Bavaria might one day turn himself over to the French for the inevitable bribe they offered, but Leopold worried that Max Emanuel was setting his sights on Leopold’s own titles, including that of Holy Roman Emperor. Max’s recent activities in the east only compounded Leopold’s suspicions of him. Leopold had begrudgingly granted the Bavarian command of the east as a way of containing his ambitions while making use of Bavaria’s army. However, with that supreme command, Max Emanuel showed far too many streaks of independent thought. To the incredulity of the Emperor, Max Emanuel’s first order was to belay the Emperor’s orders. Leopold had ordered his armies to march into Wallachia and subject it to his authority just as they had done in Transylvania. With bold insubordination, Max told the Emperor’s armies no. In his “authority” as supreme commander of the east, he halted the Emperor’s plans against Wallachia and redirected those soldiers to capture some basic forts in Serbia. He left Wallachia completely unmolested despite it holding out from joining the Holy League. Emperor Leopold was furious over Max’s actions and reprimanded severely for it. The mere Elector had the gall to stand his ground against the august Emperor and refuse to re-authorize the Wallachian plan on account of it being militarily unnecessary and strategically unsound. With these remarks, Ferdinand Bonaventura I of Harrach advised the Emperor to strip Max Emanuel of command and send him home. Only the interventions of Charles of Lorraine, Hermann von Baden, and Dominik Andreas I of Kaunitz stayed Emperor Leopold’s hand long enough for his anger to cool.

Max Emanuel’s further actions in 1689 only added to Leopold’s displeasure with him. Considering Max’s unwillingness to attack Wallachia, Leopold made it very clear to the prince that he expected major victories and conquests in the Balkans. If Max Emanuel really needed soldiers that badly then he better make use of them. The preliminary reports of the campaign led Leopold to think that the Imperial army of Aeneas Sylvius von Caprara would end the year in Skopje while Max Emanuel conquered Sofia. Instead, Count Caprara stopped at Sarajevo and Max stopped at Nis. Their marches stopped at these cities despite them taking these cities with plenty of light in the campaign season left and without any major opposing field army close by. Apparently, the young Elector of Bavaria, with all his few years of war experience, thought it was more apt to halt at these points than to continue the offensives. Max Emanuel insisted that if these conquests were to be held then the regional fortifications had to be repaired, firm lines of communication had to be set up, and the armies had to be given rest. Emperor Leopold strongly disagreed. The best way to defend conquests was to keep the enemy on the run, to push the enemy back and away from those conquests. The Ottoman army was still in some state of turmoil and so Max Emanuel was obliged to take advantage of that. Also, Marco d’Aviano and Johann Friedrich Ambrosius von Veterani assured Leopold that further conquests were within easy reach. They said that the defenses of Skopje and Sofia were inadequate and that the Albanians and Bulgarians were ready to rise up in the name of Emperor Leopold. Still, Max Emanuel refused to charge deeper into the Balkans in 1689. Had it not been for the fact that Charles of Lorraine had made such a mess in the west, then Leopold might have retaliated against Max Emanuel’s questionable decisions. Only the crisis of the west prevented Leopold from punishing Max Emanuel. Even then, when Charles of Lorraine was called back to Vienna after failing at Mainz, the thought of sending him back east to control Max Emanuel was floated. If Charles had lived through the winter then there was a very real chance that he would have been sent east to act as the Emperor’s direct representative and ensure that Max Emanuel campaigned as the Emperor wished. Charles of Lorraine’s death deprived Leopold of that possibility. Instead, Emperor Leopold and his council chose to leave Max Emanuel in the east unbothered. So long as Max kept the east safe, the Austrians would have to allow him to continue to test the extent of his authority as an independent commander. Still, Emperor Leopold made clear his disdain for Max Emanuel’s style of campaigning by not awarding him with many new honors or prizes for his victory at Nis. Only the bare minimum celebration was allowed in Vienna.

With Charles of Lorraine dead, Max Emanuel excluded, and Starhemberg already serving in the Hofkriegsrat, there was a drop off to the rest of the Imperial commanders. That is not to say that the next commanders were not as brilliant as the first. In fact, many of them such as Prince Eugene had shown flashes of even brighter brilliance. Nor is that to say that the next class lacked the experience. Generals such as Count Aeneas Sylvius de Caprara and Count Antonio von Caraffa could bathe themselves in laurels and battle stories. The issue is that none of this next class had the necessary combination of brilliance, experience, and stature. Charles, Max, and Ernst all had a combination of all three in different parts. Charles’s brilliance had been inconsistent as it was fueled by persistent stubbornness. At some points that stubbornness was an immense boon such as when he defied Emperor Leopold’s plan for the relief of Vienna. Other times that stubbornness cost Charles dearly as it led to him overstaying at Buda in 1684 and Mainz in 1689. But Charles’s stature as the titular Duke of Lorraine and experience in countless battles for Austria had always made him the obvious successor to the great Montecuccoli, his mentor. Charles’s successor in the east, Max Emanuel lacked in years of experience as he only started fighting at Vienna in 1683. But in the years since, he had been the focal point of Buda twice, then Sabac, and finally Belgrade. In each of those trials, Max Emanuel had proved himself to be one of the most resilient leaders of men. Although short in quantity of experience, there was no question about the quality of Max Emanuel’s short experience. On top of this brilliant experience, Max Emanuel was also one of Germany’s premier princes as Elector of Bavaria and he happened to command one of the best armies in Europe, even if it was far from the largest. Through this brilliant experience and unquestionable stature, Max Emanuel was able to reign as supreme commander in the east to go mostly unchallenged by his more experienced subordinates. Finally, Starhemberg could not claim to be an Elector or a Duke, but he had fought under Montecuccoli. Then using those lessons, Starhemberg had commanded the defense of Vienna, which permanently marked as one of Austria’s greatest commanders. The savior of Vienna was its own appellate that allowed him to stand side by side with an Elector and Duke. For this reason, Starhemberg could expect that any Imperial commander would adhere to his orders. However, Leopold wanted Starhemberg in Vienna more than on the Rhine, which is why he named him as the replacement for the troublesome Hermann of Baden.

After these three commanders, Prince Eugene sparkled but he did not have the experience to overcome his lack of independent title and his scandal-ridden mother. It could hardly be expected that Prince Eugene could command authority over the likes of Elector Friedrich III of Brandenburg, Elector Johann Georg III of Saxony, or even his own cousin, Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden. Regarding those three great princes of Germany, each of them certainly had the stature. However, Johann Georg lacked an overwhelming brilliance, Ludwig lacked adequate experience as a leading commander, and Friedrich III was deficient in both. As a consequence, if Emperor Leopold chose any one of them, he could expect the other two to find an issue with that choice. Additionally, each of the three princes had some additional complication to being the Imperial commander. Friedrich III had contracted so much of his army out to the Dutch Republic that he was obliged to stay close to the Dutch front. Friedrich III’s brother Prince Ludwig being in England at the head of Brandenburger detachment stood as further evidence of the Dutch-Brandenburger connection. Next, Johann Georg had never escaped the suspicion of Emperor Leopold for the French preferences of his father. Whatever degree of separation he had achieved from French suspicion was replaced with suspicion for his association with Max Emanuel of Bavaria. The two had bonded in fighting alongside each other at Vienna and their bond had led to joint defiance against the Emperor previously. Finally, Ludwig’s status as a Swabian made him naturally predisposed to defend Swabia or at least fight close to it. Already, Ludwig had shown how that predisposition could be to the detriment of the Empire. Had Ludwig sacrificed Swabia’s safety then he might have saved Charles of Lorraine’s Mainz incident. Outside of these princes, Emperor Leopold had several veterans including the aforementioned Caprara and Caraffa. However, none of these men had built a resume that could overcome their lack of stature like Montecuccoli had. Caprara had only been an Imperial Marshal since 1683 and Caraffa since 1687. The latter also carried the notoriety of the Eperjes Blood Court. Thus, Emperor Leopold wavered in picking a commander for the western army.

Besides picking commanders, there was also the issue of coordinating an overall allied campaign that would turn the tides against France. For this express purpose, William III set up a standing conference at the Hague where the diplomats and military planners of the Dutch Republic, Austria, and Spanish Netherlands could all meet, share ideas, and settle on a unified plan. The Brandenburgers as agents of the Dutch Republic were also invited to this conference. However, with William III remaining in England, this conference failed to be as effective as desired. The Dutch clearly set out a plan for Prince Georg Friedrich von Waldeck to enter the Spanish Netherlands and contest Marechal d’Humieres’ expected invasion but not all of the allies were willing to help. Although the Austrians sent a representative, Charles de Lorraine, Prince de Commercy, his input was limited to echoing previously extolled Austrian opinions. Commercy did not participate in discussions or debates on strategy beyond repeating known Austrian positions. Commercy also declined to facilitate the coordination of the Imperial army with the Dutch beyond telling the Dutch that they should do their utmost to support the Imperial army in whatever action it ultimately took. The Brandenburgers vacillated throughout the initial sessions of the conference when the Dutch asked for direct support. The Dutch first asked for the Brandenburgers to send an army into the Low Countries and when that proved too much, the Dutch only asked for the Brandenburgers to threaten the Moselle valley. Although the Brandenburgers offered support one day, the next they would claim that it was necessary for them to take Bonn first before risking a Moselle campaign. Occasionally, the Brandenburgers even asked the Dutch to abandon their positions to support a siege of Bonn. Finally, in mid-March, the Brandenburgers issued a firm promise to march down the Moselle using Koblenz as a base. However, within two weeks, Friedrich III had countermanded that promise by writing that Brandenburg would besiege Bonn. As a consolation, Friedrich III would send 6,000 men to reinforce Prince Georg Friedrich von Waldeck. Only the Spanish agreed fully with the Dutch plans for a Spanish strike against the French lines around Menin and Dixmude and a Dutch strike against Dinant. Marques de Gastanaga, the Governor-General of the Spanish Netherlands, was very willing to put the recent Dutch-Spanish troubles behind him by supporting the Dutch plans. However, the Spanish Army of Flanders was only around 30,000 strong and would be too weak to do anything more than distract the French if Humieres was seriously reinforced. Furthermore, many of the Spanish soldiers were tied down defending the fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands.

One reason that the Imperial representative, Commercy, was reluctant to discuss the Imperial plans in detail was because there were no Imperials plans to discuss yet. The Hofkriegsrat was uncertain over which direction to deploy its resources with Bonn, Mainz, and Philippsburg all still in French hands. Naturally, Friedrich III wanted the Imperial army to focus on covering or even assisting in the siege of Bonn. Friedrich III went on to say that if the Imperial army assisted him at Bonn then it would free up soldiers to help implement the Dutch plans. Further down the Rhine, Ludwig of Baden argued that Philippsburg needed to be the focus. If the Holy Roman Empire was to prevent further French depredations then it needed to retake the Upper Rhine bridgeheads. Starhemberg and Emperor Leopold were partial to the late Charles of Lorraine’s preference for Mainz. Mainz remained the holiest city in Germany as well as a major Rhenish transit point. Additionally, if Mainz was retaken then the Hofkriegsrat predicted that Bonn would fall as a consequence. However, after the events of last year when the Brandenburgers had stalled their siege of Bonn to help Charles of Lorraine at Mainz, Friedrich III argued that the Imperial army should focus on Bonn and then Mainz. The other question that the Imperial high command had to ask was whether they could allocate enough men to Germany. Emperor Leopold was reluctant to strip the army of Max Emanuel for fear of losing Hungary, but the German army in the west was in desperate need of reinforcement. A further complication for the Imperial army arose when Emperor Leopold sold an Imperial diploma to the Duke of Savoy for one million lire in February 1690. This diploma invested Duke Vittorio Amedeo II with new Imperial rights and titles. This diploma backed up a previous one by which the Emperor agreed to address the Duke of Savoy as Royal Highness. This royal address naturally upset numerous rulers who felt more deserving of one. In particular, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo III d’Medici, believed that a Duke should never be given a higher address than a Grand Duke. However, the real issue with this diploma had nothing to do with Tuscany and everything to do with France. Louis XIV immediately scolded Vittorio Amedeo for giving money to his enemies, which was contrary to Savoy’s alliance with France. Worse yet, Louis XIV read into this diploma as a precursor to a Savoyard-Imperial alliance. As a consequence, Louis XIV announced that he would be sending an army into Piedmont to handle the Vaudois emigres who had returned in 1689 and had even crossed the border into France to try to ferment a Huguenot rebellion. The news of an approaching French army alarmed Vittorio Amedeo who feared that after the French dealt with the Vaudois they would descend on Turin to punish Vittorio Amedeo for his innocent flirtation with Emperor Leopold. As a consequence, Vittorio Amedeo felt forced to actually initiate honest negotiations with the Grand Alliance.

More accurately, Vittorio Amedeo initiated negotiations with Spain through its Governor of Milan, Antonio Lopez de Ayala Velasco y Cardenas, Count of Fuensalida. The Spanish Army of Lombardy was by far the closest allied formation near Savoy and would be the only one able to help the Savoyards on quick notice. And on quick notice, Vittorio Amedeo would need help if he chose to defy France. In March 1690, the French army of General Nicholas Catinat arrived and instantly defeated the Vaudois army, although it did escape. Afterward, Catinat made it clear that Louis XIV expected Vittorio Amedeo to declare Savoy a belligerent ally to France in this war, or face consequences. Vittorio Amedeo suggested compliance as Catinat marched toward Turin but the Savoyard ruler also deepened his negotiations with Spain by making a direct appeal to Queen Marie Louise. Whether these negotiations succeeded and brought Savoy into the folds of the Grand Alliance or whether cowardice got the best of Vittorio Amedeo and he reconfirmed his subservience to France, in either case, war was bound to break out in Italy. This spiraling of a simple diploma sale into the opening of a new front in the war against France further stretched the resources of Austria. Already Austria was trying to fight a two-front war in Germany and in Hungary, but now it also found itself obliged to fight in Italy. Although Spain’s Milan or perhaps the Duchy of Savoy would stand as the first lines of defense against a French attack on Italy, the Emperor’s claim to sovereignty over Italy as well as its alliances obligated Austria to designate an army for Italy in 1690. Additionally, the Austrians would have to designate a commander for that army, one who could manage the complex politics of Italy but also competently resist Catinat’s army.

The unending series of complications and miscoordination for the Grand Alliance were not paralleled in France where Louis XIV, Louvois, and Croissy reigned supreme over the military-diplomatic apparatuses of France. When the French intervention in Germany had first expanded into a greater war, France found itself ill-prepared for the conflict. All of France’s plans had revolved around the idea of a repeat of the quick and decisive War of Reunions. Thus, for much of 1689, France was reacting rather than following through on well-thought-out plans. In Germany, the French decided to hold the line against the German offensive. In Ireland, the French answered Tyrconnell’s request for help with soldiers and arms to keep England distracted. In Catalonia, reports of rebellion and talks initiated by those rebels were ignored in favor of avoiding any commitment. Finally, in Flanders, the French had declared a truce with Spain just to buy some breathing room. Good fortune and resilience rather than sound strategic planning allowed France to survive the trials of 1689. For 1690, Louis XIV and Louvois had still not formulated a complete vision for the post-war settlement, but in regards to the war itself, Louis XIV and Louvois wanted to bring it to a decisive conclusion in 1690. While the Grand Alliance was still in the midst of designing its approach to the war in the Spring of 1690, France had already figured out its own strategy. In the Spanish Netherlands, Marechal Humieres would no longer be the source of reinforcements but instead would be a major receiver of them. The favorite of Louvois was going to be given every resource to break the Dutch-Spanish army and open Flanders to French conquest [1]. In Germany, the successes at Bonn and Mainz meant that the Rhineland remained a theater that France needed to defend but also one that could be defended. Ludwig Wilhelm’s decision to build defensive lines both precluded an aggressive campaign against Swabia and indicated an unwillingness of the Swabians to launch an offensive against Philippsburg. Thus, Marechal Lorges and the Grand Dauphin’s army at Philippsburg would be transferred north to join Marechal Duras’s army in keeping hold over Bonn and Mainz. Louis XIV made it clear that he expected great things of his son and heir. To Ireland, 6,000 French regulars were to be sent in exchange for an equivalent number of Irishmen. These French regulars were expected to match up better against Schomberg’s army of English regulars. In Spain, the French would make their move and punish the Spanish for their insolent declaration of war. Finally, in Italy, Catinat would enforce Savoy’s adherence to the French alliance by descending into the heart of Piedmont and occupying Turin. This contrast of clear plans and agreed objectives for France to the disputed leadership and multiple contrary schemes suggested that 1690 might be no better for the Grand Alliance than 1689. In fact, it could be far far worse.

[1] Importantly, the Duc de Luxembourg is still at home. Without Humieres stumbling into the Battle of Walcourt, his reputation remains intact and he remains in command of the French army of the Low Countries. So Humieres will be the one leading the French rather than Luxembourg as the fighting in the Low Countries escalates.

Ahia, bad times are ahead for the alliance if they fail to coordinate well and give themselves well-defined priorities, because while it is true that Spain's entry into the fight allows for the opening of 3 further fronts against the French, it must also be said that the the only strength of numbers is on the side of Paris ( also combined with a clear military leadership compared to the chaos of conflicting interests of the allies ) I maintain that the imperial army should focus on the young Eugene in an attempt to liberate Mainz ( which is an Electorate, therefore freeing him would be a great boost to morale ), just as I understand Leopold's fear for the eastern front ( after all, the siege of Vienna and the Hungarian revolt of 1672 are still fresh in his memory, as is the French - Ottoman alliance ) so I can understand that he wants to ward off a possible army of Constantinople as far away as possible from its possessions, but at the same time Max Emmanuel's strategy is by far the best, because in this way the new territories begin to be consolidated calmly, and subsequently they can be exploited as a new source of resources ( both for the fight against the Turks in the west ) furthermore Leopold must be convinced to review the imperial laws ( both to strengthen Austria but also to create new allies, what is Maximilian of Hanover doing at the moment ?, in Otl he fights for the Habsburg army in this period ) frankly the creation of a new Electorate would be even more useful than OTL for Vienna ( since it means having a new power at the table that can balance the aspirations of Brandenburg, Bavaria and Saxony, perhaps to make everything more bearable, Leopold can allow an exemption that allows the main princes of the Reich ( therefore only the Electors ) to standardize the administration and customs in their territories only if they are contiguous to each other ( which would also be of great benefit to Vienna ) as is it is the search for a small territorial enlargement : perhaps in Swabia ( to unify a little the Habsburg territories scattered in the area ) or in Italy ( considering how fragmented the Emilian region is, between Este, Farnese, Gonzaga, the duchy of Monferrato ( which could be divided between Spain and Savoy as Otl ? ) and finally the Cybo - Malaspina and minor imperial fiefdoms, annexation a small territory for Austria would not be so absurd ) finally I think that the Emperor should strengthen the capabilities of the imperial church ( which relies so much on Vienna for its defense and support and is much more loyal to the Habsburgs than paragonated to the secular princes of Germany, a reform agreed with Rome would be needed, with the aim of consolidating the 80 ecclesiastical territories scattered into larger entities capable of resisting external pressure from non-imperial entities ( perhaps instead of the usual secularization here we see a proposal for mediatization between ecclesiastical states, with the 3 electoral states ( provided if Cologne is not punished ) making the loudest noise, followed by Munster, Augsburg, Salzburg and Wurzburg ( which are seen slightly enlarged ) and perhaps the formation of a similar state in Swabia ( perhaps a super imperial Abbey or an enlarged St. Gallen ? ) because this strengthens both the capabilities of the church but also indirectly the Habsburg government over the Reich ), perhaps the Netherlands and Spain can be convinced of the need for this reform once the war is over ( including via bribes, particularly to the Spanish Netherlands who can make small profits from it ), certainly mine are just hypotheses and proposals, nothing more, but considering how badly the war is going for the allies, I think that any idea that streamlines the Empire 's decision-making or governmental process would be welcomed with open arms by the majority of the coalition ( except the minor German princes ) because it would increase the chances of competing on an ""equal"" basis against Louis army ( even if it's a little, it's still a lot on a theoretical level ), if we consider that in Otl, Joseph I was literally thinking of buying the territories of the minor princes of the HRE along the Rhine, so as to increase the Austrian and imperial presence in the area, with the aim of making it more difficult for the French to make friends or penetrate with the armies on site ( I don't see why a plan with similar ideas but starting from totally different bases cannot be seriously considered, given that we are still talking about expanding Habsburg influence in the Reich, only instead of being explicit as Joseph Otl wanted to do, here it is done through compromises and back channels ) considering that on average HRE could deploy approximately 127,410 annually ( of which half coming from the Habsburg possessions, but with the constant commitment against the Ottomans, it is probable that the Habsburgs will struggle to gather over 45 thousand soldiers in this TL ) while Spain did not exceed an army of 50,000 people , and the Duchy of Savoy reached a peak of 24,500 mens

 

[Vitruvius]

Great update. The issue of command is indeed a big problem for Austria. I'm kind of rooting for Louis of Baden if only because that seems like the best way to get his cousin, Eugene, on the scene. Almost like a two for one. Louis isn't perfect but perhaps selecting him would put Eugene in line to succeed him?

 

[Diego]

It seems that Netherlands is going to be the main front of this war, I think that if an allied miracle is going to happen it will be there. The best strategy IMO would be to put just enough effort on the Rhine, in Italy and Spain to defend or at least not be routed, and instead put every effort in the Netherlands, because if the french army attacking the Netherlands is defeated and the road to Paris is more or less open the French will abandon the offensive on every other front to reinforce there.

Great update. The issue of command is indeed a big problem for Austria. I'm kind of rooting for Louis of Baden if only because that seems like the best way to get his cousin, Eugene, on the scene. Almost like a two for one. Louis isn't perfect but perhaps selecting him would put Eugene in line to succeed him?

I like this take, would really like to see Eugene in command of an army through Northeastern France btw...