No Pearl Harbour raid. Victory for Japan?

[Draconis]

I think what the OP is suggesting is that with a less EMOTIONAL (for want of a better word) commitment to the war against Japan their strategy of setting up a defensive perimeter and holding it until the Allies got tired of the conflict may have worked. For those who scream ASB think about Korea(A mere 4 years after 1945) and later Vietnam. If they would have read and UNDERSTOOD the principles of Art of War ....It is still a long shot but they COULD have achieved their goals. IF war was determined ONLY by economics (and yes they are important) then Prussia would not have rose to dominate Central Europe, the USA wouldn't have won its own revolution (yes even with French help), and Finland wouldn't have been able to fight the USSR to a standstill 18 months previous. The point I think he is trying to make is CONTEXT matters in a calculation of military potential and being far less committed to war against Japan reduces that potential for the USA..Personally I don't think its enough(my great uncle was a marine in the Pacific and my grandfather a soldier in Normandy--second wave Thank God. But would a USA have decided a "Kissinger Peace" ala Vietnam was preferable to a long two front war? I think its in the realm of possibility without ASB.

Thank you. That's it in a nutshell about the key, the emotional impact. The Americans were going to give independence to the Philippines anyway in 1944. How important would P.I. and a few little islands in the Western Pacific be? Germany was always considered the bigger threat and with U-boats sinking scores of ships right off the Atlantic seaboard just maybe FDR would cut his losses in the Pacific. For the time being.

In my OP I mentioned the British also agreeing to a peace deal with Japan. Considering that they have lost Burma, Brunei and Malaya including Singapore that may be pretty unlikely almost ASB. Their commitment to regaining those colonies would be high.

Now contrast the British loss of their colonies to what the U.S. has lost. A country they were going to relinquish anyway. This is part of the reason why a negotiated peace deal with Japan would be within the realm of possibility.
And yes, the Japanese would need to do a few things differently.

 

[wcv215]

I'm also in complete agreement that something went really wrong in Japan's collective psyche after WWI. The League of Nations refusing to pass a Racial Equality resolution, and Britain refusing to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922 were both interpreted as huge insults which certainly didn't help either.

I don't see it. The Japanese troops were ill-disciplined, and had figured out that their superiors wouldn't do anything to control them, so they could do whatever they wanted. Add onto that long deployments far from home with minimal supervision in hostile countries and you get atrocities. There is no grand mystery here.

 

[Michele]

Or a US ship would be sunk that couldn't be brushed off, IE a battleship or something and then the US declares war first.

Yes. That would be my bet, and I also think a battleship wouldn't need to be sunk. A cruiser would suffice by early-mid 1942 to give Roosevelt the votes he needed. The public was becoming fed up with the remake of that great scary movie, "German submarines in the Atlantic". The US armed forces were gearing up for sometime by mid 1942.

 

[WaterproofPotatoes]

After the Reuben James Incident, the USN had a "shoot-on-sight" order in place for German ships, making war all but inevitable.

 

[Michele]

I don't see it. The Japanese troops were ill-disciplined, and had figured out that their superiors wouldn't do anything to control them, so they could do whatever they wanted. Add onto that long deployments far from home with minimal supervision in hostile countries and you get atrocities. There is no grand mystery here.

The Japanese were ill-disciplined?
So they were better disciplined around Port Arthur in 1905? And where ever they were deployed in WWI?

In any case, you've just shifted the question. If the question no longer is, why did the privates behave in that way, then the question becomes, why did the officers behave in that way? Why did the superiors not do anything to discipline the privates?

 

[eltf177]

Several people have put forward the possibility of Japan not attacking Pearl or the Philippines; just going after the UK, French and Dutch possessions.

The general consensus seems to be ignoring the Philippines is not a wise idea...

 

[wcv215]

The Japanese were ill-disciplined?

HORRIBLY.

The IJA had a major issue related to personal honor. If a portion of the army decided it wanted to go and do something they went and did it, then presented it as a fait accompli to their superiors. Their superiors in turn either had to present it as their idea, or try to reverse it. The problem was this was a MAJOR insult to their subordinates, and possibly to themselves as well since they couldn't control their troops. And that led to:

If the question no longer is, why did the privates behave in that way, then the question becomes, why did the officers behave in that way? Why did the superiors not do anything to discipline the privates?

Because either the higher ups had the same thought processes of those below them, or if they tried they go shot. And its not just the privates here. Its the captains and the colonels just as much.

So they were better disciplined around Port Arthur in 1905? And where ever they were deployed in WWI?

No. This was a situation that really developed after WWI, though I don't recall seeing a reason. But during this time period the government completely lost control of the army, and was ultimately supplanted by it.

 

[Draconis]

Several people have put forward the possibility of Japan not attacking Pearl or the Philippines; just going after the UK, French and Dutch possessions.

The general consensus seems to be ignoring the Philippines is not a wise idea...

In my OP the Japanese still take the Philippines. They don't attack Pearl Harbour. This is a different approach.

 

[freivolk]

The Japanese were ill-disciplined?
So they were better disciplined around Port Arthur in 1905? And where ever they were deployed in WWI?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Tsingtao
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandō_prisoner-of-war_camp
At least at this timr the Japanese played after the rules.

 

[WaterproofPotatoes]

The Japanese were ill-disciplined?
So they were better disciplined around Port Arthur in 1905? And where ever they were deployed in WWI?

In any case, you've just shifted the question. If the question no longer is, why did the privates behave in that way, then the question becomes, why did the officers behave in that way? Why did the superiors not do anything to discipline the privates?

The militarists considered assassination as a valid means of removing officers and politicians who stood in the way of their goals, such as the assassination of Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai on May 13,1932. You also had commanders like Field Marshal Baron Nobuyoshi Muto, CiC Kwantung Army in the mid-1930s, who was appalled by the crimes and abuses he saw, but nobody listened to his complaints, and subordinate commanders openly defied him. Although his cause of death as listed as jaundice, it is likely he committed suicide over the shame of being unable to put a stop to it.

 

[eltf177]

Understood. It may not outrage the US populace as much as attacking Pearl but it's still going to arouse US ire.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

After the Reuben James Incident, the USN had a "shoot-on-sight" order in place for German ships, making war all but inevitable.

The 'War Warning' orders/messages sent to Pacific commands 26-27 November 1941 authorized the same. Any Japanese ships or aircraft sighted were to be considered hostile and attacking them was authorized.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The militarists considered assassination as a valid means of removing officers and politicians who stood in the way of their goals, such as the assassination of Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai on May 13,1932. You also had commanders like Field Marshal Baron Nobuyoshi Muto, CiC Kwantung Army in the mid-1930s, who was appalled by the crimes and abuses he saw, but nobody listened to his complaints, and subordinate commanders openly defied him. Although his cause of death as listed as jaundice, it is likely he committed suicide over the shame of being unable to put a stop to it.

When Prime Minister Suzuiki chaired the Cabient discussions over 'War Policy' (surrender) in August 1945, he carried in his chest a bullet from a 1928 assassination attempt. A reminder of just what the consequences could be.

 

[Michele]

HORRIBLY.

Sorry, the issue you describe is very true, but it certainly isn't "indiscipline" in the common sense of, let's have some fun killing civilians or POWs at random. Which was what was being discussed.

...though I don't recall seeing a reason.

So you see that as I said, this only shifts the question, anwyay.

The militarists considered assassination as a valid means of removing officers and politicians who stood in the way of their goals,...

More of the same. Not the thing we're discussing.

 

[wcv215]

Sorry, the issue you describe is very true, but it certainly isn't "indiscipline" in the common sense of, let's have some fun killing civilians or POWs at random. Which was what was being discussed.

It certainly is. Discipline at its core requires following orders, and punishing those who don't. This had completely broken down in the IJA on a macro scale. Sure you could have officers exacting punishment, but not for the behavior actually being discussed, because if they tried they got shot. Being willing to shoot your own officers for not being zealous enough in pursuit of victory(tm) IS indiscipline.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

What if the Japanese had decided against attacking Pearl Harbour when they started the Pacific War? In retrospect they didn't really need to as the U.S. Navy was no longer planning to adopt War Plan Orange to relieve the Philippines. The Japanese didn't know that but if the U.S. Navy had tried to relieve the Philippines it would have provided the IJN with the opportunity for their "decisive battle" which their doctrine called for anyway. ...

WP ORANGE still existed to 1940, after which it was subsumed into the RIANBOW plans. WPO shifted away from a early Phillipines relief in the 1920s. USN staff studies and exercises made it clear a early and rapid crossing of the Pacific from the US to PI was impractical to the point of impossibility. This was the era in which Marine Major Ellis wrote his analysis of a island hoping campaign to seize intermediate bases; 'Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia'. ...And when the US organized Marine Expeditionary Brigades for seizing these advanced bases. The US started purchasing experimental amphibious transports, and testing landing craft. By 19\30 the idea of a early war expedition to PI was dead. The WPO & RAINBOW plans proposed a extended period of build up of the USn into a trans Pacific expeditionary force. Which had the combat power to overwhelm the Japanese navy, and the logistics train to operate anywhere it could establish a advanced anchorage/base. This was estimated to take between 12 & 24 months. In the interm the Navy would raid, conduct defense operations, and conduct 'operations of opportunity'.

If you Google WPP-46 for the Pacific Fleet you will find Admiral Kimmels last published iteration of WPO. Published in March 1941. The WPP previously published by Kimmels processor Richardson & earlier fleet commanders are located in USN archives. Hector Bywaters 'The Great Pacific War' is a fictionalized account of USN war-games and staff studies of the mid 1920s. It is still available in large well stocked libraries.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

'Secret Allies in the Pacific' is a brief outline of the combined preparations and warplanes of the British, US, and Dutch previous to Decmber 1941. Staff officers had been conveying information between HQ in the far east. Intellegence was shared, and increasingly high level meetings between staff and commanders. The last of these was the visit of Admiral Phillips to MacArthur 5-6 December 1941.

 

[Chris Triangle]

Well it might prevent the demand for unconditional surrender I suppose, at least until the P.O.W. camps in the Philippines are liberated. I can't see Luzon not falling even without Pearl Harbour.

If the US started the war, lost the opening battles, suffered really high csualties and slow progress in the Pacific so Japanese industry was largely unbombed, the Japanese had adopted decent anti-submarine tactics , the Japanese weren't cruel to prisoners AND Japan's leaders were willing to be reasonable in negotiation, then you would probably be able get a conditional surrender or some other kind of peace. But without this perfect storm of conditions (especially tricking the Americans into shooting first), the US requires a complete victory, not merely because of the Pearl Habor attack but more importantly, because once war starts it cannot allow a state so obviously aggressive, hostile and dangerous as this to continue existing in its current form. Such a state would always seek a rematch. And even if it conducted its war properly, the Japanese actions in Asia were very obvious and they indicated just how far the Imperial Japanese military intended to go and how brutally they could behave. Unconditional surrender was necessary because a full occupation is needed to remove the perpetrators of the war from power and deal with any people and elements of the society that had lead to the viciously aggressive war in the first place so that another one does not happen.

 

[Michele]

It certainly is. Discipline at its core requires following orders, and punishing those who don't. This had completely broken down in the IJA on a macro scale. Sure you could have officers exacting punishment, but not for the behavior actually being discussed, because if they tried they got shot. Being willing to shoot your own officers for not being zealous enough in pursuit of victory(tm) IS indiscipline.

It would be indiscipline to kill a POW if that was with no orders or against orders. You are assuming the officer has not simply issued the order to shoot in the first place, or a blanket standing order that POW lives matter not at all. If that is the case, on the contrary, there is no indiscipline by the soldier.

 

[Michele]

If the US started the war, lost the opening battles, suffered really high csualties and slow progress in the Pacific so Japanese industry was largely unbombed, the Japanese had adopted decent anti-submarine tactics , the Japanese weren't cruel to prisoners AND Japan's leaders were willing to be reasonable in negotiation, then you would be able get a conditional surrender or some other kind of peace. But without this perfect storm of conditions (especially tricking the Americans into shooting first), the US requires one, not merely because of Pearl Habor but more importantly, because once war starts it cannot allow a state so obviously aggressive, hostile and dangerous as this to continue existing in its current form. Such a state would always seek a rematch. And even if it conducted its war properly, the Japanese actions in Asia were very obvious and indicated just how far the Imperial Japanese military were intended to go. Unconditional surrender was known to be necessary because a full occupation is needed to remove the perpetrators of the war from power and deal with any people and elements of the society that had lead to the viciously aggressive war in the first place so that another one does not happen.

It would also help if there wasn't the WWI precedent. Everyone tends to apply it to Germany, because it was on the same side and in the same position at the end of both wars. But I suspect the Allied decision-makers in 1944-45, even if all the perfect conditions listed above applied, would be thinking about the post-Versailles stab-in-the-back theory that had blossomed in Germany. And they'd be wary about a post-WWII Japan with the same theory finding fertile ground. Note how fringe post-WWII Japanese militarists did find it hard to come to terms with their defeat - even in OTL.