Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

[Deleted member 94680]

Seriously Glenn read about the actual German plan.

It’s not about the German plan to Glenn. It’s about Glenn’s plan to Glenn.

Remember Gibraltar?

 

[RodentRevolution]

It’s not about the German plan to Glenn. It’s about Glenn’s plan to Glenn.

Remember Gibraltar?

You said!

You said what happens in Gibraltar stays in Gibraltar!

Oh....right we are talking about something completely different

 

[Deleted member 94680]

You said!

You said what happens in Gibraltar stays in Gibraltar!

Oh....right we are talking about something completely different

Definitely. We vowed never to speak of that again, remember?

Makes me queasy just thinking of it...

 

[fourthmaninaboat]

So when the Luftwaffe sank 42 merchant ships and 4 destroyers in the Kanalcampf against heavy RAF opposition, you're saying the British lost 46 ships sunk and the RN withdrew its destroyers from Dover and the Channel because the RAF had the advantage?

Forty two merchants sounds like an impressive number, but when you look at how that compared to the amount of ships travelling through the Channel, it's actually pretty small. Those 42 merchants lost totalled at most 40,000 tons; each week, somewhere in the region of a million tons of shipping passed through the Channel. Over the course of the battle ~4,000,000 tons of shipping was in the targeted area. Sinking 40,000 tons of it translates to a sinking rate of just 1%.

Similarly, the losses to destroyers sound heavy, but this includes Codrington, sunk at anchor in Dover harbour, with her AA guns unmanned, and a very easy target. The other three ships, Brazen, Wren and Delight, were not covered by the RAF at the time of the attacks that sank them. Brazen was escorting a convoy, and her abilities to manoeuvre were constrained by this. Wren was similarly unable to utilise her best defence, her speed and manoeuvrability, because she was supporting minesweepers. Delight was separated from any other British ship. The withdrawal from Dover was carried out because Dover's role could be fulfilled well by other ports which were more easily defended; the RN felt it didn't need to lose ships to little advantage. British destroyers were never withdrawn from the Channel.

First thing for Sealion is getting ashore, then the supply becomes a requirement. You are acknowledging from this argument that it can get ashore, correct? Because otherwise, how could you be suggesting that German logistics were inadequate to win the post-invasion supply battle at the beachhead where there was no invasion and no beachhead?

Getting ashore is the easy bit of any amphibious invasion, to be honest. The hard bit is actually supplying and exploiting the amphibious beachhead. To do the second effectively and efficiently needs the first bit to have been done in an orderly fashion. Trying to form an effective exploitation force from scattered bits of nine divisions landed along ~100 miles of coast, and supply them with what they need, is going to be practically impossible. I'm not contesting that Sealion can get ashore, so much - the convoys were of too large a scale for the RN to sink the first wave. What I am contesting is that they can get ashore as an effective force and be supplied, supported and exploit their gains. I think that you're going to get a mix of convoys that are sunk, convoys that turn around and return to France, convoys that land in the wrong place, convoys that scatter their troops all over, convoys that turn up at the wrong time, and maybe one or two that actually end up in the right place. No amount of improvisation is going to turn this into a workable beachhead.

In the Norwegian campaign, AFAIK, none of the German invasion transports were intercepted by RN forces prior to debarkation. This battle was further from RN bases, but none is still not very good. Off Crete the RN forces managed to sink about a dozen barques in one convoy, causing 300 casualties. Another group, Force C contacted a second convoy in daylight, but declined battle for fear of air attacks. So, overall, for the loss of 9 warships and another 17 damaged, and about a dozen barques sunk. In once case a barge from the first convoy was sighted and a destroyer, (HMS Greyhound) split off from the formation to sink it. While it was doing so, JU-87's pounced on it and sank it in minutes. Warships under air attack that broke AA formation to engage surface targets left themselves considerably more vulnerable to air attack - the same thing happened for Kurita off Samar when he ordered general chase. But, warships that kept AA (tight ring) formation were considerably less effective in surface engagements.

During the invasion of Norway, several ships were intercepted by Allied submarines prior to debarkation. The transport Rio de Janeiro was sunk by the Polish submarine Orzel, while the tanker Stedingen was sunk by Trident. RN surface forces failed to intercept the German transports, yes, but this was down to them misreading German intentions, believing the sighted German warships were planning to breakout into the Atlantic. German intentions with Sealion would be a lot more clear.

Crete was not just considerably further from RN bases than the fighting in the Channel would be, it was also completely out of range of RAF fighters. The Luftwaffe (and Italians) were also much more experienced with making attacks on shipping than they were in 1940. Even so, and with the heavy losses, the RN completed its objectives. The Germans were prevented from landing on Crete until the battle was all but over, and a large portion of the Allied forces on Crete were successfully withdrawn. The RN would have lost many fewer ships had it been operating under fighter cover, and had it been able to resupply with AA ammunition. Your framing of the RN losses is also a bit disingenuous; many of the losses that occurred happened during the evacuation, rather than during (and immediately following) the engagements with the invasion convoys. During these, Force C and Force D lost one ship sunk to air attack, Juno (to an Italian bomber, no less). Carlisle and Naiad were lightly damaged by bombing, but were still able to continue operations. Greyhound was lost chasing down a caique, yes, while Gloucester and Fiji were lost attempting to rescue her crew. Kashmir and Kelly were lost supporting troops ashore. All the other ships lost were associated with the evacuation, rather than with anti-invasion operations.

 

[nbcman]

First thing for Sealion is getting ashore, then the supply becomes a requirement. You are acknowledging from this argument that it can get ashore, correct? Because otherwise, how could you be suggesting that German logistics were inadequate to win the post-invasion supply battle at the beachhead where there was no invasion and no beachhead?



In the Norwegian campaign, AFAIK, none of the German invasion transports were intercepted by RN forces prior to debarkation. This battle was further from RN bases, but none is still not very good. Off Crete the RN forces managed to sink about a dozen barques in one convoy, causing 300 casualties. Another group, Force C contacted a second convoy in daylight, but declined battle for fear of air attacks. So, overall, for the loss of 9 warships and another 17 damaged, and about a dozen barques sunk. In once case a barge from the first convoy was sighted and a destroyer, (HMS Greyhound) split off from the formation to sink it. While it was doing so, JU-87's pounced on it and sank it in minutes. Warships under air attack that broke AA formation to engage surface targets left themselves considerably more vulnerable to air attack - the same thing happened for Kurita off Samar when he ordered general chase. But, warships that kept AA (tight ring) formation were considerably less effective in surface engagements.

Thats a great comparison assuming Kent, East Sussex and Surrey were neutral countries and it would be snowing with heavy seas in the channel in September 1940.

 

[Zincwarrior]

In the event of a disorderly landing all the superior German initiative and small unit tactics will be heavily symied by the facts that:

1. The troops will have no idea where they are. Even if all they had to do was march to London, there's a good chance they'd miss.
2. The ships carrying the follow on waves and supplies will have no idea where they are.

Also the ships carrying the follow on troops and supplies will now be at the bottom of the Channel.

 

[Glenn239]

The war with Germany was, in the abstract, a luxury. But this ignores the entire context of the thing: centuries of British wariness about a European power dominating the continent, years of Hitler being incredibly dishonest when it comes to diplomatic dealing, and the fact that the political positions (if not the lives) of those in power would be threatened by any peace deal. Sealion would not have to be threatening to force a British surrender, it would have to succeed.

Underlined - kindly cease informing me that the key thing that made Sealion even feasible in the first place is the thing I'm "ignoring". It's like telling the Wright Brothers as they are putting the wings on their Flyer that they're ignoring lift. Do you understand? It is precisely because the war was a luxury for Britain that Sealion could succeed in its political objective.

As has been repeatedly noted throughout the thread, while the Luftwaffe was able to make strikes, they weren't very successful at it. At Dunkirk, they only sank warships that were moored or in confined waters, while in the Channel, they sank a tiny fraction of the slow, vulnerable merchant shipping. The RAF didn't put their full effort into defending Dunkirk; Fighter Command sorties over the entire ten-day battle were equivalent to two to four days sorties during the Channel battles. During the Channel battles, the RAF was able to cause heavy casualties to the Luftwaffe, casualties that were arguably unsustainable.

Yes, the RAF was so successful in controlling the Channel that the RN withdrew its destroyers from the Channel in July 1940 to avoid further losses.

To do so, they'd need to march through Spain. What is Hitler offering Franco to allow this? Militarily, they probably could have done it. Politically, it was impossible.

If Hitler had said to Franco in June 1940 that the German army would require passage through Spain to attack Gibraltar, Franco was not in a position to have resisted beyond a diplomatic protest. Because anything more than that, Hitler has Franco murdered and the stooge that replaces him does Germany's bidding. That's how it was in 1940. This idea that Fascist Spain is going to bail the British out is completely absurd. If the Germans had demanded it, Spain would have had no choice but to comply. All Franco could do, at best, was attempt to maintain neutrality even while submitting to German demands. Why? Because Germany had 120 divisions in France, and the Spanish army was a joke, and the Spanish people didn't like the idea of fighting for Britain to allow Britain to continue to occupy the Spanish fortress port of Gibraltar.

The RN didn't lose the Norwegian campaign as such. It was always able to run convoys into Narvik and other northern Norwegian ports. As long as there was the political will to maintain an army in Norway, they could have supported it, and as noted above, only with minor casualties to air attacks. They did not much disrupt German resupply of the southern half of the country, yes, but as noted above, to do so required operating in conditions very different from the Channel. At Crete, similarly, the RN prevented the Germans landing troops by sea. Had the Allied troops ashore managed to keep the German paratroopers off the airfields, then Crete would not have fallen.

The RN turned back two convoys at sea while a third (tiny) one landed, then a fourth. The two convoys that turned back were not destroyed, and could have just as easily turned back towards Crete again. . Nothing happened in the Crete campaign that suggests the types of massive casualties posters are supposing here.

Kurita did not lose to Taffy 3 alone; he lost to the entirety of 7th Fleet's escort carrier strength, and the looming (if imaginary) threat of the entirety of 3rd Fleet. Kurita did not know how effective Ozawa's decoy force had been, and believed that either he was engaging 3rd Fleet units, or that they would shortly turn up to stop him. Every aircraft attacking him was one that could whittle down his force for the upcoming vast clash with Halsey's battleships and carriers.

Kurita engaged with 4 battleship, 8 cruisers and 11 destroyers - about as much surface firepower as half the RN's entire invasion reaction force. He was opposed by 400 aircraft - about 1/5th the size of the available Luftwaffe forces.

Firstly, note that the RN did successfully stop the landing here, even if they didn't completely destroy either convoy. Secondly, operating conditions off Crete, where the RN was a full day's sail from anywhere where they could resupply AA ammunition, where the sum total of supporting fighters were just 12 Fulmars (only available for just half the battle), and the Luftwaffe and Italian opposition was much better trained for anti-shipping attacks, were very different from the Channel. Extrapolating from an engagement in a theatre where a night attack meant exposing yourself in daylight without any fighter cover, where every round of AA ammunition could not be resupplied within a day's steaming, to one where RN ships can make a night attack and be back in a safe base before daylight, where ammunition resupply is plentiful, and the entirety of Fighter Command is backing you up, must be done carefully.

Not bad points, although night attacks by the RN without gunnery radar are not going to be as effective as those off Crete with it. We're assuming day battles in order for the RN to generate maximum lethality.

On the subject of ammunition reloads, what ports were intended to be used, what capacity did these ports have for reloading under optimal conditions through to under heavy air attacks? How fast did it take to replenish a destroyer, assuming no interruptions but no stockpiling of ammunition or charges allowed on the pier?

As has been pointed out by a lot of other people, this means that the Kriegsmarine is going to take casualties too, which they can afford much less than the RN can. RN AA was more effective off Crete, yes, but this is balanced out by the fact that the Luftwaffe was a lot less effective against shipping in September 1940 than they were off Crete, and by the fact that the RN has the entirety of Fighter Command, rather than just 12 Fulmars, backing them up.

Between the increase in accuracy of the LW and the decrease in AA of the RN, the LW probably is at the advantage there. The addition of RAF fighters is a big difference from Crete, but so is the fact that the overall number of LW sorties for Sealion is much higher than for Crete. So, a bit of a mixed bag.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

If Hitler had said to Franco in June 1940 that the German army would require passage through Spain to attack Gibraltar, Franco was not in a position to have resisted beyond a diplomatic protest. Because anything more than that, Hitler has Franco murdered and the stooge that replaces him does Germany's bidding. That's how it was in 1940.

Except, you know, he did.

The only concrete result was the signing of a secret agreement under which Franco was committed to enter the war at a date of his own choosing, while Hitler gave only vague guarantees that Spain would receive "territories in Africa". Possibly Franco asked to ask such high demands in order for Hitler not to force his country to join the war effort.

 

[jsb]

Norwegian campaign, AFAIK, none of the German invasion transports were intercepted by RN forces prior to debarkation. This battle was further from RN bases, but none is still not very good.

How does having strategic surprise fit with Sealion.....?

Thats a great comparison assuming Kent, East Sussex and Surrey were neutral countries and it would be snowing with heavy seas in the channel in September 1940.

 

[werehawk]

Finally managed to slog my way through this exercise in futility of attempting to convince a worshipper of the altar of the Sealion that his faith is misplaced. I have to admit watching the arguments bounce of the impenetrable shield of Sir Glenn de la Mancha has been entertaining. It is truly amazing to watch a master in the arts of handwavium and avoidance exercising his art.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Finally managed to slog my way through this exercise in futility of attempting to convince a worshipper of the altar of the Sealion that his faith is misplaced. I have to admit watching the arguments bounce of the impenetrable shield of Sir Glenn de la Mancha has been entertaining. It is truly amazing to watch a master in the arts of handwavium and avoidance exercising his art.

Yeah but I bet you learned something you never knew along the way....and a couple of things you now cannot unremember as try as you might but cannot be helped.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

and a couple of things you now cannot unremember as try as you might but cannot be helped.

Hey! Stop talking about that!

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

So when the Luftwaffe sank 42 merchant ships and 4 destroyers in the Kanalcampf against heavy RAF opposition,

Over the course of a month... Is your version of Sea Lion a month-long attritional campaign explicitly aimed at inflicting casualties on British shipping?

I don't think Germany's barge navy would hold out that long. Those ""sailors"" were impressed, not impressive.

 

[mudhead]

Well I believe it. The Royal Navy had a strong reputation for avoiding battle, especially its destroyer captains. Nelson notoriously had to egg on his captains to get their ships alongside the enemy because they were about to turn tail and run. Warburton-Lee's equally famous last signal to his fleet was "For God's sake stop engaging the enemy."

And then of course there's Glowworm frantically trying to get back home to mother England before being mercilessly ridden down by Hipper.

There's been much less on this thread than usual about the institutional cowardice of the RN, embodied in it's destroyer captains.

Do you understand? It is precisely because the war was a luxury for Britain that Sealion could succeed in its political objective.

No, I don't understand.

 

[DaveBC]

There's been much less on this thread than usual about the institutional cowardice of the RN, embodied in it's destroyer captains.

No, I don't understand.

Let me help. Glenn's thesis is that after the RN destroyers aforementioned massacre the invasion fleet, Churchill will be so scared shitless by the bullet he just dodged that he will sprint to the negotiating table immediately.

"Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result."
– Winston Churchill

(From Churchill's younger days, surrendering in Africa.)

 

[varyar]

No, I don't understand.

I think he means Britain would’ve been completely okay with a centuries old pillar of their foreign policy being reduced to rubble by German domination of France, the Low Countries and, well, all of Europe, because they’d still have the Empire or something.

 

[mudhead]

Let me help. Glenn's thesis is that after the RN destroyers aforementioned massacre the invasion fleet, Churchill will be so scared shitless by the bullet he just dodged that he will sprint to the negotiating table immediately.

Ah - his thesis in the past has been that they were too yellow to get close enough to massacre the invasion fleet.

I think he means Britain would’ve been completely okay with a centuries old pillar of their foreign policy being reduced to rubble by German domination of France, the Low Countries and, well, all of Europe, because they’d still have the Empire or something.

None of my reading - and a large part of two degrees was spent in the study of British foreign policy* - ever gave me this impression, though obviously I should have spent less time in the archives.

* An even larger part was spent in the bar, mind.

 

[Cockroach]

In the Norwegian campaign, AFAIK, none of the German invasion transports were intercepted by RN forces prior to debarkation.

Because having the entire North Sea to maneuver in; a steady flow of neutral merchant traffic to hide in (and neutral waters to sneak through) and your own heavy units active making the poms worry about a breakout into the Atlantic is the same thing as jamning 2000 barges into the Channel and taking an entire bloody day to steam across...

Kurita engaged with 4 battleship, 8 cruisers and 11 destroyers - about as much surface firepower as half the RN's entire invasion reaction force. He was opposed by 400 aircraft - about 1/5th the size of the available Luftwaffe forces.

400 aircraft right at hand manned by aicrews trained in anti-shipping duties with the advantage of another 3-4 years of technological development...

 

[varyar]

None of my reading - and a large part of two degrees were spent in the study of British foreign policy* - ever gave me this impression, though obviously I should have spent less time in the archives.

* An even larger part was spent in the bar, mind.

Who needs books or documents when you have sweeping assertions?

 

[Deleted member 94680]

None of my reading - and a large part of two degrees were spent in the study of British foreign policy - ever gave me this impression, though obviously I should have spent less time in the archives.

Ahhh, but your reading will be of volumes written by cowardly, deceitful, mendacious British officials after the various panics have passed (through no actions of their own, purely by chance, mind) rather than during the crisis and therefore unreliable accounts.