Monarcho-Communist Japan (How do we get there, and what does it look like?)

[Callmesalticidae]

ITT: Figure out how to make a Monarcho-Communist Japan in the first half of the 20th Century.

Hitoshi Yamakawa was a major figure in Japanese Leftism, who, interestingly, argued that Japanese Communism ought to retain the emperor as a sort of personification of the people of Japan.

After searching through the archives, I've found a number of "Communist Japan" timelines, and even a few which don't involve an invasion by the Soviet Union, but none (unless I've missed a thread) discuss the possibility of a "monarcho-communist" Japan that retains the emperor in some capacity.

I'd like to discuss how we might get such a timeline, and what the ramifications might be. As far as the timeline's "hardness" goes, I'd like to stay as plausible as possible but can make some sacrifices if they're necessary to get, by the time that a (conflict deserving of the name) second world war breaks out (whether that's in the 30s or elsewhen), a communist Japan which has retained the emperor as at least a figurehead. I'm also okay with not being able to trace every difference to a single POD (though I'd prefer a minimum of PODs).

To start with, it seems that Russia either needs to not turn Communist or, at the very least, not be run by the Bolsheviks. "The Russians, who previously went to war with us in 1904, are now communists and oh, by the way, murdered their royals" is probably going to make communism totally unpalatable to Japan.

Retaining the emperor as a kind of "national body" implies an ethnic focus. Yamakawa in particular didn't seem to be the imperialist sort, but the USSR is proof enough that the lofty ideals of communism are not sufficient in themselves to prevent imperialist expansion, and "some of Yamakawa's ideas are adopted" is a far cry from "Yamakawa has total control over domestic and foreign policy."

(Yamakawa himself might not even live very long, if other people decide that he's outlived his usefulness and he's too annoying as a critic, but my understanding of Yamakawa is that his position on the emperor was simply based on the pragmatic recognition that most Japanese people would reject any plan which didn't have a place for the emperor, so he might continue to shift his views as necessary in order to stay alive and at least somewhat relevant)

Anyway, if Japan is expanding in the 1920s-1930s then that means that the basic motivation for e.g. invading SE Asia will remain: Japan needs more natural resources than the country currently has access to, especially if there's a war going on in China. There would still probably be a lot of Pan-Asian/Co-Prosperity Sphere talk going on, but with the explicit focus (via the emperor) on Japanese Communism as Japanese Communism, I'm not sure that Japan is going to actually be any more internationalist than it was OTL.

 

[Hagre]

Try starting with Ikki Kita, a prominent Japanese intellectual who pushed for the establishment of "Socialism from above" within the context of the Shōwa Restoration in which the Emperor was to assume direct Imperial rule over the Empire and his An Outline Plan for a Reorganization of Japan lays out his political proposals properly. A successful February 1936 coup might do the trick in kickstarting this Monarcho-Communism you have in mind and provide a way for Yamakawa to ascend to national government in the process.

 

[Aloha]

but none (unless I've missed a thread) discuss the possibility of a "monarcho-communist" Japan that retains the emperor in some capacity.

Wrong.

#4 on here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-pc-fascist-china-and-communist-japan.467487/

 

[David T]

The Social Masses Party, the major socialist party in Japan in the 1930's (it eventually disintegrated with its members torn between social democracy and national socialism) accepted the Emperor System, and even the Communists showed some flexibility after the Seventh Comintern Congress announced the policy of the "united front":

"In concrete terms, the one issue that most crucially divided the social democrats from the Communists throughout the presurrender period was their stand on the question of the "emperor system" (tennosei). This at first may appear strange, inasmuch as antimonarchism was a cardinal principle of the early democratic movements in the West. In the Japanese context, however, the Meiji oligarchs had used loyalty to the throne not only as the slogan for the Restoration but also as their Archimedean lever in creating a "modern" state. According to official interpretation, the uniqueness of Japan lay in its being ruled over by emperors "in a line unbroken for ages eternal." The theory of the spiritual omnipotence of the Emperor, if not his divinity, was part and parcel of the "national polity" (kokutai)-the "basic essence" or "unwritten constitution" of Japan. If the emperor system were taken for granted in any plan for the construction of a socialist economy, then it followed that the uniqueness of Japan would remain. Although this line of reasoning did not inevitably lead to the ideology of "national socialism" at home and the "imperial mission" abroad, that path was thus made much easier....

"This was the state of affairs in Japan when the tactic of the united front against fascism was adopted at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July and August 1935. In February 1936 Sanzo Nozaka, who had escaped from arrest in Japan in 1931 and had just been elected at the Congress to the Presidium of the Comintern, wrote in collaboration with Kenzo Yamamoto, the Japanese representative to the Profintern, what they called "A Letter to the Communists of Japan," explaining the new tactic, and sent it to Japan via the United States.47 Man), Sekai Bunka (World Culture), Shakai Hyoron (The Social Review), Shi'mpo (Progress), Taishu Seiji Keizai (Popular Political Economy), Yuibutsuron Kenkyu (Studies on Materialism); in addition, there were two directly affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party: Ikita Shimbun (The Living News) and Zudon (Bang). 46. For the effects of these confessions in Communist Party ranks, see Yamamoto and Arita, Nihon Kyosanshugi Undo Shi, pp. 382 ff. Somewhat abbreviated texts of the Sano and Nabeyama confessions may be found in ibid., pp. 376-81. 47. The main points in the policy outlined in the "Letter" were as follows: (1) The "overthrow of the emperor system" should be deleted from the present program and the "overthrow of the military fascist dictatorship" should replace it. (2) All party sectism should be done away with to strengthen the movement to create a popular front through the achievement of a broad unity among the farmers (including the rich farmers and small landlords), the petty bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia. (3) All legal means of struggle must be utilized, and for the purpose of turning the Socialist Masses' Party to the left every effort must be made to join it and all social democratic labor and farmer unions. (4) All the various daily needs and demands of the masses that are being suppressed by military fascism must be brought to the fore and fought for; Communists should not try to make the form of struggle too extreme but should rather attempt to arouse the masses on as broad a basis as possible and lead them into organized and united action. For the text, see "Nihon no Kyosanshugisha e no Tegami" in Yamamoto and Arita, pp. 411-19.

"...Since this was almost a directive, it must have been read by many of the remaining Communists as a guide for their activities. Among other things, it proposed infiltrating the Socialist Masses' Party and other social democratic labor and farmer organizations. But it is not clear what effect this and the report of the Seventh Comintern Congress had in Japan, as they were circulated clandestinely. Furthermore, even among the few remaining Communists there was confusion as to how this tactic should be applied to Japan..." https://quod.lib.umich.edu/c/cjs/an...vement-in-prewar-japan?rgn=main;view=fulltext

But of course this time the Communists were so weak that it hardly mattered whether they would play down their opposition to monarchy; and even if things had been more propitious for the Social Masses Party is doubtful that it could ever be considered "communist"--it simply sought a fairer share for labor within the system.

 

[Callmesalticidae]

Try starting with Ikki Kita, a prominent Japanese intellectual who pushed for the establishment of "Socialism from above" within the context of the Shōwa Restoration in which the Emperor was to assume direct Imperial rule over the Empire and his An Outline Plan for a Reorganization of Japan lays out his political proposals properly. A successful February 1936 coup might do the trick in kickstarting this Monarcho-Communism you have in mind and provide a way for Yamakawa to ascend to national government in the process.

Thank you! That does sound promising.

One interesting snaggle that this presents: My understanding is that the Hokushin-ron / "Strike North" Plan, in which Japan would invade the Soviet Union in order to take Mongolia and Siberia, (1) was basically abandoned after the failed Feb 1936 Coup and (2) would have been a disastrous and unprofitable enterprise, since most of Siberia's resources were at that time unknown, inaccessible, or both.

Does anyone know if a successful coup would guarantee the selection of Strike North over the Strike South Plan which Japan chose IOTL?

(On the other hand, a not-insignificant part of the idea behind Hokushin-ron was that Communism was bad and therefore the USSR had to be knocked out of the ring, so there might not even be any Strike North Plan to begin with, which might mean that Manchuria is never invaded in the first place. Hm...)

Also, for all that the lower-ranking officers of the Japanese army were known to go off the rails and disobey orders IOTL, a successful coup would probably magnify this tendency. I...can't imagine that turning out well for anybody, which is unfortunate.

Wrong.

#4 on here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-pc-fascist-china-and-communist-japan.467487/

Thank you for pointing that one out. I'm not sure how I missed it. I wish that thread had lived a little longer...

* snip *

Thank you!

 

[Hagre]

Thank you! That does sound promising.

One interesting snaggle that this presents: My understanding is that the Hokushin-ron / "Strike North" Plan, in which Japan would invade the Soviet Union in order to take Mongolia and Siberia, (1) was basically abandoned after the failed Feb 1936 Coup and (2) would have been a disastrous and unprofitable enterprise, since most of Siberia's resources were at that time unknown, inaccessible, or both.

Does anyone know if a successful coup would guarantee the selection of Strike North over the Strike South Plan which Japan chose IOTL?

Also, for all that the lower-ranking officers of the Japanese army were known to go off the rails and disobey orders IOTL, a successful coup would probably magnify this tendency. I...can't imagine that turning out well for anybody, which is unfortunate.

I was thinking the same thing, especially with Japan about to be bogged down in China soon.

I think a successful coup basically ensures that the Strike North group is placed in power and it's likely figures like Sadao Araki purge their Strike South counterparts but I suppose there's a chance that they also pursue the southern option if they get bogged down as they did in China IOTL, especially if they go to war with the USSR ITTL.

Yeah, it'd probably be one massive cluster fuck should the officers successfully come to power.

 

[Callmesalticidae]

So far, it seems like the most important POD is "Communism doesn't take over in Russia," which (1) keeps Communism being associated with the murder of royal families and (2) keeps Japan from getting antsy about a Communist threat not too far from their shores.

Hitoshi Yamakawa is probably involved to some extent, but it seems like Ikki Kita would be even more vital to the establishment of some kind of Japanese Monarcho-Communism.

Hokushin-ron & Kodoha

The Hokushin-ron / Strike North and Nanshin-ron / Strike South plans not only involved very different ideas about how Japan ought to expand (which, MCism or no MCism, Japan is probably going to want to do) and were not just based in the army and navy respectively (and therefore represented the rivalry between those two branches), but also reflected distinct political aims: the Kodoha faction (who advocated for Strike North) were also interested in some vaguely socialist ideas that, with the influence of Yamakawa and Kita (who already had some influence on the military and Kodoha in particular), might be more explicitly "monarcho-communist."

USSR or no USSR, I imagine that Japan will still have reasons to worry about, and want to remove the threat posed by, Russia, because they'd already gone to war with the Russians once before. This means that the basic motivation behind the Strike North Plan will remain.

Kodoha staged a coup in 1936 OTL. This coup failed, basically squashing their power from that time forward. However, had Kodoha not already been on the decline and/or Hirohito been more agreeable to them, then it could have stood a good chance of success (indeed, it seems like the biggest nail in the coup's coffin was the personal opposition of the emperor to this supposed attempt to empower him and usher in a "Showa Restoration"). The coup, or something functionally equivalent (in the sense of "now Kodoha is running the show"), might even had happened earlier than 1936.

The Invasion of Manchuria

The Kodoha faction's first big move, to my knowledge, was the unauthorized invasion of Manchuria in 1931. It seems to have been precipitated by two things:

1. The desire for a more advantageous staging point against the USSR.
2. The need to acquire Manchuria's natural resources, to alleviate the effects of the Great Depression on Japan's economy.

The Great Depression started in 1929, so there's a limit to how early we can shift the invasion of Manchuria unless we suppose that the Great Depression happens significantly earlier ITTL. Still, even 1931 is fine with me.

The Decline of Kodoha

Kodoha lost influence for a number of reasons: (1) the Japanese army lost a series of battles against the USSR, (2) the Kodoha-sympathetic Minister of War fell ill in 1934 and was replaced with someone far less sympathetic to Kodoha, and (3) a number of planned assassinations of non-Kodoha officers were revealed later that year. It isn't clear from my reading whether the assassinations were a reaction to the loss of Sadao Araki as War Minister, or discovered because Araki was not there to cover for them, or had nothing at all to do with Araki and would have been planned and subsequently discovered regardless of what happened to Araki.

Anyway, it doesn't seem hard to get rid of #2 and #3 somehow, especially if (as I'd like) Kodoha effectively takes control earlier than 1934. How might they do this? Well, let's look at Russia, first.

Two important questions here:

1. To what degree is Russia likely to industrialize, without Stalin (or a comparable figure) at the helm?
2. To what degree is such a Russia (given the level of industrialization determined in the previous question) likely able to pose a threat to Japan?

At a guess, I would say that Russia would not be doing as well (especially if the Russian Civil War had gone even more terribly than IOTL), and that Russia's army would fare poorly against the Japanese in this timeline, at least as far as initial border skirmishes go. If Kodoha is aware of Russia's poor standing then they might force a confrontation earlier than IOTL, perhaps even shortly after the invasion of Manchuria, and a stellar performance here might embolden them enough to, at some point between 1931 and 1934, attempt to seize control. Depending on how he's feeling that day, His Majesty the Emperor might even support it.

Results of Kodoha Victory

First of all, monarcho-communism. That's the whole point of this TL, after all. The Kodoha already wanted to restructure Japanese society, it's just that Yamakawa is in the picture now (maybe there was increased dialogue, and an exchange of ideas, between Yamakawa and Kita). From this point henceforth, the Japanese are not the emperor's people, but rather Hirohito is the people's emperor and, in a literal sense, the national body, the embodiment of the Japanese state.

Kita at least said that non-Japanese should be given the same rights and opportunities as ethnic Japanese, and with regard to Japan's status as a nation-state he seemed to focus much less on "nation" than on "state." Hirohito was the emperor of the Japanese-as-citizens-of-Japan, not the emperor of the Japanese-as-an-ethnicity. This means that, contrary to my original assumption, Japanese communism may well have an internationalist (or at least Pan-Asian) bent to it.

An invasion of Russia is likely, though I'm still not sure what it is that Hokushin-ron was supposed to gain, resource-wise.

An invasion of China is also likely, for the "national interests" reason that China is on the road to industrialization and this would permanently eclipse Japan and reduce the empire to living in China's orbit forever. At best, Japan will support a variety of warlords in order to keep China divided, but a direct intervention seems most likely to me even with that option available. Looking back on it, invading China was not a great decision, but I'm not sure that Japan would have been able to think the same thing at that point in time, and anyway there may still be other reasons for Japan to invade.

Last but certainly not least: The army already had a problem with stuff like "starting entire invasions without permission," "committing war crimes even on those occasions that they were asked not to," and "assassinating senior officers who were annoying." If Kodoha takes control then this problem is probably going to get even worse.

Anyway, this is actually much more fleshed-out than I was hoping to get in less than twelve hours. AH.com has a special magic.

 

[Hagre]

Interesting start.

 

[Callmesalticidae]

Jumping between AH.com threads and other sources, I still haven't found anything to suggest that 1930s Siberia had abundant, accessible, and (most importantly) known resources, so a standard Hokushin-ron is just going to be, as Hagre said, a clusterfuck--and one that doesn't even pay well, at that.

However, this thread suggests that Japan came so, so close to finding an enormous oil field in Liaohe, part of the territory seized by Japan following its invasion of Manchuria. I have been unable to either confirm or deny any of the particulars described in the thread (that Japan came within "a hundred meters or so" of discovering this oil, that it would have been recoverable with the technology available to Japan at that time, etc.) but if they're accurate then this definitely suggests a particular course for Monarcho-Communist Japan.

First, to recap:

• Russia does not become a communist power, which means that (1) Russia does not industrialize as thoroughly as it did under Stalin and (2) Japan does not have a scary communist neighbor to inspire Red Scares.
• Between 1930 and 1934, the Kodoha faction invade Manchuria and eventually find themselves in a position of political dominance, with the Emperor's explicit approval.

I haven't been able to discover exactly when Japan sent prospecting teams into Manchuria, but finding the Liaohe oil field by or before 1934 could well provide an ultimate vindication for the Kodoha faction, for it was only by their recklessness and insubordination that this massive prize was obtained.

Discovering Liaohe would, as commenters in the above thread discuss, fundamentally alter Japan's foreign policy. Further buildup against Russia is paramount, in order to secure Manchuria against potential aggression from that sector (and, with a weaker, less industrialized Russia, border conflicts are more likely to end in Japan's favor) and, even in the event of a war with China, there is much less (and perhaps zero) need to go to invade Southeast Asia.

China is still going to be a matter of concern for Japan, however, because a unified China with the opportunity to recover and rebuild is going to be the sort of powerhouse which will first be Japan's equal and then, forever after, its superior. Japan has to prevent this, somehow, but a Japan with access to Liaohe's oil can stand to be a good deal more cautious (and, arguably, has reason to be, though Japan's more foolhardy endeavors seem to have been rooted not in a lack of reasons for caution but in the inability to play cautiously given the present circumstances).

There are two ways for Japan to deal with its China problem, as far as I can see:

1. Intervene directly (i.e. invade).
2. Intervene through proxies in order to delay or even prevent reunification.

What #2 would involve is supporting one or more warlords and, if at all possible, arranging a balance in which nobody comes out on top over the others. It would also be highly desirable for Japan to have a beneficial economic relationship with each of the powers that it's backing, but the most important thing is that they just not unify.

I'll need to do more research into the personalities of the warlords (and plausible alternate warlords, given that there's room for butterflies here) in order to determine which, if any, would have been amenable to Japanese support and maybe even a less-than-total victory in which you get, say, three or four Chinese states which are willing to keep the borders as they are and not go for the whole enchilada. A cursory examination of the warlords does suggest that this would be at least partially successful: The Xinjiang and Ma Cliques in Northwestern China mostly kept to themselves, as did the Shanxi Clique (for a time).

One possible route is for Japan to encourage regional, ethnic, and religious self-determination (at least outside the empire itself). China is not religiously or even ethnically homogeneous, and it might be possible to carve out distinct territories for different interest groups. Even if they aren't Japanese puppets, at least they wouldn't be a single power. As an American, I hear a lot of "Germany is throwing its weight around in the European Union in order to exert a disproportionate amount of economic and political influence" talk whenever EU-skepticism is raised and, without getting into whether this is actually true of Germany (I really hope I haven't derailed my own thread here), I think that something similar would be Japan's aim in such a scenario.

This whole self-determination thing would also prove fruitful for encouraging dissent in other countries in Southeast Asia, and maybe even as far as India. Besides the official propaganda and promises of entry into the Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan could probably do a fair amount to support uprisings without getting directly entangled in a war with the West.

(Unspoken assumption: Unless there's another great European war, thanks to a revanchist Germany or something else, the European colonies in Southeast Asia are not going to look nearly as tempting as IOTL, when the French, Belgians, Dutch, and others were too busy being conquered by Germany to do anything about Japan. This will be a further reason to "Strike North," though I think that, given Liaohe, there's still not much of a reason to invade Southeast Asia even if Europe is caught up in another war.)

 

[Hagre]

This whole self-determination thing would also prove fruitful for encouraging dissent in other countries in Southeast Asia, and maybe even as far as India. Besides the official propaganda and promises of entry into the Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan could probably do a fair amount to support uprisings without getting directly entangled in a war with the West.

I believe Japan was responsible for supporting various organizations like the All-India Forward Bloc so it’s not exactly implausible for MonBol Japan to support independence movements in East Asia. They already did support Subhas Chandra Bose so there’s a starting point for you.

One thing that makes one wonder about TTL’s Japan is what direction it’ll take on its Pan-Asian ideology, going the way of Mao and his idea of a Pan-Asian federation on the Soviet model to Kita’s OTL interpretation where there the Japanese ideal of Hakko Ichiu is realized through Japan expanding into East Asia and Oceania.

 

[Callmesalticidae]

One thing that makes one wonder about TTL’s Japan is what direction it’ll take on its Pan-Asian ideology, going the way of Mao and his idea of a Pan-Asian federation on the Soviet model to Kita’s OTL interpretation where there the Japanese ideal of Hakko Ichiu is realized through Japan expanding into East Asia and Oceania.

"MonBol" is a great term, even if they aren't quite Bolsheviks. Definitely rolls off the tongue more easily than "Monarcho-Communist."

Assuming that Japan can successfully divide China, I think that the country will be in a very good position come the year 1940, but there are probably harder times yet to come: Kodoha's success has set a precedent for insubordination and factionalism within the military, nobody yet knows whether power ultimately rests with Kodoha (who ostensibly act in the Emperor's name) or the Emperor (who has been a figurehead for generals in previous centuries), and there is probably a desire on the part of some officers to acquire glory for themselves and their country.

All of this means that, while it would be in Japan's best interests to strive for a Pan-Asian federation in which Japan is "first among equals," there will probably be countless attempts to start a new war in order to add territory directly to the empire, these wars will feature war crimes and run the risk of entanglement with the Europeans, and the war crimes will make an alliance with Japan look less attractive for East Asian powers. Unless things go well and the officers are restrained, Japan could very well enter a death spiral by the 1950s.

At this point, I think it might be important to figure out:

• What happened during the Great War
• What happened to Russia during the Revolution
• What happened to Europe thereafter

The Great War

I'm not sure whether the Great War needs to go differently and, if it does, how it should go differently. Besides some possible modifications on the Eastern Front, I think it can go more or less like OTL.

The Russian Revolution

Ultimately, it seems too difficult to prevent the Russian Revolution entirely, but it's a comparatively easier matter to prevent (1) a Communist victory and especially (2) the deaths of the Romanovs. At present, I imagine a much-battered and severely-weakened tsardom, where the Tsar is little more than a figurehead and Russia itself has lost many of its outlying territories. The idea of a socialist Transcaucasian state deeply appeals to me, and of course the Baltic States and so on would probably be able to secede as well, leaving a deeply weakened Russian rump state.

Europe 1920s-1930s

There is still probably a Spanish Civil War, but there are enough sensitive details in its unfolding that the war could go either way.

Hitler hasn't ceased to exist, but I'm not sure that the Nazis will be as successful without a Communist threat the size of Russia looming over the horizon. Mussolini's rise to power doesn't seem to have depended on the existence of the USSR (though I'm stepping pretty far from my comfort zone with that one and wouldn't be surprised to find that I'm incorrect), however, so maybe Nazism (or something very similar) is still the most plausible outcome.

There would still be a lot of far-right agitation in Germany, but I'm not sure if that's enough to actually put them in power, so Weimar might continue to totter along under some sort of SPD-Zentrum coalition for the time being. The Communist Party might also win the elections at some point, but my cursory knowledge of the situation suggests that this would be unlikely, not least because neither SPD nor Zentrum would be willing to enter into a coalition with them. On the bright side, the Communist Party seemed to acquire its most unsavory characteristics under the influence of the USSR. The other possibility, though it currently seems remote, is a takeover by the DNVP / German National People's Party, which, if its agenda were enacted, would probably see not just some brinkmanship but also the restoration of the monarchy (and, most unfortunately, more antisemitism, though probably not as much as under Hitler).

Does WWII even happen in the 1930s? Even if Mussolini takes command in Italy, he doesn't strike me as the sort of person to start a major war on his own, so Italy's acquisitions will be limited to whatever can be grabbed without upsetting Britain and France (which... probably isn't that much, actually). A less extreme German government also seems unlikely to start a war with Britain and France, and if Japan has the oil fields in Liaohe then there's no impetus for them to start a (direct) war with any of the European powers, much less the United States.