Riain
Banned
The problem with the OTL 9th Army is that it took troops from 2nd and 3rd Armies on the right wing so was a net negative. If it took troops from 7th Army on the left wing it would be a net positive no matter where it was deployed.
Most plausible WW1 German Victory?
- Thread starter Bomster
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The problem with the OTL 9th Army is that it took troops from 2nd and 3rd Armies on the right wing so was a net negative. If it took troops from 7th Army on the left wing it would be a net positive no matter where it was deployed.
You mean between Thorn and Posen? A few days earlier may be possible, but most 9th Army Corps also fought in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes (then as part of the 8th Army), so some recovery time is needed. The distance to Warsaw doesn't make it that different either.
Indeed.
The Americans not loaning money to the entente could make a big difference
That would require a much more isolationist America at the time.
I'm not sure what you want here. A contemporary quote by a British politician about a policy the Germans did not pursue?
Winston Churchill, first lord of the admiralty, was mobilizing the navy well in advance of a declaration of war. The entente cordiale was signed in 1904. Hell, The Battle of Dorking, a British book describing an invasion by a German speaking people referred to as "The Enemy" was published not long after the Franco-Prussian War. It wasn't a secret that Britain might have to go to war with Germany.
I am shocked at the number of people here who think Britain didn't play the same realpolitik games as everyone else. The Treaty of London (1839) was a scrap of paper. It did not compel Britain to do anything it didn't want to do. They wanted to go to war.
Here's a quote I found on Wikipedia on this subject:
"According to Isabel V. Hull:
Annika Mombauer correctly sums up the current historiography: "Few historians would still maintain that the 'rape of Belgium' was the real motive for Britain's declaration of war on Germany." Instead, the role of Belgian neutrality is variously interpreted as an excuse used to mobilise public opinion, to provide embarrassed radicals in the cabinet with the justification for abandoning the principal of pacifism and thus staying in office, or - in the more conspiratorial versions - as cover for naked imperial interests."
I don't think keeping Britain neutral permanently is an option. The British have always opposed one power dominating the continent. Germany was that power in 1914. They'll find a way to get into it on the side of France and Russia.
marathag
Banned
With an 'East First' and no Belgium, the UK has a ring side seat of watching huge guys in Red trousers being mowed down by German gun, for little gain south of Metz.
In the East. the Russians age getting kicked.
Where is the BEF supposed to be fielded? Poland?
No BEF is also an option. Britain could wage the war on the sea only. That would also make it easier for the British to just bankroll France and Russia.
kham_coc
Banned
Yes and no. I agree with the sentiment of your analysis, but a part of the reason the UK wanted in on the war, was to have the ability to influence the presumed victory of France and Russia. If its readily apparent that its Russia that's losing (with France whole) that's reducing their incentive to join the war since weakening Russia was one of their concerns also.
More likely (if at all) to be March 1918, when a CP win begins to look like a real possibility. OTOH Wilson (or whoever is POTUS) may decide that it's too late now for US entry to make any difference.
The British interest was to maintain France as a great power against Germany. Britain "wanted" war with Germany because it was expected that Germany would invade France. But what if this expectation does not exist, because Germany opts for 'east firtst'? In fact, what if it is France that wants to invade Germany?
What would make a difference is if France invaded Germany though Belgium.
That is very likely the case without a tall if tree but that's what it would take IMO
Germany needs to win quickly and not take on 3 Empires who have access to the worlds resources!
If they do intervene, but after France and Russia are too played out, they can lose the relay race and be left without a position they can keep tenable on the continent through 1918.
Britain could intervene to make a German major invasion of France unattractive after Germany's largely defanged Russia.
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A question about the hurry and placement and deployment of a BEF against Germany if Britain DOW'ed a Germany going east-first:
If the British DoW'ed the Germans out of realpolitik, coalition solidarity (rather than Belgium) basically, would they have thrown the BEF with all due speed to fight in France alongside the French. Would they squeeze them in the rather crowded Alsace-Lorraine front where the French are trying to attack, waiting for enough red pants'ed poilus to get mowed down to step over so they could engaged on the narrow front line, while sticking to a policy of ensuring that French, and their own, forces respect Belgian neutrality?
Would the British do the same massive peer pressure, volunteer-raising campaign to build up the BEF for this mission of invading Germany through this narrow front?
All for the glorious mission of saving Poland for the Tsar, and saving the Tsar's ability to punish Austria?
Or would the British and French amend the mission, putting intense diplomatic and financial pressure on the Belgians to let Anglo-French forces pass to widen the pressure against the Germans? If they did, would the Belgians yield peacefully to Anglo-French pressure, or force the Anglo-French to invade, while Belgian forces resisted, with German assistance? Would London, Paris let Belgian stubbornness frustrate any original intent or ambition theirs to pass through, out of respect for PR and unwanted hassle?
If the British DoW'ed the Germans out of realpolitik, coalition solidarity (rather than Belgium) basically, would they have thrown the BEF with all due speed to fight in France alongside the French. Would they squeeze them in the rather crowded Alsace-Lorraine front where the French are trying to attack, waiting for enough red pants'ed poilus to get mowed down to step over so they could engaged on the narrow front line, while sticking to a policy of ensuring that French, and their own, forces respect Belgian neutrality?
Would the British do the same massive peer pressure, volunteer-raising campaign to build up the BEF for this mission of invading Germany through this narrow front?
All for the glorious mission of saving Poland for the Tsar, and saving the Tsar's ability to punish Austria?
Or would the British and French amend the mission, putting intense diplomatic and financial pressure on the Belgians to let Anglo-French forces pass to widen the pressure against the Germans? If they did, would the Belgians yield peacefully to Anglo-French pressure, or force the Anglo-French to invade, while Belgian forces resisted, with German assistance? Would London, Paris let Belgian stubbornness frustrate any original intent or ambition theirs to pass through, out of respect for PR and unwanted hassle?
Everyone, and I mean everyone, at the outbreak of war assumed it would be a short war of maneuver and not a long war of attrition. In a short war, France is more industrialized, has a better army, and can mobilize faster. France is a bigger threat to Germany in the short term than Russia.
We know that Germany could have adopted a defensive posture and held off the French army with relatively few casualties and little loss of territory. They did not know that. In all of the most recent previous wars between European powers, rapid maneuver had led to the defeat of defending armies. By 1914, these wars (and their tactics) were forty years out of date. The machine gun and artillery meant that defense was better than offense. We know that. They learned it, slowly and bloodily, throughout the late summer and fall of 1914.
No one went to war thinking it would last until 1918. They thought it would be over by Christmas. All of the previous wars had. Its a cliche for a reason.
In a long war, going east is probably Germany's best bet. They had no way of knowing it would be a long war until it was too late.
So unless they have a crystal ball, I think Germany is going to attack France first.
I ask that same question in post #55 with regard to not just France, but France and Britain.
@PeterEzgo, and others who think like him, obviously say no. You'll get some people who agree to the possibility, but you'll never get to a group consensus for yes, so you just have to choose your own adventure without expecting consensus validation.
They did this IOTL (source), and what motorized logistics they had was critical to the initial offensive getting as far as it did. It sounds like the limiting factors were lack of an efficient system for dispatching trucks to armies on the move, mechanical breakdowns, and France's road network at the time not really being up to the task of supporting large-scale truck transport. The former two probably have opportunities for at least marginal improvement, but there's not much Germany could have done about the latter.
There's some truth behind this, but I think you're overstating the case. It's true that most of the 1918 Spring Offensives were defended almost entirely by French, British, and Commonwealth forces without significant direct American involvement, but the American Expeditionary Force did have a substantial role in turning the tide in three respects.
First, American divisions were starting to take over the defense of relatively quiet areas of the Western Front in early 1918, freeing up French and British divisions to serve as a strategic reserve. This was a relatively minor contribution at the time of Operation Michael (about 4% of the front manned by 6-8 American divisions), but had grown to 12% of the front manned by about 25 American divisions by the time of Second Marne.
Second, eight divisions of the AEF participated directly in the counterattack phase of Second Marne, where they made up most of the local Entente numerical superiority over the German forces present. And it was this counterattack that really broke the back of the German army as an offensive force: in the other battles of the Spring Offensives, the Germans had given as good as they got in terms of casualties, but the counteroffensive at Second Marne inflicted about a 2:1 casualty ratio, and more crucially, captured a significant amount of German artillery.
Finally, and overlapping with the other two, incoming American manpower replaced French and British losses and then some throughout the Spring Offensives. Even if the German army had avoided disaster at Second Marne, the roughly even trades in casualties they'd been getting in the earlier battles were a clearly losing proposition for Germany because the Entente could make good their casualties with fresh American troops, while Germany (like France and to a somewhat lesser degree Britain) was already scraping the bottom manpower barrel.