The Battle of Kursk 1943: turning point vs. over rated?

[Byzantine fanatic]

Today is the 75th anniversary of the battle of Prokhorovka, often cited as one of the largest tank battles of all time, on 12 July 1943 near Kursk in Russia. The German offensive was a do or die effort to end the war on the Eastern front. Hitler wanted a decisive victory so he could sign a favourable peace treaty with the USSR and turn his forces west to face the mounting threat of the western Allies.

The II Panzer Army fought a climactic battle against the Soviet 5th tank guards army near Prokhorovka on the 12th. Competing claims are made about the battle. Some sources claim as many as 800 tanks destroyed, although modern sources estimate a far lower total for the day.

My question is, how much did Kursk matter in world war 2? Was it really the turning point of the war? And did the Germans really come close to victory, as some claim? Was the engagement at Prokhorovka a tactical success for the Axis or a strategic win for the Soviets, or both?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Overrated. Quoting Glantz again: "Moscow determined Germany would not win the war, Stalingrad that she would lose, Kursk how fast".
Also this is a relevant discussion about turning points even being a thing:

 

[GauchoBadger]

Overrated. Quoting Glantz again: "Moscow determined Germany would not win the war, Stalingrad that she would lose, Kursk how fast".

I do agree that Kursk was not a super-important "turning point" in the war. However, the prospect of a German breakthrough or victory in this battle could still have consequences for the European theatre of WW2 that could be explored in a TL or scenario.
I posit that a German victory at Kursk would have persuaded Hitler to try again in Russia (nevermind the parity of forces, compared to 1941). If he diverts forces from the Atlantic Wall and the Mediterranean to increase the odds of this repeat of the "Russian gamble", then it is likely that operations Overlord and Dragoon are launched more-or-less concurrently with OTL. The most noticeable change in this scenario would be the Iron Curtain being raised further to the east than OTL.
These are my general thoughts on this. I think others would also argue that a German breakthrough at Kursk would have resulted in the Wallies covering more territory.

 

[Falk]

Another relevant vid:

 

[RightHoJeeves]

Well Third Kharkov demonstrated that the Heer could still inflict painful losses on the Red Army if they struck opportunistically.

Kursk demonstrated how few and far between such opportunities would arise and what would happen if the Germans struck when the Soviets were prepared.

At any rate I'd argue that Bagration more than any other post-Stalingrad battle had the largest impact on determining how soon the war would end.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

It was less of a turning point and more an indicator of the changing trajectory of the war. I don't think the importance is overrated.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I do agree that Kursk was not a super-important "turning point" in the war. However, the prospect of a German breakthrough or victory in this battle could still have consequences for the European theatre of WW2 that could be explored in a TL or scenario.
I posit that a German victory at Kursk would have persuaded Hitler to try again in Russia (nevermind the parity of forces, compared to 1941). If he diverts forces from the Atlantic Wall and the Mediterranean to increase the odds of this repeat of the "Russian gamble", then it is likely that operations Overlord and Dragoon are launched more-or-less concurrently with OTL. The most noticeable change in this scenario would be the Iron Curtain being raised further to the east than OTL.
These are my general thoughts on this. I think others would also argue that a German breakthrough at Kursk would have resulted in the Wallies covering more territory.

There was a paper in the Journal of Slavic Military studies (or something like that, it's Glantz's journal) where the author looked at the Soviet archives to figure out if Germany had a better chance had they attacked in May or June and found that Soviet defenses were such that Germany effectively could never have won Zitadel. So the reason it isn't really a turning point is that it really wasn't a major risk for the Soviets in the end despite their own mistakes leading up to and during the battle.

 

[bernardz]

There was a paper in the Journal of Slavic Military studies (or something like that, it's Glantz's journal) where the author looked at the Soviet archives to figure out if Germany had a better chance had they attacked in May or June and found that Soviet defenses were such that Germany effectively could never have won Zitadel. So the reason it isn't really a turning point is that it really wasn't a major risk for the Soviets in the end despite their own mistakes leading up to and during the battle.

I tend to agree although I do feel in May, the Germans might have succeeded in having a minor victory which would have delayed the Russians a few months however such a victory would not change much.

 

[sloreck]

IMHO there were several important battles in WWII but few that by themselves turned the tide. Obviously had Germany not overwhelmed France in 1940, or destroyed the RAF shortly thereafter, or won the "Battle of the Atlantic" things would have been quite different, but those would have required major major changes. Maybe had Germany gotten to Moscow in 1941 things would have been very different. Once they did not throw the Russians across the Volga at Stalingrad the battle was going to be lost, they could have lost a lot more cheaply. I agree that it was a question of how much faster or slowly the Germans lose.

 

[TDM]

Kursk doesn't change the basic underlying long term facts of Germany fighting the USSR, so in a way Kursk is just where it happened to be that those facts kicked in, in a noticeable way.

But you still have to fight and win the battles you are presented with in order for those underlying facts to actually transform into changing the war. I.e single battles might not wholly change the tide of war because wars generally speaking are lost and won on underlying facts, but for the tide to actually turn on the ground you need to win battles!

For me Kursk is pivotal because unlike Stalingrad which kind of happens due to a series of developing situations that was not German command's initial plan and they were forced to make the best of it and hope, and the Soviets were able to take advantage of but still had to make the best of and hope. Kursk was more a conscious decision that both sides created and went for. I.e. when both sides turn up thinking "yeah we got this" and one doesn't well that doesn't bode well!

As to the actual numbers of tanks destroyed etc, yeah OK maybe sometimes it exaggerated but it kind of doesn't really matter the point is it was a lot, and as per those underlying facts above, the amount of resources committed and consumed and for that to be accommodated had long term effects.

Psychologically I think it's important as well in the eastern front as it the laat really large scale German attack, again it's not the only place where that could have happened, the fact that it did happen and it took work and hard fighting is v.important.

 

[Byzantine fanatic]

One of the interesting aspects of Kursk is that the Germans delayed the attack repeatedly to allow more time for the new Panther and Tiger tanks to reach the front. It was believed that these new designs would tip the balance of power in Germany's favour.

However, while the German panzers do seem to have destroyed significantly more vehicles than they lost, reliability problems were a major issue. The Panthers were rushed into service and many were lost due to breakdowns, technical faults and issues with the transmission. With the benefit of hindsight, the design was not really ready in time and should perhaps have been held back until the technical issues were fixed before being used in a major offensive.

 

[starman]

It's easy to see why people consider Kursk a turning point. Even after Stalingrad the Germans still held the initiative. After Kursk they never did.

 

[TDM]

One of the interesting aspects of Kursk is that the Germans delayed the attack repeatedly to allow more time for the new Panther and Tiger tanks to reach the front. It was believed that these new designs would tip the balance of power in Germany's favour.

However, while the German panzers do seem to have destroyed significantly more vehicles than they lost, reliability problems were a major issue. The Panthers were rushed into service and many were lost due to breakdowns, technical faults and issues with the transmission. With the benefit of hindsight, the design was not really ready in time and should perhaps have been held back until the technical issues were fixed before being used in a major offensive.

I agree about not rushing the Panthers etc in (and not relying on them to win you the battle if you do)


The problem is when you're facing an opponent who can arm and create forces faster than you can if you delay you're playing into their hands anyway.

There's the additional problem that even if every Panther works like a dream, Germany's never going to produce enough of them to win, because the panther while good isn't that good. And there's more than one way to beat tanks no matter how good they are compared to the T34 (or M4). Even if that's directly e.g through air superiority or indirectly like exploiting or exacerbating long supply chains and fuel shortages (a Pather is less scary when it's out of petrol or 50 miles away)

On top of that there's the manpower issue, a great crew value adds to a great tank*, but Germany suffers in this regard as well since once you go blitzkrieg you will sustain losses, and once that blitzkrieg go on for long enough you will struggle to keep up the numbers of skilled/experienced crews. And of course once the USSR starts winning battles (or even just not getting encircled and captured in their hundreds of thousands) their crews can start to build a body of experience as well. Plus of course Russia has a much larger population to replace from


*and can make a good tank a great one on the battlefield and even a not great tank into a good one!

 

[elkarlo]

Well Third Kharkov demonstrated that the Heer could still inflict painful losses on the Red Army if they struck opportunistically.

Kursk demonstrated how few and far between such opportunities would arise and what would happen if the Germans struck when the Soviets were prepared.

At any rate I'd argue that Bagration more than any other post-Stalingrad battle had the largest impact on determining how soon the war would end.

I mostly agree. I think instead of waiting for the panthers for Kursk that if they tried more limited actions earlier, they could have seen success. They waited too long and attacked a far too obvious and defended area
Should have tried to attack and pick off some exposed corps after Kharkov

 

[Byzantine fanatic]

I mostly agree. I think instead of waiting for the panthers for Kursk that if they tried more limited actions earlier, they could have seen success. They waited too long and attacked a far too obvious and defended area
Should have tried to attack and pick off some exposed corps after Kharkov

Yes, and this was the original plan.

I wonder if Panthers and Tigers would have been much more effective if they had simply pulled back to the Dnieper river and used them defensively to hold the crossing points as a kind of mobile defensive reserve.

Advantages would include less wear and tear through movement, easier recovery and repair of damaged tanks, easier logistics, easier to rescue experienced tank crews as they're in friendly territory, and easier to ship back any tanks that need heavy repairs. Also more time to build up experience, iron out technical problems and build up strength.

Zitadelle snowballed into this huge project that was "Too big to fail" yet too cumbersome to succeed. Its failure left Germany in a very poor position, without enough time to build effective defenses and without an effective tank force to respond to new threats. It pretty much set Germany on the path to defeat which would have been very hard/nigh impossible to get out of.

 

[TDM]

I mostly agree. I think instead of waiting for the panthers for Kursk that if they tried more limited actions earlier, they could have seen success. They waited too long and attacked a far too obvious and defended area
Should have tried to attack and pick off some exposed corps after Kharkov

I think ultimately there was still a bit of an attitude of "More Russians = More Prisoners" in some parts of the German army.

But on top of that Germany knows it can't fight a long drawn out war especially given other fronts opening up a bit. So it always going to be tempted to go for the knock out punch, and possibly rely on 'new miracles of german engineering crewed by inherently superior ubermensch*' to get it.


*and while I couch that in nazi ideological terms, it wasn't that long before that German advances were encircling and captured great chunks of Soviet armed forces. So you can see why that attitude was still about a bit even if not wholly based on racist nonsense.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The importance of Kursk, both the Soviet defensive phase/German offensive phase and thr following Soviet counter-offensive phase/German defensive phase, is less about anything achieved during the battle itself than what it demonstrated about the changing capabilities of the respective sides. Kursk demonstrated that the Soviets now had the capacity to, firstly, halt main effort German offensives before it broke through the tactical defenses and into the operational-strategic depths. Secondly, that the Soviets now had the capacity to defeat German tactical-operational defenses and parry Panzer counter-attacks so as to continue on and achieve their strategic offensive objectives without the Germans having first logistically exhausted themselves. For their part, the Germans were now shown to be unsuccessful at achieving the converse.

So in that specific sense, the battle was a turning point. However, I have to reemphasize that the battle demonstrated these capabilities... it did not create them. Had Kursk not occurred, those capabilities would have still been there and likely still demonstrated and there would be a historiographical debate whether the German or Soviet mid-1943 offensive at Smolensk or the Mius or wherever represented a “turning point”.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

A more subtle 'turning point' battle would have been the air battle over Tunisia a few months earlier in March-April. The Allies succeeded in establishing all weather airfields in range of the Strait of Sicilly, and the material to support sustained air ops. The Axis air forces could not cope, suffered unsustainable losses, and were forced to break off the campaign or be simply shot out of the air. That left the Axis army group in Tunisia isolated and crushed in weeks for lack of supply. Further this successful air battle or campaign left the Axis unable to effectively interfere with Allied use of the Central Mediterranean. Allied warships were operating in the Sicillian Strait in May, and convoys resumed between the Atlantic and Alexandria/Suez via the Med at the end of May. The continued Axis occupation of Sicilly to July made little difference in this. The air battle over Tunisia turned a stalemate into a significant Allied step forward.

 

[elkarlo]

Yes, and this was the original plan.

I wonder if Panthers and Tigers would have been much more effective if they had simply pulled back to the Dnieper river and used them defensively to hold the crossing points as a kind of mobile defensive reserve.

Advantages would include less wear and tear through movement, easier recovery and repair of damaged tanks, easier logistics, easier to rescue experienced tank crews as they're in friendly territory, and easier to ship back any tanks that need heavy repairs. Also more time to build up experience, iron out technical problems and build up strength.

Zitadelle snowballed into this huge project that was "Too big to fail" yet too cumbersome to succeed. Its failure left Germany in a very poor position, without enough time to build effective defenses and without an effective tank force to respond to new threats. It pretty much set Germany on the path to defeat which would have been very hard/nigh impossible to get out of.

I agree with you and TDM, it did snowball and it took over, as opposed to the generals taking control of the operation. Stabilizing and fortifying a strong Frontier woukd have done some good. And having a surviving mobile reserve would have made crossing major Riviers a bloody and not a sure thing.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

A more subtle 'turning point' battle would have been the air battle over Tunisia a few months earlier in March-April. The Allies succeeded in establishing all weather airfields in range of the Strait of Sicilly, and the material to support sustained air ops. The Axis air forces could not cope, suffered unsustainable losses, and were forced to break off the campaign or be simply shot out of the air. That left the Axis army group in Tunisia isolated and crushed in weeks for lack of supply. Further this successful air battle or campaign left the Axis unable to effectively interfere with Allied use of the Central Mediterranean. Allied warships were operating in the Sicillian Strait in May, and convoys resumed between the Atlantic and Alexandria/Suez via the Med at the end of May. The continued Axis occupation of Sicilly to July made little difference in this. The air battle over Tunisia turned a stalemate into a significant Allied step forward.

Really that entire time period, roughly November 1942, was the turning point as operation Uranus and the beginning of the end of the North African theater and the Mussolini regime were initiated.

As a counterfactual to your point, do you think if the Axis hadn't resisted the Torch landings, instead withdrawing to Italy what could be salvaged from the forces in Egypt and reinforcing them with the '5th Panzer Army' in Sicily/Italy while sparing their air power for defending Italy, that it would have made much of a difference to the Mediterranean campaign?