Instead of Moltke going YOLO he goes with the actual Schlieffen plan for the exact war they were facing, with that as POD Central Powers victory becomes, by far, the most likely outcome. Add Austria-Hungary not fucking up so badly if you want overwhelming victory.
Most plausible WW1 German Victory?
- Thread starter Bomster
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Riain
Banned
The command problems were structural not personal , although Moltke did make significant mistakes in command. What was needed was an Army Group command level where a single leader commands multiple armies as intact units rather than Operational Control were 2nd army raided 1st and 3rd Armies for corps.
However this will only get you so far, Supreme command also needs to be applied to shift troops to the East and the right wing from the left wing.
To do better all they would have to do is, when faced with a war against France and Russia, take the prepared plan for a war against France and Russia and use it. A very low bar to clear, not exactly rocket science we are speaking of here.
Moltke instead chose to take a plan for a war against France only(with Russia explicitly not involved) and half-ass its execution by not having the preparations and troops for it while also adding a tight timeline. There is reason I called it YOLO, it comes across as that exact kind of feeling, Leeroy Jenkins fits too.
The fact that Moltke was generally competent just makes this singular decision that, more than any other, hurt the effort of Germany(and the Central Powers) in WW1 look even dumber. It is hard to fathom what he was thinking and the best guess I have is that he wasn't.
Italy actually joining on the CP side. That's probably better than just Italy being a reliable neutral.
Riain
Banned
Apparently Moltkes plan relied on the Italians taking up positions held by 6th Army by M+20 so 6th Army could transfer to the right wing. Trains were allocated to this part of the plan, but Italy remained neutral.
The most plausible IMHO is the Germans destroying the French more comprehensively during the Great Retreat. There was a point where they came within a hair of encircling and destroying the French Fifth Army, which would likely have led to a German victory at the Marne.
Another couple of PODs are the Austro-Hungarians decisively defeating the Russians in the opening moves on the Eastern Front, or the Germans doing the same in their Łódź offensive, both of which were close run things IOTL.
Another couple of PODs are the Austro-Hungarians decisively defeating the Russians in the opening moves on the Eastern Front, or the Germans doing the same in their Łódź offensive, both of which were close run things IOTL.
It all boils down to the initial deployment of the Staffel-B, AKA the 2nd Army. Deploying the 2nd Army against Russia (right from the start) would mean the Russians wouldn't have numerical superiority during their attack on East Galicia, and the Austro-Hungarians could stop their advance (at the very least) or even throw them back (behind the Sereth or even the border). Without the imminent need to reinforce East Galicia, Auffenberg's 4th Army wouldn't have to be suddenly diverted and it could completely encircle and destroy the Russian 5th Army at the Battle of Komarów. So A-H not only would avoid two disastrous defeats of OTL (Gnila Lipa and Rawa-Ruska), but it would also achieve a triumph on the scale of Tannenberg.
Later developments are harder to predict. The A-H 4th Army could occupy Kholm and some of its formations could be turned Westwards to flank the Russians at Lublin. With their positions threatened, the Russians might be forced abandon the city and withdraw to the fortress of Ivangorod. The arrival of reinforcements that IOTL were needed to replenish the badly mauled Austro-Hungarian forces could be used ITTL to create a new army formation on the left bank of the Vistula. This new Austro-Hungarian 7th Army, together with the also newly formed German 9th Army would then launch a coordinated offensive from the Krakow-Upper Silesia area. The A-H 7th Army would move against Ivangorod and the German 9th Army against Warsaw. IOTL both attacks were performed by the 9th Army, with its forces split. ITTL Ivangorod would already be put under pressure from the South by the A-H 1st Army, the 7th Army piling on it from the West would increase that even further. Meanwhile, the German 9th Army would concentrate all its strength against Warsaw.
The lack of an attack from the North would probably allow Warsaw to defend againt the German attack, but Ivangorod would likely fall. That in turn, however would leave Warsaw vulnerable to the Southeast. At this point the Russians might just decide to abandon the Polish Salient altogether, however that's not a given, since the Autro-Hungarian forces would already be exhausted and overstretched. This, combined with the arrival of the Autumn rains (mud) would provide some breathing room for the Russians. The overall Russian might would be far from spent, and the continous flow of reinforcements would give the Russians opportunity to regain the initiative.
This is how I think things could develop, but @Helmuth48 could probably offer a better perspective.
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This is a very plausible explanation. You assume that Germany still goes 'West first'?
I agree, deploying the 2nd Army in Galicia from the start will ensure that the battle of Gnila Lipa will not end in an Austro-Hungarian defeat. A stalemate is more likely to ensue, I expect. As a result, the 1st and 4th armies can probably take Lublin and Chelm. After that, the offensive will lose momentum, especially when the Russian 9th Army arrives.
I don't see a capture of Warsaw and Ivangorod happening immediately. The German 9th Army does not arrive at the Vistula until 9 October during the OTL 'Battle of the Vistula River'. By that time, also in this ATL the Russians will have reinforced the Vistula front with the 1st and 2nd armies. But combined with a German 'east first' strategy, as I described in this post, an initial deployment of the 2nd Army in Galicia will result in Poland being taken before the end of September!
I find this reasoning to be suspect. I think that Germany did not do such things because they knew it would not work. Britain was not going to stand for Germany becoming hegemon of Europe, no matter how nicely they went about it. These strategies worked in the Franco-Prussian War because Britain could reasonably assume that France would win and the balance of power on Europe would be preserved. When France lost and Germany unified, the balance of power shifted dramatically and not in favor of Britain.
To quote Bejamin Disraeli:
"Let me impress upon the attention of the House the character of this war between France and Germany. It is no common war, like the war between Prussia and Austria, or like the Italian war in which France was engaged some years ago; nor is it like the Crimean War.
This war represents the German revolution, a greater political event than the French revolution of last century. I don’t say a greater, or as great a social event. What its social consequences may be are in the future. Not a single principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to six months ago, any longer exists. There is not a diplomatic tradition which has not been swept away. You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope, at present involved in that obscurity incident to novelty in such affairs. We used to have discussions in this House about the balance of power. Lord Palmerston, eminently a practical man, trimmed the ship of State and shaped its policy with a view to preserve an equilibrium in Europe. [ . . . ] But what has really come to pass? The balance of power has been entirely destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and feels the effects of this great change most, is England."
The invasion of Belgium made their decision easier to sell to the public (and to the MPs voting for war) but I think Britain was going to declare war pretty much no matter what once Germany declared war on France and Russia. They just had to find sufficient cause for it.
Well he did die in 1884, so maybe there could be a more contemporary source to sted light on 1914 decision making?
There would be probably too few troops available to successfully conduct any large scale offensive operations. With that in mind, the pre-war warplans also called for a defensive approach for this kind of scenario. So Potiorek would likely be told to sit on his behind, defend Bosnia and don't get any funny ideas. Of course, this alone wouldn't be a garantuee on Potiorek not bombarding the A-H General Staff with requests for consent to offensive operations. In absence of other circumstances, he would probably get his way. By the time that could happen however, A-H would already begin to experience munition shortages. This in combination with the successes on the Eastern Front would probably lead to almost all available reinforcements/surplus supplies being diverted against Russia "to keep striking the iron while it's still hot," leaving the Balkan only scraps. Potiorek might even have to fight to keep what he already has.
I'm not really sure what actions the Serbians would take though. They have several options:
A: Attack the well defended, difficult terrain Bosnia simultaneously with Montenegro and bank on the possibily of a popular revolt in Bosnia cutting off the Austro-Hungarian forces from behind.
B: Attack through the Sava river into the less defended, easier terrain Syrmia to provide strategic depth for the defence of Belgrade and to shift away A-H forces from Bosnia for the sake of a potential future offensive in the region.
C: Overall remain on the defence and conduct only limited operations to keep the already present Austro-Hungarian forces occupied in this theatre.
I'm inclined to believe that the Serbians would choose to be cautious and go with option "C". On the other hand, I'm not convinced the Russians would allow them to stick to this choice for too long. After Tannenberg and Komarów, but especially after this alternative Battle of the Vistula River, the Russians (and by extension the rest of the Entente too) would be anxious to have some of the pressure diverted off of them. The Serbians would be pressured into launching a major offensive operation. At this point, I believe the Serbians would adopt the still relatively safe option "B". I could see the Serbians achieving some field successes here, but they would probably be unsuccessful in forcing A-H to redirect any meaningful amount of its forces from the Eastern Front. It's far more likely that some A-H units from Bosnia would be repositioned instead. That in itself also has its merits though. It's increases the security of Montenegro and provides opportunity to attack Bosnia facing less opposition. It must be noted though, that this last part can only apply if the Serbians don't prematurely exhaust themselves in Syrmia.
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Yes. I tried to implement only the smallest initial divergence necessary to flip the fortunes in Galicia.
I agree. Aside from the 9th Army, further advances would also endanger the A-H 4th Army's right flank.
What about the German 9th Army concentrating between the Wartha and Vistula instead? (Silesia is not endangered in this scenario anyway.) Like that, they could finish deployment earlier. Assuming the A-H 7th Army is also deployed within reasonable time, TTL's Battle of the Vistula River could be launched somewhat earlier. The 9th Army would also need to traverse a smaller distance compared to OTL. Meanwhile, the A-H 7th Army would probably face little to no opposition until it nears Ivangorod, (a rather significant change compared to OTL), so it could also advance faster. This could provide a larger window of opportunity until the arrival of the mud season.
An earlier attack would also leave less time for the Russians to prepare.
Without doubt, such scenario would ensure the largest possible early Russian screw.
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