No Pearl Harbour raid. Victory for Japan?

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The U

To come back to the OP a little bit, what if Hirohito and the Imperial Japanese armed forces heed Yamato's warning "I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success"? They take the Philippines and immediately after send a peace treaty offer to Washington and Australia? Something along the lines of:
1) Japan will immediately return all captured US troops
2) Japan and the US will stay on their own side of the International Date Line
3) Japan will have free reign on the mainland (including the Malay peninsula / Singapore), and Indonesia is now "neutral zone" with Australia?
I'm not sure the Aussies would be happy, but I think the US would take it. Gives the US time to beef up Pacific defenses, while fully concentrating on Europe.

You're the most powerful nation on Earth and proud of it.
A small Island nation that pretends to be a great empire kicks you out of a territory your grandfathers took from a very old, formerly very real empire.
And you just let them have it?
Not a chance in hell. Once Japan starts a war, any war, nothing short of going back to their 1919 situation will do, and thats if the Americans are felling generous.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

To come back to the OP a little bit, what if Hirohito and the Imperial Japanese armed forces heed Yamato's warning "I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success"? They take the Philippines and immediately after send a peace treaty offer to Washington and Australia? Something along the lines of:
1) Japan will immediately return all captured US troops
2) Japan and the US will stay on their own side of the International Date Line
3) Japan will have free reign on the mainland (including the Malay peninsula / Singapore), and Indonesia is now "neutral zone" with Australia?
I'm not sure the Aussies would be happy, but I think the US would take it. Gives the US time to beef up Pacific defenses, while fully concentrating on Europe.

This is in effect the US surrendering. Not happening if the US wants to be a world power.

 

[JAG88]

The reinforcement of PI in 1941 was not the Navy plan. Sec War Stimson bought off on the idea & a variety of others pushed for it. Reinforcing PI was largely outside the recently agreed RAINBOW Plans & a add on that was difficult to fight.

There was a hope to organize a relief of PI from the south. The collapse of the DEI defense in March left that impractical.

Sure, but that was after PH and the massive shock it caused, it forced a more realistic view on matters on the political leadership.

In this case there is no shock, just a treacherous attack by "yellow midgets" against the might of the US, and that needs to be punished, the US needs to show it can be pushed around by Japan like those weak and decadent Europeans, so I believe they would have risked at least a CV campaign, hit and run attacks around the PI to show the troops on the ground werent alone... cant just abandon Mcarthur, right?

IOTL they did something dumber with the Doolittle raid, risking CVs in a PR stunt while the other CVs fought an actual battle, they should have known better after PH and yet they still did it.

Plus, as you correctly point out, the political leadership had already began to make a mess of military planning.

 

[Resurgam]

This is in effect the US surrendering. Not happening if the US wants to be a world power.

The US of this time is not the US emerging a hyperpower in 1945. That's something to consider as well.

 

[eltf177]

Unless the IJA and IJN work better together it's not going to be easy to win if the US decides to fight for the Philippines...

 

[nbcman]

Sure, but that was after PH and the massive shock it caused, it forced a realistic view on matters.

In this case there is no shock, just a treacherous attack by "yellow midgets" against the might of the US, and that needs to be punished, the US needs to show it can be pushed around by Japan like those weak and decadent Europeans, so I believe they would have risked at least a CV campaign, hit and run attacks around the PI to show the troops on the ground werent alone... cant just abandon Mcarthur, right?

IOTL they did something dumber with the Doolittle raid, risking CVs in a PR stunt while the other CVs fought an actual battle, they should have known better after PH and yet they still did it.

How would the US do a CV campaign in the close waters of Western Pacific when there are no USN bases within range other than Subic Bay which can't support the proposed CV fleet?

The USN took a calculated risk with the 'PR stunt' knowing that the KB was most likely not able to intercept TF16 to make a quick dash through mostly empty waters - the same type of mostly empty waters the IJN sailed through to do the PH attack - to launch the Doolittle Raid. And there were benefits to the DR such as the damage to CVL Ryuho that delayed her completion until after the critical battles of Midway and around the Solomons plus causing the Japanese leadership to disperse their forces into China and to divert 2 CVs to the Aleutian Campaign when they could have been of use at Midway. Pretty good return for a PR stunt.

 

[JAG88]

How would the US do a CV campaign in the close waters of Western Pacific when there are no USN bases within range other than Subic Bay which can't support the proposed CV fleet?

They would need to take a IJN base (doubtful), or simply use Singapur.

The USN took a calculated risk with the 'PR stunt' knowing that the KB was most likely not able to intercept TF16 to make a quick dash through mostly empty waters - the same type of mostly empty waters the IJN sailed through to do the PH attack - to launch the Doolittle Raid. And there were benefits to the DR such as the damage to CVL Ryuho that delayed her completion until after the critical battles of Midway and around the Solomons plus causing the Japanese leadership to disperse their forces into China and to divert 2 CVs to the Aleutian Campaign when they could have been of use at Midway. Pretty good return for a PR stunt.

Intended returns? Or just an accident?

Now picture the IJN actually doing proper recce and crushing the USN once day before OTL Coral Sea, Yorktown goes down too, because half the carriers were off doing a PR stunt, as it was the USN lost one because of that, with all 4 USN carriers there you likely end up with a IJN massacre and a major victory instead of a defeat and loss of a CV.

With some luck Shokaku and Zuikaku even make it for Midway...

Look at the cascade effects, no Yorktown at Midway, means no late VT3 attack drawing fighters down and eating ammo, means no VF3 absorbing a good deal of Zero attention and ammo as well, means no Yorktowns SDBs sinking Soryu, means Enterprise dive bombers go in alone and against a fully armed and alert Zero screen, and in that context, with Zeros on them AND F4F escort they didnt do too well at the Coral Sea, in this case they are fewer, have no escort (VF6 got lost covering VT8) and have a LOT more Zeros to worry about... so they might not get Akagi and Kaga.

In any case, the 2 USN CVs face AT THE VERY LEAST 2 IJN CVs and have a lot less fighters to defend itself against the very best of the Kido Butai... IOTL many D3As were lost to CAP and the attack was severely disrupted, in this case you get a lot more attackers and less disruption, if any.

In this case, the IJN might pull a costly victory and pretty much wipe out the USN carrier fleet at Midway.

The PR stunt was a VERY dumb and political move that could have costed the USN dearly, they were VERY lucky it didnt.

...and this sounds like a very interesting ATL...

 

[Antiochus V]

Right, because the rationale behind Doolittle raid was to cause operation MI...

And ignoring that Midway was a huge fluke and could have very well ended with the USN carriers getting sunk.

If we look at Midway with the benefits of hindsight and/or attempt to wargame it then it can appear to be a ‘fluke’. It is however not a view I subscribe to any more. I wrote a timeline where a version of it played a significant part, from what I could tell the Japanese had insufficient carriers to both subdue the island and protect against the US carriers. As a result they were dangerously exposed for one crucial day, this was aggressively acted upon by the USN. If you have time it is well worth studying the battle.

There actual battle was of course marked by errors on both sides, had either or both made fewer errors there was still a very strong probability of defeat or heavy losses for Japan. The combination of radar (especially its impact on the ability to manage a CAP) and the presence of Midway as an unsinkable carrier gave the US a massive advantage and this combined with the element of surprise made a US victory the most likely outcome in my view.

 

[nbcman]

They would need to take a IJN base (doubtful), or simply use Singapur.

No, the USN can't use Singapore as they don't use the same weapons / ammunition as the RN. They could refuel but not much more.

Intended returns? Or just an accident?

Now picture the IJN actually doing proper recce and crushing the USN once day before OTL Coral Sea, Yorktown goes down too, because half the carriers were off doing a PR stunt, as it was the USN lost one because of that, with all 4 USN carriers there you likely end up with a IJN massacre and a major victory instead of a defeat and loss of a CV.

With some luck Shokaku and Zuikaku even make it for Midway...

Look at the cascade effects, no Yorktown at Midway, means no late VT3 attack drawing fighters down and eating ammo, means no VF3 absorbing a good deal of Zero attention and ammo as well, means no Yorktowns SDBs sinking Soryu, means Enterprise dive bombers go in alone and against a fully armed and alert Zero screen, and in that context, with Zeros on them AND F4F escort they didnt do too well at the Coral Sea, in this case they are fewer, have no escort (VF6 got lost covering VT8) and have a LOT more Zeros to worry about... so they might not get Akagi and Kaga.

In any case, the 2 USN CVs face AT THE VERY LEAST 2 IJN CVs and have a lot less fighters to defend itself against the very best of the Kido Butai... IOTL many D3As were lost to CAP and the attack was severely disrupted, in this case you get a lot more attackers and less disruption, if any.

In this case, the IJN might pull a costly victory and pretty much wipe out the USN carrier fleet at Midway.

The PR stunt was a VERY dumb and political move that could have costed the USN dearly, they were VERY lucky it didnt.

...and this sounds like a very interesting ATL...

Yes, intended returns per the report to the Commanding General, AAF (Arnold) from Doolittle, J.H. B/Gen. AAF Report on Japanese Raid copy #3, Military Intelligence Service – Dated July 9, 1942 on the Joint Army-Navy Bombing Project conceived by GEN Arnold and ADM King:

The joint Army-Navy bombing project was conceived in it's final form in January and accomplished in April, about three months later. The object of the project was to bomb the industrial centers of Japan. It was hoped that the damage done would be both material and psychological. Material damage was to the destruction of specific targets with ensuing confusion and retardation of production. The psychological results, it was hoped, would be the recalling of combat equipment from other theaters for home defense, thus effecting relief in those theaters, the development of a fear complex in Japan, improved relationships with our allies and a favorable reaction on the American people.

Note the underlined sentences. There was ensuing Japanese confusion and recalling of combat equipment from other theaters for home defence. It led to the 'development of a fear' of additional attacks on the homeland which led to the IJN's Aleutian and Midway campaigns to attempt to push out their defensive perimeter to their ultimate regret. It led to the retardation of production, specifically to the CVL noted previously. And it definitely improved the Allies and American morale.

And it was a calculated risk as the US knew the KB was swanning about in the I/O sinking an old RN CVL and some other vessels through 10 April 1942 and was out of position to intercept TF16. If the IJN was smart, they should have concentrated on the foe that was the larger threat - the USN instead of the RN.

 

[JAG88]

If we look at Midway with the benefits of hindsight and/or attempt to wargame it then it can appear to be a ‘fluke’. It is however not a view I subscribe to any more. I wrote a timeline where a version of it played a significant part, from what I could tell the Japanese had insufficient carriers to both subdue the island and protect against the US carriers. As a result they were dangerously exposed for one crucial day, this was aggressively acted upon by the USN. If you have time it is well worth studying the battle.

There actual battle was of course marked by errors on both sides, had either or both made fewer errors there was still a very strong probability of defeat or heavy losses for Japan. The combination of radar (especially its impact on the ability to manage a CAP) and the presence of Midway as an unsinkable carrier gave the US a massive advantage and this combined with the element of surprise made a US victory the most likely outcome in my view.

Looks interesting, I will certainly read it.

If Shokaku and Zuikaku make it it could have been a different outcome, which could have happened with a Coral Sea PoD.

USN radar didnt do well in 1942, specially in the early battles.

Put Nagumo on Shokaku, its radio may actually pick up the USN CV warning...

I call it a fluke in the sense that allowed for an unopposed attack on the IJN by the SBDs at the worst possible moment.

I think the Midway aircraft were pretty much spent.

 

[JAG88]

No, the USN can't use Singapore as they don't use the same weapons / ammunition as the RN. They could refuel but not much more.

Of course they dont, but the fleet support infrastructure and defenses were there, all you need to do is bring along the necessary stores on transport ships ASAP.

Yes, intended returns per the report to the Commanding General, AAF (Arnold) from Doolittle, J.H. B/Gen. AAF Report on Japanese Raid copy #3, Military Intelligence Service – Dated July 9, 1942 on the Joint Army-Navy Bombing Project conceived by GEN Arnold and ADM King:



Note the underlined sentences. There was ensuing Japanese confusion and recalling of combat equipment from other theaters for home defence. It led to the 'development of a fear' of additional attacks on the homeland which led to the IJN's Aleutian and Midway campaigns to attempt to push out their defensive perimeter to their ultimate regret. It led to the retardation of production, specifically to the CVL noted previously. And it definitely improved the Allies and American morale.

And it was a calculated risk as the US knew the KB was swanning about in the I/O sinking an old RN CVL and some other vessels through 10 April 1942 and was out of position to intercept TF16. If the IJN was smart, they should have concentrated on the foe that was the larger threat - the USN instead of the RN.

Very interesting, but Midway was already a target and, in the end, the whole purpose was to lure and trap the USN carriers but the IJN bungled the operation badly.

And as I said, that "calculated risk" cost them a CV, and could have easily had a much, much worse outcome.

 

[wcv215]

In any case, the 2 USN CVs face AT THE VERY LEAST 2 IJN CVs and have a lot less fighters to defend itself against the very best of the Kido Butai... IOTL many D3As were lost to CAP and the attack was severely disrupted, in this case you get a lot more attackers and less disruption, if any.

Then they don't show up. The US knew EXACTLY what it was facing at Midway, and what forces it could project. If they are that badly outnumbered then guess what? They keep the fleet home, and watch Japan either fail to take the island (the most likely outcome), or let Japan overextend itself even more and then retake the island when the fleet can't stay on station anymore due to fuel consumption.

For Japan trying for Midway was a stupid idea caused by a massive case of victory disease.

 

[ShockTrooper262]

There is an interesting video on You Tube of the Battle of Midway from the Japanese perspective. I can’t remember who did it, but might be interesting to look it up

Indeed, even though the second part is not out yet, the vid provides good insight to why Nagumo made his choices.


Link to it: here

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Sure, but that was after PH and the massive shock it caused, it forced a more realistic view on matters on the political leadership.

...

Yes, the Massive Shock thing which did not result in political pressure to relieve the Phillipines.

'But, the fleet was sunk.' is the common rational. Yes, six of 18 BB were 'sunk' Which left 12 BB & all the CV afloat. As of 1 Jan this was the status of the BB. Three were joining the Pacific fleet, and four more were still operational with the Atlantic fleet. Two more returned to service before the end of January for a total of nine. Eleven BB & six carriers in March, yet there was no significant push to relieve PI in the winter or spring of 1942. Was the Tirpitz really seen as to dangerous it was more important than the PI, that the Atlantic fleet must be maintained? If the political impetus of the enraged US cant overcome that perception why would a assumed less enraged citizenry demand such?

The real obstacle in any case is the inability of the fleet to conduct such a relief. There no fleet train capable of such a campaign in 1942. Without that operations only as far as the weakly defended Gilbert archepelligo are problematic. It took five months to establish industrial Wellingto NZ as a forward fleet base for operations in S Pac, & nearly as long to build a small advanced base in the Fiji/Samoa region. By the time A advanced base is built up in the Gilberts the question of relief would be irrelevant.

Finally the idea that Roosevelt would somehow succumb to the small PI lobby to send the 'fleet' off on a suicide mission beyond its operating range is flat out ignorant. That sort of political skill was at the top of Roosevelts ability. As a former under secretary if the Navy Dept, & eight years as President he had as good a understanding as anyone of the principles of WP ORANGE, the RAINBOW plans, and Kimmels WWP-46. he simply was not going to be pushed into sending the fleet on a suicide mission.

BB33 Arkansas Iceland, convoy escourt

BB34 New York Returned to service Feb 1942 after overhaul @ Norfolk

BB35 Texas Argentina, convoy escourt

BB36 Nevada Returned to service November 1942

BB38 Pennsylvania Returned to service 12 Jan 1942

BB40 New Mexico Enroute to Pacific

BB41 Mississippi Enroute to Pacific

BB42 Idaho Enroute to Pacific

BB43 Tennesee Returned to service March 1942

BB44 California Returned to service May 1944

BB45 Colorado Replacing 5" guns @ Puget Sound. Returned to Service January 1942

BB46 Maryland Returned to service June 1942

BB55 North Carolina Atlantic Fleet

BB56 Washington Atlantic Fleet

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Then they don't show up. The US knew EXACTLY what it was facing at Midway, and what forces it could project. If they are that badly outnumbered then guess what? They keep the fleet home, and watch Japan either fail to take the island (the most likely outcome), or let Japan overextend itself even more and then retake the island when the fleet can't stay on station anymore due to fuel consumption.

For Japan trying for Midway was a stupid idea caused by a massive case of victory disease.

Plan B was to sit further off and pick at the tail of the Japanese fleet when it retired. Or exposed some periphrial component

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The US of this time is not the US emerging a hyperpower in 1945. That's something to consider as well.

Actually it was. Given its industrial base, and projected weapons programs for 1943-43 alone. Theres the US, and Britain, and nothing else with global reach. France was down and out, the survival of the USSR in doubt, Germany stuck with a continental reach. Japan struggling to cope with its overreach. Who else was there?

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

No, the USN can't use Singapore as they don't use the same weapons / ammunition as the RN. They could refuel but not much more.

That's what supply ships are for, to bring the weapons and ammunition to where the fighting ships can resupply. In this case it's a fully equipped fleet base, hospital and leave centre rather than a piece of empty ocean.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

That's what supply ships are for, to bring the weapons and ammunition to where the fighting ships can resupply. In this case it's a fully equipped fleet base, hospital and leave centre rather than a piece of empty ocean.

As I pointed out earlier it took several months to establish Wellington NZ as a US fleet base. Pearl Harbor already existed as a forward base in 1940 & build up to a proper fleet base was just nearing completion at the end of 1941. Singapore's establishment as a US fleet base needs more than the arrival of two or three dozen cargo ships. Exactly when it is available depends on when the decision is made and when the actual build up starts. This would not occur in a vacuum. Any thing sent to Singapore 1940-42 means something subtracted from a fleet base expansion elsewhere.

 

[MatthewB]

To come back to the OP a little bit, what if Hirohito and the Imperial Japanese armed forces heed Yamato's warning "I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success"? They take the Philippines and immediately after send a peace treaty offer to Washington and Australia? Something along the lines of:
1) Japan will immediately return all captured US troops
2) Japan and the US will stay on their own side of the International Date Line
3) Japan will have free reign on the mainland (including the Malay peninsula / Singapore), and Indonesia is now "neutral zone" with Australia?
I'm not sure the Aussies would be happy, but I think the US would take it. Gives the US time to beef up Pacific defenses, while fully concentrating on Europe.

It’s suggestions like this that demonstrate how misinformed and delusional Japan was about the American mindset and willingness to fight. These Americans are the people that took on and defeated the British empire only 160 years prior, and fought them again to a standstill 127 years ago, and then wiped out the Spanish empire 41 years ago, and then crushed the Germans only recently. What more does America need to do to demonstrate to Japan that it will not be kicked around? When did America ever demonstrate to Japan that it would stand down after any initial setback?

 

[nbcman]

That's what supply ships are for, to bring the weapons and ammunition to where the fighting ships can resupply. In this case it's a fully equipped fleet base, hospital and leave centre rather than a piece of empty ocean.

Agreed; however, barring any changes to OTL, Singapore won't be in Allied hands for enough time to consider the risk to send the convoys of material from the US or from PH to a fleet base that will be under siege in about 2 months after the start of the wider war in the Pacific. Other bases such as Australia, New Zealand and New Caledonia would be more likely forward USN bases.