Chapter 23.The Battle of Telamon.
Chapter 23.The Battle of Telamon.
225 BC. Part three.
The Roman pursuit
Consul Lucius Aemilius Papus left Ariminum as soon as he learnt of the Gauls crossing the Apennines, heading south, and then west across the mountains on the route that would later become the Via Flaminia. His seven-day-or-so march brought him to the battlefield just too late to take part. Both Gauls and Etrusco-Sabines knew what his camp fires meant, and the latter sent messengers over the wooded heights.
About now the Gauls finally realised what they were up against – a new army on their heels – and must have reckoned on another army defending Rome. They held a council, at which the war-chief Aneroestes declared that, having captured so much booty, they should not risk fighting again, but should get their booty home safe, and return to fight the Romans another day. No doubt the thought of looting eastern Etruria as well played an unspoken part. After a debate, this course was adopted and once again the Gauls broke camp before daybreak. With wooded heights impassable to wagons to west and east, they were forced to continue south for a day or so, slowed to the pace of the ox-wagons containing their booty, and the speed they could drive herds at.
Aemilius bided his time, cautiously nibbling at the heels of the Gallic army, and doubtless hoping to trap them between himself and the army ahead of them at Rome. When the terrain opened out just north of Lake Volsiniensis, they suddenly turned west and headed for the coast, which they reached in about three or four days, and then turned north up the Via Aurelia. Meanwhile in accordance with the strategic plan, Consul Gaius Atilius Regulus had embarked his army and landed at Pisa, a voyage of around of three to four days with the prevailing westerly/south-westerly winds. Upon arriving at Pisa Atilius was informed about the alarming situation in Narbonensis(south france)Gaul.
A change of plan
As soon as the Gauls turned west toward the coast, messengers speed up the Via Aurelia to Pisa to advise the Consul Atilius, plans changed, and he now must immediately marched south. The messengers told the Consul of an ideal place to fight the Gauls, if he did not know it already, namely a large defile, just north of Telamon. The Romans also knew exactly where the Gallic host were, and their speed, no more than twelve to fifteen miles per day. Calculations will have shown there was just time to get there and “bottle up” the Gauls. He force-marched, and covered the 90 miles or so in three days.
Just as the Gauls camped overnight to the south of the defile, the Romans camped some ten miles to the north of the defile. Hurrying on at first light, the Romans captured some Gallic scouts and learned just how near the Gallic force was – already entering the defile, which surprised Atilius, and that his fellow consul was on their heels. He ordered the tribunes to form the army in line of battle, and advance as rapidly as possible. It was going to be a close-run thing. He himself led his 3,200 cavalry on ahead, for he could see directly ahead of him a hill which dominated the road, which dog-legged around it.
Atilius seized the crest, and the Gauls, still ignorant that any Roman army could possibly lie between them and home, assumed that Aemilius’ cavalry had somehow got around their flank on the other side of the hills and got ahead of them. They sent their own cavalry ahead, probably around five thousand strong, together with light troops, to drive them off and open the way. Captured prisoners revealed the presence of Atilius and his army, which could soon be seen. The Gauls at last realised they were trapped between the wooded and scrub covered hills to East and West. They did the only thing they could, and formed up back-to-back, the Insubres and Gaesatae facing the rear, and the Boii, Taurini and lesser tribes facing the Romans to the north. In order to stretch their line, they placed wagons and their chariots on their flanks. The booty – slaves, herds and laden ox-wagons – was placed under guard on a low hill that skirted the road. The Gaesatae, out of bravado, stood naked along their front line.
The Battle of Telamon
Aemilius had known that his colleague had landed at Pisa, but only now realised he had arrived, when he saw the struggle for the hill. He knew the Gauls had more cavalry than his colleague, and hastened to send his own 3,200 cavalry along the foothills to join the massive cavalry battle and strike the Gallic rear. Atilius in the meantime fought ferociously to hold the hill. He fell in the melee, fighting with desperate courage, and his head was triumphantly brought to the Gallic chiefs.
All eyes were on the pell-mell battle for the hill. The infantry forces of the three armies now closed on one another, and it was a matter of some doubt as to who was in the better position, the Gauls back-to-back and thus protected from being attacked in the rear, or the Romans who had their foes trapped. The good order of the Gauls, and the wall of sound coming from their ranks from innumerable trumpets and horns and war-cries terrified the Romans as they advanced, not to mention the cavorting Gaesatae, shrieking and shaking their weapons prominently in the front ranks of the 1.5 mile (2.5km) long front line.
The velites in Aemilius’ army, almost 14,000 light infantry, ran out and started hurling streams of javelins into the ranks of the Gaesatae. Being naked, and with heads and limbs exposed outside their shields they soon began to suffer against an enemy they could not harm, their own light troops being absent with the cavalry in the battle for the hill. In rage and impotence, some groups broke ranks and charged forward suicidally, while most shrank back into the Insubres. Once out of javelins, the velites of both Roman armies withdrew through the ranks and the grim confrontation of heavy infantry began with both sides hurling pila and gaesa (heavy throwing spears), and eventually closing hand-to-hand.
Meanwhile, the battle on the hill had been resolved in favour of the now more numerous Romans, who had driven the Gallic cavalry back to the next hill, from where they broke away northward in flight. The victorious Roman cavalry then charged down into the flanks and rear of the Gauls, and the defile became a killing field. The war-chief Concolitanus and ten thousand of the surrounded Gauls were captured. More than twenty thousand were killed, but many thousands slipped away up the wooded slopes to either side.
The other war-chief Aneroestes escaped with his household warriors, but from shame they committed suicide. The rescued booty was returned to the Etruscans, the collected spoil sent to Rome.
225 BC. Part three.
The Roman pursuit
Consul Lucius Aemilius Papus left Ariminum as soon as he learnt of the Gauls crossing the Apennines, heading south, and then west across the mountains on the route that would later become the Via Flaminia. His seven-day-or-so march brought him to the battlefield just too late to take part. Both Gauls and Etrusco-Sabines knew what his camp fires meant, and the latter sent messengers over the wooded heights.
About now the Gauls finally realised what they were up against – a new army on their heels – and must have reckoned on another army defending Rome. They held a council, at which the war-chief Aneroestes declared that, having captured so much booty, they should not risk fighting again, but should get their booty home safe, and return to fight the Romans another day. No doubt the thought of looting eastern Etruria as well played an unspoken part. After a debate, this course was adopted and once again the Gauls broke camp before daybreak. With wooded heights impassable to wagons to west and east, they were forced to continue south for a day or so, slowed to the pace of the ox-wagons containing their booty, and the speed they could drive herds at.
Aemilius bided his time, cautiously nibbling at the heels of the Gallic army, and doubtless hoping to trap them between himself and the army ahead of them at Rome. When the terrain opened out just north of Lake Volsiniensis, they suddenly turned west and headed for the coast, which they reached in about three or four days, and then turned north up the Via Aurelia. Meanwhile in accordance with the strategic plan, Consul Gaius Atilius Regulus had embarked his army and landed at Pisa, a voyage of around of three to four days with the prevailing westerly/south-westerly winds. Upon arriving at Pisa Atilius was informed about the alarming situation in Narbonensis(south france)Gaul.
A change of plan
As soon as the Gauls turned west toward the coast, messengers speed up the Via Aurelia to Pisa to advise the Consul Atilius, plans changed, and he now must immediately marched south. The messengers told the Consul of an ideal place to fight the Gauls, if he did not know it already, namely a large defile, just north of Telamon. The Romans also knew exactly where the Gallic host were, and their speed, no more than twelve to fifteen miles per day. Calculations will have shown there was just time to get there and “bottle up” the Gauls. He force-marched, and covered the 90 miles or so in three days.
Just as the Gauls camped overnight to the south of the defile, the Romans camped some ten miles to the north of the defile. Hurrying on at first light, the Romans captured some Gallic scouts and learned just how near the Gallic force was – already entering the defile, which surprised Atilius, and that his fellow consul was on their heels. He ordered the tribunes to form the army in line of battle, and advance as rapidly as possible. It was going to be a close-run thing. He himself led his 3,200 cavalry on ahead, for he could see directly ahead of him a hill which dominated the road, which dog-legged around it.
Atilius seized the crest, and the Gauls, still ignorant that any Roman army could possibly lie between them and home, assumed that Aemilius’ cavalry had somehow got around their flank on the other side of the hills and got ahead of them. They sent their own cavalry ahead, probably around five thousand strong, together with light troops, to drive them off and open the way. Captured prisoners revealed the presence of Atilius and his army, which could soon be seen. The Gauls at last realised they were trapped between the wooded and scrub covered hills to East and West. They did the only thing they could, and formed up back-to-back, the Insubres and Gaesatae facing the rear, and the Boii, Taurini and lesser tribes facing the Romans to the north. In order to stretch their line, they placed wagons and their chariots on their flanks. The booty – slaves, herds and laden ox-wagons – was placed under guard on a low hill that skirted the road. The Gaesatae, out of bravado, stood naked along their front line.
The Battle of Telamon
Aemilius had known that his colleague had landed at Pisa, but only now realised he had arrived, when he saw the struggle for the hill. He knew the Gauls had more cavalry than his colleague, and hastened to send his own 3,200 cavalry along the foothills to join the massive cavalry battle and strike the Gallic rear. Atilius in the meantime fought ferociously to hold the hill. He fell in the melee, fighting with desperate courage, and his head was triumphantly brought to the Gallic chiefs.
All eyes were on the pell-mell battle for the hill. The infantry forces of the three armies now closed on one another, and it was a matter of some doubt as to who was in the better position, the Gauls back-to-back and thus protected from being attacked in the rear, or the Romans who had their foes trapped. The good order of the Gauls, and the wall of sound coming from their ranks from innumerable trumpets and horns and war-cries terrified the Romans as they advanced, not to mention the cavorting Gaesatae, shrieking and shaking their weapons prominently in the front ranks of the 1.5 mile (2.5km) long front line.
The velites in Aemilius’ army, almost 14,000 light infantry, ran out and started hurling streams of javelins into the ranks of the Gaesatae. Being naked, and with heads and limbs exposed outside their shields they soon began to suffer against an enemy they could not harm, their own light troops being absent with the cavalry in the battle for the hill. In rage and impotence, some groups broke ranks and charged forward suicidally, while most shrank back into the Insubres. Once out of javelins, the velites of both Roman armies withdrew through the ranks and the grim confrontation of heavy infantry began with both sides hurling pila and gaesa (heavy throwing spears), and eventually closing hand-to-hand.
Meanwhile, the battle on the hill had been resolved in favour of the now more numerous Romans, who had driven the Gallic cavalry back to the next hill, from where they broke away northward in flight. The victorious Roman cavalry then charged down into the flanks and rear of the Gauls, and the defile became a killing field. The war-chief Concolitanus and ten thousand of the surrounded Gauls were captured. More than twenty thousand were killed, but many thousands slipped away up the wooded slopes to either side.
The other war-chief Aneroestes escaped with his household warriors, but from shame they committed suicide. The rescued booty was returned to the Etruscans, the collected spoil sent to Rome.