No Pearl Harbour raid. Victory for Japan?

[Johnrankins]

In a fleet of 1400 merchantmen over 2,000 tonnes each? Come on.

You do realize even OTL it was a very low margin operation, you try to get Hawaii it is a ZERO margin operation. Every ship is crucial. It isn't like the US where if you have a couple of dozen ships sunk it is no big deal, you just pull more from the reserve. Japan has no effective reserve.

Every ship sunk slows down operations. If an overweight person misses eating for a few days he will survive, if a starving person misses eating a few days then he is dead. Japan was the starving person in the analogy. It couldn't afford giving up anything.

 

[McPherson]

You do realize even OTL it was a very low margin operation, you try to get Hawaii it is a ZERO margin operation. Every ship is crucial. It isn't like the US where if you have a couple of dozen ships sunk it is no big deal, you just pull more from the reserve. Japan has no effective reserve.

Every ship sunk slows down operations. If an overweight person misses eating for a few days he will survive, if a starving person misses eating a few days then he is dead. Japan was the starving person in the analogy. It couldn't afford giving up anything.

As in at least 400 freighters alone?

Had to WaG this out of a pencil exercise for Walrus.

[snip]

​

See above an actual analysis.(^^^)

 

[Caesars11]

Also, the issue of the Japanese not abusing POWs is pretty close to ASB. The Bushido code forbid surrender and they viewed those who did surrender as sub-human and not worthy of anything remotely resembling proper treatment.

With a POD that can change. That attitude was a distortion of the bishops code much as Islamic fundamentalism is a distortion of Islam. Radical elements in Japan fostered that line of thinking. Pre 1930 Japan had a history of following what we consider proper treatment of prisoners from the Rudso-Japanese awar theough ww1

 

[McPherson]

With a POD that can change. That attitude was a distortion of the bishops code much as Islamic fundamentalism is a distortion of Islam. Radical elements in Japan fostered that line of thinking. Pre 1930 Japan had a history of following what we consider proper treatment of prisoners from the Russo-Japanese awar theough ww1

I can actually date it for you. Around 1927-1928 during the Jinan Incident we see that change take hold during the Tanaka Giichi premiership. Very strange. As late as Wakatsuki Reijirō, the Japanese military were legalistically scrupulous with most of their prisoners where officers held unit discipline intact. However I must mention that the Japanese, when unit and command discipline failed, such as during the first Sino-Japanese War on several occasions were prone to massacres.

Togo opened fire on the Chinese warship, which turned out to be the sloop Tsao Kiang. Without more ado, the latter ran away at full speed, leaving her charge to fend for herself. Togo was reluctant to interfere with a ship flying the Red Ensign, but he patently could not ignore her military passengers. Holding her under his guns, Togo sent away a boarding party, which returned with the news that the trooper was the 2,134-ton Kow Shing, owned by the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company of London and commanded by Captain T. R. Galsworthy. She was under charter to the Chinese Government and had on board 1,500 Chinese soldiers, fourteen field guns and their ammunition and a German artillery officer, Captain C. von Hanneken. Galsworthy protested loudly against his detention, declaring that he was on a lawful voyage, Britain and Japan not being at war, and that Togo had no right to hold his ship. Galsworthy was technically correct, but Togo was not about to allow 1,500 fully armed Chinese troops to land on Korean soil. He demanded surrender.

The situation on board the Kow Shing was chaotic. Galsworthy was in favour of surrendering, but he and his officers were surrounded by Chinese with loaded guns, who made no secret of what would happen to them it they refused to take the ship into Asan. The Chinese general argued that the Japanese would not dare sink a ship under the British flag, but Galsworthy was not convinced. Much as he feared the Chinese guns, he feared the wrath of his owners more. He declined to continue the voyage. It was stalemate.

This dangerous confrontation went on for nearly four hours, with the Japanese threatening, the Chinese obstinately refusing to surrender and Galsworthy and the Kow Shing’s British officers caught in the middle. Then Togo did something of which his Royal Navy mentors would not have approved. He torpedoed the helpless merchantman, pounded her with his big guns and, when she sank, machine-gunned the troops struggling in the water. Only Captain Galsworthy, his chief officer, his boatswain, Captain von Hanneken and 41 Chinese survived.

Togo’s ill-judged and brutal action elicited a howl of protest from Admiral Fremantle, commanding the British Far Eastern Fleet, and, later, rumbles of disapproval from the Foreign Office, but as far as Britain was concerned the incident was soon closed. For the Chinese, however, the attack on the Tsi Yuen and Kwang Yi, followed by the slaughter of more than a thousand of their troops in the Kow Shing, could mean only one thing: China and Japan were at war.

Victor of Tsushima... behaved with the kind of poor judgement we will see in the 1930s Kwantung Army.

 

[RMcD94]

Yes, almost anything is smarter than what they did in OTL. Trying to grab the DEI without going to war with the U.K. and/or the U.S. by exercising some clever diplomatic maneuvering is about the only way Imperial Japan survives. It would be a long shot even with a more realistic government. But you know their OTL leadership could not behave in that manner.

If you read about Japanese politics it was pretty much the army alone that was universally insane. The navy was pretty sensible. They misunderstood America but not by that much, and they were forced because of the army to make a decision.

Remember that most of Japanese High command wanted peace, the negotiations were very much genuine.

What you need is for the army to be humiliated even more than irl or for hirohito to grow a spine.

Also in a thread that is explicitly about no pearl harbour maybe the three pages of an invasion of Hawaii should find some other more relevant thread.

 

[McPherson]

Also in a thread that is explicitly about no pearl harbour maybe the three pages of an invasion of Hawaii should find some other more relevant thread.

It is a technical discussion strictly on subject as an alternative planning option (equally crazy) and is the obverse option.

If you read about Japanese politics it was pretty much the army alone that was universally insane.

Also, I point out the Manila Massacre happened under IJN command in defiance of IJA orders. (Yamashita wanted Manila evacuated.)

So one cannot claim that the IJA was solely insane.

But Laurel’s wishes were complicated by the Japanese military hierarchy. General Tomoyuki Yamashita (of the Japanese Army) was the ranking officer, and he made good on his promise to declare Manila an open city. His announcement, however, was countered by Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi (of the Japanese Navy). The Navy guys and Army guys had, for most of the war, refused to work with any kind of coordination…it’s one of the reasons Japan was losing in 1945. But more than that, they often defied each other’s plans, wishes, and decrees, to the point that they almost fought against each other. So even though Yamashita outranked Iwabuchi, there was no real impetus to follow orders. Yamashita’s men left Manila…Iwabuchi’s did not.

I have referred to this problem which goes all the way back to the Sino-Japanese War when Togo, the future victor of Tsushima, massacred a hired British transport packed full of Chinese troops, sparing only about ~50 people of ~1,500 embarked. He actually started that damn war with that war crime!

 

[Athelstane]

I can actually date it for you. Around 1927-1928 during the Jinan Incident we see that change take hold during the Tanaka Giichi premiership. Very strange. As late as Wakatsuki Reijirō, the Japanese military were legalistically scrupulous with most of their prisoners where officers held unit discipline intact.

Yes - helpful point here. It's a fascinating turning point - and a reminder of how rapidly a human culture or subculture can shift.

Victor of Tsushima... behaved with the kind of poor judgement we will see in the 1930s Kwantung Army.

I wasn't aware of this incident. Disturbing, and surprising coming from Togo.

 

[nbcman]

Yes - helpful point here. It's a fascinating turning point - and a reminder of how rapidly a human culture or subculture can shift.



I wasn't aware of this incident. Disturbing, and surprising coming from Togo.

How is it surprising that he attacked a troop ship after the war unofficially started 2 days previously and when China was warned by Japan that any further attempts to reinforce their army in Korea would be considered a hostile act almost a week prior to the sinking when the foreign flagged vessel refused to follow directions? He also planned the surprise attack on Russian ships at Port Arthur 3 hours before the Japanese DoW so it is not out of character for a Japanese officer to make a decision to start a fight in the absence of an official war declaration.

I am not excusing or endorsing these actions but noting that the Japanese have had a history of surprise attacks in the absence of a DoW that goes back decades before WW2

 

[marathag]

I am not excusing or endorsing these actions but noting that the Japanese have had a history of surprise attacks in the absence of a DoW that goes back decades before WW2

And the Royal Navy famously surprised the Danes at Copenhagen, yet Nelson didn't make a habit of slaughtering POWs

 

[nbcman]

And the Royal Navy famously surprised the Danes at Copenhagen, yet Nelson didn't make a habit of slaughtering POWs

The Chinese Army personnel on the British flagged ship weren't POWs. They could have been POWs if they wouldn't have opposed the Japanese directions and allowed the Kow Shing to follow the Japanese cruiser Naniwa to port. However, the Japanese action to shoot up shipwrecked combatants wasn't justified in my opinion even though their actions were later deemed to be in accordance with International Law and that the Chinese Army personnel were considered to be mutineers.

 

[Draconis]

If you read about Japanese politics it was pretty much the army alone that was universally insane. The navy was pretty sensible. They misunderstood America but not by that much, and they were forced because of the army to make a decision.

Remember that most of Japanese High command wanted peace, the negotiations were very much genuine.

What you need is for the army to be humiliated even more than irl or for hirohito to grow a spine.

Also in a thread that is explicitly about no pearl harbour maybe the three pages of an invasion of Hawaii should find some other more relevant thread.

Yes, that is what I have believed. That the IJN admirals were more "worldly" as in better educated and well traveled then the IJA brass. And of course the threat of assassination by army officers must have discouraged many from speaking up.

As the OP I'm inclined to accept a lot of thread drift. As I stated in a previous comment it adds more interest if the subject is examined from many angles. Especially surprising ones like McPhersons' premise. Just so long as it doesn't get too crazy. In my opinion it hasn't. I may try to push the conversation back to the OP point but I'm not going to complain if the discussion takes off in a different direction. It's all good.

 

[Athelstane]

How is it surprising that he attacked a troop ship after the war unofficially started 2 days previously and when China was warned by Japan that any further attempts to reinforce their army in Korea would be considered a hostile act almost a week prior to the sinking when the foreign flagged vessel refused to follow directions? He also planned the surprise attack on Russian ships at Port Arthur 3 hours before the Japanese DoW so it is not out of character for a Japanese officer to make a decision to start a fight in the absence of an official war declaration.

I am not excusing or endorsing these actions but noting that the Japanese have had a history of surprise attacks in the absence of a DoW that goes back decades before WW2

Two points:

1) I am not surprised that Togo might attack a ship full of Chinese troops in a time of war, declared or otherwise. I *am* surprised at his audacity at attacking a ship full of Chinese troops that was under British colors - you know, the country which was building most of Japan's capital ships at the time, and whose navy could squash his like a bug at that time.

It wound up not costing him, but that was less obvious at the time.

2) The machine-gunning of the prisoners is a bigger surprise, in light of how it runs counter the honor and generosity with which he seems to have conducted himself in wartime in other circumstances. I am aware of no such incidents by his command toward Russian sailors in the Yellow Sea, or Tsushima. Could this be some kind of racism at work?

 

[McPherson]

The Chinese Army personnel on the British flagged ship weren't POWs. They could have been POWs if they wouldn't have opposed the Japanese directions and allowed the Kow Shing to follow the Japanese cruiser Naniwa to port. However, the Japanese action to shoot up shipwrecked combatants wasn't justified in my opinion even though their actions were later deemed to be in accordance with International Law and that the Chinese Army personnel were considered to be mutineers.

Warcrimes at sea.

By the Law of Nations in 1894, Togo could take the Kowshing, but if that had been a US chartered vessel the Chinese hired, the US and Japan would be at war. The British looked the other way because during the crown government of Archibald Primrose, the British were trying to coax the Japanese into an anti-Russian alliance and also land a fat lucrative naval construction contract.

In the case of Togo, by giving aid to a convicted Japanese citizen, wanted for murder by the Hawaiian government, by offering him sanctuary aboard the HIJMS Naniwa off shore of Honolulu during "Black Week", he showed once again his recklessness and mental instability. It was once and again a miscalculation. It could have led to Japanese disaster.

Duus, Masayo (2005). The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar Strike of 1920. University of California Press. p. 82.

That the Japanese had designs on Hawaii is known. That the US thwarted them is not. 1893 is an interesting PoD for a US-Japanese war with Hawaii as the prize. It would have been UGLY. This is a war the Japanese "might" have won... easily.

 

[McPherson]

Two points:

1) I am not surprised that Togo might attack a ship full of Chinese troops in a time of war, declared or otherwise. I *am* surprised at his audacity at attacking a ship full of Chinese troops that was under British colors - you know, the country which was building most of Japan's capital ships at the time, and whose navy could squash his like a bug at that time.

It wound up not costing him, but that was less obvious at the time.

2) The machine-gunning of the prisoners is a bigger surprise, in light of how it runs counter the honor and generosity with which he seems to have conducted himself in wartime in other circumstances. I am aware of no such incidents by his command toward Russian sailors in the Yellow Sea, or Tsushima. Could this be some kind of racism at work?

Hard to say. He was accused of it, but it seems to have been a more calculated act of terrorism on his part to dissuade the Chinese government from believing that they could foreign flag a charter (under British colors.)_and safely convoy troops to Korea across a provisional blockade. I'm not sure we can make either case. Warcrime? In a US admiralty court he would have been hung as a pirate. But in a British pov, there were "extenuating circumstances" as the Chinese troops were "in mutiny" against the British vessel's master.

Figleafs cover a lot of sins.

 

[Draconis]

For @Athelstane, @McPherson and other interested readers here is a link to an earlier thread about what if Japan decided to attack only the DEIs immediately after FDRs' oil embargo is imposed. The comments are quite interesting.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-imperial-japan-had-attacked-neis-only.357471/

If any one has any comments on that premise please post them here in this thread. My DEI thread is 4 years old.

 

[Athelstane]

For @Athelstane, @McPherson and other interested readers here is a link to an earlier thread about what if Japan decided to attack only the DEIs immediately after FDRs' oil embargo is imposed. The comments are quite interesting.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-imperial-japan-had-attacked-neis-only.357471/

If any one has any comments on that premise please post them here in this thread. My DEI thread is 4 years old.

Wow. I commented in that thread. And I now disagree with my own take!

"Were Japan to attack the Netherlands East Indies, a British declaration of war would have followed quickly." The more I read about British decision-making at that time, the less convinced I am that Churchill would have declared war. He had, of course, promised to declare war "within the hour" if Japan attacked the United States; but we also know *why* he wanted to do that. He wanted America in the war, joined at the hip. But the Dutch don't present any great advantage - just another weak ally that needs assistance.

But a Japanese entry into the DEI with even a threadbare diplomatic cover - I am grokking my idea of a Japanese supported independence insurrection - might make life awkward for Churchill. He knew that Britain was in no condition to wage a war with Japan. The difficulty would be in handling Curtin and the Kiwis. They would be demanding *some* action. And I think that action would have been some rapid ground and air reinforcement of Malaya and Burma, along with all sorts of things to make life difficult for the Japanese. And the FDR would surely do likewise. In short, I think they would be buying as much time as they could, while Germany was being moved into containment, and America feverishly rearmed.

Of course, this makes Singapore, Malaya, and Luzon far more difficult to conquer when war does come.