O tempora, O mores! The Catiline Conspiracy suceeds

I like this timeline since so few people write a what if about the Cataline conspiracy

Thank you. It's an interesting period in that there's an awful lot we don't actually know, but at the same time we do have more than just the bare bones. Of course it was all written from the perspective of the winners.

As the old saying goes "Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason? Why, if it prosper, none dare call it treason.’
 
I must admit that I’m not terribly familiar with Roman history, especially the Catiline Conspiracy, but I am thoroughly enjoying this TL, it’s superbly written.
 
Part VI
Firstly, so much for all the kind comments. I'm enjoying writing my first TL, and I'm glad others are finding it interesting.

So, this actually diverged a little from what I originally had in mind; but the more I looked him up the more I liked the idea of throwing a third faction into this whole cluster- err, mess.

Potentially I'm being unfair to old Scipio here; but it has to be said few of his fellows had much good to say about him, and he seems to have been thuggish, unpleasant and grasping even by Roman standards. As for the detail about the pornographic floor shows, that's from Tom Hollands EXCELLENT Rubicon; I haven't been able to find a primary source for it (but then, I'm limited to free online English translations) but it's too good a detail not to include.

The introduction, I should make clear, is an edited version of what appears on the Perseus Digital Library for the man. For most of the introductions I've been able to edit and heavily modify existing speeches. ('Varro' is, of course, Marcus Terentius Varro).

Part VI: Scipio's Gamble

Scipio never exhibited any proofs of striking abilities either in war or in peace; and the prominent part which he played in these stormy times was chiefly owing to his high connections, being a Scipio by birth, and a Metellus by adoption. The love of country and the freedom of the Republic were a mere sham; he was only anxious to obtain for himself and his party the exclusive possession of the offices of the state and of the provinces, that they might realise fortunes to gratify their love of luxury and pomp. In public, Scipio showed himself cruel, vindictive, and oppressive; in private, he was mean, avaricious, and licentious, even beyond most of his contemporaries

Varro, On Catiline



The shock of the defeat at Claterna sent Catiline’s whole cause trembling. After all, whatever his rhetoric about the expulsion of a parasitical oligarchy, the restoration of the ancient liberties of the Roman people, and his paternal concern for the poor, at the end his regime had taken power by violent – and thoroughly illegal – means.



Its constitutional basis was an obvious fiction, the law establishing it had been passed by bribes and threats, and its authority came mostly from the gold of Crassus, the charisma of Catiline and the sicarii of Cethegus.



So long as it was successful, of course, many Romans were prepared to overlook such minor details. As, however the details filtered back to Rome, Catiline’s authority began to drain away, his fragile coalition starting to crack, his more powerful supporters suddenly becoming rather more circumspect. Most notable – and certainly the most infamous – was Marcus Caecilius Metellus – the man who had presided over Cicero’s trial in absentia. Previously one of the most well connected and influential supporters of the new regime, Marcus suddenly made it known – according to Varro – that he was, in fact, ‘eager to talk with all men of goodwill’ about the future of the Republic, and boasted he had sent letters to dozens of noblemen – including Murena, Pompey and Cicero.

(This, as Varro put it with some understatement, ‘did not improve his popularity’. Rather than being regarded as he had hoped – as a peacemaker trying to bring warring factions together – he was instead seen more as a rat who had leapt abroad a sinking ship and was now trying desperately to get off it. Varro, who appears to have had some personal connections with the nobility, mentions that even in Rome his former friends ‘pretended not to recognise him’, whilst hardline regime partisans began to jeer and threaten him in the streets. Neither does it appear his newfound ecumenical spirit impressed Cicero. In a letter to Atticus, he recorded:

“Rumour tells me Metellus has sent me a letter, and indeed he has. I shall not weary you with a recitation of it; save to say at least Catiline can be convincing in his justifications. I burnt it for warmth; that way the scroll served at least one useful purpose”.)

However, despite the evident self-interest in such shifts of support, it still had the effect of showing that Catiline and his Decemvirate were no longer the certain winners the Roman people had taken them for; that the Decemvirate was not as strong as it might be thought. Descended from boys suckled by a wolf as they were, the Romans had a fine nose for weakness. Old enemies within the city, cowed into submission, began to grow bolder. Those with the means to leave took themselves, their families, and their fortunes out of the city – Varro recording that well over a thousand people, by his estimate, fled the city in the month following the battle of Claterna. Prices spiked; debts were called in by anxious creditors, and Rome’s already high crime rate soared.

For the first time, Catiline and the rest of the Decemvirate were booed and jeered when they made speeches, or walked down the streets. Anti- Decemvirate graffiti was scribbled on walls, rabble rousing speeches were made on street corners. Even in the Senate, men who only days ago had applauded the Decemvirate began to ask searching, embarrassing questions; demand that Cicero be given a fair trial; a few even suggesting that Catiline should step down – although the intimidation that surely followed such suggestions no doubt kept the tongues of most Senators rather more circumspect.

In retaliation, the sicarii – whether by their own initiative or acting on orders – launched a wave of summary beatings, rapes and killings across the city, attempting to quell the rising unrest. In one particularly grisly incident, Varro records that six or seven businessmen, known to be quietly anti-Catiline, were hacked to pieces by the Esquiline gate in an apparently unprovoked attack. In retaliation, a wave of murders by anti-Decemvirates swept the city; supporters of the regime murdered in the streets. Demonstrations against the regime began to boil over into riots, and several pitched battles were fought in the slums of the Aventine and Suburra between mobs owning at least nominal allegiance to each faction.

However disturbing this was to Catiline however – and to a self-styled champion of the People it was, to say the least, awkward to see a large number of the People being attacked by his own Sicarii – it was not critical. He still retained substantial support, not only from the urban poor but from a hard-core of aristocratic supporters whom realised that he was their only hope of achieving the power and riches they believed was owed to them. Within the city, his opponents might demonstrate, riot and on occasion kill – but it was the violence born of spasms of rage, not an organised conspiracy.

Outside the city, however, it was a different matter – and although Murena was undoubtedly on his mind, so too was another man – Metellus Scipio.

Having based himself around Neapolis, he had busied himself raising an army, which in addition to containing a substantial subset of influential Roman nobles also included fifty thousand legionaries – the largest military force in Italy. Previously, he had sent polite, though non-committal messages to both Catiline and Cicero, dangling the prospect of his support, whilst obliquely threatening both, no doubt to their mutual frustration and anger. It had no doubt occurred to him that, with his army, his connections, and his wealth, he was now one of the most powerful men in Italy. His support, thrown behind either Catiline or Cicero would be enough to guarantee their victory.

However, after Claterna, it seems his attitude began to shift somewhat. With such power, after all, there was no reason why a man of his linage should be content merely to support either a rogue, and possibly insane, demagogue – or an immigrant lawyer from Arpinium; a consul who had let power slip away from him. Catiline had the support of the mob and the backing of Crassus and some other influential nobles, Cicero in truth had little but his empty title of Consul. In short, Scipio reasoned, neither was a government in any real sense. And, when it came to the ultimate arbiter of power, Scipio himself possessed a larger army than Catiline, a train of powerbrokers in his network, and a vast fortune of his own. By late January, it seems, he had decided on a fateful step. He was no longer content to be a weight on the scales, a mere pawn in the games of others.

A high ranking member of his inner council, and a close friend of Catiline, Quintus Lutatius Catulus Capitolinus, was despatched to Rome and met with the Decemvirate, supposedly to give them an ultimatum. The choice of messenger was inspired, for Catiline had, back in the days of Sulla, helped Catalus avenge the murder of his father by a pro-Marian politician, Marcus Marius Gratidianus. As ever with Catiline, wild rumours had swirled around his part in the affair. Whilst few judged Catalus for his punishing his father’s killer, the manner in which it was done was regarded as excessive even by the standards of the bloody days of the civil wars. Catiline had, supposedly, whipped the man naked through the town, before butchering Gratidianus at the tomb of Catalus’ father. Having carved limb and flesh from the still living man, Catiline was supposed to have slit his throat, as an animal might be sacrificed to the Gods; an offering to Catalus Pater.

There was, therefore, no better man to present an unwelcome message to Catiline, a man well regarded by almost all the aristocracy, yet also a man who had sealed his friendship with Catiline in blood. The exact terms of Scipio’s ultimatum are unclear, but according to Varro they included the disbanding of the sicarii, the pardon of Cicero and others, and the immediate resignation of all members of the Decemvirate, pending an election to be carried out under the ‘supervision’ of Scipio. In return, there would be no reprisals, no treason trials, no investigations.

If, on the other hand, Catiline ignored this olive-branch, Scipio would have no choice but to march on Rome and restore order at the point of a sword.

Cicero received a similar offer, this time conveyed by his old friend and rival, Quintus Hortensius. Trapped as he was in Brundisium, with only a few thousand armed men under his theoretical command, and with winter storms rendering passage to Greece via the Ionian Sea, Cicero was aware his options were limited – but Scipio’s deal was one he seemed unable to swallow. Not only, as he raged to Atticus, did it allow Cataline and his confederates to escape punishment, it would also inevitably place the entire state under the de-facto, if not de jure, control of Scipio – a man whom despite his birthright had achieved relatively little in his life save for organising pornographic floor shows, and whom was widely regarded as covetous, irresponsible, vicious and exceptionally arrogant even by the undemanding standards of the Roman Optimates. Of course, much of Cicero’s dismay was likely down to the fact that nowhere was it proposed that he resume his consulship – or indeed, be granted any special role in the governing of the Republic.

However, he could see no way out and, no doubt after extensive ‘persuasion’ by his colleagues Celer and Clodius, he reluctantly wrote to Scipio, hailing him no doubt through gritted teeth as ‘a man of sense and peace, a man who is willing to let his weapons of war yield to the toga of peace’. Some have detected irony in that – Scipio was hardly a respected commander; his man qualification being the presence of Scipio Africanus in his family tree.

Scipio, no doubt, was unaware of the irony. Imperiously, Cicero was summoned to Neapolis; a sign of his submission and homage towards Rome’s new master.

Catiline, however, was not so easily swayed. A man of his towering ego, and almost reckless courage, was hardly the sort of man to yield to the demands of anyone, no matter how exalted their ancestry. Likewise, Crassus was hardly a man who, having risked everything, would calmly accept his loss and retire into obscurity, the stink of treason forever attached to him; a sentiment likely shared by many of Catiline’s more passionate supporters.

True, many members of the aristocracy – even, if Varro is believed, amongst the Decemvirate themselves – were at least interested in Scipio’s promise of amnesty, now that his regime was starting to crumble. True, Murena was marching through the Appenines on the via Flamenia; town after town surrendering to his army. And, true, Catiline’s forces were limited. Next to the vast armies of the implacably hostile Murena and the opportunistic Scipio, he could perhaps raise and equip some twenty thousand men; a scratch force of ex-Sullan veterans, impressed urban plebs, a mob of sicarii better trained than the rest, and a core of actual serving legionaries of doubtful loyalty; most of whom had been awaiting the triumphal processions of Quintus Marcius Rex, who had died during the coup, and Metellus Creticus.

It was a small force of unreliable, mostly untrained men, defending a restive city infested with enemy sympathisers, from not one but two much larger armies. Even atop the walls of Rome, it was doubtful they’d hold off the forces of Murena – much less the armies of Scipio, should he decide to force his ultimatum. In open battle, needless to say, their odds would be even worse.

Therefore, it took everyone by surprise when, in late January, Catiline, along with Cethegus and another senior member of the conspiracy, Marcus Porcius Laeca, marched, with only two legions at his back, down the via Flaminia – straight into the path of Murena.
 
I wonder if half the reason the Catilinean legions leave Rome is that once on campaign they are directly under Catiline's thumb and can't sound out surrendering in the middle of battle (or, at least, not easily). Plus with the mob at least temporarily no longer Catiline's base of power the hierarchy of military command is probably the safest place he can be right now to resist any moves by Crassus to make Catiline a figurehead/tragic martyr as, after so much close proximity to each other's egos, Crassus and Catiline must at this point personally despise one another and and only stand united against their common enemies.
 
I wonder if half the reason the Catilinean legions leave Rome is that once on campaign they are directly under Catiline's thumb and can't sound out surrendering in the middle of battle (or, at least, not easily). Plus with the mob at least temporarily no longer Catiline's base of power the hierarchy of military command is probably the safest place he can be right now to resist any moves by Crassus to make Catiline a figurehead/tragic martyr as, after so much close proximity to each other's egos, Crassus and Catiline must at this point personally despise one another and and only stand united against their common enemies.
I may have missed it, but where is Caesar in all of this:? Does he have a role to play?
 
I wonder if half the reason the Catilinean legions leave Rome is that once on campaign they are directly under Catiline's thumb and can't sound out surrendering in the middle of battle (or, at least, not easily). Plus with the mob at least temporarily no longer Catiline's base of power the hierarchy of military command is probably the safest place he can be right now to resist any moves by Crassus to make Catiline a figurehead/tragic martyr as, after so much close proximity to each other's egos, Crassus and Catiline must at this point personally despise one another and and only stand united against their common enemies.

All good points! Definitely, Cataline's army is made up either of not very motivated trained soldiers, or motivated, not very trained soldiers; so yes. He definitely doesn't want the military force he has got deciding to switch sides; and the number of people he trusts is, rather sensibly, limited.

As for the relationship between Crassus and Catailine; its a loveless marriage of convenience at best; and both are watching for the backstab they are sure is coming (after all, it's what they'd both do themselves). Crassus is a slippery, ruthless opportunist, whilst Catiline is a ruthless, power hungry and perhaps not entirely mentally stable demagogue.
 
Interesting to see where this is going. Great to see Metellus Scipio featured, certainly an interesting and not often utilized character. Probably because its an era full of interesting characters.
 
Interesting to see where this is going. Great to see Metellus Scipio featured, certainly an interesting and not often utilized character. Probably because its an era full of interesting characters.

Thanks! In OTL, he was one of the men who pushed Pompey into open conflict with Ceasar and was, in every account I've seen, widely regarded as corrupt, vicious and arrogant, even by the standards of the time, although he died honourably enough.
 
Watching with interest. You picked a tumultuous but extremely underutilized time period. I think 90 BC to 55 BC are way more interesting than what came directly before or after.
Thanks! In OTL, he was one of the men who pushed Pompey into open conflict with Ceasar and was, in every account I've seen, widely regarded as corrupt, vicious and arrogant, even by the standards of the time, although he died honourably enough.
Being a Metellus AND a Scipio, arrogance is hardly surprising!
 
Part VII
Sorry for the delay, but real life got in the way.

This update is also a lot longer than usual - I kept trying to find a nice place to cut it off but couldn't. Whether that's a good or bad thing I leave to your judgement.
And before you ask, Narnia was a real Roman town - tempting as it is to imagine Catiline talking to Aslan...

Part VII - The Battle of Narnia

"When I think on you, my soldiers, and weigh your deeds, I have high hopes of victory. Your spirit, youth, and valour give me heart, not to mention necessity, which makes even the timid brave. But if Fortune frowns upon your bravery, take care not to die unavenged. Do not be captured and slaughtered like cattle, but, fighting like heroes, leave the enemy a bloody and tearful victory."

Catiline’s oration to his army just before the siege of Narnia – Sallust, the Wars of Catiline.



Historians have long amused themselves trying to work out why, in the middle of a bitterly cold winter, with blizzards sweeping across the countryside, Catiline decided to leave the protection of Rome and lead two understrength, under-trained and ill-motivated troops into a snowstorm to confront a battle hardened army that outnumbered him by at least two to one. Although of course most strategists will allow that in many circumstances attack is the best form of defence, military logic does not suggest that Catiline’s circumstances in early 62 BC were examples of such circumstances.

Cicero, and indeed most writers since, have had little difficulty explaining this decision as yet another manifestation of Catiline’s disordered mind; a boldness and impulsivity that bordered on insanity and an ego that could not conceive of the possibility of failure.

However, as an explanation this remains unsatisfactory. Doubtless, Catiline was recklessly brave, but explaining all of his actions as merely the result of madness runs the risk of truly explaining nothing at all. Mentally ill he may well have been – and at a remove of more than two thousand years, we will never truly know the state of his mind – but for all Cicero’s protestations, Catiline had managed to forge a movement that spanned all sections of Roman society; had led a ruthlessly efficient coup that had made him master of Rome inside a night, and had managed to co-opt, contain or liquidate almost of all of his potential opponents within the city within a matter of months – including men like Crassus, whose power, influence and wealth vastly exceeded his own. Mad he may well have been, but he was also undoubtedly clever, charismatic, decisive and primed to exploit any weakness his opponents displayed. Before simply dismissing his sally as the result of insanity, the true scholar of history must attempt to see if there was, in fact, some logical - or at least semi-logical - reasoning behind his actions.

It is, of course, important to remember he was a gambler at heart. He must have realised that remaining in the city, whilst perhaps safer in the shorter term, was not a strategy that could be pursued forever. His support grew weaker every day; Scipio menaced him from the south, and there was every possibility that Murena could successfully storm the city should he reach it. Even inside the city, a successful a assassination attempt could not be discounted; and he would have been well aware that many of his wealthier supporters – possibly up to and including Crassus – would be coldly considering their chances should they attempt a coup attempt of their own.

By contrast, in the midst of his army, he would be guarded by well armed and (mostly) loyal men. He would be seen to be taking the fight to the enemy, convincing his wavering supporters that he was still in the fight and had not been backed helplessly into a corner. And, perhaps most importantly to him, leading his army personally showed he was, whatever else his opponents might say, willing to risk all for his cause; dying as a true Roman should in the line of battle. To a man like Catiline, steeped in the oldest and harshest traditions of Rome, only death or victory were acceptable. Far better, he may have reasoned, to die gloriously than wait, huddled in Rome, waiting for a killer’s blade or the judgement of an opportunist like Scipio.

And there was always the chance of victory. In the narrow passes of the Appenines, where snow covered ice-slicked roads, where blizzards reduced command and control to the bare minimum, the advantages of Murena’s numbers and superior training would be minimised.

It was, undoubtedly, an exceptionally risky gamble; and one that excited a curious mixture of bafflement, fear, and reluctant admiration, even amongst his staunchest opponents. Cicero, in particular, mentions it throughout his writings; indeed at times one is left with the impression that the politician, never overly noted for his bravery (although he could be courageous in extremis) was, despite his denials, somewhat envious of Catiline’s reckless boldness

It was, however, likely a sentiment not shared by many of Catiline’s own army; a mixture of poorly trained but loyal plebs, stiffened by a core of sicarii and Sullan veterans, and active-duty legionaries whose loyalty to Catiline had likely been obtained via a mixture of threats and bribery. However they felt, they proved willing to follow him out of Rome. and down the via Flaminia. The winter conditions hampered their march, and it was not until late January at the earliest that Catiline’s army reached Narnia where the road split. Here, one branch led to Interamna Nahars and thence to Fulginium , whilst the other led, more directly, to the towns of Casuentum and Mevania, before rejoining the other branch at Fulginium.

Catiline, of course, had no way of knowing which route Murena was using; the latter, via Mevania, would have been more likely as it was shorter. However, had Catiline decided to march that road, he might well have been outflanked by Murena should his opponent have chosen the other route, who would then have a swift march to the shelter and safety of Rome whilst Catiline’s army froze in the Appenines. The tempting source of action was to fortify Narnia, which was at least defensible – but even then, his forces would still be outnumbered by at least a factor of two, and more likely much more than that.

(As with most battles in the ancient world, determining the sizes of armies is as much about guesswork as it is a science. Murena likely had four regular legions, which would have equated to around 18,000 men in theory, whilst Catiline is stated to have had two legions, or around 9000 - although whether groups such as the sicarii had been folded into these, or acted as their own formations, is unclear. However, Sallust, Cicero and Varro all reference at various times Catiline's forces being significantly outnumbered; Varro at one point mentioning that Murena's auxiliary troops outnumbered his legionaries, giving a a total of perhaps 40,000 men, and Cicero alludes to the fact that Murena had five men to every one of Catiline's. Catiline was definitely outnumbered; and his troops were, on average, less experienced and of poorer quality, but comparisons more exact than that are impossible).

In such circumstances splitting his forces before he further advanced seems as if it would have confirmed any doubts his troops might have had about his sanity; and it probably speaks to his charisma that he was able to convince his officers and men to obey such orders. One legion, commanded by Porcius – half his army – marched down the road towards Interamma Nahars, whilst the other turned, and marched towards Casuentum.

In point of fact, Murena was indeed heading down this latter oute, and by the time Catiline’s legion reached Casuentum, Murena was only a few day’s march away. After a brief skirmish between scouting elements of the two armies, Catiline started to retreat, back towards Narnia, losing several hundred of his troops in a desperate rearguard action as Murena, knowing the killer of his brother and traitor to Rome was within grasp, urged his legions onwards.

Their sacrifice, however, gave Catiline time to fortify – or at least barricade – Narnia; conscripting the locals into his own forces. Amidst flurries of snow and howling winds, Murena forced Catiline back into Narnia, before surrounding the town with four legions. His own forces were low on supplies, and Murena likely realised that a forced march to Rome in this bitter weather, bypassing Catiline, would weaken his army still further. Far better to kill trap Catiline, put him and his traitors to the sword, overwinter in Narnia, recuperate, and then march on Rome to overthrow the remnants of Catiline’s regime.

Sources are almost unanimous that Catiline’s army was both outmatched and hugely outnumbered; with most estimates giving Murena at least five men to every one of Catiline’s. Catiline’s men fought with desperation; knowing the fate that Murena had dealt his prisoners in Claterna. Catiline himself fought in the front ranks alongside his men; always found, so Varro tells us, where the fighting was fiercest and ‘never once turning his back upon the enemy’. Other, less sympathetic writers describe him fighting less like a Roman commander, and more like a gore-slicked barbarian chieftain – or perhaps a demon.

For their part, Murena’s army knew that Narnia had to fall, and soon, lest they be trapped without shelter and supplies, facing the choice of marching either back along their route or towards Rome, in both cases with the prospect of Catiline’s army at their back. Urged on by their commander, and knowing that taking Narnia would likely win them the war, they launched wave after wave of attacks against the town walls. Unlike Catiline, Murena held back, coldly watching as his men attempted to batter down the gates and scale the walls.

Murena’s three assaults upon Narnia were only barely beaten back, with horrific casualties on both sides – Catiline was, we are told, down to barely eight hundred men; whilst Murena’s losses were likely in the low thousands. The weather itself played a vital role; a blizzard blowing across the battlefield hampering Murena’s attempts to coordinate his army and blunting the effectiveness of his assaults – a sign, Catiline is supposed to have claimed, of the favour of the Gods for his cause. Favoured by the divine he might well have been, but he would have been aware that another attempt to take Narnia would likely succeed. Most of his legion was dead or injured and those that remained were exhausted. Indeed, were it not for Murena’s self-indulgent slaughter of prisoners at Claterna, it is likely that Catiline’s army would have begged to surrender.

However, there was one thing Murena was not aware of. He was not facing all of Catiline’s army, but only half of it. Upon hearing that his commander was under siege in Narnia, Porcius turned his army around and marched back, towards Narnia; the inclement weather hampering any sort of scouting on the part of either army.

Porcius, realising that Catiline’s situation was desperate, decided on the sort of bold action his commander would have favoured. As dawn broke, his men, already exhausted from several days of forced marching, came upon Murena’s encampment. As Murena’s army gathered for another attempt to storm Narnia, Porcius ordered his own legion to advance. Catiline, realising that the decisive moment was now upon him, ordered whatever forces he could muster to sally forth. As the winter storm grew ever more severe, the three exhausted armies clashed; the engagement degenerating into a series of bloody, chaotic melees amidst the earthworks, palisades and earthworks of the siege; the snow rendering any sort of grand strategy impossible.

Porcius himself, we are told, died in the early stages of the battle; his horse breaking its legs as it tried to leap a trench; Porcius himself hacked to pieces in the bloody mud. Catiline himself was, Varro tells us, surrounded almost alone; and would surely have perished were it not for the desperate efforts of his bodyguard and his own ferocity. The battle hung in the balance for most of the day; the superior training and numbers of Murena’s forces slowly beginning to tell – until Murena himself, riding too far forward, was struck in the throat by a stray javelin; the victim of one of those arbitrary accidents that play such a role in history.

Seeing their commander fall transfixed to the ground, his exhausted, bloodied, cold and demoralised army withdrew from the battlefield. Their erstwhile opponents were in no condition to pursue; indeed, they were likely still outnumbered by Murena’s former army. But, as night fell, it was Catiline who claimed victory.

It had been a victory dearly won. Sallust estimates that a staggering three quarters of his army had fled or died outside Narnia – including Porcius, one of his closest associates. But it is unlikely he considered himself as in the same unhappy predicament as the ancient king Pyrrhus of Epirus, who had lamented that his victories ruined him more than his enemies. The immediate, and major threat from the implacable, vengeful Murena had been halted – indeed, as it turned out, neutralised forever. Within a week, the battered remnants of Murena’s army had split into three groups, no one commander able to hold it together.

One faction began a weary march back to Arpinium; aiming, it seems to overwinter there and then resume the war in the spring, under the command of a young aristocrat, a former military tribune by the name of Marcus Junius Brutus. Another group, appears to have been led by an old, senior Centurion referred to only as Marius, instead a attempted to go south, linking up with either Cicero at Brundisium or Scipio at Neapolis before, we are told, rather anti-climatically disintegrating during the harsh winter.

However, it was the third faction that provided to be the most noteworthy. It was led by a man whom was not even part of the army originally, but whom instead had joined Murena at Arpinium, and whom was famous – or infamous - even at a tender age, for his profligacy, his slipperiness, his debts and his unpredictability, as well as his scandalous, passionate homosexual relationships. As the other factions marched away, it instead marched back to Narnia – but this time, not as an enemy.

Instead, Gaius Scribonius Curio came to offer Catiline his support, his loyalty – and two thousand legionaries.
 
Hats off to Curio here for being one clever SOB- Catiline's own paramilitaries and militias has been nearly destroyed and until the Catilinians get a real chance to nurse their wounds and are spared another campaign season (extremely unlikely this side of the decade) then Curio's legions are Catiline's military power with the only counterweight being the private retinues of the Cassian aristocrats so desperate for a return to normalcy and the political climate Curio once bleed for under their physical incarnation in Murena ...

will this be the normalization of the Catiline phenomena, where the mobs have their day but the "moderates" stage a soft self-coup and quiet things back down into something vaguely similar to the pre-war Senatorial nobility?
 
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