The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

[ObssesedNuker]

Which explains the Berlin airlift...

Yes, actually. The Berlin airlift was initially a chaotic and wholly inadequate affair. It took serious reorganization and a focused, minor mobilization to get it working as well as it eventually did. Even then, it absorbed practically all operational airlift assets. The US senior commanders from the theatre level all the way up to the JCS complained bitterly throughout the entire thing that the aforementioned commitment of practically all air cargo assets compromised plans to help ensure the reinforcement of Britain and Japan in the early stages of a war against the USSR.

Sounds as if you've moved it to Scotland.

My keyboard doesn’t do the umlaut, but apparently I misspelled the name: the relevant airbase was called Gutersloh and in 1948 it only had 4 fighters squadrons in 1948: 1 jet, 3 piston-engine. Another airbase, Wunstorf, had another squadron of RAF piston-engine fighters. The Dutch and Belgian air forces combined had another 3 piston-engine fighters. As I already mentioned, the USAFE had one air group of three squadrons of Thunderbolts left over from WW2.

USAF history in Korea. Let history be a guide as to whether the Russians would have gone anywhere in the face of Western tac-air. From the operational history of force on force encounters in Korea and what we know now; it appears that the answer would be that the Russians did not have the proper training, doctrine, base ground support echelon, aircraft or stomach for it.

First link is based on USAF history on kill claims which aren't worth spit (to be fair, neither are Russian claims about the number of US aircraft they downed... overclaiming in this matter is pretty universal). Genuinely independent historical studies based on opened archives since the end of the Cold War show that the Russians did quite well in Korea, scoring a close to 1:1 kill ratio, and also observed they effectively managed to shut down B-29 raids up in the region they were operating (the famous "MiG alley") during the course of the war. Second link does not support the claim in any sort of way.

The break of gauge question gives serious pause to anyone thinking about the "Soviet hordes swarming into Western Europe". Those hordes would be limited to what already is deployed forward into the Iron Curtain border countries. Second echelons etc advancing would be significantly late, and the border crossings would very likely be showered in conventional or nuclear bombs... The fact that the railways from in the Warsaw Pact satellite countries were never adjusted to match the Soviet gauge should be taken as evidence that the USSR never seriously entertained aggressive intentions, and was on the contrary deeply paranoid about undergoing yet another unprovoked attack.

I find this far more wishful thinking then anything else. The Soviets had to deal with the gauge chain in 1945 and yet they shipped record number of supplies across by simply using the large quantities of captured Eastern European rolling stock. They also had little problem going the other way, when shipping east those forces they decided to demobilize along with large amounts of surplus gear and looted industrial equipment. Why they can't repeat the performance again in 1948 despite the railnet being more rebuilt and additional rolling stock being acquired and with large quantities of supplies already stockpiled up in East Germany and forces within Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe which already grossly overmatch their western opposition... nobody here seems able to address. I've already discussed at length about the inadequacy of the USAF to deliver either atomic or conventional munitions in the face of Soviet air support in the first stage of such a war in both this thread and others and this is confirmed by Korea where American air interdiction comprehensively failed to sever North Korea's rail lines despite them being much easier targets in every way (fewer of them, against a enemy less adept at maskirovka, and with vastly less in the way of fighter cover and AAA). Communist supply throughput actually increased during the war, with artillery ammunition reaching the frontlines in July 1953 at 22 times the rate it did in August 1951. All this makes it pretty clear that people who wax lyrically about pure airpower severing Soviet LOCs in the first several months of a Western-Soviet war in 1948 seem to be engaging in total fantasy.

I would like to note that I too disagree with the idea of "Soviet hordes swaming into Western Europe". But then that is because the Soviets because the specific idea of the Soviets being "hordes" is also a product of sub-human othering which reduces the idea of Soviet ground superiority to just being that of pure quantity with zero quality. In reality, the Soviet armies also had the quality advantage in the 1946-1950 timeframe and their overrunning of Western Europe would be as much the product of ruthless application of maneuver, firepower, and skill as it would be of numbers.

 

[McPherson]

First link is based on USAF history on kill claims which aren't worth spit (to be fair, neither are Russian claims about the number of US aircraft they downed... overclaiming in this matter is pretty universal). Genuinely independent historical studies based on opened archives since the end of the Cold War show that the Russians did quite well in Korea, scoring a close to 1:1 kill ratio, and also observed they effectively managed to shut down B-29 raids up in the region they were operating (the famous "MiG alley") during the course of the war. Second link does not support the claim in any sort of way.

1. The actual kill exchange rate is 4 to 1 USAF favor where Honchos are involved and gun camera footage is involved.
2. The Russians and their clients ran no TAC-AIR against the USAF patrolled skies which was what you should have picked from the data. They, the enemy, flew counter-air or air defense because the Russians had no tac-air capability or the proper equipment to project it or the training to use it or the logistics to mount it. The USAF flew tac-air quite successfully into PRNK air space and just about anywhere their aviation could reach that was not bounded by political decision makers in Washington, so everything you claimed is simply not accurate, except that piston engine bombers can be shot down beyond jet fighter escort range. That is the history, not opinion, not YMMV or any qualifiers at all.

Jet on jet the story is quite different.

The UN lost about 139 aircraft, the RoKAF lost ~130, the PLAAF admits it lost 370 or so, the NKPRAF admits about 250 and the USAF has gun-camera on about 800 with another 200 claimed (no-evidence for the 200 so I discount.).

Many of those NKPRAF pilots (By USAF intelligence about 20% of them.) were Russians.

 

[ShadowSpeaker]

After fighting a world war and going off in a short time to fight another one. Yeesh, there must be a lot of support on the civilian front and the top brass for this to happen.

 

[McPherson]

After fighting a world war and going off in a short time to fight another one. Yeesh, there must be a lot of support on the civilian front and the top brass for this to happen.

Which is why Stalin is insane. Nobody Russian and sane wants Korea any more than anyone else sane. It could have so easily spiraled out of control with lunatics on both sides pushing the escalation ladder. When Stalin pops off on 5 March 1953, look how quickly the Korean War ends? 27 July 1953. Both sides FINALLY look for an exit once the madman is dead. I always thought that was curious.

 

[ShadowSpeaker]

Which is why Stalin is insane. Nobody Russian and sane wants Korea any more than anyone else sane. It could have so easily spiraled out of control with lunatics on both sides pushing the escalation ladder. When Stalin pops off on 5 March 1953, look how quickly the Korean War ends? 27 July 1953. Both sides FINALLY look for an exit once the madman is dead. I always thought that was curious.

I'm of Chinese background and I blame Stalin 100% for the Korean war. He pushed Kim to go South and promised North Korea that it would be a great idea because Mao would clean his bum if he got into any trouble. One of many reasons I hate the man. Mao, being Mao, most likely did it to get Soviet tech transfers although I don't know how valid this claim is. Mao was an idiot who isolated China from the West and the Soviet Bloc haha. If the Blockade leads to World War 3, then Communist China will sit out for sure haha.

 

[McPherson]

I'm of Chinese background and I blame Stalin 100% for the Korean war. He pushed Kim to go South and promised North Korea that it would be a great idea because Mao would clean his bum if he got into any trouble. One of many reasons I hate the man. Mao, being Mao, most likely did it to get Soviet tech transfers although I don't know how valid this claim is. Mao was an idiot who isolated China from the West and the Soviet Bloc haha. If the Blockade leads to World War 3, then Communist China will sit out for sure haha.

I would say that PRC policymakers were straight jacketed in that era. They may have felt they were of necessity forced to fight for their survival. They did not greenlight Kim. In fact the PRC went out of its way to use diplomacy to try to warn the UN not to cross the agreed upon 38th parallel.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

1. The actual kill exchange rate is 4 to 1 USAF favor where Honchos are involved and gun camera footage is involved.

No, that's still the claimed rate based on gun camera footage. While overclaiming is smaller when based on gun camera examination, it's still significant. The Soviets, whose kill claims even at the time were based on rigorous guncam by a group of pilots review rather then just asking the pilots, also claimed a kill ratio of 4-to-1 in their favor (a claim the Russians still stick too, just like the USAF sticks too it's ludicrous 8-to-1 kill ratio... although in the latter case, at least it's down from the 12-to-1 ratio of the Cold War). The way to verify the actual kill rate is to look at the enemies loss records on what they lost. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union those became available and they show those figures clear as day: a near 1:1 loss ratio between American and Russian pilots. They even show us that the Russians actually coming out on top of a number of large engagements that USAF official history holds the Americans won.

Now Soviet records also show that against the Chinese and North Korean pilots, the US did better: 3-to-1, American favor. But this it to be expected as the Chinese and North Koreans were new-comers to air warfare and less experienced in air operations, despite operating the same aircraft the Russians were. As always, skill trumped tech.

2. The Russians and their clients ran no TAC-AIR against the USAF patrolled skies which was what you should have picked from the data. They, the enemy, flew counter-air or air defense because the Russians had no tac-air capability or the proper equipment to project it or the training to use it or the logistics to mount it.

Your claim would be more credible if you provided evidence that the Soviets tried and failed, rather then never even making the attempt. The Soviets did not run CAS or interdiction (the actual words your looking for, since TACAIR includes a wide variety of missions including counter-air and battlefield or logistical air defense) because they refused to do so, not for any supposed inability to do so. Even the Chinese could have, as they had been provisioned with a few hundred Soviet Tu-2s and several hundred IL-2s, but they refused to rebase their airpower south of the Yalu. Only the North Koreans based air south of the Yalu and their air force indeed lacked much in the way of capability... but then that is to be expected, being a small, recently formed state with few people experienced in aviation operations having to operate against one of the two global superpowers. More to the point, the Soviets demonstrated great ability to run CAS and interdiction over the region in actual discussion 1945, when the VVS sortied in immense numbers to support the Red Army's advance across East-Central Germany and again in the immediate post-war with the mass, multi-regiment exercises the VVS ran in the region. The idea that the VVS lacked the capability for major air support of the ground forces in 1948, whether in general or in the Central European region in particular, has zero evidence behind it and plenty against it.

The USAF flew tac-air quite successfully into PRNK air space and just about anywhere their aviation could reach that was not bounded by political decision makers in Washington, so everything you claimed is simply not accurate, except that piston engine bombers can be shot down beyond jet fighter escort range. That is the history, not opinion, not YMMV or any qualifiers at all.

The USAF could not run interdiction in MiG alley for military reasons, not because of any political restrictions. The loss rates were, put bluntly, unacceptable. Nothing exemplifies this better then the raid which saw the final such cancellation of such air missions: of 8 B-29s flying a interdiction mission, 6 were shot down... a positively catastrophic loss rate of 75%. This is the history, not opinion, not YMMV or any qualifiers at all.

After fighting a world war and going off in a short time to fight another one. Yeesh, there must be a lot of support on the civilian front and the top brass for this to happen.

If this opened with the WAllies trying to shoot their way into Berlin, then I'd agree with you. Given that the OP has this war beginning with the Soviets shooting first, that solves a lot of the WAllies PR problem.

As for the Soviets, they've been drumming the idea that the West has been out to get them into their peoples heads since 1946. Even during the war, they played this double tone to their propaganda where on the one hand they praise the West for it's deliveries and then, almost in the same breath, lambast them for conspiring with the Nazis in procrastinating on the Second Front so as to ensure as many good Soviet citizens die as possible. But after the war ended, any good will propaganda dried right up. For the Soviet populace, a shooting war in 1948 would merely confirm what they believe they already knew: the West is out to get them just as the Nazis did. Stalin would probably try to negotiate a advantageous peace the first chance he got though: he wants to avoid a prolonged war because he knows that in a contest of years, he'd lose regardless of whatever short/medium-term gains he managed.

I'm of Chinese background and I blame Stalin 100% for the Korean war. He pushed Kim to go South and promised North Korea that it would be a great idea because Mao would clean his bum if he got into any trouble. One of many reasons I hate the man. Mao, being Mao, most likely did it to get Soviet tech transfers although I don't know how valid this claim is. Mao was an idiot who isolated China from the West and the Soviet Bloc haha. If the Blockade leads to World War 3, then Communist China will sit out for sure haha.

Mao certainly had issues with the Soviets, but there's the possibility that the west would not permit him to remain neutral. A WW3 in Europe could stroke their paranoia of the Chinese Communists being mere Soviet puppets (a incorrect view, but a commonly held one in the US at the time) badly enough that they may up their support for Chiang to a degree that Mao can't possibly ignore it, possibly up to and including active American military forces fighting alongside the nationalists. And if it's the US who wages war on the nascent PRC as part of a WW3 against the USSR, who else can Mao turn too for assistance other then Stalin?

 

[McPherson]

No, that's still the claimed rate based on gun camera footage. While overclaiming is smaller when based on gun camera examination, it's still significant. The Soviets, whose kill claims even at the time were based on rigorous guncam by a group of pilots review rather then just asking the pilots, also claimed a kill ratio of 4-to-1 in their favor (a claim the Russians still stick too, just like the USAF sticks too it's ludicrous 8-to-1 kill ratio... although in the latter case, at least it's down from the 12-to-1 ratio of the Cold War). The way to verify the actual kill rate is to look at the enemies loss records on what they lost. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union those became available and they show those figures clear as day: a near 1:1 loss ratio between American and Russian pilots. They even show us that the Russians actually coming out on top of a number of large engagements that USAF official history holds the Americans won.

Since the Russians are mixed in and padded within NKPRAF "units" as volunteers and "instructors" much as USAF pilots were in ROKAF units, that is nonsense.

Your claim would be more credible if you provided evidence that the Soviets tried and failed, rather then never even making the attempt. The Soviets did not run CAS or interdiction (the actual words your looking for, since TACAIR includes a wide variety of missions including counter-air and battlefield or logistical air defense) because they refused to do so, not for any supposed inability to do so. Even the Chinese could have, as they had been provisioned with a few hundred Soviet Tu-2s and several hundred IL-2s, but they refused to rebase their airpower south of the Yalu. Only the North Koreans based air south of the Yalu and their air force indeed lacked much in the way of capability... but then that is to be expected, being a small, recently formed state with few people experienced in aviation operations having to operate against one of the two global superpowers. More to the point, the Soviets demonstrated great ability to run CAS and interdiction over the region in actual discussion 1945, when the VVS sortied in immense numbers to support the Red Army's advance across East-Central Germany and again in the immediate post-war with the mass, multi-regiment exercises the VVS ran in the region. The idea that the VVS lacked the capability for major air support of the ground forces in 1948, whether in general or in the Central European region in particular, has zero evidence behind it and plenty against it.

​

I know the difference between counter-air and air defense, direct battlefield air support and so forth. When I wrote no Tac-air in USAF patrolled air space I knew exactly that NO TAC-AIR was flown by the enemy period. Air defense is not Tac air. Counter-air is not tac-air.

Aircraft mission roles - Dokuz Eylül University

Proof? USAF and PLAAF records are very good. Russian records not so much. Too much claim and not enough proof. Suggest you read Zhang, Xiaoming (2004). Red Wings Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea (2004 ed.). It goes into detail about how the Chinese and Russians organized their air operations and exactly what their limitations were.

IOW, I do not accept your claims.

 

[James Ricker]

The Soviet Union just lost 27 million people in World War II. They're not going to be able to sustained another major war.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Since the Russians are mixed in and padded within NKPRAF "units" as volunteers and "instructors" much as USAF pilots were in ROKAF units, that is nonsense.

I don’t see how. Soviet loss records are Soviet loss records, regardless of precisely where the Soviet pilots died. A Soviet who gets shot down in Chinese or North Korean service would still be reported as a Soviet loss, not a North Korean or Chinese one. In any case, your own source gives Soviet combat losses to all causes at 335 aircraft. USAF combat losses in Korea are 1,466 aircraft. Taking that at face value would suggest a 4.3:1 loss ratio in favor of the Soviets but let's be realistic here: a portion of the American aircraft were lost to AA and technical failures. In terms of air-air losses, the USAF admits too 152 aircraft. However, there is a significant qualifier, to quote Zhang:

Jon Halliday suggests that “an insurmountable methodological problem” exists when comparing the Communist and UN accounts of the air war in Korea. One major problem is the way each side determined its victory tallies. Because the Americans were always in actionover enemy territory, gun-camera film became the sole means of verifying pilots’ claims. American pilots generally were awarded credit for kills as long as their gun cameras showed hits on a MiG, even if no one saw it go down. The Soviets believed that only percent of the aircraft shown being hit in gun-camera footage might be actually destroyed. The number of aerial victories claimed by American pilots thus was apparently exaggerated. In addition, of the sixteen hundred UN aircraft reported lost in combat, most were attributed to either Communist ground fire or unknown causes. Regrettably, none of the USAF records available on their losses in Korea provide even moderately detailed information, such as date, unit, and crew status. Researchers complain that materials sent to the National Archives from various air force repositories are “disorganized” and “generally uncatalogued.” Nevertheless, realizing the Korean War was not an “alleged walkover,” a recent study notes that some American accounts have revised the kill ratio [against Chinese and Soviet air] downward to 2:1 for all UN losses.

-Pg 202

Given the above methodological issues, the likelihood is high that a number of the 305 aircraft the USAF lists as lost to "missing or unknown causes" were lost to Soviet or Chinese airpower. We know, for example, it is highly likely that one Soviet "Honcho" fighter pilot, Siskov, shot down a F-86 the Americans reported as missing on November 19th: not only because the claim of the kill was the same day as the plane was listed as missing but because the planes death involved such a violent explosion that Siskov returned with parts of the Sabre embedded in his MiG (Red Devils over the Yalu, Igor Seidov). Likewise, just as not all of those 1,466 USAF losses would be to air-air combat, so too would not all Soviet losses be to air-air combat. Some proportion would be lost to technical issues and another proportion destroyed on the ground during the instances where American aircraft crossed the Yalu and attacked Soviet airfields (something that American forces didn't have to worry about). The exact total kill ratio between the two sides thus remains something of an unknown but is likely close to 1:1. The American kill ratio advantage against the Soviets is, in all likelihood, marginal. And this was in a case where the Soviets were being seriously held back by a unwillingness to deploy in numbers actually capable of matching the Americans or operate as aggressively as they could in a open war due to political concerns.

For our 1948 war scenario, not only is any restraint but the numerical advantage is on the other foot. As noted, the Americans only have 75 fighters in region. For the Soviets part... well, I'm still counting the number of fighter regiments (equivalent to an American group) they have in Eastern Germany but the number is already past the combined number of western squadrons, which is as bad a sign as the fact the Soviets have more armies in Germany then the Anglo-Americans do divisions.

I know the difference between counter-air and air defense, direct battlefield air support and so forth. When I wrote no Tac-air in USAF patrolled air space I knew exactly that NO TAC-AIR was flown by the enemy period. Air defense is not Tac air. Counter-air is not tac-air.

Aircraft mission roles - Dokuz Eylül University

Yes, they are and yes the Soviets did those. A mission flown by tactical aircraft such as fighters is a TACAIR mission. That's what the acronym of "TACAIR" means. BARCAP and DCA are both TACAIR and basic counter-air or air defense missions. To claim that the Soviets and Chinese did not fly these missions is to effectively claim that no Chinese or Soviet fighters flew in Korea at all. If that is the case, how then did the United States lose 152+ aircraft to enemy fighter aircraft?​

Proof? USAF and PLAAF records are very good. Russian records not so much. Too much claim and not enough proof. Suggest you read Zhang, Xiaoming (2004). Red Wings Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea (2004 ed.). It goes into detail about how the Chinese and Russians organized their air operations and exactly what their limitations were.

I find it funny that you keep appealing to sources which contradicts you: Zhang makes clear that China lacked the relevant supporting forces but never makes such a claim about the Soviets. Instead, Zhang attributes Soviet lack of deploying the sort of tactical bomber and ground attack air assets to political concerns about escalating the conflict, not to a incapability like you claim. Repeatedly he uses sentences like this:

"Beginning in late 1950, the Soviet Union committed several hundred combat planes to Korea, but political considerations circumscribed Soviet air operations there."-Pg 139

The Soviet Union just lost 27 million people in World War II. They're not going to be able to sustained another major war.

Yes, yes. You are going to continue to pretend the Soviet Union didn't emerge from WW2 as a military superpower because you refuse to accept that those Russian commies could ever harm a hair on a America because God, Freedom, and Apple Pie or something.

 

[McPherson]

You missed the part where Zhang describes Chinese base infrastructure problems and the fact the Chinese noticed the RUSSIAN lack of ground crew training or support echelon organization among their "advisors"? I just find that "interesting" among a lot of things. (^^^)

Your understanding of what constitutes defensive and offensive TACAIR is in error.

Also I prefer verified data. Our records are rather damn good.

 

[sloreck]

Neither the USA nor the USSR were supermen. Both had certain sets of military advantages, and overall the economic advantage went to the USA in a big way. In the post WWII decade the USSR is recovering from massive populations loss, especially young men, and massive devastation of the most productive parts of the USSR.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

You missed the part where Zhang describes Chinese base infrastructure problems and the fact the Chinese noticed the RUSSIAN lack of ground crew training or support echelon organization among their "advisors"? I just find that "interesting" among a lot of things. (^^^)

I do not see how Chinese base infrastructure, which was deficient due to a combination of the Chinese own problems and Stalin's unwillingness to provide enough resources to solve it, is relevant to the issue of Soviet base infrastructure in Central Europe. Paging through my copy of the book, I'm also not finding any mention of the claimed lack of ground crew training or support echelon organization among the Soviets. Perhaps a page number would help narrow things down there...

Your understanding of what constitutes defensive and offensive TACAIR is in error.

Prove it.

Also I prefer verified data. Our records are rather damn good.

Not according to Zhang or the historians he is citing. Is Zhang and the Korean War historians he mentions a reliable source or not? If he is, then your claim about US records is doubtful. If he isn't, then why did you try to use him to support your prior claim about supposed deficiencies in Soviet ground crews?

Neither the USA nor the USSR were supermen. Both had certain sets of military advantages, and overall the economic advantage went to the USA in a big way. In the post WWII decade the USSR is recovering from massive populations loss, especially young men, and massive devastation of the most productive parts of the USSR.

Sure. That does not change that that the Soviets conducted a much shallower demobilization of it's military forces and maintained overwhelming superiority in conventional ground and air forces throughout much of continental Eurasia vis-a-vis the US and it's western alliance as well as a industrial-military complex able to compete with the United States. While American economic superiority will ensure it's victory in a prolonged war, said victory will not be quick, easy, or bloodless.

In terms of manpower, in addition to the ~9 million men demobilized during 1945-46, another ~9 million men fit for military service came of age in 1945-1947 who had been born in the late-20s. The class of 1930, who would be coming of age in 1948, would be the first class in which the Soviets started to see a serious drop-off in the yearly number of young men becoming available as it was the first class born at the time in which the collectivization program, and it's consequences, had impact on the Soviet population, but the drop off was still only about 20% at this point which leaves the class of 1930 as being about 2.4 million. So, that leaves the Soviets with a unmobilized military manpower reserve of potentially some 20.4 million men. Add on to that the 3-4 million man standing military the Soviets had in 1948 and that's 23-24.4 million total military manpower. While this figure is smaller then the number of men the Soviet Union who cycled through during the course of WW2 (34,000,000), it's still more then 6-7 million men larger then the number of men the Germans cycled through during the war and about 3-4.5 million more then the total military manpower fielded by the US during the war.

From a industrial perspective, Soviet industrial output had recovered to pre-war levels in 1948 in terms of general output, save for some cases where the Soviets were actually even better off then they were before the war (thanks to tech derived from lend-lease or the plundering of Eastern European industry) and this is discounting the improvements in quality. Agriculture and certain other elements of the civilian economy would lag for a little longer, not fully recovering until the early-50s, but the Soviets were in a vastly superior military-economic position compared to their pre-war selves by 1948. Their still ultimately dwarfed by the American potential but, as WW2 showed, it's gonna take years for the US to transform that potential into actuality.

 

[Aber]

Add on to that the 3-4 million man standing military the Soviets had in 1948

I thought you had agreed that this was actually 2.9m.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I thought you had agreed that this was actually 2.9m.

I recall agreeing that being the figure for 1946. I don’t have the precise figure for ‘48, but since it rose to being 4.73 million by 1949, no doubt it was between those two figures in 1948. Hence a estimate range of 3-4 million. That said, the difference between 2.9 million and 3 million is small.

 

[Aber]

I recall agreeing that being the figure for 1946. I don’t have the precise figure for ‘48, but since it rose to being 4.73 million by 1949, no doubt it was between those two figures in 1948. Hence a estimate range of 3-4 million. That said, the difference between 2.9 million and 3 million is small.

Most of the figures for Soviet force strengths are Western intelligence estimates of variable accuracy. The exceptions are:
2.874m in 1948 (which I believe you did agree to); and
5.763m in 1955

Anything else needs to be clearly sourced as in the 1940s US intelligence estimates were too high, as they didn't recognise that most Soviet divisions were at reduced strength.

 

[Wendell]

The West would win, unless the public grew impatient with the war.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Most of the figures for Soviet force strengths are Western intelligence estimates of variable accuracy. The exceptions are:
2.874m in 1948 (which I believe you did agree to); and
5.763m in 1955

Perhaps you need to refresh your memory:

Rechecking the figures from The Development of the Soviet and Russian Armies in Context, 1946–2008: A Chronological and Topical Outline of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, it's 2,874,000 personnel in 1946, 4,730,000 personnel in 1949, and 5,763,000 personnel in 1954.

And then in response to you asking what sources it used:

A Russian military history study from 2004, another from 2006, and the 1982 copy of Voenno-tekhnicheskii progress i vooruzhennye cily SSSR. Slavic Military Studies in general tends to rely heavily on Russian archival material.

The 4.73 million by ‘49 is as accurate as the 5.76 million for 1954 and 2.87 million for 1946, being derived as it was from Soviet sources, so you can stop trying to obfuscate on this matter.

 

[McPherson]

Prove it.

I already did.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I already did.

Since you have not, indeed you haven’t even provided a coherent definition of TACAIR, I’ll take that as a concession. Likewise, I’m guessing your conceding on the claim about overall Soviet ground crew capabilities, since you can’t provide a page from the book like I asked.