Everybody is always arguing about German difficulties and shortcomings without really looking at the bigger picture and the British constraints.
So, as far as the air situation is concerned, the RAF would not have things all their own way. During September 1940 10, 11 and 12 group had roughly 300 fighters available to them that had the range to get to the Channel and landing areas. In total they had about 450 competent pilots, the rest had been grouped into squadrons further away from the front line in Category C squadrons which were effectively training squadrons. The Germans in contrast had 700 single and 200 twin engine fighters to throw into the battle with fully trained crews.
While it's true the Germans would be dividing their bombers between various targets the fighters could and would mainly be flying independent patrols high above the bombers ready to pounce where they were needed. Close escort was only needed when bombing targets far from the German bases. In addition Fighter Command would not have a single task they would be required to fly patrols above the beaches, above the ships, escorts for RAF bombers and provide a sizeable reaction force for raids against targets such as Harwich, Portsmouth, London etc. All of this without the added advantage of radar as any landings would rip quite a sizeable hole in the network. Do I think this equals a German victory, nope not at all, but at least it's worth recognising it's not going to be a British pushover.
300 fighters still represents a 25 fold increase on the number of fighters available for Crete, so you need to assess the impact of German anti-shipping operations in light of that even with deductions due to other missions. In contrast the German fighter force is only at best only 5 fold larger than in that campaign even that after the numbers have been massaged upwards in an Ian Hathaway classic. The dive bomber force available is only around 2 times as great as Crete incidentally. Yes the RAF will not have things all their own way but they are going to be vastly more present than in other circumstances where the RN were able to disperse and prevent sea landing forces.
Yes I get it, you are frustrated when German difficulties are mentioned as things are still shockingly bad for them when such adverse situations are ignored.
Really you think that in Sep the Germans who had taken the greater losses in planes and crew before hand would now have a greater advantage in both than the British, despite the British being able to replace both faster?
Have you got some link to support the claims that the RAF with 300 planes and 450 pilots would be facing off against a 700 single engineer & 200 twin engineered fighters all with fully trained crew. a 3:1 disadvantage in fighters and 2:1 disadvantage in fighter crews?
To re-post what I linked earlier:
Overy indicates the number of serviceable and total strength returns reveal an increase in fighters from 3 August to 7 September, 1,061 on strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on strength and 746 serviceable.[230] Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10%. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third. "If Fighter Command were 'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer".[231] .
I know this reply is late but it’s the first chance I’ve had to properly sit down with my books and go through the figures and refresh my memory, yes the figures I posted above were from memory and so could be a little off which is why I use terms such as roughly and about. In addition this was a very fluid time in terms of numbers so there will always be minor differences.
So lets have a look at the figures I have ‘massaged’.
During September 1940 10, 11 and 12 group had roughly 300 fighters available to them that had the range to get to the Channel and landing areas.
According to the RAF diaries for the period, on 7th September Fighter Command had 621 Spitfires and Hurricanes serviceable and 604 on September 28th. From that you can assume that during the invasion scare period they could field in total 613 (+/- 8) on any given day.
From ‘Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority’ edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling.
"The RAF’s Order of Battle remained remarkably stable over the period July 1-September 1. The total number of Hurricanes and Spitfires in the Fighter Command squadrons rose only from 756 to 761 and then fell back to 759. The number of these planes that were serviceable rose from 548 on July 1 to 558 and stayed there, while the number unserviceable actually dropped over the summer from 208 to 201."
This gives an idea of what was available to the 48 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in September throughout the whole of the UK but not what was within reach of the Invasion area, the so-called frontline.
So, what was the frontline? Effectively it was the squadrons of 11 Group plus those at Middle Wallop in 10 Group and Duxford in 12 Group, so 26 to 28 squadrons. It’s always considered that Fighter Command put in maximum effort in the afternoon of 15th September when all of the frontline squadrons were airborne to meet Luftwaffe attacks on London. Patrick Bishop in his book Battle of Britain says this comprised of 28 squadrons (Max. 336 fighters). I Dr Alfred Prices book Battle of Britain he puts a little more meat on the bones:
“All twenty-one of No 11 Group’s Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons were now airborne and either in contact with the enemy or moving into position to engage. From No 12 Group, Squadron Leader Douglas Bader was again on his way south leading the five squadron ‘Big Wing’. And from the west No 10 Group sent a further three squadrons to protect the capital.
To defend London against attack Fighter Command had amassed a total of two hundred and seventy-six Spitfires and Hurricanes, slightly more than during the noon time engagement.”
So, it could be 304 (+/- 32) during any engagement.
This is at great odds with Stephen Bungay’s claim that Fighter Command had 630 Spitfires and Hurricanes in the frontline, a figure which is greater than they had available throughout the whole of Britain.
Overy is also at odds with these numbers and this is always going to be an issue in any discussions on Fighter Command strength which in just this small sample of authors above ranges from 558 to 746, a variation of 188.
In total they had about 450 competent pilots, the rest had been grouped into squadrons further away from the front line in Category C squadrons which were effectively training squadrons.
Just a brief bit of background which I’m sure you all know already. From the beginning of the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command’s policy was to maintain 11 Groups squadron strength by replacing worn down squadrons wholesale with selected full-strength squadrons from the rear areas. In addition, each squadron would have a small compliment of non-operational pilots straight from the OTUs that would be trained up within the squadron ready to replace lost or wounded pilots. By the end of August it was becoming clear to Dowding that this was no longer a workable system as there were fewer and fewer full strength squadrons in the rear areas and squadrons already withdrawn and refitting were taking longer to refit than the frontline squadrons were being worn down. An extra burden that could no longer be tolerated within 11 Group squadrons was the training of green pilots. By 7th September Dowding had come up with a solution. The following is taken from ‘The Battle of Britain, New Perspectives” by John Ray and explains things better than I could:
“Dowding’s arrangements for the three classes of squadron were transmitted next day [8th September] in a note headed ‘Policy for Maintenance of Fighter Squadrons in Pilots’. The classes were listed in order of priority. First were Class A Squadrons of No 11 Group, ‘to be maintained constantly at minimum strength of sixteen operational pilots’. Next were Class A Squadrons of Nos 10 and 12 Groups, kept to a ‘minimum of sixteen operational plus non-operational as convenient’. Class B Squadrons were required to have ‘a minimum strength of sixteen operational pilots with up to six more non-operational’. Blenheim and Defiant squadrons were to remain unaffected. The last category, Class C Squadrons, would retain ‘a minimum of three operational pilots to act as leaders’, except for three named squadrons which would have eight.”
So if you consider just the Class A and B Squadrons with an assumed 5% unavailability due to leave, sickness and pilot deficit (5% is very low) you get a total of 456 operational pilots available at any one time. Where I have made an error is in not counting the operational pilots in the C squadrons which could add a further 66 pilots; 512 in total with probably another 450-500 non-operational pilots in training.
The Germans in contrast had 700 single and 200 twin engine fighters to throw into the battle with fully trained crews.
This final point is the easiest one to sort. As an example, Alfred Price puts the serviceable number of Bf109s at 686 and Len Deighton at 687 as per 7th September in both cases. Other Luftwaffe OOBs for 28th September put the number of Bf109s at 716. So, throughout the invasion period they had 701 (+/- 15) Bf109s.
There are so many places the Luftwaffe OOBs can be found that there’s no real point in me directing you all to them (that and the fact that I can’t be bothered to do all the work).