It takes time to gear up ground assets.
But the west is going to pummel them from the air and they have the atomic omb.
France has an army . The British have an army . And the US still has occupation forces.
It takes time.. But the west can fly strato fortresses and drop nice bombs.
How. Much of a pounding will it take for the the soviets to say
. Eh . That's a bad choice that we made . Generals are not blind.
The soviets are stopped at the Rhine worst case.. The US will move people fairly rapidly... But yeah it takes time.. Helm it takes time to get a bomb where it needs to be . But the soviets are not going to the Atlantic in a week or two. And that's a fact, their logistics are strained as is
You clearly didn't actually bother to read the rest of this thread or understand any of what was said, I recommend you go back and do so. The relevant Soviet ground assets would be in action within days, at the most, whereas Western reinforcements are months out. Western Air Forces are in no position to do any of what you claim and the ground forces in Western Europe are little more then speed bumps for the Red Army as it existed in 1948. There are no American conventional bombers, much less atomic ones, in position to effectively launch attacks (it wasn't until the spring of '49 that any B-29s were deployed to Britain and it wasn't until
1952 that any atomic weapons were forward deployed there) and evidence from both the capabilities of SAC at the time and the Korean War indicates they would be completely ineffective and suffer heavy losses. Certainly, they'd win the war from 1950 on, but the fantasy of the WAllies suddenly magicking up their strength in a matter of weeks or months to halt the Red Army has no basis in reality.
By the late 50s/early 60s the non-Soviet militaries of the WP were pretty reliable and could be counted on fro specialized roles and in some cases forward uses in numbers, and at a minimum be expected to perform logistics and internal policing along supply lines.
They were available considerably earlier then that.
"By late-1949 and early-1950, Soviet power in Central Europe was further enhanced by the strengthening of the Eastern European satellites. The East German Alert Police, in reality an army, had 50,000 personnel by March 1950, and were being issued Soviet tanks. After the introduction of conscription in 1949, the Polish Army grew to 400,000 troops, and by 1950 the Czechoslovakian army had 140,000 troops. These Czech troops, and to a lesser extent, the other Soviet-bloc armies in Europe, relied on goods from the Skoda arms works, one of the largest military production complexes in the world." -Raymond P. Ojserkis,
Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race, Pg 38-39
The outbreak of a war would probably accelerate the process of standing up Eastern Satellite armies described above by a bit, but even then the Soviets won't be able to call upon satellite troops to secure and police their own supply lines in the first phase of the OP's described war. They will for the second phase, though.
The number of non-Soviet troops and paramilitary police that were in any way reliable is small. Sure you have the secret police organs watching, but you need numbers to patrol roads and rail lines, guard bridges and so forth. Gumming up the works for the logistic lines the Soviets have is ridiculously easy, a loose rail, a jammed switch all cause delays where significant resources are needed to deal with a derailment and you can do that without an ounce of explosives. If you have some explosives, every culvert over a stream becomes a target. Whatever the number of Soviet troops in 1948, a lot of them are going to have to be detailed for line of communications duty either patrolling directly or "supervising" squads of locals. This will start spontaneously, and rather quickly you'll see Poles, Hungarians, etc who are now in the west parachuting in or rowing ashore from submarines to do this sort of thing even better. Yes, Soviet agents in the establishment (Cambridge 5 for example) will cause losses (eggs and omelettes however), but damage will be done.
I find this to be a pack of wishful thinking. The "secret police organs" include full on military formations and no, gumming up the works won't at all be easy given the lack of coherency among Eastern European resistance groups at this time. Additionally, in the first few months these countries will be swarming with Soviet military forces in transit to the front, so any sort of uprising in that period would be absolute suicide. The post-war western intelligence agencies were already having locals parachuting or rowing in ashore in the post-war period to try and conduct espionage and sabotage. The result was that, at best, these agents would be caught within weeks having achieved absolutely nothing. The problem with these infiltration operations went beyond merely Soviet agents in place in western emplacements, indeed these operations were often totally botched even before they began, so no damage will be achieved in the initial stage of the war. From the second phase on, as the western intelligence organs shake out their difficulties, they would probably start to have more of an effect but by then the Soviets will be mobilized and have a surfeit of troops to garrison things.
Unless the Soviets can do better than the Germans, and by that I mean everywhere from Gibraltar to North Cape, Italy, and Greece before the US and allies stiffen things,
What you mean isn't precisely clear. Greece (which is already in a state of Civil War) would be gone within the first week, the Soviets would be at the Pyrenees and seized control of mainland Italy within three months. If Spain doesn't wind-up neutral (50/50 there), then the Red Army would have the strength to push through the Pyrenee's, although they might stall out inside of Central Spain. Depending on whether the Middle Eastern states declare neutrality and prohibit the use of their bases to western forces or not, subsequent Soviet invasions would overrun Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and much of Jordan, likely only stalling out in the Israel-Palestine region within 6 months. In the Far East, the US didn't even intend to attempt to defend South Korea (even during the Korean War, the plan was to withdraw if a shooting war broke out in Europe) and would merely focus on holding Japan, so the peninsula would be reunified under communist control (at least for the next few years) inside of 2 months. How things turn out in China is rather up in the air, as by this point the Chinese Communists already have achieved the upper hand in the civil war but a shooting war in Europe might change the calculus of either the Americans or the Soviets in aiding Chiang or Mao (respectively). That would itself influence whether the war spreads to or remains absent from Southeast Asia during the second phase in '49.
By comparison, from the decision to reinforce Europe made during December of 1950, following the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, to the arrival of the first actual reinforcement of American ground troops took 7 months. And this is with the Americans prioritizing the reinforcement of Europe over that of Korea because of fear that the Chinese offensive during the winter was both a prelude and distraction to a Soviet offensive in Europe.