I would think that Caesar would have as much reason to defect, since then Pompey has a clean march on Rome and Caesar could probably name his price.
O tempora, O mores! The Catiline Conspiracy suceeds
- Thread starter Kolchak17
- Start date
I would think that Caesar would have as much reason to defect, since then Pompey has a clean march on Rome and Caesar could probably name his price.
It's still going to take a couple months for Pompey's legions to shake off their sea legs and roll up the length of Italy, and that's with Caesar immediately surrendering and no other complications like say the rampant banditry and lawlessness that Pompey the mighty pirate-slayer might feel compelled to suppress and bring to order.
Still enough time for one last gamble of a campaign, I think.
Still enough time for one last gamble of a campaign, I think.
Wooohooo!!!! Or maybe, oh no. Definitely, if you're Crassus, oh, no!
Pompey is really well set-up to play the savior of Rome here, isn't he? Especially if he doesn't divorce Mucia this time around (and given that she's been under house arrest it might be more difficult to claim that she's been sleeping around while he was gone) he keeps his connection to a lot of the aristocratic families, he remains popular with ordinary citizens (absence and military victory make the Roman heart grow fonder), he has the biggest and most experienced army in Italy, and as we know, turning up at the last minute to claim the credit for the victory that someone else has mostly achieved is Pompey's favorite tactic. The question then is, what does he really want? At this stage, probably not Sullanum regnum, but then again the best way to make sure that everyone loves you is to kill of all the people who don't. Like, just for example, Crassus?
As always this is a great & exciting update. Your attention to detail is amazing, and it's a lot of fun to see names familiar from Cicero's letters popping up to play a role here too.
I can't wait to see what kind of ultra-violent and possibly stupid plan cethegus and Autronius come up with. They're going to try buring the city down, aren't they? And I very much hope that Curio gets to Curio his way out of his current predicament, bringing the young Marc Antony with him. (Oh, one tiny thing -- was Antony Sura's son-in-law, or stepson? I thought stepson?)
And of course, it will be very interesting to see what kind of deal Caesar makes, with Pompey or with Crassus.
Great work. Like I said, I can't wait to see how this all plays out.
I doubt it. Pompey isn't the sort of man to rush into a confrontation ahead of his support, and he's had lots of time to prepare. If he's brought even half his army back from the East, that's maybe 4-6 legions, say 20,000 veteran soldiers loyal to him. I doubt Caesar has half that number and most of his troops are raw recruits and/or local irregulars.
Caesar is no Catiline, to throw himself into a glorious charge into superior forces. His first move will likely be to open negotiations with Pompey, preferably before either Crassus or the Senatorialists get a chance to talk to him. Caesar, as a populist supporter of Catiline yet untainted by Catiline's crimes in Rome could be very useful to Pompey in restoring order to Italy - or facing down the Senate.
And if it all goes wrong, Caesar's likely Plan B will be to withdraw to the hills and await developments. Pompey most likely wants to get to Rome ASAP, not chase Caesar round southern Italy, but neither Crassus nor the Senatorialists wants him as Dictator. Armed opposition closer to the capital might make him reconsider Caesar's offer - and if that doesn't work, chewing on Pompey's supply lines while he besieges Rome offers much better odds than a straight-up fight.
Isn't he just? He has by far the strongest army - experienced, supplied and untainted by divided leadership. If he marches direct on Rome it would take at least two of Caesar, Torquatus and Crassus to stand a chance of stopping him and they all hate each other more than him. I can see him parading up the Via Appia while Caesar fades into the background, Crassus bunks into exile and the Senate (through gritted teeth) votes him its thanks.
But want does he want? The general historical opinion of Pompey seems to be that he wanted to be boss, but he also wanted to be loved and wanted to be accepted as a proper Roman aristocrat. So I can't see him pulling a Sulla. Enemies in arms will be dealt with accordingly, but he won't march into Rome and commence the purges. Even Decemvirs may get away with it if they grovel fast enough. He might demand the consulship, but I can also see a compromise where (for example) he accepts a command to restore order to the province of Italy, with proconsular imperium. That technically keeps his army out of Rome and allows the Senate to return and restore the constitution, while remaining aware that the P-man is all around them. It also keeps him conveniently away when/if the Senate takes its revenge on surviving Catilinians.
Of course, this all changes if he has to fight his way into Rome - against Crassus or a renewed popular uprising - or if the City is a pile of cinders by the time he gets there.
Crassus, meanwhile, is in roughly the position of Wile E Coyote after the latest Acme product has projected him over the side of the mesa - without visible means of support and with something very nasty under him.
I think you're right about Pompey here, but I think that (as the rest of his career kind of demonstrates) his desire to be boss and his desire to be a proper Roman aristocrat are in conflict, precisely because being the big boss is actually a possibility for him, to the extent that it isn't for other Roman aristocrats at this moment, and everyone knows it. So on the one hand, when he returns OTL from the east he is clearly ready to act in a constitutional manner, so I can certainly see him putting his proconsular imperium at the disposal of the senatorial forces here, in the expectation that he will get some kind of reward -- technically he shouldn't be consul again yet, but that hasn't stopped him before. But on the other hand, all the optimates in the senatorial party know he's a threat to their own power in the state, which encourages them to say "no" to whatever he wants, no matter how reasonable. They might still drive Pompey and Caesar together as in OTL!
I look forward to seeing whether Crassus can escape before the giant anvil falls on his head.
It could have been so, initially, but at this stage of the campaign,, I think that Caesar helped by the professional/veteran core and the strict discipline that keeps his forces with...
I would guess that he would have enough time to train and shape them into a well trained and disciplined enough force that, guess again, that also, would be extremely loyal to him...
I'm not sure he could quite name his price. Caesar has pretty blatantly thrown his lot in with Catiline and has ironically being one of their most successful commanders.
At this stage, that's probably Crassus' best hope. Catiline's shade would approve!
You are correct - it was stepson! (And one reason why in OTL, Antony HATED Cicero...)
Unlike a lot of the other Decemvirs, Cethegus knows he has no way out, save victory. He was just too closely associated with Catiline. So yes, burning the city down, bribing some Gauls, arming slaves...all are potential plots.
Also, 'to Curio' should definitely be a verb.
He most definitely is - but he didn't get where he is by being dumb and cuddly. He still has quite a few aces up his toga (as Curio found out) and, unlike Catiline, he's capable of thinking more than a week ahead.
And you're utterly right about Pompey. In a sense, all he has to do is stretch out his hand and take power...but that would be a fateful step. And the more sensible Decemvirs might work out that Pompey is not, necessarily their enemy - and might even be a useful tool he can use in his negotiations with the Senatorialists.
Pompey is in a super-brilliant position strategically - but you're right. Pompey (unlike Caesar) never quite understood you cannot be accepted by your peers and also dominate them effortlessly - and in the end, arguably, this contributed to his downfall.
But to say the Optimates are less than thrilled about this development would probably be a bit of an understatement. A popular general, untainted by the current chaos and politics, marching back and setting everything in order; able to position himself as a neutral arbiter? Next to that, what can either Crassus or the Senatorialists offer?
To a degree - but remember, this is just the end of October. Caesar only got 'sole' command of his forces in June/July - and a lot of them are, essentially, angry young men and bored freebooters from the south. This is not the well oiled machine that conquered Gaul - it is strong enough to seize (most of) the area around Vesuvius, and probably deeply loyal to Caesar, but its hardly a match for Pompey's tens of thousands of well trained, experienced legionaries, in a head-to-head battle.
It may or may not be relevant, but Faustus Cornelius Sulla, only surviving son of the Dictator, is Pompey's son-in-law and has been serving as one of his lieutenants in the East. If he's come back to Italy in Pompey's train - well, any faction boss whose army is built around ex-Sullan veterans should probably think carefully before opposing Pompey (and anyone too strongly associate with the populares is probably very nervous).
Isn't this whole crisis kinda just the self-destruction of the supporters of Sulla and the fundamental failures of his legacy of ruthlessly crushing dissenters and tweaking and rationalizing the procedural and organizational structures of the republic without actually addressing the strangulation of the Roman smallholder? I don't think a civil war that has largely been led on both sides by the nobles that inherited Sulla's state is going to be especially moved by his son coming in to go fight his old hachetman Crassus.
I think Pompey, Caesar, and the Senatorials will figure something out. The Senatorials want Crassus gone, Caesar is the only one from the Catilina conspiracy that is in a good position, and Pompey has no clear plan going forward. Crassus could pull a rabbit out of his hat and convince Caesar and Pompey to turn against Cicero and gang. Whatever it goes, it can't end with someone monopolizing power like Sulla: it would only start things all over again. Probably, a triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey, and Curio could work out. Well, for a couple of years until they kill each other again.
I think Caesar is going to wait and see to play his cards well. It's not like he is going to fight to the death for a guy with no army.
I think Caesar is going to wait and see to play his cards well. It's not like he is going to fight to the death for a guy with no army.
Really enjoyed the last couple updates, it will be interesting to see how things will end up now that Pompey has landed in Italy. I was kind of rooting for Crassus, but it seems unlikely that he will end up on the victorious side unless he can reach some sort of agreement with Pompey. I guess that at least his head won't end up as a theatre prop.
One thing I did notice however was this:
One thing I did notice however was this:
I'm not really sure to what place you are refering here. Do you mean Arpinum, hometown of Cicero and Marius, which however is inland and thus not a port. Perhaps you mean Ariminum, modern day Rimini, which is a port on the Adriatic.
You are completely correct - I meant Ariminum. Thanks for the spot, and glad you are enjoying!
Part XXII - Amnesty
In this way, then, Pompey was elated, and his confidence filled him with so great a contempt for his adversary that he mocked at those who were afraid of the war; and when some said that Crassus might have greater forces than reported, with a smiling countenance and calm mien he bade them be in no concern; ‘For’ said he, ‘in whatever part of Italy I stamp upon the ground, there will spring up armies of foot and horse.’
Plutarch, The Life of Pompey
It is little wonder that across the Italian peninsula, the news of Pompey’s return was greeted with rapturous joy. For many, Pompey had been a distant memory of better days; a heroic general who had humbled the mightiest enemies of the Republic. He had driven the arch-enemy Mithridates from his throne, had shattered the power of Pontus and Armenia, taught barbarians from lands so distant they were half considered myths to tremble before the might of Rome. He had scoured the seas of pirates, slaughtered the rebellious slaves of Spartacus, crushed rebels in Spain. Along the way he had acquired an immense fortune, casually cast ancient kings into the dirt and raised new ones in their place, and annexed vast swathes of land directly to Rome.
Perhaps even more importantly, he had managed to remain aloof from the swirl of Roman politics. He could be all things to all men; the supporter of the aristocratic, reactionary Sulla was the darling of the plebs. And, far from Italy as he had been, he had not been forced to pick a side. He could pose equally well as a supporter of the traditional order; and a sympathiser with the Decemvirate.
Pompey’s appeal then, was clear. A hardened military hero, impartial, with no politics of his own, who would restore order, prosperity and freedom to a people broken by more than a year of chaos, bloodshed, and arbitrary tyranny.
Pompey – a man whose almost infinite ego needed constant flattering, and who loved nothing more than to bask in the adulation of adoring crowds – was obviously pleased by his reception, and shrewd enough to keep his long term plans carefully concealed. His speech to his army made no mention of the Decemvirate, Crassus, the Senate, or indeed much of anything concrete. Rather, he simply vowed to restore peace. In a move of brilliance, he silkily suggested that the time had come for peace negotiations – negotiations he would be graciously pleased to assist with, however he could. He suggested a truce – an affair he would, likewise, be pleased to help enforce – until after the new year, to allow time for tempers to cool and for the negotiations to be arranged.
If Pompey’s return had caused wild celebrations amongst the mass of the Roman people, it plunged the councils of both the Decemvirate and Senate into utter gloom. With his vast army of well equipped, well trained, rested and experienced legions, he was now undoubtedly the preeminent power in the peninsula.
Crassus, obviously, saw his weakening hold on Rome weaken still further. The two men – as two of the richest, most influential, and most powerful men in the State – hated and loathed each other. Crassus, as ever able to appraise the likelihood of a business venture succeeding or failing – knew that he had not the popularity, nor the army, nor, likely, the money to stand against Pompey. He likewise knew that Pompey now had a window of opportunity to utterly destroy him. At best, exile and impotence; at worst death. Around him, his subordinates, nervous as ever, cast anxious eyes towards Brundisium, contemplating their chances should they opt to defect.
Cicero and Torquatus were equally despairing. Their entire strategy had been to win the war before Pompey arrived. Cicero was in no doubt that Pompey was now in the ideal position to make himself a de-facto, if not a de-jure, monarch. Sharp politician that he was, Cicero saw that the Senate, to many Romans, had long ago lost its legitimacy. Next to the glamour and charisma of a new Alexander the Great, how could the cause of the Senatorialists compare? His mood was scarcely improved by the obvious pro-Pompeian sympathies of several senior Senatorialist leaders; one of whom, Publius Piso, openly demanded that Pompey be given the supreme command. Piso’s close friend Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus exasperated Cicero nearly as much by repeatedly, and unfavourably, comparing Torquatus’ generalship to Pompey’s.
As if this division was not enough for the Senatorialists, the arrival of Pompey also stirred into action those men who Cicero disparagingly called ‘compromisers’. Such men included Manius Aemilius Lepidus, and the former tribune Gaius Popilius. Ironically sharing the same concerns as Cicero, they urged a common cause be made immediately with Crassus’ regime; forming a united front to block Pompey’s anticipated takeover of the state. Catalus, the flinty old aristocratic paragon of Republican virtues, who once had counted Cataline as a friend, would doubtless have been amongst their number as well. However, a sudden fever had swiftly killed him as he led his small force around the south-east of Italy, hunting for Gaius Manlius – Catiline’s ex-lieutenant who had turned bandit. Ironically, Catalus had based himself in Brundisium; it is tempting to wonder how a man of his ilk might have reacted to Pompey’s sudden arrival.
Moreover, the Senatorial forces were now in an agonising dilemma – though not through any fault of Pompey. Caesar’s seizure of the south had effectively cut them off from resupply; at the same time, their recent victory placed them within striking distance of Rome. If they attacked Rome, and the city swiftly fell, then the war would to all intents and purposes be over; Caesar would almost certainly sue for terms; the Senate’s position would be reaffirmed, and even Pompey might have to accept a fait accompli. At the same time; if such an assault failed the Senatorialist army would be cut off from their main sources of supply, demoralised, and caught between the armies of Crassus in Rome and the armies of Caesar in the south. This would shatter their cause beyond all hope of recovery; and Pompey would have no choice but to march on Rome.
Pompey, after landing, divided his forces into two. The larger, under his own command, commenced a rather leisurely march northwards, towards Ariminum; whilst the other, made up mostly of cavalry, struck westwards, moving towards Vesuvius. This flying column was led by one of Pompey’s most trusted, though corrupt, supporters – Scaurus; who had earned both fame and notoriety (as well as vast sums of wealth) as Pompey’s legate in Syria. Faced with two feuding brothers from the Hasmonean dynasty contending to be High Priest and King of Judea, Scaurus had simply opted to throw his weight behind Aristobulus upon receipt of a vast bribe; installing him as monarch. He had, however, shown no concern when Pompey, three years later, had Aristobulus arrested, Jerusalem stormed and his rival restored to the Priesthood – though not, as it happened, his Kingship. It was as likely for his cheerfully amoral outlook and skill at exploiting political rivalries, rather than any military capability, that led Pompey to order him westwards.
Swiftly reaching the town of Nola, he found himself surrounded by Caesar’s rather more ragtag, if larger, army. Nothing daunted, Scaurus offered Caesar a truce – and invited him to dinner. The famously reckless Caesar, we are told, did not even hesitate, expressing only concern that he was not properly attired for such a formal meal. Perhaps, with that keen predatory instinct he always possessed, he knew Scaurus had come to treat with Caesar, not to bury him.
The two men talked, long into the night. Pompey had always recognised talent, and in Caesar he saw, perhaps, something extraordinary – as well as the political coup of having Rome’s senior religious leader in his pocket. Further, Caesar was a senior member of the Decemvirate, and arguably its most successful military leader. By ‘pardoning’ Caesar, Pompey would demonstrate to all but the most committed members of the Decemvirate that there was a way back, that there was no need for a desperate fight to the death. (The fact that Pompey had precisely no legal right to offer anyone amnesty or pardon appears to have concerned him not at all).
Caesar, for his part, was no fool, and likely realised that currently he was fighting for a cause on the verge of collapse. Famously willing to take risks although he was, he was also a seasoned gambler; and knew when was best to collect his winnings. He had proved himself a skilled general and leader of men, had boosted his popularity with the urban poor, and now had the chance to re-enter the world of legitimate Roman politics – for what Scaurus was offering him was nothing less than Pompey’s support, friendship – and an amnesty.
By morning, the deal was done; the two men clasping hands and pledging friendship. Scaurus even pledged, in Pompey’s name, vast sums of money to be paid to every man in Caesar’s army. Enriched, amnestied, and secure in the knowledge they had not been defeated and were now on the winning side, Caesar’s men cheered him to the skies as he bade them return to their homes, leaving only a small bodyguard of several hundred men for himself.
Marcus Petreius, on his sickbed, was furious when he heard the news – and still more furious when emissaries from Scaurus told him that it was on Pompey’s orders that Caesar had been brought back into the fold. Partisan of Pompey he may well have been, but he was also a proud Roman, and a patriot. For months he had done his utmost to defeat Caesar, only to find his supposed patron welcoming a traitor into the fold; rendering his months of fighting and struggle meaningless. Still, his illness rendered him impotent. Sensing safety and an end to the fighting, the populace of Capua – which consisted overwhelmingly of relatives of the Senatorial elite – opened the gates. In Puteoli, Labienus, seeing which way the wind was blowing, and anxious not to lose Pompey as his patron, made the best of the situation. After giving a speech that equally glorified his army and himself, he then rode out from Puteoli on a white charger, to meet Scarurus and Caesar in person to surrender the city – an act which permanently ended the friendship between him and Petreius; who ever after would consider himself an enemy of Caesar, Scarurus and Pompey as well. A decade later, this hatred was to have fatal consequences.
As the first snows of the season landed atop the summit of Vesuvius, Petreius, Scarurus and Caesar feasted. With barely a sword drawn in anger, the whole south of Italy had dropped, like a ripe plum, into the lap of Pompey.
Plutarch, The Life of Pompey
It is little wonder that across the Italian peninsula, the news of Pompey’s return was greeted with rapturous joy. For many, Pompey had been a distant memory of better days; a heroic general who had humbled the mightiest enemies of the Republic. He had driven the arch-enemy Mithridates from his throne, had shattered the power of Pontus and Armenia, taught barbarians from lands so distant they were half considered myths to tremble before the might of Rome. He had scoured the seas of pirates, slaughtered the rebellious slaves of Spartacus, crushed rebels in Spain. Along the way he had acquired an immense fortune, casually cast ancient kings into the dirt and raised new ones in their place, and annexed vast swathes of land directly to Rome.
Perhaps even more importantly, he had managed to remain aloof from the swirl of Roman politics. He could be all things to all men; the supporter of the aristocratic, reactionary Sulla was the darling of the plebs. And, far from Italy as he had been, he had not been forced to pick a side. He could pose equally well as a supporter of the traditional order; and a sympathiser with the Decemvirate.
Pompey’s appeal then, was clear. A hardened military hero, impartial, with no politics of his own, who would restore order, prosperity and freedom to a people broken by more than a year of chaos, bloodshed, and arbitrary tyranny.
Pompey – a man whose almost infinite ego needed constant flattering, and who loved nothing more than to bask in the adulation of adoring crowds – was obviously pleased by his reception, and shrewd enough to keep his long term plans carefully concealed. His speech to his army made no mention of the Decemvirate, Crassus, the Senate, or indeed much of anything concrete. Rather, he simply vowed to restore peace. In a move of brilliance, he silkily suggested that the time had come for peace negotiations – negotiations he would be graciously pleased to assist with, however he could. He suggested a truce – an affair he would, likewise, be pleased to help enforce – until after the new year, to allow time for tempers to cool and for the negotiations to be arranged.
If Pompey’s return had caused wild celebrations amongst the mass of the Roman people, it plunged the councils of both the Decemvirate and Senate into utter gloom. With his vast army of well equipped, well trained, rested and experienced legions, he was now undoubtedly the preeminent power in the peninsula.
Crassus, obviously, saw his weakening hold on Rome weaken still further. The two men – as two of the richest, most influential, and most powerful men in the State – hated and loathed each other. Crassus, as ever able to appraise the likelihood of a business venture succeeding or failing – knew that he had not the popularity, nor the army, nor, likely, the money to stand against Pompey. He likewise knew that Pompey now had a window of opportunity to utterly destroy him. At best, exile and impotence; at worst death. Around him, his subordinates, nervous as ever, cast anxious eyes towards Brundisium, contemplating their chances should they opt to defect.
Cicero and Torquatus were equally despairing. Their entire strategy had been to win the war before Pompey arrived. Cicero was in no doubt that Pompey was now in the ideal position to make himself a de-facto, if not a de-jure, monarch. Sharp politician that he was, Cicero saw that the Senate, to many Romans, had long ago lost its legitimacy. Next to the glamour and charisma of a new Alexander the Great, how could the cause of the Senatorialists compare? His mood was scarcely improved by the obvious pro-Pompeian sympathies of several senior Senatorialist leaders; one of whom, Publius Piso, openly demanded that Pompey be given the supreme command. Piso’s close friend Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus exasperated Cicero nearly as much by repeatedly, and unfavourably, comparing Torquatus’ generalship to Pompey’s.
As if this division was not enough for the Senatorialists, the arrival of Pompey also stirred into action those men who Cicero disparagingly called ‘compromisers’. Such men included Manius Aemilius Lepidus, and the former tribune Gaius Popilius. Ironically sharing the same concerns as Cicero, they urged a common cause be made immediately with Crassus’ regime; forming a united front to block Pompey’s anticipated takeover of the state. Catalus, the flinty old aristocratic paragon of Republican virtues, who once had counted Cataline as a friend, would doubtless have been amongst their number as well. However, a sudden fever had swiftly killed him as he led his small force around the south-east of Italy, hunting for Gaius Manlius – Catiline’s ex-lieutenant who had turned bandit. Ironically, Catalus had based himself in Brundisium; it is tempting to wonder how a man of his ilk might have reacted to Pompey’s sudden arrival.
Moreover, the Senatorial forces were now in an agonising dilemma – though not through any fault of Pompey. Caesar’s seizure of the south had effectively cut them off from resupply; at the same time, their recent victory placed them within striking distance of Rome. If they attacked Rome, and the city swiftly fell, then the war would to all intents and purposes be over; Caesar would almost certainly sue for terms; the Senate’s position would be reaffirmed, and even Pompey might have to accept a fait accompli. At the same time; if such an assault failed the Senatorialist army would be cut off from their main sources of supply, demoralised, and caught between the armies of Crassus in Rome and the armies of Caesar in the south. This would shatter their cause beyond all hope of recovery; and Pompey would have no choice but to march on Rome.
Pompey, after landing, divided his forces into two. The larger, under his own command, commenced a rather leisurely march northwards, towards Ariminum; whilst the other, made up mostly of cavalry, struck westwards, moving towards Vesuvius. This flying column was led by one of Pompey’s most trusted, though corrupt, supporters – Scaurus; who had earned both fame and notoriety (as well as vast sums of wealth) as Pompey’s legate in Syria. Faced with two feuding brothers from the Hasmonean dynasty contending to be High Priest and King of Judea, Scaurus had simply opted to throw his weight behind Aristobulus upon receipt of a vast bribe; installing him as monarch. He had, however, shown no concern when Pompey, three years later, had Aristobulus arrested, Jerusalem stormed and his rival restored to the Priesthood – though not, as it happened, his Kingship. It was as likely for his cheerfully amoral outlook and skill at exploiting political rivalries, rather than any military capability, that led Pompey to order him westwards.
Swiftly reaching the town of Nola, he found himself surrounded by Caesar’s rather more ragtag, if larger, army. Nothing daunted, Scaurus offered Caesar a truce – and invited him to dinner. The famously reckless Caesar, we are told, did not even hesitate, expressing only concern that he was not properly attired for such a formal meal. Perhaps, with that keen predatory instinct he always possessed, he knew Scaurus had come to treat with Caesar, not to bury him.
The two men talked, long into the night. Pompey had always recognised talent, and in Caesar he saw, perhaps, something extraordinary – as well as the political coup of having Rome’s senior religious leader in his pocket. Further, Caesar was a senior member of the Decemvirate, and arguably its most successful military leader. By ‘pardoning’ Caesar, Pompey would demonstrate to all but the most committed members of the Decemvirate that there was a way back, that there was no need for a desperate fight to the death. (The fact that Pompey had precisely no legal right to offer anyone amnesty or pardon appears to have concerned him not at all).
Caesar, for his part, was no fool, and likely realised that currently he was fighting for a cause on the verge of collapse. Famously willing to take risks although he was, he was also a seasoned gambler; and knew when was best to collect his winnings. He had proved himself a skilled general and leader of men, had boosted his popularity with the urban poor, and now had the chance to re-enter the world of legitimate Roman politics – for what Scaurus was offering him was nothing less than Pompey’s support, friendship – and an amnesty.
By morning, the deal was done; the two men clasping hands and pledging friendship. Scaurus even pledged, in Pompey’s name, vast sums of money to be paid to every man in Caesar’s army. Enriched, amnestied, and secure in the knowledge they had not been defeated and were now on the winning side, Caesar’s men cheered him to the skies as he bade them return to their homes, leaving only a small bodyguard of several hundred men for himself.
Marcus Petreius, on his sickbed, was furious when he heard the news – and still more furious when emissaries from Scaurus told him that it was on Pompey’s orders that Caesar had been brought back into the fold. Partisan of Pompey he may well have been, but he was also a proud Roman, and a patriot. For months he had done his utmost to defeat Caesar, only to find his supposed patron welcoming a traitor into the fold; rendering his months of fighting and struggle meaningless. Still, his illness rendered him impotent. Sensing safety and an end to the fighting, the populace of Capua – which consisted overwhelmingly of relatives of the Senatorial elite – opened the gates. In Puteoli, Labienus, seeing which way the wind was blowing, and anxious not to lose Pompey as his patron, made the best of the situation. After giving a speech that equally glorified his army and himself, he then rode out from Puteoli on a white charger, to meet Scarurus and Caesar in person to surrender the city – an act which permanently ended the friendship between him and Petreius; who ever after would consider himself an enemy of Caesar, Scarurus and Pompey as well. A decade later, this hatred was to have fatal consequences.
As the first snows of the season landed atop the summit of Vesuvius, Petreius, Scarurus and Caesar feasted. With barely a sword drawn in anger, the whole south of Italy had dropped, like a ripe plum, into the lap of Pompey.
Well, II think that it would be kind of implicated, when Pompey's emissary at the head of an army of his own, was asking him for 'Gentlemen' parley, rather than demanding to lay down their arms/surrender and that the army to be disbanded...
And this was before that the news about Pompey's 'generosity/forgiveness', may have reached Rome... After it would happen, if lucky Crassus' decemvirate faction 'army/followers', would melt under him... If not, well, would be possible, that somebody would get the idea/attempt to get his head handed to Pompey...
Now, Crassus, would be left without more options than to ask Pompey, for his terms, and hoping that Pompey, would still feel magnanimous and allowed him a kind of golden exile, even if bitter, in his states in Iberia...
Essentially. Now we need to see if Cicero swallows his pride and accepts whatever peace offer Pompey sends and if Crassus is willing to accept some sort of conditional surrender. Once that is out of the way, Pompey is basically the master of Rome.
Honestly, I just liked the "treat with Caesar" line...
I guess, though, there's a difference between thinking maybe this can be resolved without bloodshed, and marching straight into the 'enemy' camp to have dinner and putting oneself utterly at the emissary's mercy.
Crassus is really backed into a corner, here. The Iberian exile is a possibility, indeed, but time is on Pompey's side (as you point out). Crassus' 'supporters' are even now sharpening their knives...
I've been away from the forum for a while and it looks like I returned at just the right time to catch up. Lots of big moves happening since the last I read. We have Catiline's death (as others said, nicely evocative of Caesar while still remaining appropriately Catilinarian), Curio's failure (poor guy, it seemed like a good plan) and the long-awaited arrival of Pompey (I rather suspected Caesar would get on board with him. Crassus and the Senate are both in tough spots now...).
Oh, and congrats on the Turtledove nomination! It's well deserved.
Oh, and congrats on the Turtledove nomination! It's well deserved.