When the key ingredients in fertizer and explosives are one and the same hunger is unfortunately a weapon by default.Certainly - Weaponizing hunger and starving civilians though, that one is on the UK.
When the key ingredients in fertizer and explosives are one and the same hunger is unfortunately a weapon by default.Certainly - Weaponizing hunger and starving civilians though, that one is on the UK.
The USA does that in the proper venue, Figure Eight Demolition Derby.
Behold, the roundabout near where I use to live, they've changed it now but it wasn't called The Magic Roundabout for nothing.
When the key ingredients in fertizer and explosives are one and the same hunger is unfortunately a weapon by default.
Russia and Austria-Hungary did as well, as shown in Poland.Germany chose supplying armies above feeding civilians.
Last off topic comment from me (SORRY!)
Behold, the roundabout near where I use to live, they've changed it now but it wasn't called The Magic Roundabout for nothing.
Absolutely.Certainly - Weaponizing hunger and starving civilians though, that one is on the UK.
Behold, the roundabout near where I use to live, they've changed it now but it wasn't called The Magic Roundabout for nothing.
The other one is Swindon - which is more a modern art installation IMOIs that near Hemel Hempstead? I think I've been on that!
There's a couple of big history making mistakes in that period. Moltke could have tried to take troops from 5th or 7th Armies for East Prussia, leaving the 5 divisions in Belgium to be moved to the Marne. He could also have started moving troops west after the failure of Mortange, more than 2 weeks before they did ITOL and without the big losses arising from Grand Couronné. That sounds like a win in the Race to the Sea to me.
The attacks on Nancy were enough that Castelnau asked permission to abandon the fortress.
Joffre replied "If 2nd army withdrew, it would be separated from the 1st army and both destroyed piecemeal. If 1st army retired to keep contact, Belfort would have to be abandoned and both armies enveloped"
Far from being a mistake, it came close to winning the war.
As for the five divisions, if the divisions were taken from the attack on Nancy instead, the pressure on 1st and second army would have been reduced and allowed the French to move forces towards the Rhine. There are also serious questions as to the logistics of moving them to the Marne.
That's what the Germans thought would happen. If you ever looked at their plan, not the ISOTs kicked around here, that's about right.
You're underestimating the success the Western campaign had in transforming the situation. The French took heavy losses on the Frontiers, lost the vital iron reserves and the Germans could establish themselves in some of the best defensive positions in Europe.
They also managed to lure the Russians into East Prussia and destroy the 1st and 2nd Armies.
Since the real German plan is not to occupy Luxembourg but stand on the Saar, they would have given up the Lorraine fields without a fight. Even if they try and hold the fields, the Germans will need to deploy about 56 divisions not the 40 claimed. That gives them nothing to send East (a net of seven divisions) which will accomplish less than nothing as the Russians avoid Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes.
No, much of the planning is fairly accurate. Moltke correctly believed that only victory in the West can be decisive and that victory must be won in the opening weeks.
His plan would have worked if the Italians had shown up. Since the Eastern plans also assumed the Italians and the Romanians Ally with Germany, it's easy to see where it falls apart as well
Umm... you do realize, that morale is a very real thing in warfare, and that defender has a real advantage in it? It is much easier to motivate people to defend their homes than to conduct offensive through heavily fortified borders to impose harsh terms on somebody. The physical and material situation matters only so much - if the Germans don't show any inclination to push to the Channel, British and French voters won't want to get pushed through the meat grinder, even if the French get to keep their heavy industry.
@Fulton 44 explained this pretty well IMO, so I'll quote him.
I agree with 3, but partially disagree with 2,4 and 5 and completely disagree with 1.
1, 2) My entire argument is that the prospect of a quick war in West was a pipedream that seduced German military and doomed their war effort. Even if you are technically right about 2, the chances were so small that it wasn't worth it to be even seriously considered.
4) I'd say this is not true, either - the border is heavily fortified, and it was extremely difficult for the Germans to advance in France, despite their operational superiority. It would be a massive grind for France & Britain even in the best case. More likely, they would get bogged down for years.
5) How much is "too much"? Sure, Germany can't try reverse Schlieffen and leave just two armies to West. But defending the Western border with 4-5 armies, while going on offence in East with the rest should be doable. I guess this is the question that determines if your core claim 1 is true or false - if Germany can defend West more or less indefinitely with 4-5 armies, a long war is not a problem.
Anytime soon doesn't mean not at all and also see aboveI'm not an expert by any means, but I have understood from other threads that France & Britain were unlikely to be able to break through anytime soon. Maybe somebody can correct me if I'm wrong?
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Maybe if you mean a total victory, where the Germans march to Paris and onto the Channel. But they didn't really need that. Defeating Russia and then negotiating a peace in West would have been enough for them.
Sorry late reply
Firstly you still haven't answered the geography question, or the political question instead moving on to entente morale in this new war
So on morale the reality is that once fighting starts the nationalism on either side will kind of override qualms about why they are there. "King and country" (or Kaiser and country, emperor and country, Tsar and country come to that) was still potent incentives at this point.
Or put this way if not being invaded is really going to be a huge negative factor in ongoing morale how was it the Germans were able to keep fighting for so long?
Ok but since the German strategy for decades had been to fight and win a quick war your argument fails to address the basic reality of the situation.
Remember part of the reason why the German military was so keen to go in 1914 is precisely because they thought they saw the window of opportunity closing for their plan's success. Not just with Russian modernisation but with French developments as well (and domestic political changes were an issue too)
Well like I said two points about this, your talking about two industrial powers concentrating all their efforts here against a spilt German force. Also I actaully suspect that Ironically the French and British will go through Belgium! Since there will already be war.
And here we get back to the main point a long war is a problem. because Germany is surrounded and in economic terms out matched, it can't win a war of attrition here
Anytime soon doesn't mean not at all and also see above
The problem with this is the shadow of 1871 looms large in German minds as much as French. That's the metric they are measuring against. For domestic political reasons (as well as economic reasons and generally wanting to limit damage) they want a short glorious victory*.
Thing is we can test your theory, if what you said was true why didn't they seek to negotiate in the west in 1917 when they had won against the Russians, especially as considering they were sitting on a lot French territory they were in a stronger position to negotiate from?
Ironically if swap the direction it would work better, a a quick victory in the west against France would mean they could more easily force Russia to negotiate.
1). Russia will know it's big trouble with no Western front to split German concentration. Not to mention it was largely being economically propped up by France and Britain.
2). Russia can give up large chunks of Eastern Europe and still be Russia i.e. there's a range of option where Germany can clearly win and take home the glorious spoils of victory but Russia can still survive largely intact.
3). America if far less likely to back** Russia if France and the UK have been brought to terms, than they are to back France and the UK if Russia has been brought to terms
There's another factor for wanting a fast win in the west. Britain.
1), Germany does not plan on fighting France and Britain in the west, so having to fight Britain as well not only was a nasty shock but only increases the need for a quick win
2). Britain does not have a huge standing army it's going to take time for them to arrive in force again making a quick win better
There are other more ancillary benefits as well, a quick victory in the west and bringing France to terms likely increases the chances of Italy coming in with the CP
*I mean everyone wants a short glorious victory but there are specific reasons here
**weather that's just economically or militarily as well
I did not address geography, because my argument is that it does not matter. Having to fight on two fronts is a problem for Central Powers, but it is a problem they managed for years in OTL, so what is there to address?
Morale is basically same thing as political question. If enthusiasm for the war (ie. morale) wanes in French and British publics, that will cause political problems for their rulers, as they are democracies.
As for why Germany managed to fight for so long, I guess a lot has to do with Germany not being a democracy at the time? Plus they had drummed up nationalism far more aggressively than France and Britain.
Pardon my sarcasm, but OTL course of events failed to address the basic reality of the situation. As has been said, everybody expected a quick war, and they got a several year grind.
This might have been the reason why Germans chose the Western plan, but hindsight still proves that they were wrong. And as such, their planning cannot be used as an argument for why Eastern plan would have been impossible.
In OTL they also concentrated all their efforts against a split German force - and barely managed to keep them at bay. Offence is fundamentally much harder, so defending on a smaller front on West while moving a couple of armies to East shouldn't have enabled a breakthrough for the British and French anytime soon.
Maybe Britain and France would have been able to eventually grind Germany and A-H down over the years if they were bloodthirsty enough to take on them no matter the cost - but that is doubtful given they were democracies at the time, and as such subject to public opinion. Also, remember that in this case they would also be facing an A-H that is still functional, while the Balkan front likely would have collapsed what with German focusing East.
This might very well be the reason why they chose the Schlieffen plan - but they were still wrong, and as such this is not an argument for this discussion.
IIRC even Moltke admitted later that they should have gone East - I'll try to find a source for this.
Sure, a quick victory in West WOULD have been the best end result for Germany if they actually managed to pull it off - but I'd say it was unlikely, making it a pipedream.
As for why Germany didn't negotiate with France and Britain in 1917, I don't know.
Not sure what you suggesting here TBH, but like I said they were much better placed to extract territorial adjustments from France OTL since they were already sitting on French soil.Didn't they try to go for total victory, or at least to extract some territorial adjustments from the French instead of accepting status quo antebellum? So they would have had to adjust their expectations by quite a bit - which should have been an easier thing to sell to their public in an Eastern strategy.
As for why Germany didn't negotiate with France and Britain in 1917, I don't know. Didn't they try to go for total victory, or at least to extract some territorial adjustments from the French instead of accepting status quo antebellum? So they would have had to adjust their expectations by quite a bit - which should have been an easier thing to sell to their public in an Eastern strategy.
like that ?...
This might very well be the reason why they chose the Schlieffen plan - but they were still wrong, and as such this is not an argument for this discussion. IIRC even Moltke admitted later that they should have gone East - I'll try to find a source for this.
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The reality is as the computer figures out in the movie war games the only winning move is not to play. Germany had no winning move.