POD is post OgadenDepending on how the Ogaden War goes ITTL,
If Barre cracks down more harshly in the aftermath of the 1978 coup attempt, you could see more of an outburst from the SNA's officer corps who decides to oust him and usher in a newer military junta to control Somalia.POD is post Ogaden
Could the 1978 coup work ?If Barre cracks down more harshly in the aftermath of the 1978 coup attempt,
What would be necessary for it to succeed and would they purge any clans from the government ?It could.
Have the loyalists who put down the coup attempt instead join the SNA officers and lead to the SNA toppling Siad Barre's administration while ushering in a military dictatorship that isn't too unlike the Derg - this could happen if the Ogaden War goes even worse than it did IOTL as I recommended above, shaking the faith of the SNA in Barre. They might purge members of the Darod clan (of which Barre was apart of) for what they suspect as being too close to while promoting members of the Majeerteen clan to replace the purged government officials.What would be necessary for it to succeed and would they purge any clans from the government ?
If their Darod would they join the Majeerteen officers or no ?Have the loyalists who put down the coup attempt instead join the SNA officers and lead to the SNA toppling Siad Barre's administration while ushering in a military dictatorship that isn't too unlike the Derg
How could the Ogaden war go worse than IOTLif the Ogaden War goes even worse than it did IOTL as I recommended above,
Would that encourage a revolt or a countercoup ?They might purge members of the Darod clan (of which Barre was apart of) for what they suspect as being too close
I doubt it.If their Darod would they join the Majeerteen officers or no ?
How could the Ogaden war go worse than IOTL
Would that encourage a revolt or a countercoup ?
I doubt it.
Have Ethiopia be more ready for the Somali invasion which entails a whole host of things to select - no purge of the senior officer corps, reinforcement of Ethiopian Army positions in the Ogaden with regular Ethiopian troops, continuation of American material support, etc.
It could encourage a revolt which might devolve into an earlier Somali Civil War but I'm not sure about this bit.
Could adding a Darod leader or members prevent that ?The 1978 coup was mainly majerteen and would have led to disintegration and civil war earlier, 1978 was too late
May I ask where this notion of Somali forces being outnumbered during the initial months of the Ogaden War comes from? While the Ethiopian Army was overall larger than the SNA, one must consider that most of these troops were spread throughout Ethiopia in the Derg's campaigns against newly-born ethnic nationalist movements, especially in Eritrea and Tigray where those particular movements were becoming stronger - meanwhile, in the Ogaden, Ethiopian forces never exceeded 4 infantry brigades (of which only one was mechanized) that were cripplingly under-equipped while also dealing with the Western Somali Liberation Front's own rather effective insurgency. Ethiopia didn't achieve numerical superiority until the SNA was at the gates of Harar, Dire Dawa and Jijiga where their initial attempts to take these cities failed which allowed for Ethiopia to bring in hundreds of thousands in reinforcements.In Otl the Somali army did pretty well capturing 80% of the Ogaden within the first first few weeks despite being outnumbered in every battle, they did however have a superiority in armour and mechanized infantry and also motorized troops.
This was despite crippling interference and micromanagement from siad Barre that led to terrible decisions on the battlefield.
The soviet/Cuban intervention gutted the Somali army , a more prepared Ethiopia that does better would not have been as devastating as the Soviets.
One way of doing better for the Ethiopians would be to prevent the purge if the airfirAi that happened during the war.
The Ethiopians with their F5e's against Somali mig21s did very well and achieved air superiority despite losing in the ground.
The Ethiopians were more experienced had more flight times and the Airforce was founded in 1947 as opposed to the Somali that was founded in 1961.
Could an even worse 1973-74 famine lead to the SNA coup'ing Barre?The only way a coup would succeds would be before the Ogaden war preferably closer to 1974 and any coup would need to be made up of officers from a broad clan membership like the 1969 coup.
Could adding a Darod leader or members prevent that ?
Going off Gebru Tareke's estimates, the WSLF numbered around 35,000 men and probably never exceeded 45,000 men at its peak - combined with that, the total number of Somali troops in Ethiopia numbers roughly 63,000 men. About Ethiopian forces, I'm referring to the size of the troops stationed in the Ogaden at the time of the Somali invasion and up until Jijiga fell into Somali hands which was when Ethiopian High Command issued orders for general mobilization. Even if the Eritreans were "practically celebrating independence", this doesn't mean that the Ethiopian Revolutionary Army isn't dealing with other expanding insurgencies throughout the country - the TPLF is a good example of this, alongside the OLF and EPRP's own movements.The Ethiopians held on in diredawa and Harar due to the Airforce, but the SNA was still attacking. I forgot to account for wslf troops which were more than 5000 guerillas so the numbers might not have been that disproportionate.
I suspect there were more Ethiopian forces than you say because by Jan 1978 it was collapsing on other fronts, the Eritreans were practically celebrating indepence in 1978 before the Soviet airlift.
It reached its peak in 1976-77 but effectively ceased to exist in the 1980s after Operation Lash.WSLF was a very strong insurgency in 1977, but some people say WSLF ceased to exist after 1978.