"Russia First" German strategy in ww1?

A few takeaways I've gotten from when this question has been asked before:
-logistics would restrain a german advance east, even if they planned for it. However, it is reasonable to assume the germans and Austrians do well against the Russians, it will just take time.
time.
-France Is significantly stronger without having so much important industrial area occupied.
-Austria is significantly stronger without losing the bulk of their officers in the OTL Russian offensive
-the German-French border is well guarded and will be a struggle for France to advance into even if they outnumber german forces there significantly
-Britain probably enters the war eventually without Belgium. But they'll need a suitable excuse first, which could take time, and if it takes long enough the british public could lose appetite for war after seeing modern warfare conditions.
-France may invade Belgium to attack germany. If so, it's unlikely Britain will defend Belgium against France. But it would make Britiah neutrality more likely.

A different war. Neither side is guaranteed to win, though the central powers are probably better off than OTL (especially Austria-Hungary).
I basically agree. A great deal depends upon whether the UK joins the war and, if so, what level of enthusiasm they bring to the party. If they stay out, a long war is not necessarily to the disadvantage of the CP. UK participation also affects Italy and the US.
One likely scenario would be - 1. a bloody stalemate in the West close to the existing border, 2. a few striking victories in the East adding up to earlier and larger Russian casualties, 3. CP occupation of Belgrade but stopping at that point, 3. Romania joining the CP. Then - maybe even as early as 1915 - an armistice with 1. status quo ante in the West, 2. the creation of Polish, Baltic, Finn and Ukraine buffer states in the East with German princes as monarchs, minor adjustments to the Ottoman/Russian frontier, 3. Russian reparations, and 4. the creation of a "Council of Europe" to try to head off future conflicts.
The kind of war we are discussing has a completely different effect on the populations of the UK and France - no rape of Belgium, no threat to Paris, no Edith Cavell, no Germans on the English Channel - just a frustrating and futile French offensive into Lorraine which bogs down with very heavy casualties. It will be much harder to incite the French population (and probably impossible to incite the British population) to a high level of enthusiasm for this endeavor. With governments that are popularly elected, the public's view of the war becomes very relevant. Sometime in late 1915 or early 1916, the sentiment to wrap things up and call it quits may become overwhelming.
The Russians will take more casualties and lose more land earlier and they will not have any significant successes in the balance. Because of the incompetence of their leadership they may blunder on but there may be some advisors to the Tsar who begin the perceive the danger of regime change. There may also be less of an appetite on the part of the French to continue to loan them money.
 

Riain

Banned
Letter Commander-in-Chief July 28 (August 10th.), Number 345 (pcs. Front Lida).
"It has been quite reliable data - Germany has sent its main forces to its western border against France, leaving against us a smaller part of their forces. Although these forces have not yet been clarified with certainty, it is possible to assume that in Prussia Germany left four corps (I, XX, XVII, and V (registered in Silesia at Kalisz, Bendzin and Czestochowa also VI corps troops mentioned*) with several Res. divisions and landv. units. Moreover, the parts of the Konigsberg garrison are not combat troops...."*added by me from source GolovinTherefore ... IOTL the russians assumed at 4 (active) Corps in eastern Prussia, and a possible thouth rather doubted other Corps in Upper Silesia.
Interesting :
No mention of the reserve Corps at all, only some not much (actually none at all) detailed division and Landwehr units.Similar to the french these troops were more or less ingnored as not "combat worthy".
The "not combat troops" of Königsberg - later named 16th Landwehr division - proofed rather troublesome already at Gumbinnen

Maybe also noteworthy : the date of the letter.
By then according to Golovin and Dobrorolski the decission of Variant "A" or "G" had already been made because it HAD to be made already at night from M+7 to M+8, when the troopstrains reached the first critical junctions-

The Russians figuring out by August 10 what they actually faced more or less is pretty quick given the intelligence resources of the day, however I believe their pre-war intelligence on which they made their plans assumed 15-25 divisions.

I believe that while Russia had Plans 19A/G in 1912 they didn't update the G version in 1913 although they didn't actually drop it. In 1914 they had a new plan based on them standing up 2 new field armies, this was a hybrid between Plan 19 and the looming change to Plan 20. Much like Plan 19 it had 2 armies against EP on week 2 and 4 armies against AH on week 4 but differed by having 2 Armies against German Silesia on week 6. However in the event this was changed while the trains were moving to basically enact both A and G of Plan 19, sending an army to both EP and AH.

M+7/M+8 is very early to have to decide to change direction of these 3rd wave armies, how late could it have been done? I have a vague notion that M+ 2 weeks is too late but it could be done at M+10 days or so?
 
You conflating two things

The geography point is about why Germany more than most needs to quickly win

You political landscape point is based on a-priori assumptions, and you haven't answered my points about that.

Umm... you do realize, that morale is a very real thing in warfare, and that defender has a real advantage in it? It is much easier to motivate people to defend their homes than to conduct offensive through heavily fortified borders to impose harsh terms on somebody. The physical and material situation matters only so much - if the Germans don't show any inclination to push to the Channel, British and French voters won't want to get pushed through the meat grinder, even if the French get to keep their heavy industry.

@Fulton 44 explained this pretty well IMO, so I'll quote him.

The kind of war we are discussing has a completely different effect on the populations of the UK and France - no rape of Belgium, no threat to Paris, no Edith Cavell, no Germans on the English Channel - just a frustrating and futile French offensive into Lorraine which bogs down with very heavy casualties. It will be much harder to incite the French population (and probably impossible to incite the British population) to a high level of enthusiasm for this endeavor. With governments that are popularly elected, the public's view of the war becomes very relevant. Sometime in late 1915 or early 1916, the sentiment to wrap things up and call it quits may become overwhelming.


Fair enough

To summarise (but see also previous posts) and to add to my last point on the last post:

1). Germany can only win this if it quickly beats one opposing side and then can swap to the other

2). there is a chance it can get that first quick victory in the west against France

3). while it can beat Russia, it can't do it quickly.

4). A lot of the factors that makes Russia hard to defeat quickly also make it hard for Russia to defeat Germany quickly. This is less true for France & Britain

5). If Germany shifts too much of it's "weight" to the east first it risks losing or suffering irreparable damage in the West and at that point it doesn't matter how close to defeating Russia it is

I agree with 3, but partially disagree with 2,4 and 5 and completely disagree with 1.

1, 2) My entire argument is that the prospect of a quick war in West was a pipedream that seduced German military and doomed their war effort. Even if you are technically right about 2, the chances were so small that it wasn't worth it to be even seriously considered.

4) I'd say this is not true, either - the border is heavily fortified, and it was extremely difficult for the Germans to advance in France, despite their operational superiority. It would be a massive grind for France & Britain even in the best case. More likely, they would get bogged down for years.

5) How much is "too much"? Sure, Germany can't try reverse Schlieffen and leave just two armies to West. But defending the Western border with 4-5 armies, while going on offence in East with the rest should be doable. I guess this is the question that determines if your core claim 1 is true or false - if Germany can defend West more or less indefinitely with 4-5 armies, a long war is not a problem.

I'm not an expert by any means, but I have understood from other threads that France & Britain were unlikely to be able to break through anytime soon. Maybe somebody can correct me if I'm wrong?
 

Aphrodite

Banned
@Joku_ Going East can only force the Russians to retreat to their East. They will never advance into Poland and allow the Germans and Austrians to close the pincers behind them.

Gorlice Tarnow is an East first strategy. All it does is have the Germans chase the Russians around Poland while Britain and France build up their strength. The Russians come back and attack again in 1916.

Morale isn't a problem for any of the powers. Only when defeat becomes obvious do the armies unravel. Russia decides they would rather have a fight amongst themselves than with the Germans.

The Western campaign would have worked if the Italians had joined. The Eastern plans called for the Italians to free up 12 German divisions as well. A German Eastern attack will only have maybe 10 extra divisions. They aren't going to do much
 

Aphrodite

Banned
The Russians figuring out by August 10 what they actually faced more or less is pretty quick given the intelligence resources of the day, however I believe their pre-war intelligence on which they made their plans assumed 15-25 divisions.

I believe that while Russia had Plans 19A/G in 1912 they didn't update the G version in 1913 although they didn't actually drop it. In 1914 they had a new plan based on them standing up 2 new field armies, this was a hybrid between Plan 19 and the looming change to Plan 20. Much like Plan 19 it had 2 armies against EP on week 2 and 4 armies against AH on week 4 but differed by having 2 Armies against German Silesia on week 6. However in the event this was changed while the trains were moving to basically enact both A and G of Plan 19, sending an army to both EP and AH.

M+7/M+8 is very early to have to decide to change direction of these 3rd wave armies, how late could it have been done? I have a vague notion that M+ 2 weeks is too late but it could be done at M+10 days or so?
The Russians had pretty accurate estimates of German forces. It's easy since deployment used railroads, what train station they were heading towards is obvious.

Plan 19 allowed for switching up to M9 because they felt they could detect it. The decision to change plans could only be made by the Tsar. Since by M9, the Germans haven't invaded France or Belgium, their intentions would be obvious.

These are deployment, not operational plans. The Russians would not move out of their forward bases until M15.

How quickly plans can change? Look at France. After their defeat on the frontier, they decided a completely new strategy, redeployed their armies and fought on the Marne.

That no plan survived contact with the enemy is a truism well known to all Generals. They will apply basic concepts and strategies to any unforseen development. Any strategy based on the Entente not noticing the changed deployment and adjusting is not coming from the German general staff
 
1, 2) My entire argument is that the prospect of a quick war in West was a pipedream that seduced German military and doomed their war effort. Even if you are technically right about 2, the chances were so small that it wasn't worth it to be even seriously considered.

4) I'd say this is not true, either - the border is heavily fortified, and it was extremely difficult for the Germans to advance in France, despite their operational superiority. It would be a massive grind for France & Britain even in the best case. More likely, they would get bogged down for years.

5) How much is "too much"? Sure, Germany can't try reverse Schlieffen and leave just two armies to West. But defending the Western border with 4-5 armies, while going on offence in East with the rest should be doable. I guess this is the question that determines if your core claim 1 is true or false - if Germany can defend West more or less indefinitely with 4-5 armies, a long war is not a problem.

I'm not an expert by any means, but I have understood from other threads that France & Britain were unlikely to be able to break through anytime soon. Maybe somebody can correct me if I'm wrong?

If we assume this is all apparent to German leadership, i.e. no quick victory is possible, that time has passed. Then the diplomatic run up to war becomes a lot more different than OTL. Germany really won't want war now under these more painful circumstances.

1) As per OTL, Russian mobilization, triggers things. Germany mobilizes, brings forces to the Russian frontier.
2) But unlike OTL, Germany doesn't really have to DOW anybody right away (there is no ticking clock on finishing a western campaign within a certain time)
3) Austrian leadership will mobilize, perhaps leaving 2nd army south, ultimately to occupy Belgrade. Perhaps encouraged by the Germans to settle things quickly.
4) But here it is up to the Russians to DOW somebody, and if and when.
5) In the meantime the Germans can still buy stuff on world markets, mobilize reservists worldwide, bring home merchants, fit out raiders.

The advantage of east first is that it gives better diplomatic leverage to the Austrians/Germans, the Russians have to make the decision to declare war and cross the Austrian border, in the meantime the Austrians bombard and occupy Belgrade with 2nd army remaining south, the Austrians settle when they think they got the agreement they need out of Serbia.

If war happens anyway, a settlement might be reached after the French are repulsed and the Germans win a frontier battle, and the Austrians occupy Belgrade (perhaps the trickiest part as per OTL).

OR later on if a Russian shell shortage happens as per OTL.
 
Last edited:
The Western campaign would have worked if the Italians had joined.

Well...

1) The Italians joining was never likely anyway, and it's foolish to build any German plan of campaign on that eventuality.
2) 12 Italian divisions don't solve German logistical problems. Worse: The Germans were going to have to supply them.
 

Riain

Banned
My entire argument is that the prospect of a quick war in West was a pipedream that seduced German military and doomed their war effort.

It's pretty well known that the Moltke plan was poorly executed, a few obvious things could have changed the result considerably, however even with OTLs failure it put Germany in a very good position to conduct a long war. Taking a huge part of France's industry, coal and iron resources, best farmland and 1/4 of the population while providing forward naval bases for operations against Britain sounds like a long war wish list.

All an East First offensive would do is duplicate OTLs September 1915 result 6 months early, which certainly didn't knock Russia out of the war. It also leaves France and Britain vastly more powerful, which makes is a massive net negative compared to OTL let alone what was possible IOTL with better execution of the western offensive.
 

Aphrodite

Banned
Well...

1) The Italians joining was never likely anyway, and it's foolish to build any German plan of campaign on that eventuality.
2) 12 Italian divisions don't solve German logistical problems. Worse: The Germans were going to have to supply them.
Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance and German war plans assumed that Italy would participate. The assumption is the same for both war plans:

1. That the Italians would pin down 6 French divisions in the Alps. This is the French plan so they were accurate.

2. That the 3rd Italian Army would arrive on the lower Rhine. The two corps that Moltke sent East were supposed to be replaced by the Italians

In the Western campaign, the six French divisions of the Army of the Alps played a decisive role in the Battle of the Marne.

In an Eastern strategy, they Germans will hold back so the 4-4 becomes 5-3. They also need to keep 6 divisions on the Belgian border until Belgian intentions are clear.

In reality, the Germans would need 56 not 40 on the Western border.

There are scenarios were Italy would join. FJ adventure wasn't one of them. The failure to insist on Austria honoring it's commitments to Italy is the fatal flaw of the July crisis
 

Aphrodite

Banned
@Riain @Joku_

The Germans do have victory scenarios in a western attack- Italy joining, French seeking refuge in Meubege, a pilot being shot down at Mons, the 5th Army being cut off at Guide or Castelnau withdrawing from Nancy.

A long war can only be won with Britain neutral and the Ottomans in. Neither can be assured on August 1 when the decision must be made.

It's not that the Western campaign is great-Joffre should have easily parried it and all French plans before Plan XVII would have. It does put pressure on Joffre so he does make those mistakes.
 

Riain

Banned
@Riain @Joku_

The Germans do have victory scenarios in a western attack- Italy joining, French seeking refuge in Meubege, a pilot being shot down at Mons, the 5th Army being cut off at Guide or Castelnau withdrawing from Nancy.

A long war can only be won with Britain neutral and the Ottomans in. Neither can be assured on August 1 when the decision must be made.

It's not that the Western campaign is great-Joffre should have easily parried it and all French plans before Plan XVII would have. It does put pressure on Joffre so he does make those mistakes.

I believe the western offensive is by far Germany's best option in 1914. It is the only option for them to inflict a war winning blow using their fast mobilisation and tactical superiority and it's the best chance to get into a long war winning position with the capture of resources and geography.

Sure Germany could make big advances in the East, but big deal, they wouldn't go close to doing what the offensive in France did even poorly executed.
 

Aphrodite

Banned
I believe the western offensive is by far Germany's best option in 1914. It is the only option for them to inflict a war winning blow using their fast mobilisation and tactical superiority and it's the best chance to get into a long war winning position with the capture of resources and geography.

Sure Germany could make big advances in the East, but big deal, they wouldn't go close to doing what the offensive in France did even poorly executed.
Of course it's the only winning plan, that's why they scrapped the other one. The Eastern was supposed to be used only in a war with Russia alone. That sounds strange but in the 1890s, it wasn't. A Russian attack on the straits , meaning war with Britain,the Ottomans and the Triple Alliance could easily see France sitting out.

It's not until 1912, that Germany accepted that this was impossible.

I find it amazing that people think there's an alternative. The Germans planned this war for forty years. We should assume they get it right unless proven otherwise.

Instead, we get assumption piled upon assumption, the insistence that France and Russia make no changes and Germany accomplishes some grand feat of arms far in excess of what they do our time.

Reality would be Germany defeated in six weeks just like the Germans gamed it
 
Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance and German war plans assumed that Italy would participate.

I'm honestly puzzled by your comment here. Whatever had been the case when the treaty was signed, Italian membership in the Alliance was . . . quite nominal well before 1914, and everyone in Berlin knew it, alas. The fact that the Alliance was defensive in its terms merely gave Salandra the legal excuse to do what he and his government were minded to do anyway.

The Germans planned this war for forty years. We should assume they get it right unless proven otherwise.

Well, except for the fact that they, uh, lost. The war was a lost cause even before they were stupid enough to provoke American belligerency.

That tends to happen, though, when you go to war with coalitions with markedly superior war-making power and the ability to deliver it as combat power to the points of contact.

ww1 alliance industrial power Kennedy 258.png
 

Aphrodite

Banned
I'm honestly puzzled by your comment here. Whatever had been the case when the treaty was signed, Italian membership in the Alliance was . . . quite nominal well before 1914, and everyone in Berlin knew it, alas. The fact that the Alliance was defensive in its terms merely gave Salandra the legal excuse to do what he and his government were minded to do anyway.
Not really. France and Italy had poor relations at time and Italy participated in war planning with the Triple Alliance. Italy and Romania had been intregal parts of the German alliance system.

A Franci-Russian attack on Germany is likely to find Britain neutral and Italy allied. Austria was pursuing an anti Italian as much as anti Russian Balkan policy.

Italy, like Britain, thrived in the prewar diplomatic environment.

The French thought it serious enough to deploy six divisions to the Alps.
Well, except for the fact that they, uh, lost. The war was a lost cause even before they were stupid enough to provoke American belligerency.

That tends to happen, though, when you go to war with coalitions with markedly superior war-making power and the ability to deliver it as combat power to the points of contact.

View attachment 697026
Except the Western campaign does have victory scenarios. I gave you four off the top of my head. There are no victory scenarios in an Eastern strategy. None, zero, zip nada.

The disparity in economics is just one more reason to go for broke on a Western campaign.

In fact, the Germans are almost certain to lose in a couple of months at best.

The Kaiser was right in seeking to keep the peace. It's the greatest trajedy that FJ played him in 1914
 

Riain

Banned
Of course it's the only winning plan, that's why they scrapped the other one. The Eastern was supposed to be used only in a war with Russia alone. That sounds strange but in the 1890s, it wasn't. A Russian attack on the straits , meaning war with Britain,the Ottomans and the Triple Alliance could easily see France sitting out.

It's not until 1912, that Germany accepted that this was impossible.

I find it amazing that people think there's an alternative. The Germans planned this war for forty years. We should assume they get it right unless proven otherwise.

Instead, we get assumption piled upon assumption, the insistence that France and Russia make no changes and Germany accomplishes some grand feat of arms far in excess of what they do our time.

Reality would be Germany defeated in six weeks just like the Germans gamed it

The German General Staff were the best available, they outperformed at the Tactical and Operational level all the other General Staffs.
 

Riain

Banned
I'm honestly puzzled by your comment here. Whatever had been the case when the treaty was signed, Italian membership in the Alliance was . . . quite nominal well before 1914, and everyone in Berlin knew it, alas. The fact that the Alliance was defensive in its terms merely gave Salandra the legal excuse to do what he and his government were minded to do anyway.



Well, except for the fact that they, uh, lost. The war was a lost cause even before they were stupid enough to provoke American belligerency.

That tends to happen, though, when you go to war with coalitions with markedly superior war-making power and the ability to deliver it as combat power to the points of contact.

View attachment 697026

Germany's strength was in the Tactical and Operational sphere, in contrast with the British who were supreme in the Strategic and Political spheres. The problem was that the British could and did drag their Operational and Tactical performance up during wartime but Germany proved totally unable to improve it's political structure and its ability to produce good strategy, indeed the Silent Dictatorship shows how it actually got worse! This is why Germany lost, great Operations and Tactics married to bad declining to hopeless Strategy and Politics can't match great Politics and Strategy married to improving to good Operations and Tactics. This is why so many CP victory ideas and TLs exist but easy/quick Entente victory TLs are rare; its far easier to shuffle a few key people around and redraw a few lines of responsibility than it is to raise and train an effective million man army in less than 2 years.

IIRC that table is from Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. IIRC Kennedy decided that with Britain the Entente had a comfortable but not overwhelming advantage and that things like internal lines of communications reduced the Entente margin of superiority.
 
IIRC that table is from Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. IIRC Kennedy decided that with Britain the Entente had a comfortable but not overwhelming advantage and that things like internal lines of communications reduced the Entente margin of superiority.

That's correct - page 258. Sorry. I should have given the cite on that.

And you are right, Kennedy did note countervailing Central Powers advantages. Still, the larger theme empasized is the self-defeating German pattern of provoking into war an ever growing coalition beyond its strength.
 

Aphrodite

Banned
Sorry, but none of them work. They just don't.
The Western campaign offered the Germans their best shot of victory. It almost worked. The fortunes of war did not favor the Germans.

I don't see what you think the Germans should have done- other than what they did.

Moltke was to come up with the best plan for the situation. He did that. East is stupid.

I gave you several German victory scenarios. What more could he have done?
 
Top