Neocons in a longer Cold War

[Anchises]

So assuming the CW lasts longer and the WP has managed to stay a somewhat credible enemy to NATO:

A similiar set of people to OTLs Bush Adminstration gets into power in the early 2000s. Not trying to venture into chat territory but I guess most members would agree, that the foreign policy of W's administration was fairly aggressive and influenced by the Neocon ideology.

So with a similiar set of decision makers, influenced by the same advisors:

How would a "Neocon" influenced government fare in a Cold War? How would the "Neocon-ideology" develop without the "End of History"?:

- Ronald Reagan 2: Electric Bogaloo?

- prime dystopia material: crapsack world due to hamfisted gunboat politics (ME blows up?)

- WW3

- fairly meh (run of the mill Republican government)

- capable geopolitical chessmasters containing/ending the Red threat

- something else entirely

 

[FillyofDelphi]

The Neocons, in many ways, are highly comparable to fish-out-of water Reagan Republicans; dedicated to the protection of democratic values abroad, a strong pro-military bent, ect., dumped into a world with no obvious outlet to express their cherised values in. Looking for an enemy is how we got to the "Axis of Evil" perception on which the policy in the Middle East was started, which was the catylst of many further iniatives. If the Soviets are still there, I expect a continuation of forceful containment. @

 

[Amadeus]

World War III wouldn't happen, if it didn't happen under Reagan it wouldn't happen under ATL Dubya or Trump who have very similar foreign policy views to the Gipper. I agree with FillyofDelphi: had the Cold War not ended then the neo-cons would simply continue the same policies they carried out under Reagan, but to varying degrees of success depending on who is President .

 

[Kalga]

If the USSR hangs around long enough and the PRC's economic growth goes as OTL then it would be relatively simply to construct a suitable narrative replacing the USSR with the PRC as the main villain/opponent/whatever. If that's the case then the Cold War might continue for quite a while yet (with future historians dividing it in the 'red bear' and 'red dragon' phases).

 

[FillyofDelphi]

If the USSR hangs around long enough and the PRC's economic growth goes as OTL then it would be relatively simply to construct a suitable narrative replacing the USSR with the PRC as the main villain/opponent/whatever. If that's the case then the Cold War might continue for quite a while yet (with future historians dividing it in the 'red bear' and 'red dragon' phases).

Speaking of economic growth, I presume the Soviets have managed to cobble together some kind of effective economic reforms to save their rusting industries? I can't imagine they would be a credible threat otherwise

 

[Kalga]

Speaking of economic growth, I presume the Soviets have managed to cobble together some kind of effective economic reforms to save their rusting industries? I can't imagine they would be a credible threat otherwise

Depends on how much longer than OTL you want the Soviets to be around.

If it's just a few years to a decade or so, then minimal changes in terms of reforms are needed, their nuclear capabilities meant that even as their conventional forces become less and less relevant (as by the late 80s the USA military were beginning the reap the benefits of massive R&D & construction since the tail end of the prior decade and the gap will only widen, especially in naval matters) they could still hold massive geo-political sway.

Now if you need the USSR to survive well into the 21st century then they needed to have kept pushing reforms during the 60s and onwards.

Of course there's still a spectrum of everything in between on the sliding scale of 'how long do you want the USSR to last longer than OTL?'

 

[Anchises]

Speaking of economic growth, I presume the Soviets have managed to cobble together some kind of effective economic reforms to save their rusting industries? I can't imagine they would be a credible threat otherwise

Depends on how much longer than OTL you want the Soviets to be around.

If it's just a few years to a decade or so, then minimal changes in terms of reforms are needed, their nuclear capabilities meant that even as their conventional forces become less and less relevant (as by the late 80s the USA military were beginning the reap the benefits of massive R&D & construction since the tail end of the prior decade and the gap will only widen, especially in naval matters) they could still hold massive geo-political sway.

Now if you need the USSR to survive well into the 21st century then they needed to have kept pushing reforms during the 60s and onwards.

Of course there's still a spectrum of everything in between on the sliding scale of 'how long do you want the USSR to last longer than OTL?'

Well the hard question always is:

What kind of reforms the Politbureau could have realistically enacted and what kind of reform would actually improve things. The overlap is probably relatively small.

- Chinese "Socialist Market Economy":

Not going to happen. Would be the ideological death of the Soviet project and the West would never allow it to happeb like it did witch China.

- Glasnost and Perestroika but this time it works:

No.

- Andropov gets a few more years and picks a successor:

Some moderate-hardline facelift for the planned economy might prolong the whole suffering into the 90s but given the trajectory of the Soviet economy, I don't see them reaching the new millenium.

- modern NEP (New Economic Policy) and "foreign policy realism":

Imho one of the best ways to have a SU that still somewhat functions as an antagonist in the 21st Century.

They slowly introduce market economy elements in their economy, step by step rebuilding the rotten foundation.

And the military is slowly downsized. By 2000 they are probably slightly more powerful than OTLs Russia with most of the WP gone.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

Depends on how much longer than OTL you want the Soviets to be around.

If it's just a few years to a decade or so, then minimal changes in terms of reforms are needed, their nuclear capabilities meant that even as their conventional forces become less and less relevant (as by the late 80s the USA military were beginning the reap the benefits of massive R&D & construction since the tail end of the prior decade and the gap will only widen, especially in naval matters) they could still hold massive geo-political sway.

Now if you need the USSR to survive well into the 21st century then they needed to have kept pushing reforms during the 60s and onwards.

Of course there's still a spectrum of everything in between on the sliding scale of 'how long do you want the USSR to last longer than OTL?'

The OP specifically says the NeoCons come into power in the early 2000's, so you need them to last another decade as a serious force at least. So, no withering into a zombie husk over the course of the 90's. That means you'll need some real economic reforms (The after-hours "worker's co-operative" model was introducing something vaguely resembling market forces, so there's a seed at least) and industrial investment. Off the top of my head, the best route I can see is some kind of mending of the Sino-Soviet split/the US going hard-line against China on the eve of her really taking off in development; hamstringing Chinese industrial development and giving the Soviets a large captive market to encourage new, more efficent production. (And even that only has a modest chance of working out as planned)

 

[Kalga]

The OP specifically says the NeoCons come into power in the early 2000's, so you need them to last another decade as a serious force at least.

Sometimes perception is more important than actual reality. In hindsight OTL it was pretty obvious that the USSR was circling the drain even as early as the early 1980s:

Industrial productivity has never been altogether satisfactory, particularly in such new fields as electronics. By the early 1980s many new warships were going to sea without key electronic systems, and sometimes even without portions of their armament. The Soviets did continue to develop innovative prototypes, and sometimes they were able to acquire electronic components from the West. Overall, however, it seems unlikely that the system could compete with the Western powers in the ongoing electronic revolution. Unfortunately, the Soviets had no Khrushchev who could envisage some radical military reaction comparable to the 'revolution in military affairs'. The post-Khrushchev settlement, in which all segments of the Soviet system were allowed to develop much as they liked, precluded that. In effect, the costs of maintaining standing forces and building the sort of forces already in production, could not be sustained.

(speaking on Conway, I guess their volumes of post WWII would be as follows: 1947-1982 combined revised edition, detailing the golden age of the aircraft carrier, 1983-2002 late classic cold war era and the rise of the VLS, 2003-20?? new/sino cold war era and the coming of age of lasers and railguns)

But at the time it certainly didn't appeared that way.

It was certainly possible that hardliners to take power in the late 1980s, double down on their unsustainable policies, and suffer an even bigger implosion by the late 90s/early 00s, or becomes the bedridden ex-supervillain as PRC starts to trickling in investments to prop up the ramshackled shambling corpse. Either way they could still keep appearances of might (the usual, parade newest gear on Victory Day parade, they would still have the capability to produce some amount of bleed edge gear (though less and less as a percentage as the decade went on).

Come to think of it, would the Gulf war still occur? If not then the perception/reputation of soviet military hardware wouldn't take a (deserved or undeserved) nosedive until much later, if at all (at least in the public sphere).

 

[Yossarian]

There's a lot of unwarranted belief that the Soviet system was on an inevitable road to collapse in this thread. Important to remember that the shortages and chaos of the late 1980s were the result of attempted economic reform. If someone more conservative than Gorbachev came to power they could have kept things going relatively easily by just not making as much of an attempt to monkey around with the economic underpinnings of the system.

 

[Kalga]

There's a lot of unwarranted belief that the Soviet system was on an inevitable road to collapse in this thread. Important to remember that the shortages and chaos of the late 1980s were the result of attempted economic reform. If someone more conservative than Gorbachev came to power they could have kept things going relatively easily by just not making as much of an attempt to monkey around with the economic underpinnings of the system.

Actually, the attempted reforms were because some in the leadership had came to the realization that economically they were slipping behind, and at an unacceptable rate at that. The screw ups in attempting reform simply made an existing bad situation much worse.

If no reforms were to occur or attempted during the 80s, the USSR could probably coast along for another decade or so, perhaps even settling into something akin to the current Juche DPRK, but it could not maintain military dominance/relevance for much longer, especially as the electronic revolution goes into full swing.

 

[Anchises]

Actually, the attempted reforms were because some in the leadership had came to the realization that economically they were slipping behind, and at an unacceptable rate at that. The screw ups in attempting reform simply made an existing bad situation much worse.

If no reforms were to occur or attempted during the 80s, the USSR could probably coast along for another decade or so, perhaps even settling into something akin to the current Juche DPRK, but it could not maintain military dominance/relevance for much longer, especially as the electronic revolution goes into full swing.

And the ammount of military spending would have been impossible.

For the GDR I am certain and for the SU I am pretty sure, that the industrial substance was rotting away quickly. The Soviets even had problems keeping the oil industry going.

In the 90s they would have probably been forced to divert more and more ressources to keeping increasingly decrepit factories and refineries running. Housing would also be a huge cost and labor intensive problem.

At some point the West would notice. In OTLS 1989 the WP forces were in a bad state. Without the disruption of Perestroika and Glasnost this might be avoided for a few more years but at some point the Soviets would be forced to adress the economy.

If they don't reform we would probably see a series of desperate, huge investment drives into the economy, that would immediately stumble over entrenched bureaucratic interests, material shortages and poor planning. This would inevitably lower the available budget for the military.

At some point even commited Cold Warriors would have a problem explaining the obvious weaknesses of the SU away. If the tanks aren't driving and the Soldiers are mistreated and starving not even "Team B" shenanigans will convince the right people that the Reds are still a threat.

So I doubt that Neocons would be able to follow an agressive approach against the Soviets, in a no-reform scenario. Nobody would be willing to pay for "kicking the man already lying on the ground".

 

[Kalga]

And the ammount of military spending would have been impossible.

For the GDR I am certain and for the SU I am pretty sure, that the industrial substance was rotting away quickly. The Soviets even had problems keeping the oil industry going.

In the 90s they would have probably been forced to divert more and more ressources to keeping increasingly decrepit factories and refineries running. Housing would also be a huge cost and labor intensive problem.

At some point the West would notice. In OTLS 1989 the WP forces were in a bad state. Without the disruption of Perestroika and Glasnost this might be avoided for a few more years but at some point the Soviets would be forced to adress the economy.

If they don't reform we would probably see a series of desperate, huge investment drives into the economy, that would immediately stumble over entrenched bureaucratic interests, material shortages and poor planning. This would inevitably lower the available budget for the military.

At some point even commited Cold Warriors would have a problem explaining the obvious weaknesses of the SU away. If the tanks aren't driving and the Soldiers are mistreated and starving not even "Team B" shenanigans will convince the right people that the Reds are still a threat.

So I doubt that Neocons would be able to follow an agressive approach against the Soviets, in a no-reform scenario. Nobody would be willing to pay for "kicking the man already lying on the ground".

That's kinda what I been saying, and a few more years is just enough to start swapping out the Red Bear for the Red Dragon, especially if the rhetoric from the West gives PRC the perception that they don't really have a place in the coming new world order.

Also, people are totally willing to pay for "kicking the man already lying on the ground", if the rhetoric is phrased in a suitable way. That's what the expansion of NATO expansion of former Warsaw Pact members are.

 

[Yossarian]

Actually, the attempted reforms were because some in the leadership had came to the realization that economically they were slipping behind, and at an unacceptable rate at that. The screw ups in attempting reform simply made an existing bad situation much worse.

If no reforms were to occur or attempted during the 80s, the USSR could probably coast along for another decade or so, perhaps even settling into something akin to the current Juche DPRK, but it could not maintain military dominance/relevance for much longer, especially as the electronic revolution goes into full swing.

There's a difference between slipping behind and heading for collapse though. They realized that they were not on track to ever surpass or even catch up to western living standards and started making changes to try to resolve that problem. It's not that the economy was collapsing and needed to be salvaged, they just thought they could be doing better and really screwed up the attempt.

It's also funny how we talk about the military standoff. I guess the Soviets may have been paranoid enough to imagine that the US might start a war if it thought it could win it, but if so that belief was as irrational as American fears that the Soviets would start a war. Seems pretty clear that the Soviets could have carried out a pretty huge military demobilization without much in the way of geopolitical risk. Keeping a small fraction of their nuclear arsenal would be plenty to deter NATO.

 

[Kalga]

There's a difference between slipping behind and heading for collapse though. They realized that they were not on track to ever surpass or even catch up to western living standards and started making changes to try to resolve that problem. It's not that the economy was collapsing and needed to be salvaged, they just thought they could be doing better and really screwed up the attempt.

It's also funny how we talk about the military standoff. I guess the Soviets may have been paranoid enough to imagine that the US might start a war if it thought it could win it, but if so that belief was as irrational as American fears that the Soviets would start a war. Seems pretty clear that the Soviets could have carried out a pretty huge military demobilization without much in the way of geopolitical risk. Keeping a small fraction of their nuclear arsenal would be plenty to deter NATO.

The part of Conway's all the World's Fighting Ships I quoted from was talking about the Soviet's inability in competing against the west in terms of military production, especially of high tech gear/equipment. Competing in living standards is small fries in comparison to the spectral of becoming militarily irrelevant (in terms of force/power projection capabilities).

As for simply cutting back on military spending, the problem lies not in just the threat of NATO & USA but also of the influence of the military itself within the government. Thus any cuts to the military's budget would be seen as an attack on the power and position of the military's place in the government, something they are unlikely to take lying down.

 

[Yossarian]

The part of Conway's all the World's Fighting Ships I quoted from was talking about the Soviet's inability in competing against the west in terms of military production, especially of high tech gear/equipment. Competing in living standards is small fries in comparison to the spectral of becoming militarily irrelevant (in terms of force/power projection capabilities).

As for simply cutting back on military spending, the problem lies not in just the threat of NATO & USA but also of the influence of the military itself within the government. Thus any cuts to the military's budget would be seen as an attack on the power and position of the military's place in the government, something they are unlikely to take lying down.

Needing to maintain a bloated military apparatus for essentially political reasons doesn't really conflict with not needing to keep up with the Americans militarily. They'd have been better off shifting resources from the military to the civilian sector, but regardless of where they invested those resources there was no need for them to be comparing their military to America's.

 

[Kalga]

Needing to maintain a bloated military apparatus for essentially political reasons doesn't really conflict with not needing to keep up with the Americans militarily. They'd have been better off shifting resources from the military to the civilian sector, but regardless of where they invested those resources there was no need for them to be comparing their military to America's.

They're literally unable to keep up with US military development even with their outsize spending allocated to military, and a significant part of the Cold War was about them comparing to the USA, whether it's the military, standard of living, or technological progress.

Also none of that changes the internal political calculus between the party, the military, and the KGB, none of which are willing to volunteer downsizing themselves (which gives the other an advantage in terms of prestige and influence over them)

 

[RamscoopRaider]

Needing to maintain a bloated military apparatus for essentially political reasons doesn't really conflict with not needing to keep up with the Americans militarily. They'd have been better off shifting resources from the military to the civilian sector, but regardless of where they invested those resources there was no need for them to be comparing their military to America's.

The USSR does need to keep up with the US, and compare its military to the US if it wants to keep the Cold War going on, which is the purpose of the thread. If the USSR decides not to compete, it concedes defeat in the Cold War, as it is no longer a threat to NATO

 

[Yossarian]

The USSR does need to keep up with the US, and compare its military to the US if it wants to keep the Cold War going on, which is the purpose of the thread. If the USSR decides not to compete, it concedes defeat in the Cold War, as it is no longer a threat to NATO

This is what I'm saying - why do you think that's the case? Imagine if the Soviets had cut their military spending but not let up on the Cold War in other ways. Do you really think the US would have launched a surprise attack once it was far enough ahead? Think of the tension between the US and Russia or China today - obviously the US has a far stronger military, but there's no concern that they might take advantage of that fact to fight a winning war with either country. A few hundred nukes like China has currently is plenty of deterrence. Besides protection from an attack (and pork projects for the military bureaucracy) what did the Soviets really need that huge military for anyway?

 

[Kalga]

This is what I'm saying - why do you think that's the case? Imagine if the Soviets had cut their military spending but not let up on the Cold War in other ways. Do you really think the US would have launched a surprise attack once it was far enough ahead? Think of the tension between the US and Russia or China today - obviously the US has a far stronger military, but there's no concern that they might take advantage of that fact to fight a winning war with either country. A few hundred nukes like China has currently is plenty of deterrence. Besides protection from an attack (and pork projects for the military bureaucracy) what did the Soviets really need that huge military for anyway?

Internally: because of the nature of Soviet politics it is not in the military's interest to downsize (which means an reduction of their prestige and power within the system)
Externally: because their ability to exert geopolitical influence (and thus their ability if not the point of the Cold War) is directly based on their ability to back their soft power with hard power if necessary, and that means a stronk and threatening military in comparison with NATO/USA's.

Also present day PRC isn't competing in terms of ideologies, but is rather playing into the current system, and her lack of capability to project hard powers shows, which is why they're doing all they can to expand their blue water naval and amphibious capabilities among other things. Note that despite PRC's heavy investments and courting of influence into Africa, at present they're not a serious concern as they have limited to no capability to protect their investments if, say, the USA decide to suddenly back a number of coups.