The Battle of Kursk 1943: turning point vs. over rated?

Over the game table last night we discussed this subject briefly. The question came up of if the Kursk battle or campaign was over shadowed in importance by the Battle of the Atlantic, fought out the previous winter in the North central Atlantic. At this point I have no opinion either way. The argument presented was the interdiction of th north Atlantic sea route prevented the Allies from making a really decisive effort against Germany.

for context that time period was when u-boat campaign began to be defeated, if in fact it was not defeated?

my view one of biggest mistakes of KM not to develop the smaller Type XXIII Elektroboot first as they could see the wave coming towards them, that nexus was going to change from middle of Atlantic to coastal waters.

instead they were forced to rely on LW across N. Africa and KM largely absent? (or effectively absent)

(with hindsight, but they did have hindsight of WWI)
 

Deleted member 1487

First, that has nothing to do with whether an early attack or not could succeed, but rather whether Hitler should have called off Citadel in July 16th. Secondly, Nipe's evidence for his “tactical victory was possible” arguement basically begins and ends by uncritically repeating what Manstein wrote in Lost Victories. Manstein wrote his memoir believing that all of the Soviet reserves had already been committed at Prokorovka. What Manstein did not know, even in 1956, was that Soviet reserves were far from exhausted. On the night of 15 July, the 27th and 53rd Armies of the Steppe Front, along with the 4th Guards Tank Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps were closing on the left flank of the German divisions committed to Kursk, with orders to launch a general counter-offensive to crush the German spearhead. Between them the 4th GTA and 1st Mechanized had a tank strength of over 800, some 500 of which would be ready to attack on 17 July. They would have been assisted by the 200 remaining tanks of the battered but not beaten 1st Tank Army. As for the German forces defending this flank, the Leibstandarte could muster just 57 tanks, 18 tank destroyers and 28 assault guns remaining operational, with the other two SS divisions in little better shape. All German divisions attacking the salient, having been in non-stop combat, were running low on their organic stocks of fuel and ammo, their vehicles worn to the verge of a mass mechanical breakdown, and their men were literally starting to collapse from exhaustion and overexertion. The Germans had even run out of Pervetine. They had basically overexerted themselves attacking, after giving everything they had to win at Prokhorovka, and were reaching the maximum point of vulnerability to a Soviet counterstroke. Cancelling the offensive gave them several weeks to recuperate before Operation Rumyanstev broke in August. [David Glantz, “The Battle of Kursk," p.221]

The withdrawal of the Germans pre-empted what could have been a very, very bad day for Army Group South’s Panzer.
We've had that argument before, the Soviet reserves were not coming at the flanks, but at the front of the German advance; their positioning wouldn't have allowed for cutting off German spearheads, just another bumper car event unless somehow they managed to actually breakthrough the German line frontally, which is unlikely given the track record to that point against German panzer corps.
Also it was the 4th Guards Tank Corps not Army plus 1st Mechanized Corps with 400 tanks combined, NOT each. A Soviet tank corps only had about 200 tanks or so.
Edit:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20th_Guards_Army#2nd_Formation_(4th_Guards_Tank_Army)
The 4th Guards Tank Army was only formed on July 15th and was part of West Front, north of the Orel Bulge, only entering combat for the first time in Operation Kutuzov, so it was impossible for the 4th Guards Tank Army to have been in the Kursk bulge in mid-July. Also Glantz's text doesn't say Tank Army, just 4th Guards Tank and in his map it say 4GTC (guards tank corps).

Also they were spaced far apart and would hit different German Panzer Corps when put into the line and only really just reinforce depleted units. Even with the relatively depleted status of LAH and DR divisions, given what they did to an entire Soviet Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka with limited losses to themselves, 1 fresh Mechanized Corps isn't going to break them even if it forces a pause in operations. Certainly though the Soviet infantry armies would have effectively ended the German advance when they appeared, but their ability to push back the Germans was limited at best and likely would be very costly given the concentration of air and artillery support with 4th Panzer Army.
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And the consequences for Army Group Center would have been just as bad, seeing as Operation Suvorov was threatening to breakthrough the northern face of the Orel salient...
Where was anything mentioned about AG Center continuing it's offensive after Suvorov was started? It would be in the same historical position as IOTL.
 
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for context that time period was when u-boat campaign began to be defeated, if in fact it was not defeated? ...

At the highest strategic level the BoA was won when the Allies took action to boost their ship construction above the loses. Simultaneously there were some losing decisions on the German side. That was all in 1942. At sea the submarines were no longer able to operate in the Allied coastal regions by the Autumn of 1942. The Allies had finally provided enough ships and aircraft for local ASW to make the Mid Atlantic Gap the only remaining practical area for effective submarine ops. The Caribbean, the US Atlantic coast, the UK waters, the Mediterranean became increasingly dangerous and the losses there unsustainable by the last quarter of 1942. The final mid Atlantic campaign dragged on into early 1943. In hindsight its clear the submarine fleet had lost that winter & was a deadman still walking. At the time this was not clear to either side, tho Donitz figured it out first. He could see as early as February if the loss trends continued he'd have to find new methods & strategy. In April and May he & his staff had to accept they had reached or passed the tipping point. The senior British leaders were still in a panic until the 'temporary' retirement of the submarines came in May.

In the Spring of 1942 Allied losses to submarines peaked & a very favorable ratio of submarines sortied and subs lost vs Allied cargo ships lost existed. The loss of cargo embarked to the UK exceeded 10% of the total embarked for all of 1942. By the end of 1942 that loss rate had fallen back close to its 1941 level of around 6% and in 1943 the amount embarked for the UK lost to submarines dropped down to 4% of the gross.

John Ellis in 'Brute Force' takes a long look at the actual performance of the submarines, and air forces in the BoA. Huge and Costello take a look at the the BoA from a somewhat different perspective. Both show how the decisions both side made in 1942 put the Germans in a loosing position in the effort of the winter of 1942-43.
 
Over the game table last night we discussed this subject briefly. The question came up of if the Kursk battle or campaign was over shadowed in importance by the Battle of the Atlantic, fought out the previous winter in the North central Atlantic. At this point I have no opinion either way. The argument presented was the interdiction of th north Atlantic sea route prevented the Allies from making a really decisive effort against Germany.

Disagree. Several reasons. First was that the North Atlantic Route was never interdicted. Second until late 43 the majority of US production by value ( note qualifier) is aimed towards Japan. partly that's a function of the training rates of US divisions vs aircraft/ship production partly the costs of shipping in the pacific and the very large air forces deployed there. Another factor is the Allied overeaction to Drumbeat.

The training rate item is really out of control and not changeable the US was going as fast as it could and it did take Uranus to show that the USSR was not at the point of collapse. The others are a matter of decisions. There is no need for three separate 'decisive' campaigns against Japan ( McArthurs, Nimitz and Matterhorn, the latter being incredibly resource intensive. Drumbeat results in both excess production of escorts but also diversion of the bomber forces into attacks on invulnerable sub pens and the air commanders knew it.
 
My view is in different direction. If the 'schnorkel' had been installed in wolf pacts -mid war- instead of the 'winter garden' ; and a LR MPA used to located & broadcasted the numerous BdU convoy detections- then the allied air dominated ASW system- would have had little success against the wolf pacts, who in-turn would have remained at sea for another year or more.
 

Deleted member 1487

My view is in different direction. If the 'schnorkel' had been installed in wolf pacts -mid war- instead of the 'winter garden' ; and a LR MPA used to located & broadcasted the numerous BdU convoy detections- then the allied air dominated ASW system- would have had little success against the wolf pacts, who in-turn would have remained at sea for another year or more.
The snorkel never worked that well in the Atlantic:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_snorkel#Technical_details
https://uboat.net/technical/schnorchel.htm
 
We've had that argument before, the Soviet reserves were not coming at the flanks, but at the front of the German advance; their positioning wouldn't have allowed for cutting off German spearheads, just another bumper car event unless somehow they managed to actually breakthrough the German line frontally, which is unlikely given the track record to that point against German panzer corps.

Sure, because you refuse to actually read the maps you post, accept the given strengths, and accept that the Germans were human beings and not automatons capable of endlessly operating for what was approaching two weeks at this point with zero rest, resupply, and refit. Citing the previous track record tends to ignore these facts. The German tank crews since Prokhorovkha had basically been running on pervetine and their supply of those had run out by July 17th.

And yes, they were coming at the flanks. The XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was guarding the left flank of the advance, with the front constituting the II SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps facing to the northeast.

Also they were spaced far apart and would hit different German Panzer Corps when put into the line and only really just reinforce depleted units.

They were still deploying in the tactical rear, of course their still relatively spread out. But the assertion that once they go into the line they'd hit more then one panzer corps is baseless. They very much could deploy against any individual panzer corps they wished too (or even the flagging LII Infantry Corps on the extreme left). The Germans just withdrew before they could deploy into the line. That they were merely "reinforcing depleted units" is directly contradicted by the order issued to them.

Also it was the 4th Guards Tank Corps not Army plus 1st Mechanized Corps with 400 tanks combined, NOT each. A Soviet tank corps only had about 200 tanks or so.

Eh, I made a typo. It was the 4th Guards Tank Corps as part of the 27th Army. However, the figure of 800 tanks is accurate as the 27th and 53rd Armies contained additional tank brigades and regiments that combined added another several hundred tanks to that figure. They were essentially mini-tank armies. Fixating solely on the 1st Mechanized and 4th GTC. You just keep ignoring that fact for some reason and try to pretend the 4th GTC and 1st MC were the only mechanized assets they had, which is grossly dishonest. Then there's the ~200 tanks of the still intact 1st Tank Army to add to that.

Even with the relatively depleted status of LAH and DR divisions, given what they did to an entire Soviet Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka with limited losses to themselves, 1 fresh Mechanized Corps isn't going to break them even if it forces a pause in operations.

LAH and DR would be off to the East, facing their own troubles from the remained of the still unbeaten 5th Guards Tank Army and had exhausted themselves achieving what they did at Prokorovkha as I described. They didn’t have the strength to pull off a repeat. They had fully enmeshed themselves on Soviet AT offensives as they had not yet at Prokhorovka. You might think that the German ubermensch can just shrug off their unit stocks of ammo and fuel running out, literally collapsing from physical exhaustion, and having their equipment on the verge of breaking down an-laser, but that just indicates your existence in OKH fantasy land then the actual reality of the Eastern Front.

Certainly though the Soviet infantry armies would have effectively ended the German advance when they appeared,

If the German panzers were so worn down that Soviet infantry armies could prevent them from advancing, then they would be too exhausted to withstand a concentrated Soviet counterattack by that point.

but their ability to push back the Germans was limited at best and likely would be very costly given the concentration of air and artillery support with 4th Panzer Army.

The 4th Panzer Armies air support was largely being negated by having to focus on the VVS, hence it's overall miniscule impact on the battle, and it’s artillery support was increasingly outweighed by that of the Soviet forces now pouring into the region plus the supply problems of trying to get ammo forward past threatened flanks and through a penetration corridor under constant artillery fire.

Where was anything mentioned about AG Center continuing it's offensive after Suvorov was started? It would be in the same historical position as IOTL.

Manstein was the one arguing for a continuation of Citadel, which would implicitly include AG Center continuing it’s own offensive. He managed to get Hitler to accept a watered down version limited to Army Group South that, due to the panzers being spent after Prokhorovka, went nowhere before it too was quickly called off and the panzers withdrawn.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Eh, I made a typo. It was the 4th Guards Tank Corps as part of the 27th Army. However, the figure of 800 tanks is accurate as the 27th and 53rd Armies contained additional tank brigades and regiments that combined added another several hundred tanks to that figure. They were essentially mini-tank armies. Fixating solely on the 1st Mechanized and 4th GTC. You just keep ignoring that fact for some reason and try to pretend the 4th GTC and 1st MC were the only mechanized assets they had, which is grossly dishonest. Then there's the ~200 tanks of the still intact 1st Tank Army to add to that.
I'll do the rest later, but this is exceptionally egregious. In Glantz "Kursk" Appendixes p.326 53rd army had 78 tanks, 65,000 men. p.325 27th army had 92 tanks.
p.239 4GTC: 189 AFVs, p.240 1MC: 204 AFVs.
Total: 563 AFVs for all reinforcing units split evenly between two separate groups that would hit two different Panzer Corps each with 3 Panzer divisions and had already smashed a Tank Army each. Speaking of which p.342 1st Tank Army losses, 1,049 in July and August, 542 in August; in July it only fought until the 15th of July before being taken out of line, so all it's losses in July happened during Zitadelle, which means 507 AFVs lost until July 15th. P.316 is army strength, which started at 646 AFVs. 646-507=139 AFVs operational on July 15th in the 1st Tank Army. If that Panzer corps had already taken out at least 507 AFVs of the 1st Tank Army, you think that 281 additional AFVs would help them (4GTC+27th Army)?
That would only be 281+139= 420 AFVs, substantially less than the full strength 1st TA. Based on the chart IOTL 1st Tank Army had 30% losses due to breakdown, so moving up some number of Soviet AFVs would be lost to mechanical issues even before combat.

They would be enough to ensure the German advance from the XLVIII Panzer corps and probably push them back a bit, but the GD Panzer division was the strongest in the 4th Panzer Army, had two battalions of Panthers (granted most taken out due to mechanical issues, but they were easily repairable and constantly coming back online...plus would be at their best on the defensive rather than attacking), and an attached unit of Tigers.
If you have any sources about the additional brigades and regiments attached that Glantz missed I would be very interested in seeing them.
 
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do you think if the Axis hadn't resisted the Torch landings, instead withdrawing to Italy what could be salvaged from the forces in Egypt and reinforcing them with the '5th Panzer Army' in Sicily/Italy while sparing their air power for defending Italy, that it would have made much of a difference to the Mediterranean campaign?

circling back to this point, it was proposed historically, what numbers of LW (and Italian aircraft) could have been saved, what numbers feasibly sent to Kursk? (leaving aside the troops and any salvaged equipment for a moment)
 

Deleted member 1487

circling back to this point, it was proposed historically, what numbers of LW (and Italian aircraft) could have been saved, what numbers feasibly sent to Kursk? (leaving aside the troops and any salvaged equipment for a moment)
Probably none. All were needed to hold off the Wallies. But that probably means that none need to be taken from Kursk to reinforce Italy
 

Walthers schnorkel was designed in 1933/34 and when used on V-80 boat allowed schnorkel speeds of 25 knots on turbine just below surface. This was because the sub could not sail on surface for any time due to the wash over the unconventional hull shape deck. The historical adaptation of the Dutch schnorkel model did have to use the internal U-Boat air reservoir to overcome leakage from bigger waves and the floating value shutting off to prevent wave flooding. Its true the vibration on the retractable schnorkel limited speed to 6 knots , but within a year of program - the retractable "Oeflken schnorkel" emerged. This locked the schnorkel in place isolating the air pipe from the vibration through the outer streamlined casing . That allowed schnorkel speeds up to 10/11 knots. With out the contribution of air power in the ASW war , the kill rates on U-Boats with would likely be cut in half.

While a schnorkeling boat was still detectable - the radar distance was feeble compared to a surfaced U-Boats at about 1/10 sweep area. However in clear seas /days - 'wake sighing' was possible, but this reduced sweep rates to 1/3 normal. Until the Wallies can increase their airpower by order of magnitude -the kill rates against U-Boats should still be cut in half.

There would be attendant loss of time on station. Type IX endurance on schnorkel would be 8000nm @ 6 knots [1333 hours] compared to 12000 nm @ 12 knots [1000hrs]. If the N Atlantic is the area of interest you would need 2000-3000nm each way, leaving just 2 to 4 weeks on patrol @ 6 knots . Historically 3-4 weeks on patrol @ 12 knots was likely for the Type IX . Sounds the same but a 12 knot U-Boat can at least sweep for convoys and chase down and over take a slow convoy , while 6 knots can't catch anything. A likely hybrid would require U-Boat transit at schnorkel speed and then sweep and attack on surface- which means air ASW could still contribute to U-Boat kills.

Something more is needed.
 

Deleted member 1487

Walthers schnorkel was designed in 1933/34 and when used on V-80 boat allowed schnorkel speeds of 25 knots on turbine just below surface. This was because the sub could not sail on surface for any time due to the wash over the unconventional hull shape deck. The historical adaptation of the Dutch schnorkel model did have to use the internal U-Boat air reservoir to overcome leakage from bigger waves and the floating value shutting off to prevent wave flooding. Its true the vibration on the retractable schnorkel limited speed to 6 knots , but within a year of program - the retractable "Oeflken schnorkel" emerged. This locked the schnorkel in place isolating the air pipe from the vibration through the outer streamlined casing . That allowed schnorkel speeds up to 10/11 knots. With out the contribution of air power in the ASW war , the kill rates on U-Boats with would likely be cut in half.

While a schnorkeling boat was still detectable - the radar distance was feeble compared to a surfaced U-Boats at about 1/10 sweep area. However in clear seas /days - 'wake sighing' was possible, but this reduced sweep rates to 1/3 normal. Until the Wallies can increase their airpower by order of magnitude -the kill rates against U-Boats should still be cut in half.

There would be attendant loss of time on station. Type IX endurance on schnorkel would be 8000nm @ 6 knots [1333 hours] compared to 12000 nm @ 12 knots [1000hrs]. If the N Atlantic is the area of interest you would need 2000-3000nm each way, leaving just 2 to 4 weeks on patrol @ 6 knots . Historically 3-4 weeks on patrol @ 12 knots was likely for the Type IX . Sounds the same but a 12 knot U-Boat can at least sweep for convoys and chase down and over take a slow convoy , while 6 knots can't catch anything. A likely hybrid would require U-Boat transit at schnorkel speed and then sweep and attack on surface- which means air ASW could still contribute to U-Boat kills.

Something more is needed.
That and the lack of time on surface spotting anything or having the speed to get into position.
 
That and the lack of time on surface spotting anything or having the speed to get into position.

Exactly , so more change is needed. This problem was anticipated prewar by other KM Officers and suggestions were made...but little was done until it was to late to do anything.
 
Exactly , so more change is needed. This problem was anticipated prewar by other KM Officers and suggestions were made...but little was done until it was to late to do anything.

that happened repeatedly. my convoluted point about LW at Kursk was that the service was broken over Med at Tunisia, while development of long range Elektroboot was pursued the smaller coastal Type XXIII Elektroboot was sort of afterthought (as well as any effective mini submarine)

leaving aside making prewar changes once they needed to operate in Black Sea and Med a smaller (transportable overland) u-boat should have been priority. they knew once US entered the war there would be invasion attempts.

even a small number of coastal u-boats, with only some of features of Elektroboot if they appeared in Med prior to Sicily would have been effective?
 

Deleted member 1487

Sure, because you refuse to actually read the maps you post, accept the given strengths, and accept that the Germans were human beings and not automatons capable of endlessly operating for what was approaching two weeks at this point with zero rest, resupply, and refit. Citing the previous track record tends to ignore these facts. The German tank crews since Prokhorovkha had basically been running on pervetine and their supply of those had run out by July 17th.

And yes, they were coming at the flanks. The XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was guarding the left flank of the advance, with the front constituting the II SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps facing to the northeast.
No resupply or replacements? They'd been getting both, but the rest part is a point (though there were pauses in the advance). Thing is they'd do exactly all that and more over longer periods, like say in Barbarossa, during the retreat over the winter of 1942-43, and so on in many other cases. Besides other than the reinforcements coming in on the Soviet side, the majority of Soviet units were in the same situation.

Also the XXXXVIII PC was advancing itself, the flank was the LI AC, which was not facing major Soviet infantry or armor reinforcements. The SS PC and III PC were part of the overall armor advance, not the sole part of it. XXXXVIII PC isn't going to get 200 Panthers (aka all of them in service) and a unit of Tigers to be simply a flank guard.

They were still deploying in the tactical rear, of course their still relatively spread out. But the assertion that once they go into the line they'd hit more then one panzer corps is baseless. They very much could deploy against any individual panzer corps they wished too (or even the flagging LII Infantry Corps on the extreme left). The Germans just withdrew before they could deploy into the line. That they were merely "reinforcing depleted units" is directly contradicted by the order issued to them.
They were to be sent forward according to you, which means 4GTC and 27th Army going against XXXXVIII PC and 1MC+53rd Army against the SS. I didn't say they'd hit more than one PC, just that they'd each hit different ones. Thing is those PC had just smashed entire tank armies at limited cost to themselves and they'd have the strength to sit on the defensive and do it again against much smaller armor units than they had previously faced. It is doubtful that the 4GTC+27th Army could or would go against the extreme right flank given the Soviet practice to that point ramming their armor against German PC to stop their advance and the road situation, as the map really only shows one significant major road leading south from their positions on the 15th, which is aimed directly at the XXXXVIII PC and wouldn't require any significant river crossing, while advancing obliquely to the far west flank would not have that luxury.
How would they not be reinforcing depleted units? Sure they'd be attacking, which was what the shattered Tank Armies had already been doing, they'd be keeping that up, which was an extremely costly effort that only had limited or stopped German forward movement, not actually pushed them back operationally.


LAH and DR would be off to the East, facing their own troubles from the remained of the still unbeaten 5th Guards Tank Army and had exhausted themselves achieving what they did at Prokorovkha as I described. They didn’t have the strength to pull off a repeat. They had fully enmeshed themselves on Soviet AT offensives as they had not yet at Prokhorovka. You might think that the German ubermensch can just shrug off their unit stocks of ammo and fuel running out, literally collapsing from physical exhaustion, and having their equipment on the verge of breaking down an-laser, but that just indicates your existence in OKH fantasy land then the actual reality of the Eastern Front.
Unbeaten 5GTA? That unit was virtually combat ineffective. It was so badly beaten that Stalin rebuked the commander of the unit personally. They had lost (damaged or destroyed) some 600-650 AFVs in couple of days.
If the Soviets are going to throw fresh men and machines into the offensive meat grinder the Germans are going to be on the defensive, so Soviet AT defenses aren't going to be a significant factor. Where are you getting that they weren't getting more ammo? Resupply is covered here:
https://books.google.com/books?id=A...#v=onepage&q=artillery ammo use kursk&f=false

Repairs were happening to machines and they were getting more. I'm not arguing that the German advance would be continuing, that was already effectively stopped; likely they'd be pushed back a bit by the fresh Soviet troops. Also it isn't as if there weren't repeated historical examples of troops fighting continuously for weeks without significant break, like say during Barbarossa, which was months of advance and constant combat, with low supplies yet still massive victories. Kursk was relatively much lower intensity than say the Bialystok-Minsk pocket battle and Smolensk immediately after, not to mention a hell of a lot shorter distance to travel.

If the German panzers were so worn down that Soviet infantry armies could prevent them from advancing, then they would be too exhausted to withstand a concentrated Soviet counterattack by that point.
Its not that the machines themselves were worn down, rather than the masses of infantry and artillery would stiffen the lines so that any further advance into fortified belts wouldn't be possible given the relative lack of infantry in the Panzer Corps. Soviet infantry advancing on the attack was something quite different, as the casualty rates during Soviet attack periods in the Kursk fighting showed. Soviet casualties were at their worst when they attacked, the least bad when they were sitting in their fortified belts and letting the defenses absorb the attacking force. At Prokhorovka as an example the Soviets attacked not just with a tank army, but multiple infantry units against a single Panzer corps and lost over 6 times as many men despite grossly outnumbering the Germans.


The 4th Panzer Armies air support was largely being negated by having to focus on the VVS, hence it's overall miniscule impact on the battle, and it’s artillery support was increasingly outweighed by that of the Soviet forces now pouring into the region plus the supply problems of trying to get ammo forward past threatened flanks and through a penetration corridor under constant artillery fire.
Yet in Glantz's accounts the Soviets mention repeatedly the heavy German air attacks; as it was the Luftwaffe was generating double the sorties of the Soviets while suffering a fraction of the loss rate (~0.7% vs 4.95%). Soviet air superiority was only achieved on the Northern Flank, while in the South the Germans maintained it during their offensive. For example the Soviets committed nearly all their available air support to the 5th GTA at Prokhorovka...which didn't really seem to help:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk
Vatutin ordered a powerful counterattack by the 5th Guards, 2nd Guards, 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, in all fielding about 593 tanks and self-propelled guns and supported by most of the Front's available air power, which aimed to defeat the II SS Panzer Corps and therefore expose the right flank of XLVIII Panzer Corps. Simultaneously, the 6th Tank Corps was to attack the XLVIII Panzer Corps and prevent it from breaking through to the free Soviet rear. Although intended to be concerted, the counterattack turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks due to poor coordination.[245]The 10th Tank Corps' attack began on the dawn of 8 July but they ran straight into the antitank fire of the 2nd and 3rd SS Divisions, losing most of its forces. Later that morning, the 5th Guards Tank Corps' attack was repelled by the 3rd SS Division. The 2nd Tank Corps joined in the afternoon and was also repelled.[245] The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, masked by the forest around the village Gostishchevo, 16 km (10 mi) north of Belgorod, with its presence unknown to the II SS Panzer Corps, advanced towards the 167th Infantry Division. But it was detected by German air reconnaissance just before the attack had materialized, and was subsequently decimated by German ground-attack aircraft armed with MK 103 anti-tank cannons and at least 50 tanks were destroyed.[246][247] This marked the first time in military history an attacking tank formation had been defeated by air power alone.[248][249] Although a fiasco, the Soviet counterattack succeeded in stalling the advance of the II SS Panzer Corps throughout the day.[250][249]

The Germans also used 300% more artillery ammo during Kursk than the Soviets did. (The link with the info is unfortunately down due to site upgrades)



Manstein was the one arguing for a continuation of Citadel, which would implicitly include AG Center continuing it’s own offensive. He managed to get Hitler to accept a watered down version limited to Army Group South that, due to the panzers being spent after Prokhorovka, went nowhere before it too was quickly called off and the panzers withdrawn.
Manstein's proposal was only to have the Southern pincer continue, as that was his area of command and it was clear the Northern Pincer had been stopped and was already retreating due to Soviet attacks against Orel. His goal was the continued attrition of Soviet armor, which would have happened had he not been ordered to pull back due to Soviet counteroffensive plans, but that simply meant a stalled offensive and fighting off Soviet attacks from there on out.
 
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