Derek Pullem
Donor
Might the RA be persuaded to let the line formations control their own light AA as well? Can do lots of useful things with 20 mm and 40 mm AA and not all of them involve things with wings.
The Forge of Weyland
- Thread starter Astrodragon
- Start date
The bad news is the British couldn't supply the BEF with its full allotment of Anti Tank Guns so they had to scrounge 25mm pop guns from the French. With two types of AT gun needed there's even less chance of the BEF being fully equipped.
Well, you're assuming the manufacture stays identical to OTL. If its seen as more important, it can be increased. Note the 3pdr production line is in addition to the 2pdr one
Probably but . . . . The orders might go ahead six months earlier than OTL if the Army has its act together earlier.
Using cost as an indication of production is very simplistic, but the light carriage is a lot cheaper than the bells-and-whistles RA one, so those 2pdr's will be cheaper. Allowing them to make some 3pdrs as well, even if funds aren't increased
Also the simpler 2lb carriage will be quicker to make. In OTL IIRC the two pounder carriage was a bottleneck due to its complexity. ITL with less three pounders being made then possibly there will be less delays.
Yes. Also a lot of the 3pdr guns are going into tanks, even less pressure on the carriage availability.
It's probably too late at this point. It took two years and a couple of million quid to get ROF Nottingham fully operational by January 1939, and that was starting with an already constructed shell of a building. Anything you start to build now might be operational by mid 1940, just in time to start re equipping units returning from Dunkirk probably.
One of the big problems is that a lot of the gun building effort was on AA guns, which is a political priority and not something that is likely to have changed. Though it would be nice if it somehow could.
One of the big problems is that a lot of the gun building effort was on AA guns, which is a political priority and not something that is likely to have changed. Though it would be nice if it somehow could.
Its early 37, so things they start now will be working by 1939, even if there is no change in priority. There is also an option of equipping part of the plant first, getting output while you finish the rest of it. More about building plans in the next update.
Heavy AA guns are more of a contender for artillery output that things around the 40mm size, but light air defence is still air defence, right?
The Army didn't fight their corner very well in OTLAlas no. The war office brought the ROF Nottingham factory in September 36, didn't finish installing the machine tools till January 39. They did phased commissioning at Nottingham, opening areas up early when they could, but only to get the AA guns built faster.Its early 37, so things they start now will be working by 1939, even if there is no change in priority. There is also an option of equipping part of the plant first, getting output while you finish the rest of it. More about building plans in the next update.
Heavy AA guns are more of a contender for artillery output that things around the 40mm size, but light air defence is still air defence, right?
Main production lines were the QF 3.7" and 40mm Bofors, 2pdrs were fitted in on one of the smaller lines. Air Defence of the UK was a higher political priority than a Field Force going to the Continent, at least until early 1939.
However taking over 2 years to install new tools is... long. The speed the aircraft factories ramped up output, was much quicker. However that was private industry, not civil servants...or Nuffield...
Maybe someone could come up with a dual-purpose gun that could be used for both AA & AT (possibly from different mountings)?
Sadly the 40mm Bofors is a bit light and the 3.7" a bit heavy.
The clever part of the 3.7" was the predictors and the control system in the mounting, that accounted for most of the weight difference between that and the German 88. And was also why that mounting was was not much use as an AT gun, because it had been utterly optimised as an AA weapon. Didn't help much in the early war, but did mean it became lethal when VT fuses came around.
In theory you don't lose much of that advantage by trading in the gun for a slightly smaller one, the important bit is the mount. Of course if you do that then the tankers are competing with Home Defence AA for barrels, and frankly they lose that political fight. MPs were asking questions in Parliament about how few AA guns Britain had and how this could be improved, I don't believe they were asking searching questions about tank production. Not until it was too late anyway.
IIRC the 3"" AA gun went with the BEF to France, and was quite popular. Apparently they found it lighter and a lot easier to cart around.
24 March 1937, War Office
16th March 1937, MEE Farnborough
The team at the MEE were rather grateful for the men sent over from Bovington to help them with their trials, as Vickers had just delivered the final prototype version of the A10* for testing. They had done all the small fixes asked for in the initial tests, and had carried on with suspension and track improvements. The teams job was to spend a week going over it, then report to the War Office about its suitability for putting into production; the tank would remain with them for some time doing a long term reliability evaluation, the results of which would be sent back to Vickers. The intention was to use the borrowed men drive the tank around a lot while they saw what broke; they'd been informed that they would have a new tank to test soon, and the results on that were needed quickly as well. It was a different world from that of a few years ago, when testing had been leisurely and prototype few and far between.
24th March 1937, War Office
The committee had just received the report from the MEE, and it was more favourable than some of the more pessimistic members had expected. Basically Farnborough considered it a very good tank, much better than their existing Mediums. The only real problem, slipping its tracks, seemed to have been fixed, at last as long as they didn't drive it flat out, and even then was much reduced. They expected this problem to be basically fixed by the time production tanks were available.
While this was all good, it meant that they now had to decide on tank orders to be placed. They had already decided on ordering 70 of the light Mk IVD with the COW gun, but how many mediums was a more difficult issue. It wasn't that they didn't want them - if it had been up to the RTC men they'd have ordered 400 to outfit a new armoured division - but the idea of what the Treasury would say when seeing the costs had led to shaking of heads from some of the senior officers.
The Cabinet had recently approved the deficiency program for the Army for the next 5 years. The amount of money, £214 million, was certainly impressive, especially to those who'd been fighting for money for the last 10 years, but there was a hidden catch. Much of the money would have to be used for the Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB), a new task for the Army, and to put it into perspective, it had been allocated an initial £37 million, while training equipment for the Territorial Army, badly needed, was only allocated £9 million, and there was no allowance for war equipment or reserves.
There was one hope; in the previous month the Cabinet had agreed that the Territorials would be trained on the same equipment as the Regulars, so a request for extra training equipment had been put in. The Army was hoping that by leveraging this agreement they could get enough to outfit two, or maybe even three, divisions by early 1940. There had been a certain amount of cynicism as to fundamental inconsistencies in the proposals, but they intended to get as much front line equipment as they could before some politician changed his mind again. There was also considerable allowance 'to augment war potential', which was all well and good, but this needed to be done in the most efficient way. Concern had been raised that some of the government ideas, to use firms not doing too well, and unfamiliar with providing equipment, should be used. This didn't bode well for getting what they needed in the timescale they wanted.
First business was to make the light tank order. Unofficial discussions had been had with their contacts at Vickers and some other large engineering firms, and the conclusion was to use this to allow Vulcan (already designing the new A12 infantry tank) to get familiarity with building tanks before they started seriously on the A12. They would also place an order with Harland & Wolff in Belfast - this firm had been recommended by Vickers as suitable for helping build the A10* they had designed, and again a light tank order would get them started on actually building tanks. Each firm would receive an order for 35 tanks. They had considered using the Royal Ordnance factory as well,m but experience with an earlier light tank order had shown that they didn't have the capability to build them fast enough, and it would be useful experience for the two new firms.
The order for the new Cruiser tank had been set at 150 tanks, a very large order by previous standards. The only company currently gearing up to make this was Vickers, who were busy improving their factory at Elswick in Newcastle to cope with the hoped-for order. They expected to be able to produce 10 tanks/month as soon as the work was complete, which meant by late summer. They had also indicated that they could increase this number considerably by adding another production line either at Elswick or at their Chertsey site. They had made two suggestions the committee intended to agree to. First, that if they Army wanted another source for Cruiser and Medium tanks, to consider Harland & Wolff. They were already associated with Vickers, and while not experienced in building tanks, had considerable naval experience so were familiar with heavy engineering. They were well out of range of air attacks from Germany, being based in Northern Ireland, and if the government were to consider a new tank plant, using the same arguments that had been made for Shadow Factories for aviation, this would be a very useful place to build it. This had made sense to the Army, and also Vickers point that it would be far more productive to set up new factories, or expand existing ones, if these were run by companies familiar with the complicated nature or building tanks and similar vehicles rather than a company that just made railway engines. They'd suggested that the best approach was to use unskilled firms to produce components and subassemblies for final construction by an experienced workforce. This would be most efficient in time and money.
The final decision of the committee was to authorise production of 150 A10* tanks. 100 would be ordered from Vickers, the other 50 from Harland & Wolff. It was hoped that this would result in the order being completed in about 18 months time. This would allow the equipping of a full Armoured Brigade, as least as far as its cruiser tanks went. They would also be keeping an eye on the development of the Infantry tanks from Vickers and Vulcan, and the new cruiser being developed by Nuffield - it was hoped that parallel orders could be approved for these vehicles as well. Vulcan had indicated that a mock-up would be ready for inspection in a few weeks, and one had already been approved for the A13. The radio sets, an important part of the tank in British doctrine, would be initially the existing No 7 sets. While workable, these weren't considered good enough, and a replacement was being worked on at the Signals Experimentation Establishment. It was expected that once this was ready it would replace the No 7 set in the new tanks.
The other production problem that had to be addressed was the Mk II Diesel Kestrel, which Vickers had christened the Kiwi. Rolls-Royce was busy with work for the Air Ministry, and while they had promised help to set up a new production line, this would be limited. One advantage was that the bulk of the production machinery already existed to make the Kestrel, so little new machinery needed to be created, but it would still take time. Vickers had suggested that to start with they could build a production line in part of one of their factories, to save time while a new factory was built. They had recommended a site in Scotland; skilled labour was available, and again it would be safe from air attack. It was expected that it would take a year to get this built and operational, but as long as some engines could be built by more old-fashioned methods in the meantime, tank production shouldn't be badly affected. Some of the components would have to be outsourced to subcontractors, and the time would allow their production to be increased. It was hoped that if the orders for engines increased, a considerable amount of work could be done by car manufacturers; in the main, the tolerances for the tank engine were not as critical as for the aero engine, and it was thought this would simplify matters.
The team at the MEE were rather grateful for the men sent over from Bovington to help them with their trials, as Vickers had just delivered the final prototype version of the A10* for testing. They had done all the small fixes asked for in the initial tests, and had carried on with suspension and track improvements. The teams job was to spend a week going over it, then report to the War Office about its suitability for putting into production; the tank would remain with them for some time doing a long term reliability evaluation, the results of which would be sent back to Vickers. The intention was to use the borrowed men drive the tank around a lot while they saw what broke; they'd been informed that they would have a new tank to test soon, and the results on that were needed quickly as well. It was a different world from that of a few years ago, when testing had been leisurely and prototype few and far between.
24th March 1937, War Office
The committee had just received the report from the MEE, and it was more favourable than some of the more pessimistic members had expected. Basically Farnborough considered it a very good tank, much better than their existing Mediums. The only real problem, slipping its tracks, seemed to have been fixed, at last as long as they didn't drive it flat out, and even then was much reduced. They expected this problem to be basically fixed by the time production tanks were available.
While this was all good, it meant that they now had to decide on tank orders to be placed. They had already decided on ordering 70 of the light Mk IVD with the COW gun, but how many mediums was a more difficult issue. It wasn't that they didn't want them - if it had been up to the RTC men they'd have ordered 400 to outfit a new armoured division - but the idea of what the Treasury would say when seeing the costs had led to shaking of heads from some of the senior officers.
The Cabinet had recently approved the deficiency program for the Army for the next 5 years. The amount of money, £214 million, was certainly impressive, especially to those who'd been fighting for money for the last 10 years, but there was a hidden catch. Much of the money would have to be used for the Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB), a new task for the Army, and to put it into perspective, it had been allocated an initial £37 million, while training equipment for the Territorial Army, badly needed, was only allocated £9 million, and there was no allowance for war equipment or reserves.
There was one hope; in the previous month the Cabinet had agreed that the Territorials would be trained on the same equipment as the Regulars, so a request for extra training equipment had been put in. The Army was hoping that by leveraging this agreement they could get enough to outfit two, or maybe even three, divisions by early 1940. There had been a certain amount of cynicism as to fundamental inconsistencies in the proposals, but they intended to get as much front line equipment as they could before some politician changed his mind again. There was also considerable allowance 'to augment war potential', which was all well and good, but this needed to be done in the most efficient way. Concern had been raised that some of the government ideas, to use firms not doing too well, and unfamiliar with providing equipment, should be used. This didn't bode well for getting what they needed in the timescale they wanted.
First business was to make the light tank order. Unofficial discussions had been had with their contacts at Vickers and some other large engineering firms, and the conclusion was to use this to allow Vulcan (already designing the new A12 infantry tank) to get familiarity with building tanks before they started seriously on the A12. They would also place an order with Harland & Wolff in Belfast - this firm had been recommended by Vickers as suitable for helping build the A10* they had designed, and again a light tank order would get them started on actually building tanks. Each firm would receive an order for 35 tanks. They had considered using the Royal Ordnance factory as well,m but experience with an earlier light tank order had shown that they didn't have the capability to build them fast enough, and it would be useful experience for the two new firms.
The order for the new Cruiser tank had been set at 150 tanks, a very large order by previous standards. The only company currently gearing up to make this was Vickers, who were busy improving their factory at Elswick in Newcastle to cope with the hoped-for order. They expected to be able to produce 10 tanks/month as soon as the work was complete, which meant by late summer. They had also indicated that they could increase this number considerably by adding another production line either at Elswick or at their Chertsey site. They had made two suggestions the committee intended to agree to. First, that if they Army wanted another source for Cruiser and Medium tanks, to consider Harland & Wolff. They were already associated with Vickers, and while not experienced in building tanks, had considerable naval experience so were familiar with heavy engineering. They were well out of range of air attacks from Germany, being based in Northern Ireland, and if the government were to consider a new tank plant, using the same arguments that had been made for Shadow Factories for aviation, this would be a very useful place to build it. This had made sense to the Army, and also Vickers point that it would be far more productive to set up new factories, or expand existing ones, if these were run by companies familiar with the complicated nature or building tanks and similar vehicles rather than a company that just made railway engines. They'd suggested that the best approach was to use unskilled firms to produce components and subassemblies for final construction by an experienced workforce. This would be most efficient in time and money.
The final decision of the committee was to authorise production of 150 A10* tanks. 100 would be ordered from Vickers, the other 50 from Harland & Wolff. It was hoped that this would result in the order being completed in about 18 months time. This would allow the equipping of a full Armoured Brigade, as least as far as its cruiser tanks went. They would also be keeping an eye on the development of the Infantry tanks from Vickers and Vulcan, and the new cruiser being developed by Nuffield - it was hoped that parallel orders could be approved for these vehicles as well. Vulcan had indicated that a mock-up would be ready for inspection in a few weeks, and one had already been approved for the A13. The radio sets, an important part of the tank in British doctrine, would be initially the existing No 7 sets. While workable, these weren't considered good enough, and a replacement was being worked on at the Signals Experimentation Establishment. It was expected that once this was ready it would replace the No 7 set in the new tanks.
The other production problem that had to be addressed was the Mk II Diesel Kestrel, which Vickers had christened the Kiwi. Rolls-Royce was busy with work for the Air Ministry, and while they had promised help to set up a new production line, this would be limited. One advantage was that the bulk of the production machinery already existed to make the Kestrel, so little new machinery needed to be created, but it would still take time. Vickers had suggested that to start with they could build a production line in part of one of their factories, to save time while a new factory was built. They had recommended a site in Scotland; skilled labour was available, and again it would be safe from air attack. It was expected that it would take a year to get this built and operational, but as long as some engines could be built by more old-fashioned methods in the meantime, tank production shouldn't be badly affected. Some of the components would have to be outsourced to subcontractors, and the time would allow their production to be increased. It was hoped that if the orders for engines increased, a considerable amount of work could be done by car manufacturers; in the main, the tolerances for the tank engine were not as critical as for the aero engine, and it was thought this would simplify matters.
Derek Pullem
Donor
"Kiwi" = flightless RR engines
Can we look forward to the "Emu" and "Ostrich" as well?
Can we look forward to the "Emu" and "Ostrich" as well?
For the "Centurion" equivalent maybe the "Cassowary". Vicious predators with lethal, raptor-like, claws."Kiwi" = flightless RR engines
Can we look forward to the "Emu" and "Ostrich" as well?
Given that Rolls have been naming the aero engines after birds, having the vehicle derivation named after a flightless bird did seem in keeping