I basically agree. A great deal depends upon whether the UK joins the war and, if so, what level of enthusiasm they bring to the party. If they stay out, a long war is not necessarily to the disadvantage of the CP. UK participation also affects Italy and the US.A few takeaways I've gotten from when this question has been asked before:
-logistics would restrain a german advance east, even if they planned for it. However, it is reasonable to assume the germans and Austrians do well against the Russians, it will just take time.
time.
-France Is significantly stronger without having so much important industrial area occupied.
-Austria is significantly stronger without losing the bulk of their officers in the OTL Russian offensive
-the German-French border is well guarded and will be a struggle for France to advance into even if they outnumber german forces there significantly
-Britain probably enters the war eventually without Belgium. But they'll need a suitable excuse first, which could take time, and if it takes long enough the british public could lose appetite for war after seeing modern warfare conditions.
-France may invade Belgium to attack germany. If so, it's unlikely Britain will defend Belgium against France. But it would make Britiah neutrality more likely.
A different war. Neither side is guaranteed to win, though the central powers are probably better off than OTL (especially Austria-Hungary).
One likely scenario would be - 1. a bloody stalemate in the West close to the existing border, 2. a few striking victories in the East adding up to earlier and larger Russian casualties, 3. CP occupation of Belgrade but stopping at that point, 3. Romania joining the CP. Then - maybe even as early as 1915 - an armistice with 1. status quo ante in the West, 2. the creation of Polish, Baltic, Finn and Ukraine buffer states in the East with German princes as monarchs, minor adjustments to the Ottoman/Russian frontier, 3. Russian reparations, and 4. the creation of a "Council of Europe" to try to head off future conflicts.
The kind of war we are discussing has a completely different effect on the populations of the UK and France - no rape of Belgium, no threat to Paris, no Edith Cavell, no Germans on the English Channel - just a frustrating and futile French offensive into Lorraine which bogs down with very heavy casualties. It will be much harder to incite the French population (and probably impossible to incite the British population) to a high level of enthusiasm for this endeavor. With governments that are popularly elected, the public's view of the war becomes very relevant. Sometime in late 1915 or early 1916, the sentiment to wrap things up and call it quits may become overwhelming.
The Russians will take more casualties and lose more land earlier and they will not have any significant successes in the balance. Because of the incompetence of their leadership they may blunder on but there may be some advisors to the Tsar who begin the perceive the danger of regime change. There may also be less of an appetite on the part of the French to continue to loan them money.