Remember the Texas! The United States in World War II (an alternate history)

CalBear

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I think that's a good point but in my belief internment will happen. Hopefully this doesn't sound too political but with Covid and the increase in racism that followed right now in 2020 and 2021 then what can we expect from people in the 1940s.
The scale of the Interment was 100% the result of of one U.S. officer, Major (later Colonel) Karl Bendesten, and his somewhat less racist but equally culpable commander, Lt. General John L DeWitt (it says a lot about Dewitt, that as an, at the time, 43 year Regular Army veteran THREE STAR GENERAL that he allowed a National Guard Major to browbeat him into balling the Constitution up and tossing in the trash can). Bendesten LITERALLY stated that the "one drop of blood" rules should be used in determining who should be interned.

Bastard should have spent his declining years making big rocks into little rocks while serving a life sentence at hard labor for giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
 
Couldn't be worse than the relations between China and Stillwell. Stillwell was no better than Mac.
Stillwell I'm fairly certain didn't have real combat experience. I also remember reading somewhere that at one point he pushed for an offensive in Burma that devastated the armies under his command causing him to flee.
 
As the OP noted they are seen as scouting units to act as a tripwire to detect any planned attacks rather than to fight battles , thing about the Panama Canal is that it can swing ships quickly to the Pacific ( and the RN will point out there is not a lot most of those battleships can do in the Atlantic anyway due to a lack of targets so I'd expect most to switch back pretty soon , the whole plan reeks of more PR than long term)

I was thinking that myself. What are BBs going to do in the Atlantic at this period. The US is nowhere ready for an amphibious invasion anywhere in Africa and the KM is basically a lot of U-boats and a bunch of rubber ducks. It is a destroyer war there.
 
Wouldn’t the amount of men and material involved be enough of a deterrent for a Formosa invasion? Reading up on Operation Causeway, it sounds like Formosa would involve over 500k troops including logistical support. Since Formosa was a colony of Japan it wouldn’t be a leap in logic to assume that the fighting would be similar to Saipan or Tarawa (or TTL’s equivalent). Whereas the Philippines are occupied territory that sounds like a much worse bleeding sore for Japan than OTL. Got to save the leave-behind troops and our Filipino allies too, right?

Just some ideas. Source
it was a bad idea that King seriously pushed but FDR overruled in favor of the Philippines
 
Stillwell I'm fairly certain didn't have real combat experience. I also remember reading somewhere that at one point he pushed for an offensive in Burma that devastated the armies under his command causing him to flee.
He got a DSM in World War I on IV Corps staff as part of the planning staff for the St Mihael offensive.
 
I was thinking that myself. What are BBs going to do in the Atlantic at this period. The US is nowhere ready for an amphibious invasion anywhere in Africa and the KM is basically a lot of U-boats and a bunch of rubber ducks. It is a destroyer war there.
they cannot do much in the Pacific either.... not enough tankers for the carriers AND old battleships

the Standard BBs are also far less fuel efficient than the newer NC/SC classes
 
Actually quite the opposite.

MacArthur is, possibly, the most overrated U.S. Army officer this side of George Armstrong Custer (admittedly there are other strong contenders) by the American general public. Had he spent 1/4 the effort he did burnishing his image on actually fighting the war (including getting rid of the worthless boot lick sycophants who spent the entire war doing nothing but issues glowing press releases) American and Australian losses would have been lower across the entire SW Pacific Theater.

I have an entire pre-packaged MacArthur rant, but most folks around here can likely quote it from memory, so I'll spare the thread yet another push outside of the thread's parameters.
you may have noticed I am not a fan... at least I didn't kill him TTL this time

so far in three time lines... I sacked him and sent him to Panama and eventually West Point and retirement (Gorings Reich), killed him off (Ike in the Pacific) and this time off to China he goes

seriously not a fan of El Supremo (to quote from the Griffith Marine Corps series)
 
you may have noticed I am not a fan... at least I didn't kill him TTL this time

so far in three time lines... I sacked him and sent him to Panama and eventually West Point and retirement (Gorings Reich), killed him off (Ike in the Pacific) and this time off to China he goes

seriously not a fan of El Supremo (to quote from the Griffith Marine Corps series)
Don’t read the Patton in Korea TL then, it may make your blood boil.
 

CalBear

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you may have noticed I am not a fan... at least I didn't kill him TTL this time

so far in three time lines... I sacked him and sent him to Panama and eventually West Point and retirement (Gorings Reich), killed him off (Ike in the Pacific) and this time off to China he goes

seriously not a fan of El Supremo (to quote from the Griffith Marine Corps series)
I'm at

1. Not in the PI, when the war started, put in change of standing up the massive training apparatus for the draftees.
2. Killed him (mortar, he lingered until the war was over)
3. Forced into disgraced retirement.
 

CalBear

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I was thinking that myself. What are BBs going to do in the Atlantic at this period. The US is nowhere ready for an amphibious invasion anywhere in Africa and the KM is basically a lot of U-boats and a bunch of rubber ducks. It is a destroyer war there.
IOTL? Distant escort in case the KM broke out. The Washington was part of the "heavy covering force" for PQ 17 (which is a story into and of itself, and qualifes as one of the great Charlie Foxtrots to come out of the RN during the entire war), she had replaced the North Carolina who had spent a couple months on the same mission. South Dakota, after the damage she sustained during the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (aka 4th Battle of Savo Island) went to Brooklyn Navy Yard for repair/refit. When she came out of the yard she was set North to replace some of the RN Home Fleet heavies (that were assigned to support the Husky Landings) to provide distant cover for the Murmansk convoys, specifically in case the Tirpitz* broke out.

Massachusetts was used as part of the Naval contingent of Operation Torch (where she got into a bit of gunfight with the immobile Jean Bart). Alabama spent four month with the British Home Fleet doing the same mission. Iowa also had a turn at the "The Tirpitz may be out!" merry-go-round before she went to the Pacific.

Tirpitz was, hands down, the best money the KM spent during the war, based on the amount of effort the WAllies put into waiting for her to NOT come out and then to overreact to the point of blind panic if she did.
 
Tirpitz was, hands down, the best money the KM spent during the war, based on the amount of effort the WAllies put into waiting for her to NOT come out and then to overreact to the point of blind panic if she did.
Agreed, there was no reason to go into such a blind panic over one battleship. Even if she got out she could have done only so much damage before an aircraft carrier or a sub or a couple of battleships caught up with her and sunk her.
 
Agreed, there was no reason to go into such a blind panic over one battleship. Even if she got out she could have done only so much damage before an aircraft carrier or a sub or a couple of battleships caught up with her and sunk her.
I attribute part of that to the trauma of losing the Hood and to Pound's health issues until his death
 
I attribute part of that to the trauma of losing the Hood and to Pound's health issues until his death

Hood was a BC so it shouldn't have been a shock to lose her to a BB, which she shouldn't have been fighting in the first place. An elderly battlecruiser shouldn't be fighting a brand new battleship. True, she was taken down so quickly because of a golden bb, but it shouldn't have been a shock for her to be lost.
 
IOTL? Distant escort in case the KM broke out. The Washington was part of the "heavy covering force" for PQ 17 (which is a story into and of itself, and qualifes as one of the great Charlie Foxtrots to come out of the RN during the entire war), she had replaced the North Carolina who had spent a couple months on the same mission. South Dakota, after the damage she sustained during the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (aka 4th Battle of Savo Island) went to Brooklyn Navy Yard for repair/refit. When she came out of the yard she was set North to replace some of the RN Home Fleet heavies (that were assigned to support the Husky Landings) to provide distant cover for the Murmansk convoys, specifically in case the Tirpitz* broke out.

Massachusetts was used as part of the Naval contingent of Operation Torch (where she got into a bit of gunfight with the immobile Jean Bart). Alabama spent four month with the British Home Fleet doing the same mission. Iowa also had a turn at the "The Tirpitz may be out!" merry-go-round before she went to the Pacific.

Tirpitz was, hands down, the best money the KM spent during the war, based on the amount of effort the WAllies put into waiting for her to NOT come out and then to overreact to the point of blind panic if she did.
Tirpitz was nicely placed to sally out, help wreck a convoy to Russia, and then disappear back into a Norwegian fjord again. It was a potential threat to one of the lifelines the Allies were running to Stalin's Russia, and the Western Allies badly needed the Russians in the fight, and at least moderately well supplied, for a lot of the war, given all the Axis divisions that the Russians were engaged in a brutal struggle to the death with.
Tirpitz was a very nice investment for the German navy, yes, but it posed a genuine threat which needed to be respected, at least as far as I can see.
Your mileage may vary, mind you...
 
Stillwell I'm fairly certain didn't have real combat experience. I also remember reading somewhere that at one point he pushed for an offensive in Burma that devastated the armies under his command causing him to flee.

Stilwell fought two rounds in Burma. First was in 1942. He was in charge of a Chinese corps sent to assist the Britsh, and yet was not in charge. All orders from him were supposed to be vetted back in Chunking by Chiang Kai Shek, & the actual corps commander could refuse orders if they endangered the corps. The Chinese set up blocking positions to prevent the Japanese from advancing north , then retreated each time after the briefest skirmish. Like most Chinse corps or 'armies' then the soldiers were under fed, badly armed, poorly trained, & their officers usually stole their pay. The Chinese officers commanding them did not fight them because they were in no condition to fight.

A couple years later Stilwell came back into northern Burma with a fresh corps of Chinese & some US raiders. In the interim he had blackmailed and bribed the KMT government into allowing a corps to be properly trained, fed, clothed, armed, and actually paid. This corps was the northern column fighting their way south, helping the Brits or Indian Army advancing from the west into Burma

Tuchmans bio of Stilwell is the clearest & most accessible on him. Its common on the used book market.
 
Stilwell fought two rounds in Burma. First was in 1942. He was in charge of a Chinese corps sent to assist the Britsh, and yet was not in charge. All orders from him were supposed to be vetted back in Chunking by Chiang Kai Shek, & the actual corps commander could refuse orders if they endangered the corps. The Chinese set up blocking positions to prevent the Japanese from advancing north , then retreated each time after the briefest skirmish. Like most Chinse corps or 'armies' then the soldiers were under fed, badly armed, poorly trained, & their officers usually stole their pay. The Chinese officers commanding them did not fight them because they were in no condition to fight.

A couple years later Stilwell came back into northern Burma with a fresh corps of Chinese & some US raiders. In the interim he had blackmailed and bribed the KMT government into allowing a corps to be properly trained, fed, clothed, armed, and actually paid. This corps was the northern column fighting their way south, helping the Brits or Indian Army advancing from the west into Burma

Tuchmans bio of Stilwell is the clearest & most accessible on him. Its common on the used book market.
Interesting, I'll look into it. Thanks for putting letting me know this. I've heard a lot of criticisms of Stilwell as someone who seemed to some extent more like an armchair commander than an actual one.
 
Tirpitz was nicely placed to sally out, help wreck a convoy to Russia, and then disappear back into a Norwegian fjord again. It was a potential threat to one of the lifelines the Allies were running to Stalin's Russia, and the Western Allies badly needed the Russians in the fight, and at least moderately well supplied, for a lot of the war, given all the Axis divisions that the Russians were engaged in a brutal struggle to the death with.
Tirpitz was a very nice investment for the German navy, yes, but it posed a genuine threat which needed to be respected, at least as far as I can see.
Your mileage may vary, mind you...

At least thrice the Germans sortied one of more BB, & heavy cruisers to intercept arctic convoys. When the Tripitz sortied it was returned to port when radio signals indicated a Brith battle group was stalking it. This was the prelude to the P17 massacre. In the last attempt the Scheer was sunk by a group so large it made the last stand of the Bismarck look like a fair fight.

The Brit panic may have derived from the successful sorties of the Scheer, Hipper, Scharnhorst & Geisnau into the Atlantic. All four sunk a uncomfortable amount of cargo. Read up on those ops & the Brit nervousness becomes understandable.
 
Interesting, I'll look into it. Thanks for putting letting me know this. I've heard a lot of criticisms of Stilwell as someone who seemed to some extent more like an armchair commander than an actual one.
One of the forgotten things about the US Army interwar, is the top officers were favored for staff positions. There the senior officers could keep a eye on them and give them tasks that prepared them for future generals rank. Stilwell commanded a infantry company & later a battalion of the 15th Infantry in Chine during the 1920s & 1930s, but his more valuable experience was as a regiment intelligence officer (S-2) and in the operations section. Mark Clark was wounded in the trenches in the Great War & had company & battalion commands, but he also as a lowly major planned & supervised a amphib exercise in 1940 while in the G-3 section of the 3rd Division. Eisenhower learned how to build armies as a junior major while working as a staffer for MacAurthur when CoS of the embryonic PI army.

The thing is most of the Great War veterans were too elderly, to dead, or had left the Army in 1919. There simply were too few to fill the command slots with proven combat veterans. Unlike the Marines the Army had no deployment to the Banana Wars to experience actual combat. Watching the Chinese warlords skirmish was about as close as they could get.
 
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