No Soviet Union ideological impact
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Well, obviously Marxism-Leninism would have little importance, and Revolutionary Leftism at large would be... discredited, at least in Europe. This certainly does not mean that Marxism in general becomes marginal (Marx was fairly influential in the far-Left by then, and he was a powrful thinker whose ideas would still be discussed). But the Leninist "Vanguardist" approach would lose a lot of credit. There would be no hegemony of Bolshevik-derived discourse in the Left. On one hand, that would go into support for various forms of Social Democracy on one side, and various strands of Anarchism/Syndacalism on the other. The Interwar KPD or its equivalent would either have a different ideological trajectory, or a much diminished importance, for example. Likewise, the Communist/Socialist split in Italy and France would take very different forms and likely be delayed (though in both countries, as in Germany, the underlying differences had already made Socialist unity a polite fiction at best, so I think some sort of split is difficult to avoid).
The key point is that, here, the party of the organized Socialist workers trying to seize the control of the state apparatus is militarily defeated in the attempt (somehow; I suspect that a White victory is not very easy to do) showing that this strategy is unlikely to ever work. Thus, Revolutionary minded groups would have to think of different strategies (non-Vanguardist ones, probably) while more conciliatory ones would try and play the rules of bourgeois Democracy whenever possible, aiming at expanding their chances of working within that framework, which was the main strategy of British Labour and the majority fraction of French and German Socialists even before WWI (when the choice to support the war put it under major stress).
One problem here is that post-war, any sort of even remotely working Socialist International is hard pressed: how does Worker Internationalism function even as a polite fiction, after the French and German elected representatives voted for nation over class, i.e., accepting that workers have a national fatherland after all? And the committed Internationalists have not the Soviet Union as an example (however flawed) to look at.
Of course, the specifics of how the Bolsheviks lose are important. A longer, if unstable, Socialist unity might , even if I don't see a clear path for that, lead to successful "revolutionary" regimes elsewhere (Germany, Italy, perhaps Hungary are the least unlikely candidates, but all are very long shots).
The key point is that, here, the party of the organized Socialist workers trying to seize the control of the state apparatus is militarily defeated in the attempt (somehow; I suspect that a White victory is not very easy to do) showing that this strategy is unlikely to ever work. Thus, Revolutionary minded groups would have to think of different strategies (non-Vanguardist ones, probably) while more conciliatory ones would try and play the rules of bourgeois Democracy whenever possible, aiming at expanding their chances of working within that framework, which was the main strategy of British Labour and the majority fraction of French and German Socialists even before WWI (when the choice to support the war put it under major stress).
One problem here is that post-war, any sort of even remotely working Socialist International is hard pressed: how does Worker Internationalism function even as a polite fiction, after the French and German elected representatives voted for nation over class, i.e., accepting that workers have a national fatherland after all? And the committed Internationalists have not the Soviet Union as an example (however flawed) to look at.
Of course, the specifics of how the Bolsheviks lose are important. A longer, if unstable, Socialist unity might , even if I don't see a clear path for that, lead to successful "revolutionary" regimes elsewhere (Germany, Italy, perhaps Hungary are the least unlikely candidates, but all are very long shots).
With Bolshevism collapsing before the Comintern's "21 Conditions" had been established, there is a better chance that at least some socialist parties remain united, instead of dividing into social democratic and communist parties. Remember that the French Communist party was nor founded until 1920, the Italian and Czechoslovak ones until 1921, etc. There would still be rival left and right wings within the socialist parties, of course, but the differences wouldn't be as clear-cut as in OTL, where the Communists, simply by following the discipline of the Comintern, made themselves absolutely distinct from all other socialists, however "left-wing."
Very probably anarchosyndicalism would be a stronger presence in the radical Left. OTL, the Bolshevik success in Russia drew a lot of the energy to their model.
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This is exactly the sort of question I love to see! I'd agree that social democracy and syndicalism would get a boon, but I think the big takeaway for international socialism is less "a workers revolution is unworkable" and more "those Bolshevik losers ignored historical materialism to their peril, obviously only industrial societies can advance the proletariat toward a true socialist society." That would have all sorts of ramifications in the industrialized world going forward.
Even aside from the considerable impact on the political left, such an outcome would have ripples on the right of the aisle without a doubt. After all, what would eventually coalesce into fascism contained many preexisting currents of anti-socialism that were galvanized by a wave of reaction prompted by the creation of the USSR.
So, if we assume that a White victory results in an international socialism focused primarily on spreading within industrial societies, the sheer reality of what I would assume was a near-Red victory would still produce a reactionary backlash, but I wonder if it would be more solidly classist, traditionalist or conservative as opposed to mass-action revolutionary fascism.
Even aside from the considerable impact on the political left, such an outcome would have ripples on the right of the aisle without a doubt. After all, what would eventually coalesce into fascism contained many preexisting currents of anti-socialism that were galvanized by a wave of reaction prompted by the creation of the USSR.
So, if we assume that a White victory results in an international socialism focused primarily on spreading within industrial societies, the sheer reality of what I would assume was a near-Red victory would still produce a reactionary backlash, but I wonder if it would be more solidly classist, traditionalist or conservative as opposed to mass-action revolutionary fascism.
So how much difference does this make in the USA. Is Paul Robeson MLK half a century earlier
There would be a lot more sympathy than in OTL for the short-lived Bolshevik regime even from relatively moderate Socialists. It would be viewed as a promising experiment, like the Paris Commune, crushed by superior force. The Red Terror would be dismissed as an emergency civil war measure not likely to be representative of how the Bolsheviks would govern under "normal" circumstances.
People indeed forget the widespread sympathy for Soviet Russia in 1917-20 even by Socialists who did not subsequently adhere to the Third International (many of them wanted to but the Comintern rejected them). As Irving Howe notes, writing about American Jewish Socialists in World of Our Fathers:
People indeed forget the widespread sympathy for Soviet Russia in 1917-20 even by Socialists who did not subsequently adhere to the Third International (many of them wanted to but the Comintern rejected them). As Irving Howe notes, writing about American Jewish Socialists in World of Our Fathers:
I think the butterflying of fascism would be one of the most interesting consequences. There might be a more traditionalist anti-communist backlash, but I imagine anti-communism in general would have much less effect as a rhetorical tool or platform without a massive Bolshevist state lurking to the east.
The RSFSR being crushed by 1922 is not going to stop:
D'Annunzio
Horthy
Austrian revanchevist extra-parliamentary radical nationalism
German revanchevist extra-parliamentary radical nationalism
The German whites
The Russian whites.
Sir John Monash.
Arguably the defeat of the RSFSR by whites, at least by any white configuration capable of mobilising radical modernity, is fascism.
* * *
Nor will it stop European Maximalism fetishising Leninism. It may in fact rehabilitate Lenin's works in the eyes of the KAPD.
Maximalism will still be present, but will be multipolar reflecting the local maximalisms of Italy, Hungary, Germany, Russia, England, Holland, etc.
The IWW probably survive as there's no alternate locus to outcompete them for Maximalist cred in Australia and the US.
Minimalism will not reunite with maximalism. That ship sailed in 1914. Even after local conditions force minimalists parties into maximalist positions, they're not going to get along well with multipolar international maximalism.
What does probably happen is that the 2.5 and 3 Internationals are formed as a matter of pressure. But they are in no way culturally significant compared to the historical 3rd International.
D'Annunzio
Horthy
Austrian revanchevist extra-parliamentary radical nationalism
German revanchevist extra-parliamentary radical nationalism
The German whites
The Russian whites.
Sir John Monash.
Arguably the defeat of the RSFSR by whites, at least by any white configuration capable of mobilising radical modernity, is fascism.
* * *
Nor will it stop European Maximalism fetishising Leninism. It may in fact rehabilitate Lenin's works in the eyes of the KAPD.
Maximalism will still be present, but will be multipolar reflecting the local maximalisms of Italy, Hungary, Germany, Russia, England, Holland, etc.
The IWW probably survive as there's no alternate locus to outcompete them for Maximalist cred in Australia and the US.
Minimalism will not reunite with maximalism. That ship sailed in 1914. Even after local conditions force minimalists parties into maximalist positions, they're not going to get along well with multipolar international maximalism.
What does probably happen is that the 2.5 and 3 Internationals are formed as a matter of pressure. But they are in no way culturally significant compared to the historical 3rd International.