On Brazen Wings - From the Pseudo Space Race to Independence and Beyond.

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Prologue
On Brazen Wings
Prologue

It was an awfully cold, near frigid Tuesday morning in 1986 when Thomas Paine found himself checking in to a motel, just outside Rockledge, Florida. Normally he would stay closer to the Cape, but tourists in town for the launch were still packing the nearer accommodations in Cocoa Beach, and even from Titusville and as far south as Melbourne were rooms sold out, so he was lucky to still find a vacancy a mere 20-minute drive away. In his mind, as he climbed the steps to the second floor, he went over his schedule for the day just as he had countless times in the last day he spent travelling from Los Angeles to Orlando, and through the dim morning taxi ride to the coast.

NASA had invited him to be a part of some ceremony later today and while they were rather surprisingly coy about what it was about, Tom suspected it was to do with the program. Perhaps a meet and greet with the astronauts or some pointless medal now that the Shuttles were flying.. His mind flickered back to Disney and those early days, juggling Apollo and the next great leap they were already calling it...but no matter, he would think; it was time away from the Commission work he was doing for Reagan, which if nothing else was a well-deserved break.

But suddenly, as he ran through his mental checklist, he remembered the most important thing; he needed to call his wife Barbara before he left for the day. While it was still early back in LA, he knew she'd be awake as she was an early riser, and at any rate she wasn't very keen on him not staying in touch given how often he had been away this year.

So, as he kicked off his shoes and settled in, he picked up the phone. She didn't answer. He called again, and she picked up but he could not tell what she was saying before the line seemed to have disconnected.

That was odd...he thought. He called again.

"Honey? What's..." he started, but she would cut him off immediately, very clearly upset.

"Tom! Tom! Oh my god Tom!"

"What on earth is going on?" he interjected.

"Wha...Tom! Haven't you been watching? The Shuttle! Those poor people!"

She trailed off and he could hear her muffled sobs, as if she had her face buried in her hands. But he knew something was wrong.

The Shuttle?
he thought. It took him a few seconds, but like lightning he understood. In a mad scramble he accidentally knocked the lamp off the dresser trying to get to the television, but he paid no mind. He flipped it on and by chance it was already on CNN. The face of Bernard Shaw filled the screen, looking rather visibly disheveled.

"We have confirmation now coming in from NASA and confirmed by the White House: there was no possibility of survival. The Shuttle has been lost."

Tom was, understandably, speechless. All at once his mind filled with emotions. Anger, confusion, and perhaps most painfully, guilt. His mind flickered back again, and he remembered how hard he had fought for this. This was to be our next step, and now it was our greatest tragedy.. However, he was not alone. Across the world, millions mourned the loss. NASA's Space Shuttle, above all else, represented a new era for humanity, and unlike the Space Race of yesteryear, these were not military veterans who one might be able to just write off as the cost of war, but civilians; scientists and engineers, among the best and the brightest the world had to offer, now dead, consumed by the very fire that ignited imaginations everywhere.

But, across the Pacific, in a near scorching basement below Moscow, lit by little else than the glow of a small television, not everyone had the same mixed emotions as Tom Paine had. For Valentin Glushko, while he too felt great sorrow and loss for the Americans, he was also filled with certain other emotions. Pride, guilt, but most strongly, he felt vindicated. After 15 years, he was finally proven right.
 
Hello, and welcome to On Brazen Wings. This has been in the works for me for quite some time, on the order of several years in fact. As one may be able to tell, this timeline is going to be about the Space Shuttle (among other things ;) ), but its going to be a rather different and perhaps unique take from what's been done by, well, anyone as far as I've been able to tell, on this site or in literature in general.

While I won't spoil it (though clever readers may be able to catch certain subtleties in the prologue), I will warn that this timeline is going to be somewhat of a slower burn than some others. I'm of the camp that believes that history is not so easily altered, and beyond the POD, to be covered in the next post, it will take a lot of buildup to see the kind of big change butterflies that you'd expect.
 
POD: Ad Astra Program and Paine ousted in 1969.
The Ad Astra Program:
Man's Job in Space
On March 9, 1955, a red-letter date in the history of space exploration, Walt Disney would air an episode of his television show Disneyland. Titled "Man in Space", the episode would mark the first of three such episodes that focused on topics ranging from simple rocketry to almost fantastical dreams of flying to the Moon or Mars, and even that most primal question...are we alone?

Central to these episodes was both the imagination and near unparalleled expertise of Wernher Von Braun. A German rocket scientist who immigrated to the United States following World War II, he had already enjoyed brief fame with the average American for the publishing of a series of articles by Colliers Magazine, which laid out Von Braun's visions and plans for spaceflight more comprehensively. This media presence would end up capturing the imagination of America and while Von Braun would still find it difficult to get the government on his side, despite the show of support he was receiving from the public, it would not be until that fateful day in October 1957, when the USSR would launch Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite, that an opportunity would finally open for him.

And the rest is, as they say, history. A history indeed, that was not lost on Thomas Paine in the early days of 1969 in his year as NASA Administrator, as the Apollo program rapidly approached the deadline for fulfilling Kennedys challenge of landing a man on the Moon before the end of the decade, and still the program working through hurdle after hurdle to get it done.

But it was not merely the struggles of Apollo that weighed on his mind. As NASA administrator, as much as it was his job to ensure the ongoing success of Apollo and the recovery from the accident, it was also his job to ensure the future success of Americas space program and to secure its next great project after Apollo, which by July, even before Armstrong's crew had left the launchpad, was feeling the heavy and impending weight of budget cuts and cancellations. This so-called financial noose was in fact what colored the agency's vision for the future, for while they (and as historians might put it, Paine specifically) had grandiose visions of Moon Bases and Mars expeditions, they intended to bring these to fruition on a bed rock of cheap, routine spaceflight.

Beginning in 1965, research and development began for what would become known as the Integrated Program Plan (IPP). In these early years, most focus was on a "space shuttle", space stations in low Earth Orbit, and potential stations and basis centered on the Moon. However, when Thomas Paine was appointed as NASA administrator, in March of 1969, he had much a much more ambitious vision in mind. Spurred on by the successes of Apollo 8 and 9, and with the first landing imminent within the year, Paine had the idea that NASA would be rewarded for winning the race to the Moon.

As such, by May 1969, the IPP had had grown to include a buildup of space infrastructure stretching not merely from LEO to the Moon, but to Mars, to Venus, and even to the farthest reaches of the Solar System. With the Space Shuttle at the backbone of the program, space stations would be constructed not just in LEO, but in geosynchronous orbit, around the Moon and above Mars, and semi-annual flybys of Venus could all be achieved within the coming decade, but that would not be all. Concurrently, driven by the lowered costs of spaceflight the Shuttle would provide, large-scale nuclear-powered shuttles would be constructed as well, giving the efficient and powerful propulsion needed to launch interplanetary probes, establish the Moon Base, and, as the crowning achievement, a manned Mars Landing by 1981, and the first city by 2000. With illustrations from the Marshal Spaceflight Center, the plan would pave the way for America, and truly, humanity as a whole, for years to come.

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This, in hindsight almost childish plan for NASA's future would be presented to the Space Task Group (STG), established by President Nixon to oversee NASA's follow on to Apollo, presented by an equally enthusiastic Wernher Von Braun. Von Braun initially was rather skeptical (or as his biography would note, more very cynical) of the idea, as he was already seeing his political weight diminished, and with the Saturn V unlikely to ever be built again, he did not believe that the government would be willing to commit to even a modest proposal, much less one as ambitious as what Pained championed.

However, Paine was not one to merely let it go. In a series of meetings, phone calls, and late-night arguments circling a proverbial drain of mathematics and economic discussions, Paine and Von Braun would eventually come to not only a mutual understanding, but a vision they could both stand behind. Together, they tailored the IPP as it stood into a more presentable state. Gone were the superfluous Venus fly-bys and extraneous space stations in every orbit imaginable, and the focus of the plan instead came to be on the economics first, and the glory second. With the reusability of the Space Shuttle at the fore front, the IPP would go on to establish four key phases.

First would be to get the Shuttle up and running, as it would still form the backbone of the program, using the Saturn rockets as a basis to speed its development. From there, phase 2 would be the first American space station to fly and the first nuclear shuttle would be constructed there, which would be a point from which the program would begin to accelerate as the infrastructure became established. Next would be a return to the Moon (their reasoning being that it was unlikely Apollo would be able to continue concurrently even if the hardware was still in service)and the eventual establishment of a Moon Base. And finally, with sufficient experience with the Moon base established, a Mars project could begin utilizing assets that would be sourced and constructed in space.

And as a final touch of flare, they opted to give the overall plan a more public relations friendly name, something they could tie in as a true successor to Apollo. As such, the newly christened Ad Astra program was born.

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While considerably more reasonable, and with substantial economic justification (as each phase could see a substantive reduction in total spending compared to Apollo, and would only need relatively minor increases as each phase begins), it would still unfortunately lead to the pair's disappointment. While the STG was impressed by the presentation and its considerations for funding, many in the group and the greater administration (namely, Nixon himself) did not believe that they were being sincere, and instead took the plan as a way for Von Braun to recover from his fading limelight, and for Paine to establish himself him Washington. As a result, Nixon would opt to create their own version of the program, with the Nuclear shuttle, Moon base, and Mars project completely nixed, and the proposed space station left as a possible follow up to the Space Shuttle, which would become the programs sole focus. This would eventually morph into the STS Program as we know it today.

Left disappointed, Paine was at a total loss, but Von Braun, having become more invested in the program as time went on, had an idea.


While Walt Disney had unfortunately passed away some years prior, Von Braun had developed a close relationship with the producers of Disneyland, and with Walt's brother Roy in particular. Contacting him in late May, Von Braun would successfully lobby Disney to help him and Paine sell Ad Astra to the public, and for Von Braun, much of the month of June was spent at the same production studios where he worked with Walt and the others all those years ago, producing models and presentations. Paine himself would be too busy at NASA to help much with preparations, but he would be present in late June to film his own role as the final presenter, making his (unknown to him at the time) fatal plea for his project.

The program, entitled Man's Job in Space, would air to the public on on July 28th, 1969, days after the return of Apollo 11. The nearly 4 hour long special would be aired in 4 parts throughout the week, and edited versions would be distributed to movie theaters as pre-movie shorts and in some places as a marathon of the entire program. The first two parts would focus on the hardware and actual plan itself, with nearly the entire first episode dedicated to the Space Shuttle. The latter half would end up focusing on the individual impacts Ad Astra would have on the daily lives of Americans, its principle message was that America's, and truly humanity's, next step would not merely be glorified camping trips, but the establishment of outer space as a place for people to work, to build great things, to live and love, and to raise future generations as a multi-planetary species. But more than the lofty rhetoric that colored the program, so too did it delve into the same economic arguments that convinced Von Braun, showing how the legacy of the many billions spent on Apollo could be leveraged to cheapen access to space and how eventually it would become self-sustaining where not only would Earth no longer have to commit its resources, but it would start receiving resources back in return.

The program was received with widespread affection across America, and many critics applauded that it was able to synthesize cold reality with the warm dreams of the future, but its most critical moment was Thomas Paine's sole speaking part as the concluding speaker at the end of the last special, filmed the same night that man first walked on the Moon.

"Hello America. My name is Thomas Paine, and I am the administrator at NASA, its leader if you will. These past four nights, Dr. Von Braun has lead us down a road to our future, and has explained in the best detail what we at NASA hope to accomplish in this latter half of the 20th century.

To close out our broadcast, I wanted to speak to you directly on two matters. First, why the name "Ad Astra"?

Translated from Latin, it means "to the stars". We felt that, as a follow on to Apollo, we could think of no greater phrase, for while a single step by a man was all that was needed to bring us to this moment, to go forward we must all of us together, make this next giant leap to the stars.

Not merely to walk amongst these planets and moons we named after great gods of old, but to count them as our home.

But, before this can happen, we must first face the cold reality. Of politics, economics, our national spirit. So, America, I implore you - reach out to your Congressmen, your Senators and Governors, to our nations highest office. We can do this, and to allow ourselves to be held back and beaten down, is a loss we cannot accept and must be unwilling to entertain.

For we must also remember: we are not the only ones who want to go.

Thank you; Good night, and God Bless you America."

While at the tail end if the final, hour long broadcast, for those that watched it it represented a wake up call and a call to action. But as it was, not many ended up watching. While the broadcasts were well received, by the end of the week most had tuned out, leaving only the proverbial choir to listen. And even news outlets reporting on Paine's plea would not help, and in many ways would hurt him.

President Nixon, already suspicious of Paine and Von Braun's motivations, found the broadcasts to be a direct attack on his administration. Citing concerns over a dereliction of duties, Nixon would ask for Paine's resignation, who, finally defeated, acquiesced. Von Braun meanwhile, would resign from his post a few years later, having long since become disillusioned with the direction of the space program.

While Paine's plea fell effectively on deaf ears in America and doomed his program (as he envisioned it) to never see the light of day, across the Pacific, he did manage to capture a very attentive audience with the USSR, and a trio of chief designers poised to change the course of Soviet space ambitions.
 
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Great. Another space TL for me to watch........watched. Anyways,here’s hoping that the (whatever Shuttle this is) disaster isn’t the end of the program.
 
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A Storm Approaches - The Glushko Plot
A Storm Approaches
The Glushko Plot

In late August of 1969, three of the Soviet Union's chief designers would be recalled to Moscow by the KGB with an urgent priority. Normally cause for alarm, the trio, and their host of staff, were assured it was regarding a national defense matter. Chief among them was Valentin Glushko, and accompanying him would be Vladimir Chelomei and Vladimir Barmin. There was a host of others present as well from across the various bureaus, and it quickly became apparent that all in attendance were people who happened to be available at the time, as opposed to any specific group. Notably missing was Vasily Mishin, who was currently working nearly around the clock to fix the N1 (the Soviet Moon Rocket, which had failed on both of its initial launch tests earlier in the year).

As the group settled in to the dimly lit room, the single KGB agent that had corralled them all there fired up a projector and explained why they had been gathered. He put it simply: the Americans have decided the next step in space, and we must be prepared to meet them lest we fall behind in perpetuity. At that, he began the film reel and as the group watched, they quickly understood what they were seeing.

Over a decade previously, before Sputnik, diplomats had managed to secure copies of a similar presentation by the American Disney, and it appeared that they had once again released a fantastical description of space travel, but this was much different. The presentation focused on a reusable spaceplane, called a "Space Shuttle", and as Von Braun went over its details, what it would do, and how it would affect costs, it could be seen in the room that many were beginning to fidget at some of the claims made. Notably, one Boris Chertok carried a visibly livid visage through most of the presentation, and Glushko was not much happier. Chelomei however appeared almost delighted, though he maintained about as stoic a face as he could manage if he noticed anyone studying him.

After a couple hours, the presentations finally ended. The KGB agent would mention that there was more, but they were not able to secure the rest and diplomatic channels were being strained, preventing conventional procurement. At this, the room finally exploded in rather fierce and rapid debate.

These discussions, now historically known as the Glushko Plot (though the "plot" would only comprise a relatively small amount of the time spent), would carry over for nearly a week, with the core focus being on whether or not the Soviets even had the capability of creating such a spacecraft at all, and many other related topics such as logistics for testing and the notion of attempting to compete with eventual Mars missions when they were still struggling to even get to the Moon. The principle detractor, Chertok, was very adamant on the ideas impossibility and had argued that counter to the notion of it saving costs, it would likely bankrupt the Union entirely. Many however took this as hyperbole, but with Glushko still on the fence Chertok managed to maintain credibility as the debates went on.

Meanwhile, the Vladimirs, Chelomei and Barmin, would form the leadership of the opposing camp, who bought in to the concept and were convinced of its efficacy. While they acknowledged the technological hurdles, they both recognized that in order to overcome the difficulties the country had faced in catching up with the Americans, they would have to move past the old ways of thinking, and that even if they opted not to do this, it was unlikely that any successes would be possible. The Luna program was incredibly behind with no end in sight, and with only Soyuz and Proton as the nation's launchers they could not hope to compete in any regime as time went on.

It was these arguments that affected Glushko the most, as through his work with Barmin on the moon base he too was frustrated by the failures of the N1 (a rocket he originally did not support to begin with) and did not see any way it could be recovered, and eventually he would come to establish a compromise amongst the two camps. He would argue that they should pursue the reusable shuttle (now abbreviated as MKS), and that in tandem a series of modular rockets would need to be developed that could not only launch the spaceplane component, but able to launch a variety of payloads. Core to his argument was that more than anything else, regardless of how they choose to proceed, they would have to be able to convince the congress to fund the projects, and merely copying the American's ideas was not going to cut it.

But even more importantly, it represented a chance to pay back to the Americans the embarrassment Apollo 11 had afforded them. If they could do this, and get it done before the Americans, they could leapfrog them and re-establish Soviet supremacy in spaceflight, without even having to go to the Moon at all, just as the Americans had done when they went for the Moon, when the Soviets had beaten them at every turn in Earth's orbit.

This brought the group into a rough agreement, and they spent much of their remaining time together hashing out the who's and the what's of the program. Glushko would take the lead on developing the new rockets while Chelomei focused on developing the spaceplane. Barmin meanwhile would begin work on payload development, ideally with a space station as a priority to make the as yet unflown Salyut stations more worthwhile.

This plan however, lead to one issue that couldn't be avoided or planned around. While the group was confident that they could put together a proposal that would be acceptable to the government, they knew it was going to be near impossible to have it funded concurrently with the Luna program, which was already consuming vast resources, and it was unlikely that even the Soyuz and station programs would be able to continue. As such, the group devised a scheme to oust Mishin and have the program cancelled, using detailed reports that they could draw up (or, if needed, manufacture out of thin air) indicating the failures of the program and Mishin's inadequacy to resolve it. This would be presented alongside the new proposal, and all it would take is a rubber stamp.

And indeed, by December of that year, that stamp was received. Mishin was fired and replaced with Gluskho, and the combined MKS-RLA program was born. Soyuz would continue in the interim to maintain access to space, and the station programs would be put on hold until 1976 to allow for funding to be directed towards the program.

==

Some notes here. Through my research into the Soviets work on Buran IOTL, I was keen to identify who, if they were prompted earlier, would be amenable to what the Space Shuttle concept was, and the three, Glushko, Barmin, and Chelomei wound up fitting the bill. Glushko was mostly focused on his RLA rockets and saw Buran as a path to realizing them (and he has much the same motivations ITTL as well). Chelomei had already been working on spaceplane concepts and during the Buran discussions seemed to be the most supportive, with Barmin chiming in with similar levels of support, except from the economic perspective of realizing his moon base and other large scale projects. With these personalities identified, I felt reasonably comfortable that my prompt would elicit the response we see.

Mentioned here also is Boris Chertok, whose memoirs served as the primary source for the attitudes presented. IOTL he genuinely did not believe the Soviets could do the Shuttle, and with nearly 5 years head start he would be even more entrenched in that position until overridden by consensus.

And finally, I will note that the group presented did not see the entire 4-part series, instead only seeing the first two episodes and parts of the third. The reels for these would be split up and smuggled out of the US by the KGB but one of the agents would be caught in Europe with other contraband and another wound up procuring only a partial reel that was meant for schools. As such, they would critically miss Paine's Plea and would not realize until the ASTP missions (when they finally got the full reels) that the US was not yet committed to the Shuttle when they started, and never committed to the other aspects. But by then, they will be too far along to walk back.
 
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Nice update and yes, for the most part (most being the keyword and phrasing actually :) ) there was a LOT of opposition to simply 'copying' the American Shuttle due to the unrealistic economics, (flight rate, turn around time and other factors were obviously HIGHLY optimistic) and it ended up being a 'top-down' decision to specifically copy as closely as possible the America design. NOT doing so will open up a lot of possible actual economics and mission opportunities that the USSR could heavily exploit.
(On the other hand "politics" is just as much a 'thing' there as on this side of the world so... :) )

Randy
 
(On the other hand "politics" is just as much a 'thing' there as on this side of the world so... :) )

Oh yes, very much so. Perhaps a happy medium might be found? 🤔

Or may be it just becomes a total disaster that makes Challenger look like a launch delay. 😬

Who knows, who knows...
 
Oh yes, very much so. Perhaps a happy medium might be found? 🤔

Or may be it just becomes a total disaster that makes Challenger look like a launch delay. 😬

Who knows, who knows...

Uhm, well it is YOUR time line so we'll just assume that at least one of us around here "knows". You know, just to be on the safe side :)

Randy
 
Subscribed though I find Paine's plea somewhat unlikely, he wasn't the sharpest political operator but even he would have realised that going on national television and trying bounce Nixon into something when no final decision had been made was a dumb idea.
 
Subscribed though I find Paine's plea somewhat unlikely, he wasn't the sharpest political operator but even he would have realised that going on national television and trying bounce Nixon into something when no final decision had been made was a dumb idea.
Yeah I think thats a fair assessment. The ASB here is basically that Paine is hella more enthusiastic (ie, obsessed) about the idea to a near blinding degree. Hence why hes able to convince Von Braun which was what was arguably even more implausible, but what was really needed to go where we needed to go, and I feel that VB drinking the IPP kool aid would be better served if hes convinced rather than ASBd.

But at the same time, its a relatively minor twisting of events. Paine and VB were still central to how IPP as we know it came to be and from everything Ive read the reason Paine resigned IRL is because Nixon asked him to due to the fallout of his stubborn advocacy for the program. (Which i believe referred to insisting on everything at once as opposed to any overstep like we see here)

As such, this all happens earlier and with a more elaborate fallout of the Shuttle decision, and provides a means of getting the Soviets to where they are now. (Which is going to end up being very crucial to future events ;) )
 
Yeah I think thats a fair assessment. The ASB here is basically that Paine is hella more enthusiastic (ie, obsessed) about the idea to a near blinding degree.

That's not ASB that's exactly how Paine WAS with the IPP. He would not let ANY aspect of it go and even argued straight to Nixon's face about it being all of nothing so Nixon asked for his resignation. And Paine then went to the media and tried to raise public support, which failed because the public had other issues they were more interested in.

Hence why he's able to convince Von Braun which was what was arguably even more implausible, but what was really needed to go where we needed to go, and I feel that VB drinking the IPP kool aid would be better served if he's convinced rather than ASBd.

WVB was NOT enthusiastic about the IPP simply because he was aware of how much an aberration the entire Apollo program had been and normally how little public and political support there was for space flight. OTL he kept trying to whittle down the ambitions of the IPP supporters in HQ and specifically Paine but he was put in charge of the Mars mission planning and ordered to present it despite his reservations. He was right and everyone else in HQ was wrong and this carried through to the design and development of the Shuttle as well, so WVB retired from NASA in 1972 OTL. He WAS disappointed in the direction OTL's space program was going and that was because there was an obsession with repeating Apollo over and over again rather than focusing on a more sustainable overall program.
TTL I'd say it was more likely that WVB tempered Paine's enthusiasm which would allow Paine to take a step back and consider reducing the IPP which OTL he never did.

But at the same time, its a relatively minor twisting of events. Paine and VB were still central to how IPP as we know it came to be and from everything I've read the reason Paine resigned IRL is because Nixon asked him to due to the fallout of his stubborn advocacy for the program. (Which i believe referred to insisting on everything at once as opposed to any overstep like we see here)

Yep arguing with the boss who tells you to dial back your ambitions and then trying to go behind his back (to Congress who were not interested) isn't a career enhancing move :) Worse his insistence on 'dreaming big' fed into the higher ups idea that the dip in budget and interest was only temporary and "soon" money and political support would pour in at levels surpassing Apollo. What was needed was a coherent and rational plan on how to down-size and rebuild into a more sustainable space program but instead the Administrator and HQ were more interested in pushing another Apollo program to Mars which was exactly the opposite of what the politicians and public actually wanted. OTL it all got whittled down to a Space Station and supporting space shuttle which then got reduced to only a Space Shuttle which ended up having to do everything.

NASA post Apollo was a mess, but a fixable mess but no one wanted to actually fix things or lower their ambitions.

Randy
 
And by having Glushko do the booster and Chelomai the space plane, you avoid toxic hypergols. Good!!!

Er, those two were the ones pushing hypergolics for general use :)

Glushko only ended up designing kerolox and hydrolox engines when he was forced to. (Damn good job once he did but...)

Randy
 
TTL I'd say it was more likely that WVB tempered Paine's enthusiasm which would allow Paine to take a step back and consider reducing the IPP which OTL he never did.

Indeed that is pretty much what happened here, though contrary to how OTL went, Von Braun doesnt merely go through the motions but gets invested in the program, and for me I think it really would have come down to the promise of reusability.

Have to remember at this point we're in 1969-1970. The Mathematica report doesnt exist promising 700 flights (IIRC) over 30 years and other ridicuolous wank material, so all NASA or the SSSR guys would have to work with are plausibly more realistic pizza box estimations. They still wouldnt be able to anticipate how badly refurbishment would go, but I doubt theyd initially assume that kind of insanity.

-

Note for anyone thats curious, I do hope to have the next post up today. We're going to start to dig into the more technical side of things as opposed to the narrative so Im trying to get my intellectual ducks in a row.
 
Indeed that is pretty much what happened here, though contrary to how OTL went, Von Braun doesn't merely go through the motions but gets invested in the program, and for me I think it really would have come down to the promise of reusability.

Agreed but again the "tough" part here is all the 'extra' stuff that was tagged on because of the insistence that Apollo was the 'standard' and not the oddity it actually was. WVB was about the only one fighting the growth and optimism. I think that really pushing for a rather 'simple' space station and a shuttle to support it would be a more 'solid' plan than the IPP in the short term. (The main problem is not scaring Congress and the public with emphasizing the LONG term planning too soon :) )

And it does since the entire goal of both Nixon and Congress was to reduce the cost of space flight in general from Apollo level costs.

Have to remember at this point we're in 1969-1970. The Mathematica report doesn't exist promising 700 flights (IIRC) over 30 years and other ridiculous wank material, so all NASA or the SSSR guys would have to work with are plausibly more realistic pizza box estimations. They still wouldn't be able to anticipate how badly refurbishment would go, but I doubt they'd initially assume that kind of insanity.

One thing that you mentioned already is more use of Saturn technology which was tossed out early on. Then of course there's a 'different' design approach and philosophy since the "shuttle" will be designed to actually support a space station and not have to do everything itself. I will sort of 'defend' some of the Mathematica report though as they incredibly high flight rate was intended to be unreasonable as far as I can tell to get across the idea that reuse only actually made economic sense if you had a very high flight rate. Arguably, (and it has been argued a LOT :) ) SpaceX's Falcon 9 flight rate is really not high enough to justify reuse but overall the 'case' is marginal enough to make some sense.

In context many at NASA in fact DID have some pretty good data on recovery and refurbishment through prior testing. (WVB had done some pretty extensive testing on recovery and refurbishment of H1 engines for a possible Saturn 1 first stage recovery scheme with the testing showing a maximum cost of around %5 of the total engine cost for recovery and refurbishment. He'd wanted to test the F1 and J2 as well but the pressure of Apollo took recovery right off the table early on) Oddly the refurbishment and maintenance costs of the X-15 were actually pretty high and did not lend a lot of confidence to the possible utility of a flyback first stage. But this was ignored once real work began on the Shuttle concepts and a manned, flyback first stage was baselined anyway. WVB among others argued for a more basic ocean recovered booster stage but the pressure for a high flight rate was already appearing even back then. (Another thing Mathematica got 'right' was that TAOS was in fact the more efficient option if you had to develop a very expensive piece of flight hardware {the Orbiter} then it would be lots cheaper to make the 'booster' as cheap as possible}

Which leads me to the OTHER big question as politics is going to have to rear it's ugly head here :) Part of the reason the TAOS design was chosen was to be able to spread the program as far as possible. (Why else would you ship SRBs FROM Utah to Florida to use then BACK to Utah to refurbish? Kind of blows the economics out of the water really quickly)

With a more 'broad' program (shuttle AND space tug AND space station) then you get a much broader participation without having to compromise any one part of the project too much due to shipping and other ancillary costs.

Randy
 
MKS Design Process Part 1 - The Horror and the Headaches
MKS Design Process Part 1
The Horror and the Headaches

Before the fall of the Soviet Union, the design process of their MKS program was, like much of the Soviet aerospace research and development apparatus, an enigma wrapped in a mystery. As such, as far as most of the world knew or was concerned (or had to know), the process may as well have been the cleanest and most straightforward process ever. But, of course, the truth was nothing but.

Beginning in 1971, the MKS program was faced with two almost immediate hurdles. First and foremost was the design of their orbiter. Under the ostensible leadership of Vladimir Chelomei, his own bureau and several tangential to it would put to task a number of proposals. Many of these often would not take much consideration before being rejected or otherwise disregarded. Amongst Chelomei's camp there appeared to be a great disconnect between the design requirements that were expected (based on the early assessments of the American Shuttle that were now flowing in from overseas) and what would be put to paper.

This disconnect was so inherent during this period that even Chelomei himself was losing sight as he pursued his own design, the LKS (Лёгкий Космический Самолёт, "Light Cosmos Plane"). Based on the perspective of limiting development costs and an intent for future growth, his design was much smaller than the American design and carried a fraction of the payload. While it would prove promising, particularly as it could theoretically be launched on already operating boosters, internal assessments by his bureau and the GSKB (Barmin's house) would indicate the extreme inefficiencies the small payload (barely 5 tons) would induce on orbital construction, necessitating more launches and limiting the value over the conventional station launches they were already familiar with.

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An early sketch of LKS on a UR-500 [1]

While Chelomei would still favor and champion his pet design right up to his passing some 30 years later, going so far as to use funding to build an unauthorized 1:1 mock-up of the orbiter:

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The only surviving photograph of the LKS mockup, which was destroyed sometime in the mid 1980s [2]

He would find his lack of focus perpetually detrimental, and the lack of coordination with the other involved bureaus would result in a great deal of tension.

So much so in fact that Glushko would end up submitting his own proposal for the orbiter. Designed from the ground up to be integrated with his planned RLA series of rockets, it would take the American Shuttle to task.

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A modern rendering of Glushko's MKTVA - Original cylindrical design pictured on top.

Boasting a payload of a massive 88 tons, his orbiter would consist of a rounded, triangular body with relatively small vertical stablizers in the rear and a body flap at the base, which was estimated [3] to provide high hypersonic maneuverability. For landing, it would take inspiration from the Soyuz, using parachutes to slow its descent before using retrorockets, exposed with the landing gear, to allow for a soft landing.

For most of the two year process, Glushkos design was considered by most to be the likely candidate to fly, but the bureaus were ultimately at a stalemate. While they could all agree on where they needed to go, consensus was failing to be reached on how they would get there.

However, at least one aspect of all the various proposals did bring practically unanimous consensus: thermal protection. No matter the design of the orbiter, its thermal protection system would be its most critical factor. Not only did the system have to be light enough to not impose harsh payload penalties to the design, but it also had to be reusable unlike the ablative materials of the past which were expended after one use.

The Americans by this point had already soldified their plans, using a combination of various materials, with the bulk of the TPS being a type of ceramic tile. By mid 1970, they would be able to replicate a rudimentary form of what the Americans were using, and in a notable incident with Glushko, a rather surprising fact would become apparent to the Russians.

As one Boris Chertok would tell us in his memoirs, when the initial samples arrived for testing, Glushko had been the direct recipient. Unbeknownst to him at the time, the manufacturing bureau had neglected to note the apparent fragility of the tiles. As a result, when Glushko would inadvertently crush one of the tiles in his hands, leaving him rather horrified and confused. [4]

While the material did have the necessary properties to fulfill the design, the fragile nature made the prospect of using them very suspect. This prompted the need for alternatives, and the leading consensus rapidly enveloped around a system of metallic tiles instead, something that the group was wholly unfamilliar with but would begin research on. [5] But, in a stroke of cleverness that would end up being emblematic of the early MKS program, they had assumed that the Americans must be aware of this problem and have identified alternatives. Thus, in cohort with the KGB, the Soviets would begin attempts at smuggling materials and research out of the US.

For a time, however, this did not bring the results they had hoped for, until some years later in 1975, when the KGB would finally come through during the Apollo-Soyuz project. By happenstance, the same agent that had initially gathered them together (who they only knew as Vasily) would be the one to deliver. Not only did they now have access to a wealth of data on the subject, they also had a material to work with. A nickel and chromium based alloy [7], the material provided the much needed bedrock for the TPS that had been slowly developed in the preceding years. Almost immediately, a vast amount of state resources would be directed towards replicating the material, a benefit the designers would seldom get to enjoy with the metal having supposed benefits to the military just as much as the space program.

Over time as the 1970s came to a close, the TPS would end up becoming the sole factor determining the launch date, as the manufacture of the needed metals would face numerous delays, to the point that the Politburo had begun pressuring Glushko and the others to just use the Americans ceramics. He would not succomb to this however, and pushed back arguing that without the TPS the entire program would be rendered useless, and even into the early days of 1980, when the first orbiter would finally be prepared, he would constantly have to justify the delays and necessity. Given the great deal of advancement[6] over the American design, he consistently won these arguments, though the endless parade of politicians would sour on him as time went on.

Not all aspects were horrors and headaches, however. Concurrently, the rocket and payload development programs proceded relatively stress free.
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[1] The actual IRL source of this is unclear, but was most likely not contemporary.

[2] Likewise with this one, which may not be an actual picture of the real mockup.

[3] Estimated as at this point in time they wouldnt have all the details yet, though ITTL Glushkos team would internally improve their design over the original cylindrical design they started with IOTL, giving them a better idea of how it would behave.

[4]I doubt this would have happened in any timeline, but its a highly amusing mental image for me and so I ASB it into being 😁

[5] I actually could not find any good data on the state of Soviet material sciences nor any indication of whether or not they ever studied metallic TPS systems, and so the assumption here is that they just didnt, or had so little that it wouldnt have made a difference. If you dear reader have any documentation to this end, I would LOVE to read it. Given theyd end up stealing a lot of things anyway, IOTL and ITTL, I didnt consider too much of an issue, however.

[6] The final design will be described with the finalized orbiter several posts from now. Im still working on the math and also I dont want to spoil what happens so 🤐

[7] out of order, sue me. The specific alloy was Inconel 625, which AFAICT was the best available in the US at the time that wasnt going to be too absurdly expensive. The Soviets would overtime improve on the alloy, getting somewhere inbetween 718 and X-750 performance wise, which would be one of the primary causes of the delays into 1980.
 
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I have to say as well that Ive really come to appreciate Soviet/Russian philosophy when it comes to spacecraft and rocketry design. For a long time I was very put off and dismissive (mostly for the childish reason that everything just looks so weird compared to Western equivalents), but these days Im really into it, especially now given the great deal of research this project required.

And, let me say too, I was startled at how much the MKTVA designs resembled Starship, if only superficially, and it makes me wonder if SS wasnt inspired by the idea.
 
Model of the MKTVA:

Some related stuff from around the web:
Maks-Q on Twitter: "The second proposal was called MTKVP. This was a  wingless spacecraft proposed by Valentin Glushko that would land vertically  under parachutes. It would launch on top of the RLA-130V -


MTKVP: Glushko's Opening Gambit | False Steps


And somewhere there's both an animated gif of the fin deployment and a hand drawing of a supposed swing wing version that was considered. As can be told by the huge cloud of parachutes the design would have needed it was quickly concluded that there was a high risk of loss-of-vehicle with ANY parachute malfunction. (And the number of chutes pretty much gave a very high chance of such malfunctions) Which is why folding wings and a larger propulsion system were considered.

Oddly the US also looked at a vertical landing propulsive capsule called "PLAME" for "“Propulsive Lift Concept for the Descent and Landing of Manned Entry Vehicles” which used turbojets to allow a controlled soft landing with parachutes as a backup.

And in the case of MKTVA you needed 'something' due to the landed mass, it was a beast :)

As to metallic TPS, Lockheed actually offered a titanium based metallic TPS based on designs they'd been working on since the early 60s but at the orbiter size the weight was a serious issue.

Looking forward to more :)

Randy
 
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