The Spanish Heir (What if Carlos II had a son?)

[Archduke]

True! That's why i didn't mention anything on the italian front, since the spanish participation/butterflies begin only in 1690. The next year is tabula rasa.


Indeed! However, it would make no sense fighting in Catalonia while the exposed (even more due to the different 1683-1684) Spanish Netherlands remain neutral. Especially considering that even in OTL Louis didn't make a major effort in Catalonia at the very beginning, even though the memory of the revolt was very recent. To invade Catalonia right now would go against his high strategy.


Sensible policies for both Spain and France.

It seems plausible that the Spanish will get their wish. Even with more forces available for Rhineland, the French cannot hope for a decisive victory. Even though they have the numbers to secure Cologne, Bonn, Mainz and Koblenz, a stalemate seems much more plausible than a quick victory.

I also think that the Spanish are right to hope that France will be heavily involved in english affairs, I just think that they lack the numbers to invade England. Having said that, a prolonged war in Ireland seems very plausible.

When it comes to Italy, the Spanish have an opportunity to avoid a french invasion. The French were trying to bully Victor Amadeus to join them, true. I doubt they would succeed to get Savoy to join them. However, Savoy joining the League and bringing war to Italy largely depends on Spain. A neutral Spain makes Victor Amadeus' position rather uncomfortable. It would be easier for the Savoyards to get a modicum of security by joining Spain in an "armed neutrality" league. After all, according to the "Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy" :

I do think that Catalonia can remain a point of conflict. Firstly, it just helps the French to put the Spanish on the defensive there. If the French attack there while the truce in the north holds then the Spanish will have to invest funds in defending Catalonia now and then later won't have those funds to afford German auxiliaries in the north. The other thing to remember is that Louis XIV didn't invade Catalonia because he never felt the need to. In OTL, he always had the thought of inheriting Spain in the back of his mind. He chose to prioritize the Netherlands and Burgundy first, because he needed them for his immediate security, but he still thought that ultimately he could come in owning Spain. In TTL, he doesn't have that opportunity. So Louis XIV might want to invade Catalonia because he knows that he won't inherit. Now, Louis XIV might not actually want Catalonia. As you point out, he wasn't too aggressive about it in OTL. But he might be more incentivized to invade it as a means of acquiring bargaining chips. Since he can't inherit any part of Spain, he might want to take Catalonia and trade it for Naples or the Spanish Netherlands.

Pretty ASB. Spain would NEVER forgive such loss, at least not for many generations. And while they would resent but could accept the loss of the Netherlands, they would NEVER EVER renounce to reconquer Milan as that loss would put in danger Naples, giving them more reasons for fight against France

I can see Spain conceding the Netherlands is rare cases, but not necessarily to France. If Spain traded the Netherlands to an ally in exchange for help recovering something else then that would be more tolerable, but still not something that the Spanish would rejoice at.

Spain is a Great Power, even though it is the weakest of its peers. A Stuart bride with a crownless father is of limited value to Spain. They will either have to cancel the betrothal and suffer a major loss of face, or try to assist James in recovering his realm. I don't see any other paths other than the above two.

Having said that, assistance to James can come in various forms, from a direct intervention all the way down to providing some money and men - private individuals of course, the same kind that the United Provinces provided for Willem. Somehow I doubt there will be a direct intervention. But a few ducats?



Indeed. In general, I don't think Milan is a major french aspiration. The only design Louis had on Milan was to exchange it with the Duchy of Lorraine. In any case, Lorraine was occupied for a long time. I doubt that Louis would risk alienating a Great Power over providing legality to his conquest. The Spanish Netherlands is an entire different thing though.

Right now, Spain's assistance is basically a down payment in the form of the Irish Brigade, which I think is ample assistance. Additionally, Spain is sticking by james diplomatically, which is worth something.

For Italy, I think Louis XIV was more increased in Savoy and Piedmont than Milan because it would enhance French defensiveness. Louis XIV also had ideas about Naples and Sicily because Spain had proved that they have their own inherent defensiveness (locked behind Papal borders but still large enough to support their own defenses).

I don’t see Spain giving up the Netherlands, they were vital to the Spanish defense for France have to divide it forces in 3 or 4 (Iberian front, Netherlands, Italy, HRE border). Thus France needs to keep it forces divided and the Spanish putting more pressure on one front makes France shift forces.
A Spain that reforms its army, quite needed at this time, and its finances would be able to carry its weight and be a proper counter against France.

Yeah, you're completely right, the Spanish defensive doctrine involves spreading the enemy thin and drawing them away from the Spanish Peninsula. Even though it makes it difficult for Spain to defend its extremities, it does do a great job of keeping the peninsula safe. And even during Spain's decline they were able to mitigate by losing in one region and winning in another to force the enemy to return lost territory.

 

[Archduke]

V: Siege of Mainz

French sketch of Mainz​

Louis XIV’s quick and decisive 1688 Rhenish campaign had been designed specifically to demonstrate the incredible military prowess of France so that the Germans would be intimidated into accepting Louis XIV’s demands. The brilliant preparation and planning of the campaign were shown by the quick and wide-ranging success achieved by the French. The campaign had succeeded in accomplishing almost all of its military objectives. Yet in hindsight, the campaign was a major failure and a significant strategic mistake. Despite the campaign being executed to perfection, the campaign failed to cow the Germans in the slightest. Instead, in October, the Germans doubled down on the commitments they made at Augsburg in 1686 and promised to wage a unified war to drive the French out of Germany. Notably, the Imperial Diet did not vote for a Reichskrieg nor did Emperor Leopold I ask for one. Instead, Emperor Leopold wished to follow the example he set during the Dutch War of encouraging an empire toward war but not binding the Empire to that end. This nuance meant that when the time for the war's end arrived Emperor Leopold could negotiate on his own without the inference of any pesky Diet representatives. Whether it was a Reichskrieg or not, the Empire's resolve took the French by complete surprise and their military planners immediately found themselves in trouble. As a result of France’s strong expectation of German cowardice, Louvois had only raised a limited proportion of the French military. With tens of thousands of Germans now being raised, the French army in Germany would certainly find itself outnumbered and its current positioning had it horribly overextended and exposed.

The unwelcome situation in which the French found themselves led to Jules Louis Bolé, Marquis de Chamlay, and Louvois recommending that France evacuate basically all of the positions it had taken beyond the Rhine. This suggestion for withdrawal was unremarkable given the shifting military situation. What was more exceptional was Chamlay and Louvois’ advice that when the French withdrew they should burn and destroy everything from the fields to the villages and towns. This destruction was to go beyond the typical contribution levying that an army did where it abused locals to raise money or just dismantled fortifications to prevent the enemy from using them. Instead, Chamlay and Louvois gave the counsel that a wide swathe of Germany needed to be completely razed and rendered absolutely useless to the enemy. They argued that this strategy might yet scare the Germans into submission, or in the likely case of war, this strategy would stall the German offensives long enough for France to more fully mobilize its resources and unlock all its war capabilities. Despite the dramatic nature of the plan, Louis XIV agreed with it completely. Starting in December, General Joseph de Montclar and Philibert-Emmanuel de Froulay, chevalier de Tesse, began to put numerous towns and villages to the torch. In many cases, the villagers were able to come back and put out the fires afterward, but the damage was still intense. The cities were not so lucky. The French had the decency to give the citizens a few days to carry their belongings and offered them refuge in Alsace where they would not have to pay any taxes for ten years. However, this was little consolation when Mannheim was leveled “like a field” or Worms was left with “not a single house standing”. Speyer, Oppenheim, Bingen, and Neuburg were given similar fates. All in all, dozens of cities and towns and hundreds of homes were burned to the ground across the Rhenish Palatinate, Baden, and Wurttemberg.

Although similar destruction campaigns had been carried out by the French in 1672-74 in the Dutch Republic, in 1674 by the French between the Main and the Neckar, and in 1677 by the French in the Meuse valley, all of these campaigns paled in comparison to the scale and thoroughness of 1689 campaign. At the same time, the large scale of the project meant that small bands of French soldiers often had to carry out the destruction without sufficient supervision. The result was a substantial amount of looting and even murder. The cruel razing of the Palatinate and Swabia incited outrage and disgust across Europe. Not even the intercession of Louis XIV's own sister-in-law and the supposed heiress of the Palatinate, Lisolette, could stop the rape of the Palatinate. In fact, the criminality of the attack on Germany rose even more after Lisolette pleaded with Louis XIV, almost as if he meant to punish her for being sympathetic toward his enemies. Whatever Louis XIV's intentions with Lisolette, his intention to break Germany's will failed horribly. When the Imperial Diet met again in late January, any hopes that the project was going to inspire fear in the Germans were washed away instantly. Already, the Germans had felt aggrieved by the French attack and desired to evict the French presence from Germany. But once the burnings started, the German sentiment toward France turned into outright hatred, and succeeding debates in the Imperial Diet were filled with a considerable amount of vitriol targeted against France. No delegate, not even Bavaria's, dared to defend France in the slightest. France had escalated the conflict beyond that of a simple war and a wave of emotions seized the Germans. This wave crashed down on January 26, 1689, when the Imperial Diet declared a Reichskrieg, a war of the entire Holy Roman Empire, against France. This represented the first time since the 1663 war against the Ottomans that the Diet had declared a Reichskrieg. Although Emperor Leopold might have hoped to keep control of the war entirely in his hands, Louis XIV's devastation of the Palatinate had excited the Empire into a fervor not even witnessed during the Siege of Vienna.

The Empire was quick to act on its promise of an Imperial war against France. The first campaign to take place under the auspices of this Reichskrieg was the offensive of the Brandenburgers, Dutch, Saxons, and Hessians. The core of this army had been assembled during the previous fall when the crisis in Cologne had been brewing. Once additional reinforcements arrived in March 1689, Feldmarschall Lieutenant Hans Adam von Schoning led the army against the French positioned at Neuss. Ill-advisedly the local French commander, Francois d'Escoubleau, Comte de Sourdis, tried to challenge the significantly larger German-Dutch army. The resultant battle went against Sourdis and forced him to evacuate the fortresses of Neuss and Linn. Although Sourdis ended up retreating to Bonn, the German-Dutch army found itself stalled conquering the fortresses of Zons, Rheinberg, and Kaiserswerth. Each of these fortresses had only a small French garrison but through their control of the Rhine required being taken before an army could go any further. Despite the sluggish and difficult pace that the Imperials conquered these fortresses in, France's poor preparations for a grander war left it incapable of stopping the first counterpunch of the Holy Roman Empire. This early reversal for the French played a considerable role in the French decision to accept Spain's Brussels Convention. With the Brussels Convention, France and Spain were both able to delay any fighting in the Spanish Netherlands for the first year of the larger war. The Spanish knew that they could not hold the line against the French without the Dutch so they needed the Brussels Convention to buy time to reconcile with the Dutch Republic. On the other hand, the French knew that they could not leave the Spanish army unattended or the Spanish would make many deep and damaging raids into northern France, but if the French fought the Spanish then they would struggle to simultaneously defend against the Germans. Through the Brussels Convention, France and Spain avoided what was an unwinnable situation for both of them. The two powers sealed the arrangement by making a joint commitment to the nascent Jacobite cause. France agreed to take on the duty of fighting William III's England and restoring James II, and Spain provided a great tool for accomplishing this, the Irish Brigade [1].

France was not able to capitalize on the security that the Brussels Convention afforded them in the Spanish Netherlands. Even with the agreement, the French armies were undermanned for 1689 and the army of Marechal d'Humieres posted across the border from the Spanish Netherlands was out of position relative to Germany. Furthermore, despite the arrangement, French and Spanish mutual trust did not go far and the neutrality arrangement only extended for a single year. Thus, France could not afford to completely redeploy Humieres's army. Ultimately, the last Zons, Rheinberg, and Kaiserwerth fell by the end of June while the French were still downsizing and redistributing Humieres's army. Even if the French did not save those fortresses, their defenders had given the French just enough time to reinforce the Imperial City of Cologne ahead of the Brandenburger-led Imperial army's advance. The presence of such a stout Franco-Kolner garrison necessitated some type of siege. However, the Imperial commander, Schoning, did not feel it was appropriate for him to make the decision of whether to starve out Cologne or invest it. Instead, he waited for the arrival of his liege, Elector Friedrich III. The Elector recognized that Cologne probably had ample stores and had its native arms production so he doubted that the city would surrender in good time if starved. In light of those facts, Friedrich III made the obvious choice to besiege Cologne with the typical bombardment and successive assaults, but as a consequence of Schoning deference to Friedrich III the army was not yet in a position to execute such a siege. Thousands of soldiers and cannons were still at Zons or Kaiserwerth and had to be transferred toward Cologne before the siege could begin. Ultimately, it was July 22, 1689, by the time the first bombardment began [2].

Further south, the French opened hostilities in Swabia. While Montclar was still evacuating his soldiers and laying waste to Swabia, Louis XIV dispatched Antoine de Pas, Marquis de Feuquieres, to execute a contribution campaign deeper into Germany. Although this campaign was supposed to touch on a number of German cities and the principalities they lay in, Louis XIV made it a specific goal of Feuquieres to reach Bavaria. Louis XIV had not taken kindly to Max Emanuel spending half a year flirting with France and repeatedly issuing statements of friendship only for Max Emanuel to join the rest of the German electors in supporting the declaration of a Reichskrieg. Although Louis XIV had been willing to play off Max Emanuel’s acceptance of supreme command of the Imperial army in the east as glory-hunting, Max Emanuel’s failure to obstruct the Reichskrieg in any way was deserving of punishment. Feuquieres’ campaign saw huge success as he successfully occupied the cities of Wurzburg, Nuremberg, Ulm, Augsburg, and Pforzheim. Feuquieres did not stop to raze these cities as Montclar’s army was doing in the west. Instead, using the threat of repeating Montclar’s crimes, Feuquieries extracted massive ransoms from these cities and countless towns. By the time Feuquieres rejoined the French army, he had gained 500,000 livres in addition to the loot that he had already split amongst his soldiers as pay.

The German campaigns on the Upper Rhine were much slower to start than Brandenburg’s campaign on the Lower Rhine. While the Brandenburgers had begun to muster their army in the Rhineland in 1688, the German armies on the Upper Rhine did not begin mustering until the spring of 1689. Additionally, several thousand units had to be redeployed from Hungary to form the new western German armies. As a consequence, Charles of Lorraine had set the date for his army’s assembly at Frankfurt for May 25, 1689. However, even this deadline was not met. The only prince to beat that deadline was Karl I of Hesse. Charles himself only arrived on the day of the 25th and the rest of his army in the weeks after it. Outside of this trouble with assembly, Emperor Leopold’s military had failed to fulfill its promise of a full ammunition depot and plentiful food stores at Frankfurt. In fact, both were practically empty as there were no bullets, cannonballs, or gunpowder. Meanwhile, the heavy field cannons remained in Bohemia. Despite lacking both soldiers and supplies, Charles and Karl left Frankfurt by May 30 and told the other princes to catch up with them. The target for Charles’s army was to be the crucial bridgehead of Mainz, which also happened to the be holiest city in Germany. To initiate hostilities against Mainz, Charles had the Hessians conquer a redoubt on the right bank of the river across from Mainz. But Charles could go no further than that. French had taken all the river barges around Mainz to deny Charles an easy crossing. The French had even sunk many of the barges to block shipping through the Rhine, which meant that Charles’s poor logistical situation would become impossible if he moved before being resupplied. Ultimately, Charles sent some regiments north to Koblenz where Maximilian von Starhemberg’s garrison was being threatened by the French.

By mid-June, the rest of Charles of Lorraine’s army had arrived at Frankfurt, which gave an army of a little more than 40,000 men. This number compared favorably to the main French field army in the region, Marechal Jacques Henri de Durfort de Duras’s army of slightly over 30,000 men. Marechal Duras had been a lesser recipient of Humieres's reinforcements. Even then if Charles was to feel safe about laying siege to Mainz then he needed more soldiers. Accordingly, Charles sent a summons to Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden who had been given command of the Imperial army in Swabia. Charles requested that Ludwig send 20,000 men from his army so that Charles could have a 2 to 1 advantage over Duras. Ludwig unhesitatingly refused this request as it amounted to basically all of Ludwig’s army. With the Bavarians having stayed east, the Swabians and Franconians and other southern Germans had only mustered 22,000 soldiers. Charles subsequently lowered his request and ultimately asked for just 8,000 men, but even this request was denied. Given the recent devastation to their lands, including Baden-Baden, Ludwig’s own home, Ludwig and his commanders were extremely reluctant to leave their zone for Mainz. Especially after Feuquieries’s chevauchee reached as far as Bavaria, Ludwig felt it necessary to remain directly opposite of the French bridgeheads and prevent any further French expeditions. Although Ludwig recognized the importance of Mainz, he could not place it above defending his own home where he had already begun constructing fortified lines to stop the block French attack [3]. On top of all of these concerns for the safety of Ludwig’s home, Ludwig still had a lingering distrust of Charles after the two sieges of Buda. Ludwig was unsure if Charles could even execute a siege properly against a prepared French garrison and a potential French relief under the esteemed Marechal Duras. Also, without the Bavarians, Ludwig was sure that Charles would make the Swabians carry the burden of leading the assaults on Mainz. Already, Charles had chosen to use the Hessians on the French fort east of Mainz rather than the Austrians. If the Swabians were attack dogs of the siege then that would only further weaken the defense of Swabia. When Charles appealed to the Hofkriegsrat for support, the President, Hermann of Baden, naturally sided with his nephew and instructed Charles to carry on with his siege of Mainz without Ludwig’s soldiers. As Hermann wrote, if Charles truly considered himself to be the conqueror of Buda and Belgrade then he should be more than capable of recapturing Mainz.

The dispute between Charles and Ludwig over military strategy was very harmful to Charles’s campaign. Not only had the dispute prevented him from getting the soldiers he saw as necessary, but it also cost him a not-inconsiderable amount of time. It was not until the end of June that the dispute was resolved in Ludwig’s favor and Charles had to get on his way with besieging a Mainz that France had recently reinforced with members of Humieres's army. Charles still had painful memories of his mistake crossing the Sava at Sabac, so he had the wherewithal to ask the Saxon and Hessian soldiers of Elector Johann Georg III and Landgrave Karl I to split from his army and cross at Bingen, which was close to Duras’s army outside of Mainz. At the same time, Charles’s army would cross much further to the north at the much safe and protected crossing of Koblenz. Only Johann Georg III’s sense of dignity and bravery allowed him to accept such a risky and inadvisable maneuver that exposed his army to undue harm. Fortunately, the example that Max Emanuel had set at Sabac served as a cautionary tale for Marechal Duras. Even though Duras’s army was individually stronger than Johann Georg’s, Duras had respect for the Saxon army, its commander, the Saxon Mars, and the well-trained Hessians. Duras expected them to acquit themselves well in defense and also half-suspected a trap was being laid by Charles. Had it been the Austrians who were crossing at Bingen, Duras undoubtedly would have pounced due to the prevailing opinion among the French military that the Austrian infantry was woefully inferior to its French counterpart. Instead, Duras allowed the Saxon and Hessian army to cross the Rhine with only minor harassment [4].

Once the Austrians rejoined the Saxons and Hessians they marched toward Mayen instead of Mainz. Through this march, Charles meant to feint an attack against the newly built French fortress of Mont Royal at Traben-Trarbach. Duras fell for the trick and moved his army away from Mainz toward Mont Royal. While Duras marched west, Charles doubled back with his first sign of haste since starting the campaign. Before the French even knew what was happening, Charles had crossed the Moselle to march on Mainz. Only then did the French scouts catch this change in Charles’s positioning and alert Duras to his mistake. Quickly, Duras sent back men to restore the garrison of Mainz. However, Duras did not return his main army to Mainz. In light of the size of Charles’s army, he felt that Charles could not possibly mean to besiege Mainz and reported such to Louis XIV and Louvois. Charles would have been a fool to besiege a city as impregnable as Mainz while it was garrisoned by close to 10,000 men [5]. Instead of going to Mainz, Duras went to Landau to oversee the defensive preparations there and observe Ludwig of Baden’s army. With Duras falling back, the Imperial army was able to reach Mainz unhindered by the beginning of August.

The Siege of Mainz began in earnest by mid-August when all the necessary supplies were finally in place. The siege proved to be exceptionally slow and just as difficult as the incredible sieges that Charles had endured in the east. From the very beginning the French garrison of Nicolas Chalon du Ble, Marquis d'Huxelles, matched the besiegers’ bombardment with effective and sustained counterfire. Frequent sorties wreaked havoc on the progress of the trenches by killing engineers, breaking equipment, and filling in trenches. One sortie against the Hessians was so successful that 50 paces of trenches were filled. An even more successful sortie occurred once the besiegers reached the moot at the beginning of September. More than 2,000 Frenchmen were sent out in an attack designed to overwhelm the Imperial forward position. Although the Imperials resisted for a while it took two waves of reserves before they could push the French back into Mainz. The sortie cost the besiegers a week and then making headway against the moat took another two weeks.

By late September, fighting with the besiegers and attrition had cost the Imperials so dearly that Louis XIV directed Duras to go to Mainz. However, Duras was not ordered to relieve Mainz. As Louis XIV could see, Huxelles had already succeeded in defending Mainz. Instead, Louis XIV sent Duras to achieve the destruction of Charles’s battered and diminished army. Charles learned of Duras’s preparations for an attack soon after they began. By this point, Charles still had more soldiers than Duras’s field army. But the Imperial army would be outnumbered by the field army in combination with the garrison of Mainz. Although Charles had already requested reinforcements from Brandenburg’s army, these men were still on their way. As a result, Charles of Lorraine found himself in a precarious position and a retreat would not have been unwise. However, Charles of Lorraine still carried the shame of failing to take Buda in 1684 and most recently had been reprimanded for leaving Max Emanuel exposed at Sabac. Charles could scarcely accept having another poor mark on his record. In spite of all the grave risks, Charles decided to risk standing his ground. In preparation for Duras’s attack, Charles took measures for his defense. This included sending detachments to screen for Duras’s army, laying a chain across the Rhine to stop Duras from ferrying soldiers or equipment to Mainz, and turning some of his artillery batteries away from Mainz and toward the south. However, Charles felt that the best way to avert potential disaster was to finally break through Mainz’s defenses with an all-out assault.

On September 30, the Brandenburger reinforcements spotted a French army approaching Mainz from the north. On the same day, reports of Duras closing in from the south arrived. With this news, Charles of Lorraine felt it necessary to make an immediate attack on Mainz. Johann Georg III and Karl agreed with Charles’s judgment and consented to the army. The next day, nearly a third of the army was organized into a massive assault along similar lines to the final assault on Buda. At 4 P.M., as the Imperial cannons blasted, Charles, Johann Georg III, Karl, and all of their generals personally led their soldiers in the attack. For hours the Imperials struggled with the French defenders. Mines exploded and strew dirt and stones everywhere while musket and cannon smoke choked the air. Ultimately, Charles found himself desperately missing Max Emanuel and his fearless Bavarians. Despite all their differences, Max Emanuel had never been anything less than exemplary in siege, especially in an assault. Meanwhile, Max Emanuel’s Bavarians seemed able to endure the worst of any assault. The Saxons although brave were not brave enough, the Hessians lacked the experience in the crucible of battle, and the veteran Austrians on their own were not enough. As if all the French reports of the east were right, the Imperials struggled in the absence of their most stalwart soldiers. After five hours of brutal, bloody combat, the Imperial assault fell apart and was pushed off the walls of Mainz. In the end, more than 5,000 Imperial soldiers lay dead [6]. Although the French had also lost dearly, their casualties were not even half that of the Imperials.

The costs of the failed assault left the Imperial army in little position to resist Duras’s relief. Charles of Lorraine’s efforts to negotiate some type of capitulation failed completely. The victory in the assault left the French commander, d’Huxelles, with unbounded confidence. He seriously doubted that Charles could make another assault and if he did, d’Huxelles was sure that he would win again. As Duras bore down on Mainz, Charles of Lorraine hesitated to break the siege of Mainz just as he had hesitated at Buda in 1684. Some part of Charles believed that victory was still possible and another could not bear to be the humiliation of another defeat. Fortunately, Johann Georg and Karl were able to talk sense into Charles. There was no victory to be found in this mess. Mainz had stood its ground and a fresh army of Frenchmen was racing toward them. Their army was beaten and in poor shape. Under the advice of Johann Georg and Karl, Charles ordered the Imperial army to withdraw to Koblenz. However, Charles’s hesitation was not without cost. Unlike the Ottomans in 1684, the French were able to give chase and in the pursuit, they forced Charles to give up some of his equipment, provisions, and even men. As a consequence, Charles could not sustain himself even at Koblenz and he had to retreat across the Rhine. Still, Duras lacked the strength to take Koblenz himself and also felt that it was too late in the season to take Koblenz. Instead, Duras moved to threaten a relief of the Brandenbuger-besieged Bonn. Duras's turn north was enough to break Bonn's siege and afterward Duras returned to Mainz to oversee the repair of its fortifications.

All in all, the Siege of Mainz was a rather unmitigated disaster for the Imperial cause. First off, Mainz remained in enemy hands. Secondly, the siege and the pursuit had cost Charles of Lorraine a third of his army. The casualties included two brothers-in-law of Emperor Leopold, Ludwig Anton of the Palatinate and Friedrich Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg. When Charles re-crossed the Rhine he had just over 26,000 men remaining from his original army. This number was augmented by 6,000 Brandenburgers under Hans Albrecht von Barfus. Although the casualty ratio experienced by d’Huxelles defenders was not much better, that number was just under 3,000 compared to the more than 13,000 Charles lost. The third consequence of the siege was that it had disrupted the northern campaign of the Brandenburgers. Although the Brandenburgers had successfully captured Cologne in September after an assault ended a six-week siege, Bonn had been allowed significant time to prepare for its own siege. By the time, the Brandenburgers had gotten past just the first defense of Bonn, the Beueler Schanze, Charles of Lorraine had asked for Friedrich III to send reinforcements. The sending of reinforcements left Friedrich III without the necessary manpower to continue a typical siege and so the siege of Bonn devolved into starvation. Meanwhile, the act of sending reinforcements led to a clash between the leader of the reinforcements von Barfus and Friedrich III’s top officer, Schoning [7]. Schoning was clearly in the wrong and as a result, Friedrich III had to release him from Brandenburger service, which deprived him of a great officer, albeit a detestable person. Once Charles lost at Mainz, Duras was able to threaten a relief while Charles’s army was in no position to offer a counter. Rather than force the situation as Charles did at Mainz, Friedrich III destroyed the Beueler Schanze and retreated from Bonn to Cologne without any punishment.

In the end, the Imperial campaigns in the Rhenish valleys had ended on an unquestionably failed note despite a promising beginning. Over the course of the year, the Imperials had managed to reassert themselves in Swabia and to conquer half of the electorate of Cologne, which on the net left the Imperials in control of more territory than they had at the beginning of the year. But the economic devastation and damage dealt by France’s burnings, Feuquieries’s chevauchee, the repeated interruption of the Rhenish river trade; the failed siege of Mainz; and the abandoned siege of Bonn left the Imperials feeling weak. In truth, they were still stronger than the French in Germany, but the issue at hand was that the Imperials had only been dealing with a limited French military. France was still mobilizing and 1690 promised to be a significantly more difficult campaign than 1689. So even though the Imperials had some successes, they did not have nearly as much success as they should have had given their vast superiority in numbers, which continued even after parts of Humieres's army were sent to Germany.

The key cause for the failure of the 1689 Rhenish campaign for the Imperials was their inability to coordinate well. Despite showing a unified face with their declaration of the Reichskrieg, the Germans executed what was in truth three separate campaigns in the Rhineland. In the north, Brandenburg executed a campaign in which it and the Dutch were the main providers of soldiers. Elector Friedrich III’s authority went unquestioned even if his military decisions were discussed and debated. As a consequence, Brandenburg successfully conquered half of the Electorate of Cologne, including the city of Cologne. The failure to capture the city of Bonn can not be faulted on Brandenburg. To the south, Charles of Lorraine was not able to rein in Ludwig of Baden and bring his army to help him at Mainz. At the same time, Ludwig failed to offer an alternative objective for Charles to pursue. Instead, Ludwig focused on defense alone. Had Ludwig gone to Charles then Charles doubtless could have emerged victorious at Mainz. If Charles had accepted Ludwig’s stubbornness and decided on a campaign against Philippsburg then he would have had Ludwig’s army close at hand and probably would have emerged victorious. In either scenario, part of Germany would have been exposed to French depredations. In the former case, it would have been Swabia. In the latter, it would been the Palatinate and Franconia. However, those depredations might have been worth the recapture of a significant citadel in the form of Mainz or Philippsburg.

The repercussions of the failed campaign in Vienna were significant. When Charles of Lorraine returned to Vienna to report on the campaign he exchanged a series of recriminations with Hermann of Baden. Charles of Lorraine pointed out that none of the supplies he had been promised had actually been given to him, that the princes had failed to show up on time, and that his authority as supreme commander in the west was trodden over by Hermann of Baden. The President of the Hofkriegsrat threw back that Charles once again had fumbled a siege and then refused to recognize that fact and give up in good time, which Friedrich III had successfully performed at Bonn. Before Emperor Leopold could resolve the dispute, Charles of Lorraine resolved it for him. Utterly drained by his Mainz campaign, Charles of Lorraine lacked the energy to continue on and he died during the winter. Still, Emperor Leopold showed where his sympathies lay by dismissing Hermann from the Hofkriegsrat after he recommended Ludwig as Charles’s successor. Ultimately, Emperor Leopold settled upon Ernst Rudiger von Starhemberg as the next President of the Hofkriegsrat. Emperor Leopold prayed dearly that Starhemberg could show better leadership in 1690 than Hermann did in 1689. The alternative that Leopold feared was that he would have to recall Max Emanuel from the east. That alternative would not only expose Austria’s new conquests to Ottoman reprisals but would also indebt Leopold to the Elector of Bavaria and crown him as the savior of the Empire all at the same time. Anything but that, anything but Max.

[1] The beginning of the 1689 Rhenish campaign plays out similarly to OTL because the French approached this war with the same lack of preparedness and overconfidence. However, unlike OTL, the Anglo-Spanish complications create a unique opportunity for France to neutralize the Spanish Netherlands for the first year of the war.
[2] Due to the election of Furstenburg as the Archbishop of Cologne, France was able to seize much firmer control of the Electorate of Cologne ahead of the Brandenburger counterattack. With the support of the relatively large Cologne army, France is able to make a stand at Cologne city instead of at Bonn. This means that the Brandenburgers have to go to Cologne rather than Bonn after taking the first slew of Rhenish fortresses. Essentially, Brandenburg's campaign is delayed relative to OTL.
[3] In OTL, Max Emanuel commanded the Upper Rhenish army instead of Ludwig (who instead was in the east). Max like Ludwig was reluctant to leave the Upper Rhine defenseless but ultimately did and he provided Charles with 20,000 men from his army of 30,000 men. In this case, Ludwig is in charge of the Upper Rhenish army and he commands fewer soldiers, just 20,000. This means that Ludwig had fewer men to work with and cannot afford to send 20,000 men to Charles, to begin with. Ludwig also is more cautious as a commander than Max Emanuel, which makes him less inclined to take a high risk of sending the bulk of his soldiers to Charles and leaving Swabia at risk. Finally, Ludwig lives on the frontline of Swabia whereas Max Emanuel was much more secure as the Elector of Bavaria. The end result is that Ludwig says no where to helping Charles where in OTL, Max said yes. As an effect, Charles never gets a massive reinforcement of Swabians and instead just has his 20,000 men.
[4] The French do not challenge the Germans during this crossing because of the example of Sabac and because they do not want to get out of their positions defending the approaches to Mainz.
[5] Due to the delays in Charles's approach to Mainz and the redeployment of some of Humieres's army, the French garrison of Mainz is larger (10,000 vs. 8,000) and better supplied for the siege.
[6] With the larger French garrison, better French supply situation, fewer Imperial soldiers, and lack of the typical Imperial siege shock troopers, we see the siege of Mainz fail. In OTL, the siege had more soldiers and faced a smaller garrison, which allowed it to handle sorties better. Eventually, the assault on Mainz was championed by Bavarians and Swabians. Neither of these parties is present, which deprives the Imperials of both soldiers and role models during the final assault. Even though it can go unaddressed, the Bavarians were the key fighters in several late 17th-century battles (Esztergom) and sieges (Buda) for the Imperial army and were among the best battle-hardened soldiers in the Empire. Their absence is meaningful.
[7] Much like OTL, Schoning gets himself dismissed from Brandenburger service for being an intolerable personality.

 

[Archduke]

Now we can finally begin discussing the war that we've been building up to for 5 years in earnest.

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

Amazing chapter, fascinated to see how things will play out here, Louis did a blunder with his scorched earth policy yet it worked for him better than OTL all things considered, meanwhile the Imperials despite roaring loudly failed to bite hard especially that outside of Cologne they don't have anything to show for all that they lost, especially as Charles of Lorraine(arguably one of their best commanders) has died, couple that with the Emperor's reluctance in calling Max Emanuel(not for too bad a reason, leaving the Eastern flank exposed and the time it will take for them to reach the French) as well as the lack of cooperation and infighting between Imperial commanders will have some severe consequences for their war effort, even if France isn't exactly in a sea of roses either although as long as they have time, they have the upper hand.

 

[Dragonboy]

On one hand max is needed to safeguard hungqry, on the other i want to See him kick the french in the teeth

 

[King of Danes]

Damn, the war isn’t really going well for the empire… Hopefully William will be able to draw in the Brits to kick some French butt

 

[X Oristos]

I do think that Catalonia can remain a point of conflict. Firstly, it just helps the French to put the Spanish on the defensive there. If the French attack there while the truce in the north holds then the Spanish will have to invest funds in defending Catalonia now and then later won't have those funds to afford German auxiliaries in the north. The other thing to remember is that Louis XIV didn't invade Catalonia because he never felt the need to. In OTL, he always had the thought of inheriting Spain in the back of his mind. He chose to prioritize the Netherlands and Burgundy first, because he needed them for his immediate security, but he still thought that ultimately he could come in owning Spain. In TTL, he doesn't have that opportunity. So Louis XIV might want to invade Catalonia because he knows that he won't inherit. Now, Louis XIV might not actually want Catalonia. As you point out, he wasn't too aggressive about it in OTL. But he might be more incentivized to invade it as a means of acquiring bargaining chips. Since he can't inherit any part of Spain, he might want to take Catalonia and trade it for Naples or the Spanish Netherlands.

That's a very fair argument!

My thoughts were that as long as Louis is on his back foot, he would have little reason to further expand the war. And of course you nail Louis' motives. I am not sure that he would try to satisfy all his aspirations in a single war, at least according to his OTL policy.

It has to be said though, that after the french illusions on german resolve collapsed and France got entangled into a long war, Louis tried to bolster neutral parties and restrict the expansion of the war. As soon as 1692, Rebenac negotiated treaties with Parma, Modena, Mantua and Tuscany. Venice and Innocent XII looked on with approval. He did the same in the Empire (Sweden included) and spent vast sums of money with little to none results.

The improvement of his relationship with the Vatican is another thing to consider. After the death of Innocent XI (12 August 1689), he applied gentler methods of dealing with the Papacy, At the conclaves of 1689 and 1691 French cardinals helped secure the elections of Alexander VIII and Innocent XII. That policy shift resulted to Innocent XII to support italian neutrality and even tell Carlos that the dauphin was his lawful heir.

Right now, Spain's assistance is basically a down payment in the form of the Irish Brigade, which I think is ample assistance. Additionally, Spain is sticking by james diplomatically, which is worth something.

It is indeed! The Irish Brigade - and the Irish Regulars Tyrconnell sent to James, are much more valuable than an equivalent number of e.g French. It will be easier and faster to build an army with them as a cadre, since they share the same language(s).

I think Tyrconnell would be a bit more influential under these circumstances, because the 2,500 Irish that were evacuated, were commanded by officers he had selected and promoted. A more influential Tyrconnell with the policies he was proposing, would further reduce the popularity of James back in England. It is interesting that the "New Cambridge Modern History, vol 6" states also that Tyrconnel contemplated cutting ties with England. The notion of a spanish heir to the Stuart dynasty must be alluring to him.

I would argue that something like that also applies to the Irish Brigade as well. A Catholic Irish army is also influenced by local catholic interests. In contrast, any French troops serving in Ireland won't be a stakeholder and just adhere to James.

But he might be more incentivized to invade it as a means of acquiring bargaining chips. Since he can't inherit any part of Spain, he might want to take Catalonia and trade it for Naples or the Spanish Netherlands.

Or he might also want to get Milan to trade it with Savoy and Nice. I think there were some thoughts on that in Louis court.

In the end, the Imperial campaigns in the Rhenish valleys had ended on an unquestionably failed note despite a promising beginning.

This is a huge departure from OTL. The French are not chased away from the middle and lower Rhine. In OTL they had to fall back to Vauban's forts. The only available theater for french aggressive action was in Flanders. However now, they hold strategic locations along the Rhine, but the line is not complete: Koblenz and Cologne are in imperial hands and they seem like potential targets once the mobilization is completed.

 

[Diego]

I don’t see Spain giving up the Netherlands, they were vital to the Spanish defense for France have to divide it forces in 3 or 4 (Iberian front, Netherlands, Italy, HRE border). Thus France needs to keep it forces divided and the Spanish putting more pressure on one front makes France shift forces.

Yeah, you're completely right, the Spanish defensive doctrine involves spreading the enemy thin and drawing them away from the Spanish Peninsula. Even though it makes it difficult for Spain to defend its extremities, it does do a great job of keeping the peninsula safe. And even during Spain's decline they were able to mitigate by losing in one region and winning in another to force the enemy to return lost territory.

That strategy was fine in the 16th century when Spain had the 17 provinces and in the early 17th century when they had the Spanish Road and Franche Comte, but in the later 17th century it is more like a relic that the Spanish are holding by their geopolitical and military conservatism. It is not surprise that the Spanish European Empire was spared more by the French hope of inheriting everything than by their military might.

 

[X Oristos]

That strategy was fine in the 16th century when Spain had the 17 provinces and in the early 17th century when they had the Spanish Road and Franche Comte, but in the later 17th century it is more like a relic that the Spanish are holding by their geopolitical and military conservatism. It is not surprise that the Spanish European Empire was spared more by the French hope of inheriting everything than by their military might.

Pretty much this. Spanish Netherlands at this point is a source of dependence for Spain - the province can be protected only with foreign support. It attracts more powerful foes that even if they cannot snatch the province, they can errode spanish power in other places that are actually vital for Spain (Caribbean, Perpignan). Imagine if the French were able to capture Catalonia in the 1650s, while the Spanish Netherlands remained in Madrid's hands. It would have been a strategic disaster of the first magnitude.

In Spain's defence, imperial prestige is important to every major power and Great Powers have been notoriously slow to cut their losses.

 

[TimTurner]

"United we stand, divided we fall"

 

[ike225]

That strategy was fine in the 16th century when Spain had the 17 provinces and in the early 17th century when they had the Spanish Road and Franche Comte, but in the later 17th century it is more like a relic that the Spanish are holding by their geopolitical and military conservatism. It is not surprise that the Spanish European Empire was spared more by the French hope of inheriting everything than by their military might.

And yet until the War of Spanish Succession, Spain always used the Spanish Netherlands to distract France from fully committing to an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and it kept working for long after that time

 

[Diego]

And yet until the War of Spanish Succession, Spain always used the Spanish Netherlands to distract France from fully committing to an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and it kept working for long after that time

Didn't distract France enough to save Roussilon, the Pyrenees made a better job.

 

[X Oristos]

And yet until the War of Spanish Succession, Spain always used the Spanish Netherlands to distract France from fully committing to an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and it kept working for long after that time

I am under the impression that there is a fallacy here. Did France saw Spain as a rival because of aspirations in Iberia or because of spanish possession of the Low Countries and Franche Comte? I think it is the latter rather than the former. A Spain that doesn't have commitments in the Netherlands, is more geopolitically secure. I would argue that the dependencies produced by the need of protecting the burgundian inheritance, did not allow Spain to properly manage its decline and reform. Or at least contributed to that state of external insecurity that affected spanish policy so much.

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

I am under the impression that there is a fallacy here. Did France saw Spain as a rival because of aspirations in Iberia or because of spanish possession of the Low Countries and Franche Comte? I think it is the latter rather than the former. A Spain that doesn't have commitments in the Netherlands, is more geopolitically secure. I would argue that the dependencies produced by the need of protecting the burgundian inheritance, did not allow Spain to properly manage its decline and reform. Or at least contributed to that state of external insecurity that affected spanish policy so much.

That's something I always said and it's the main reason I think the Habsburgs were a disaster for Spain as they sucked the money and population out of Iberia to feed their ambitions and defend their empire. A Spain that doesn't need to keep protecting the Netherlands from constant French invasion nor send it's soldiers to fight there or in Germany and the Balkans is a much better Spain in every sense of the word, it's why I keep saying that Spain actually losing the Netherlands here would be beneficial for them in the long run because they wouldn't need to keep pouring money, attention and troops to defend a region that is a whole country away and directly borders the biggest kingdom in Europe with the biggest population, the most riches as well as expansionist monarchs

 

[CaedmonCousland]

This is not a time period or area I have much familiarity with, but there's also just the fact that Spain losing the Netherlands also comes with the addendum of someone else gaining them. Now, who would be the likely ones to gain them? Netherlands, France, England, and Austrian Hasburgs. Netherlands and England are out due to Protestant. Austrian Hasburgs are okay-ish, and they were the ones to gain them after the War of Spanish Succession. There's no heritage dispute here though, and the Emperor even rather alienated Spain here. As for France, this is an already powerful kingdom that has repeatedly attacked Spain for just that. It is also expansionist. France wants it now for 'defense', but then the next king comes and suddenly they need more to defend their new borders. Expansionist kingdoms rarely stop from successfully fulfilling their expansionist agendas, which means Spain has real reason to not believe they'd in twenty years be dealing with an even stronger France that is now targeting its Italian possessions. Or wants a foothold past the Pyrenees to ensure Spain can't engage in a military war while forcing France has to have its land forces go through mountains.

Spanish Netherlands don't do much for Spain, but who can they lose it to that they don't feel like they'd only empower an enemy? And how would they lose it in such a way that doesn't damage national prestige?

 

[HeavyMetal]

Spain was somewhat unlucky regarding the Netherlands. If any of the children of Alfred and Isabel Clara Eugenia had survived, one of them would have inherited those lands and the Spanish commitments would have disminished greatly (and correspondly, the Austrian Habsburg's would have increased). Instead of that, the lands returned to the Spanish crown and continued being a drain of resources for the country.

 

[Johan104]

Any chance of just releasing it and creating belgium a bit early?

 

[HeavyMetal]

No King of that era would consider releasing any possession he had for nothing. The only real chance is giving it as inheritance to a younger child, as it was with Philip II, and even that kind of partition wasn't very frequent.

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

This is not a time period or area I have much familiarity with, but there's also just the fact that Spain losing the Netherlands also comes with the addendum of someone else gaining them. Now, who would be the likely ones to gain them? Netherlands, France, England, and Austrian Hasburgs. Netherlands and England are out due to Protestant. Austrian Hasburgs are okay-ish, and they were the ones to gain them after the War of Spanish Succession. There's no heritage dispute here though, and the Emperor even rather alienated Spain here. As for France, this is an already powerful kingdom that has repeatedly attacked Spain for just that. It is also expansionist. France wants it now for 'defense', but then the next king comes and suddenly they need more to defend their new borders. Expansionist kingdoms rarely stop from successfully fulfilling their expansionist agendas, which means Spain has real reason to believe they'd in twenty years be dealing with an even stronger France that is now targeting its Italian possessions. Or wants a foothold past the Pyrenees to ensure Spain can't engage in a military war while forcing France has to have its land forces go through mountains.

Spanish Netherlands don't do much for Spain, but who can they lose it to that they don't feel like they'd only empower an enemy? And how would they lose it in such a way that doesn't damage national prestige?

If we're being honest, it's most likely France gets them given they already surround it even more than OTL given they hold Luxembourg and it's fortress as well as a few other areas that make them essentially hold the area hostage, any Spanish aggression against France will result in the Spanish Netherlands being overrun by ANY French king and his troops who would not let such a prize pass by, it's why Spain is keen to avoid a war with France despite this being the best time to pounce against them: The Dutch are exposed and William is days away from the continent, the Spanish garrison in the Netherlands while not exactly bad can't match the quality nor the numbers of the French meaning that no matter what they'll lose the Netherlands due to the French essentially swarming it, this is especially true as while France hasn't fully mobilized their armies each day is a time another French company is raised and that means more soldiers to overwhelm Spanish defenders. For Spain, peace is their best option, at least for now.

 

[Gryffinson]

I think once this war is done and we unavoidably see more drastic border changes we're gonna have to draw up a map, i already can't picture the situation in the Spanish Netherlands with TTL's Truce of Regensburg anymore.