seems to me that Lincoln will suffer more in TTL, as well as Dixie of course.
Miranda's Dream. ¡Por una Latino América fuerte!.- A Gran Colombia TL
- Thread starter Red_Galiray
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seems to me that Lincoln will suffer more in TTL, as well as Dixie of course.
Has it been established that Lincoln is President in this timeline? It would be nice to see someone else in the top spot (though we do know he reached the Senate, unlike in OTL)
Who said it would be Lincoln? As I said, the war will be very, very different.
Scott is president until 1859 when there are new elections. Who wins is anyone's guess, and the event surrounding the road to civil war will be examined later. All we know of Lincoln is that he was elected as Senator as a pro-Peace Liberal during the Mexican War, and then remained loyal to Scott and a supporter of compromise.
Wow, thats a big change, considering that we know that Lincoln´s election was the catalyst of the war...
Wonder who will make the paper of Martyr this time?
So we could say, that he could be either the dominant figure of the House or become the most hated man and get kill by radicals, either Republicans or Democrats.
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the Colombian Army of the mid-19th century, part 1:
At this stage during the competition years, it was plain clear that Mexico was not the mortal threat that was thought in principle, as opposed to its northern neighbour that is, which was a significant factor behind the increasingly less frozen approximations between the Empire and the Republic in subsequent years, at the beginning timid due to Colombia´s reservations about the Mexican monarchy (Colombians viewed Mexico as the creation of a Tyrant that was bound to the power thanks to the support of the army, making it akin to a dictatorship, something that the average Colombian fervently despise) but progressively more closer and open, until the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance 1863. Reaction to all these developments were channel usually in one direction, the army. Given its current state and size as it was since independence, some changes were needed in order to adapt it to the changing battlefield. During the 1850´s, in a move for having more resilient and stable combat strength, and achieving a quick and comprehensive response capacity, the infantry and cavalry regiments were organized in a more standardized way, namely:
Pictures for later, I promise.
At this stage during the competition years, it was plain clear that Mexico was not the mortal threat that was thought in principle, as opposed to its northern neighbour that is, which was a significant factor behind the increasingly less frozen approximations between the Empire and the Republic in subsequent years, at the beginning timid due to Colombia´s reservations about the Mexican monarchy (Colombians viewed Mexico as the creation of a Tyrant that was bound to the power thanks to the support of the army, making it akin to a dictatorship, something that the average Colombian fervently despise) but progressively more closer and open, until the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance 1863. Reaction to all these developments were channel usually in one direction, the army. Given its current state and size as it was since independence, some changes were needed in order to adapt it to the changing battlefield. During the 1850´s, in a move for having more resilient and stable combat strength, and achieving a quick and comprehensive response capacity, the infantry and cavalry regiments were organized in a more standardized way, namely:
- Following the Regular Reserve, the soldier would automatically pass to the new Territorial reserve until age 40 (later 42).
- the infantry, though it retained its distinctive names, these became increasingly phased out due to the progressive advancements in firearms, and the regularization of equipment, tactics and uniforms until no real difference existed among them. Due to the widespread adoption of Minié rifled-muskets, which increased range and effective fire without diminishing the rate of fire, thanks to the percussion mechanism of the new rifle (that was more reliable than the former flintlock), all this made units such as the ´Cazadores´ and ´Tiradores´ lost some substance as special skills, though still had tactical meaning, consequently instead it was decided to introduce light infantry tactics into each battalion, to enable tactical flexibility, thus open order and marksmanship was inserted inside the basic training, so at least one company could serve as skirmishers and vanguards, as well as to provide cover to the flanks of the battalion, also several companies or battalions could be detach to form ad-hoc battalions or brigades of skirmishers at the discretion of a brigade or divisional commander respectively. To cope with this profound changes, the nominal strength of an infantry regiment was rise up to 3 battalions, spread through out various points as garrisons; in war, a regiment fielded its battalions as necessity dictated but never all at a single time, usually just one, also the establish theoretical strength of each battalion was rise up to 1200 men, divided in ten companies of 100 men all ranks.
- The cavalry, by regulating its uniforms and standardizing equipment for all units, it became during this period an homogeneous force, as a result the line between heavy and light units was discarded entirely and their titles turn ceremonial (horse carabineers, hussars, horse grenadiers, etc) and mostly reduce to a matter of privileged and prestige (the former heavy regiments had higher wages, for instance), from now doctrinal thinking evolve to embrace the dragoon model for tactical flexibility, which paradoxically supposed a more vital and prominent role for the mounted arm as a whole. For instance, the real difference was reduced essentially to lancer and non-lancer units. But even then, though both could perform the same missions, some tactical division of duties were still in place and regiments were group accordingly in either ´dragoon´ or ´lancer´ brigades for that purposes, were the ´dragoons´ were expected to play the original role of that type of troops, acting as versatile reserves in either mounted or dismounted actions, on the hand, the lancers were call to perform mostly the traditional light cavalry duties such as screening and scouting as vanguards for the infantry formations, or even raiding in larger formations. In the end, however, the cavalry in its position as the traditional offensive arm (and the bulwark of conservatism), remain convince and unshakeable in its belief that mounted charges still carried the day (even in the face of modern weaponry), which to be fair was not completely false though just under favourable tactical circumstances and if battlefield conditions allowed it, fortunately Colombian generals were taught to be very scrupulous in committing their mounted forces into the fray, and often use them more as mobile troops. Regimental organisation evolve to have a nominal strength of 4 squadrons divided in 2 companies of 100 each, but as the infantry, squadrons usually were not fielded all at a single time. Equipment was regulated as sword, 2 revolvers and single-shot Kammerlader carbine (later Spencer 7-shot rifle) for the ´dragoon´ cavalry and sabre, 2 revolvers, single-shot Kammerlader carbine (later Spencer 7-shot carbine) for the Lancers, besides the lance, that is.
- In the artillery´s case, interior organisation would still be broadly the same, just making small adjustment to regimental strength. Centred around the 12 artillery regiments plus the siege artillery reserve, formed progressively after independence, initially each was composed of 5 batteries: three light, one heavy and one horsed battery, and restructure to have five light, one heavy and one horsed battery, the number of guns for each type of battery being as follows: 8 guns for the light batteries employed as close-range support weapons, six guns for the heavy batteries employed for long-range bombardment and counter-battery fire, and 4 guns for horse batteries. Generally speaking, the calibres assigned to each respectively, was as follows: 6-pounders for light batteries, 12 and 18 pounders for heavy batteries as well as the siege weapons, but in the latter case including 24 and 32 pounders, finally 5.5 inch and 6 pounder howitzers for the horse batteries. However, as the 1850´s roll on and progressive changes in artillery drew, the calibres were progressively modified, namely: the universal adoption of the 12-pounder ´Napoleon´ gun as standard light artillery, while the bronze 6-pounder guns were re-bore and rifled to 12-pounders through the James system, as a quick and inexpensive option, and amalgamated with the ´Napoleons´ in the same battery. In later years, were produce guns of 10, 12, 14 and 20 pounder calibres for the heavy batteries under the Parrot, James and Whitworth systems and, Wiard 12-pounder mountain guns for the horse artillery. Eventually, by 1863 all the artillery park was re-bored or replace outright to rifled guns, with notable exception being the ´Napoleon´, retain on account of its reliability until 1870, but the most important factor was the quick adoption of the ´flying artillery´ system that had proven so effective in the recent Mexican-US war.
Pictures for later, I promise.
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Edited
As promise:
Uniforms of the Colombian army, french influence is evident all over:
Regulation uniforms for the infantry: officer (center), sergeant (left) and private (right). The coat actually reaches just half thigh.
Regulation uniform for the cavalry: Lancer (left) and Cavalry (french dragoon style).
The 1855 Regulation Sword for the ´Dragoon´cavalry (right) and pattern 1812 Regulation Sabre (left) for the lancers, still in use a this time.
Several models of the Kammerlader breech-loader, carbine version, the 2 from the top were the issued to the cavalry.
Regulation uniforms, Marine infantry: private (right), officer (center), sergeant (left).
Regulation uniform for the artillery: private (left), and captain (right).
General officer, field dress for all ranks.
As promise:
Uniforms of the Colombian army, french influence is evident all over:
Regulation uniforms for the infantry: officer (center), sergeant (left) and private (right). The coat actually reaches just half thigh.
Regulation uniform for the cavalry: Lancer (left) and Cavalry (french dragoon style).
The 1855 Regulation Sword for the ´Dragoon´cavalry (right) and pattern 1812 Regulation Sabre (left) for the lancers, still in use a this time.
Several models of the Kammerlader breech-loader, carbine version, the 2 from the top were the issued to the cavalry.
Regulation uniforms, Marine infantry: private (right), officer (center), sergeant (left).
Regulation uniform for the artillery: private (left), and captain (right).
General officer, field dress for all ranks.
Attachments
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Artillery pieces:
12-pounder ´Napoleon´ gun, renown for its reliability.
6-pounder, rebored through the James system to a 12-pounder, similar in performance to the ´napoleons´, but the barrel grooves would wary relatively fast and lose effectiveness. It had the consideration of a smoothbore gun despite its qualities.
rear and front views of a 20-pounder Parrot type rifled gun, use in the heavy batteries alongside its 10-pounder brother seen below.
Though they had a known tendency to burst suddenly under stress, small adjustments in the forging process were made to reduce the risk, which truth to be told it still not prevent it entirely but the percentage was considerably reduce and also some signs of an incoming burst could be detected by the crews before actually happening, thus avoiding injuries.
12-pounder Whitworth rifle gun, known for its odd hexagonal shape ammunition and praise for its qualities as effective counter-battery weapons. Eventually, some of the first breech-loading cannons adopted were Whitworth.
the 14-pounder James rifled gun, another of the James system guns adopted by the Ordinance Department in succession along with the Parrots, it was a bronze-made cannon and as every bronze cannon, the grooves became wary and the gun ineffective as long-range weapon, but never entirely replaced mostly because it was easy to produce, much of the material was of old bronze guns deemed unfit for the re-boring process and its material recast.
Finally, the 6-pounder Wiard rifled mountain gun, this particular weapon was the invention of a Canadian, Norman Wiard, it prove a formidable gun due to its particular qualities and unique carriage design that made of it an effective high angle howitzer, note the right picture.
12-pounder ´Napoleon´ gun, renown for its reliability.
6-pounder, rebored through the James system to a 12-pounder, similar in performance to the ´napoleons´, but the barrel grooves would wary relatively fast and lose effectiveness. It had the consideration of a smoothbore gun despite its qualities.
rear and front views of a 20-pounder Parrot type rifled gun, use in the heavy batteries alongside its 10-pounder brother seen below.
Though they had a known tendency to burst suddenly under stress, small adjustments in the forging process were made to reduce the risk, which truth to be told it still not prevent it entirely but the percentage was considerably reduce and also some signs of an incoming burst could be detected by the crews before actually happening, thus avoiding injuries.
12-pounder Whitworth rifle gun, known for its odd hexagonal shape ammunition and praise for its qualities as effective counter-battery weapons. Eventually, some of the first breech-loading cannons adopted were Whitworth.
the 14-pounder James rifled gun, another of the James system guns adopted by the Ordinance Department in succession along with the Parrots, it was a bronze-made cannon and as every bronze cannon, the grooves became wary and the gun ineffective as long-range weapon, but never entirely replaced mostly because it was easy to produce, much of the material was of old bronze guns deemed unfit for the re-boring process and its material recast.
Finally, the 6-pounder Wiard rifled mountain gun, this particular weapon was the invention of a Canadian, Norman Wiard, it prove a formidable gun due to its particular qualities and unique carriage design that made of it an effective high angle howitzer, note the right picture.
He will be important, but he will not be president ITTL.
Btw, once again thanks for your very detailed accounts of the military aspect! Your help is very valuable since my military knowledge is lackluster.
Latin America is stable in this TL is it already causing some noticable effects in the Pacific?
Some, because some Latin American countries are interested in the Pacific in a larger scale than OTL.
the Colombian Army of the mid-19th century, part 2:
Although different levels of military sub-divisions were in place for better defence of the nation, these were, to all effects and purposes, just for the garrisoning of the regular troops in key points throughout the country and not much else, to Bolivar´s annoyance, who wanted a strong army, in the expectation of renewed Spanish reconquest efforts or actually any threat, but his opinion was dismissed as gross exaggerations, even with the example of the failed Caracas landings at the end of the independence war it was argued, with good reason, that it was a proper navy not an army what was lacking, but later events would make a reflexion on Bolivar´s arguments.
As previously stated, by the late 1850´s the regular army was in a better and much-renovated shape, but after witnessing the sheer scale that supposed the Mexican-US war, many began to question if the recent reforms were enough to meet the demands of modern war and realized that a more efficient and systematic method of articulating the country´s manpower in wartime was required. The list of able-bodied men was a step in the right direction but a further, more thorough way of distributing and allocating troops and resources was required to stand a major effort. Indeed, from a military perspective, Colombia was ill-suited to meet its own logistical needs, despite having the second largest economy on the continent. If a full mobilization was required, further reforms were needed if the territorial integrity of the Republic ever found itself at stake. Several schemes were envisioned but one was eventually settled upon:
By Federal Law of 24 June 1858, anniversary of the Battle of Carabobo, it was established the integration of the State militias into the wider frame of the armed forces as a national service branch rather than a regional improvise police force, thus also formalizing their training with the creation of drilling camps in every major city, maintain at each State´s expense. The Drilling camps themselves would serve as acting headquarters of every regiment formed inside its jurisdiction in wartime, training and furnishing replacements as needed to each one. Though regiments were name after their State and nominally created under their sponsorship “at the request of the Federal Government”, this was merely a formality, by law they were obliged to create the necessary units requested, but even then, as a concession to its identity, the State flags formed part of the regimental colours. Training was under the direct supervision of regular reserve officers, as inspectors or instructors, assigned by request of each State. The system would be model along the lines of the Prussian Landwehr (1), which was based on one-year part-time conscripts, constituting an inexpensive reserve of relatively well train citizen-soldiers that could be call to serve with the colours in short notice, the difference being that instead of compulsory, enlistment would be on a volunteer basis, forming a new “Territorial Reserve” that was expected to yield an annual number 60k+ reservist. It was required that in addition to infantry, also cavalry should be train under the same system and conditions. Artillery was excluded as it was considered unnecessary and also because, if necessary, it take much less time to train an artillery unit.
These actions effectively stripe off the hands of the States Legislations and Governors the power to arbitrarily call the state militias to control riots and other kinds of civil unrest, such as the case of the Daquilema Uprising or the Workers riot which had a huge impact on the stability of the country. This was accomplished through some legal subterfuges, namely: The emplacement of regular officers in charge of the camps implied that they owed allegiance to the Republic not its autonomous components and that they received orders just from their superior army officers or Federal Officials (2), the Creation of the National Guard which would fill the former functions of the militias (3), and finally the Integral Defense Law (as it was call) made clear that just the Congress Assembled had the exclusive power to decree the mobilization of these forces just in the case of a national emergency, particularly in war were the “War to Death” or “Total Victory” Decree was required to pass a full-mobilization, this meant in political terms the separation between limited affairs (that could be solve through diplomatic means) and full-scale conflicts.
On the flip side it supposed that in any other circumstance that doesn´t imply a full-scale mobilisation, the regular army would have to deal with a given conflict on its own, without the support of any other reinforcements than its own reserves (and then just to those units on the field), plus whatever (any) other provisional (federal or provincial) volunteer unit organized through a federal call, that could be rise on the initiative of private citizens authorised by state legislatures, which are automatically put under Federal administration. On the other hand, conscription was never on the table mostly due to the 19th century taboos concerning the issue; at the time it was considered an honour and a moral duty to serve in the army, as heirs of the independence heroes and even more in wartime, were patriotic frenzies could make huge numbers of volunteers flock to the colours and not to join was considered shameful and even unmanly, and in any case as opposed to volunteers, conscription was considered an arbitrary and even autocratic act of oppression just resorted by the most absolute and despotic tyrannies, thus the concern at the time was actually how to organized, manage and supply the numbers rather than actually get them. The units themselves would be model at the image of the regular units, but with certain differences, the key ones being as follows:
Service and training
As stated before, unlike the regulars, service conditions in the militias call for a part-time one-year instruction cycle, that is to say, the recruits would be gather from their homes for a week per month (4), during which they were required to stay in the barracks. In this way, the daily civilian life wasn´t disrupted too greatly. The training would cover from basic manoeuvres to weapons handling in different levels of difficulty, initiating with the platoon, progressing to the company and finally regiment size manoeuvres (5), or company, squadron and regiment, in the cavalry´s case.
Officers
Officers, on the other hand, were chosen from among those well-to-do and prominent citizens, i.e. professionals, bourgeois and landed aristocrats, to be train as such separated from the rank-and-file, after which they were given a certificate that ensure their commission upon mobilisation. Nonetheless, in a bit of democratic rule, NCOs could and would be chosen generally by the soldiers themselves from their ranks, though it would be subject to approval by the commanding officer of the regiment. All this didn´t meant that rising through the ranks was impossible, but quite the contrary, in wartime militia officers could and would fill to command a brigade or Division, rise by merit by army commanders, if there wasn´t an available regular army officer, likewise the regiments could be commanded by an NCO rise by merit, in case that the former colonel should be relieve or kill in action.
In general, this arrangement resulted quite successful, the officers, far from being the dandies that one would think at first, prove excellent discipline instillers, devoted to the service and courageous under fire. The soldiers on the other hand were so full of eagerness and patriotism, that weren´t much troubled by the prospect of hard marching as far as they could come to grips with the enemy at the end of the day, giving chance to a French officer to remark “it’s like witnessing the Spirit of Valmy and Austerlitz”, after seeing a regiment of Caracas on manoeuvres.
Infantry
The infantry regiments would be composed of one battalion for administrative as well as tactical purposes, namely: the administrative apparatus of a regiment had a more comprehensive structure but having a single battalion eases the furnishing of supplies and replacements; the tactical consideration was that is more easy to manoeuvre battalions rather than proper regiment-size units on the field, that in any case will be active just for the duration of a given emergency; this had the side effect of making informal reference to the units in combat as “battalions” (which, truth to be told, they actually were anyways), but to administrative effects they were “regiments”, just rather small ones, though this was not a significant factor because the regulars themselves only fielded one battalion. The basic structure of each regiment would be the battalion, divided in twelve companies of 100 men, at image of the regulars, providing the mould for brand-new units. The basic service requirements were that the recruit should be either native-born or naturalised, single, male citizen, between the ages of 17 and 30, that upon taking the oath it accepted to be under military rather than civilian jurisdiction and as such, all matters concerning the recruit were to be regulated according to the military code, until completed the one-year service, at which time it would pass to the Territorial Reserve.
Cavalry
The mounted arm, on the other hand, was model along the lines of the regular cavalry, each regiment could choose the type of their unit, either cavalry or lancer (6), also could decide its own nickname, be it hussars, carabineers, etc. Usually the election was determined by geography, and thus, rather naturally, in urban regions, the regiments (usually made of middle-class citizens that weren´t acquainted with pole weapons) tended to be predominantly of the ¨dragoon¨ type, while in rural regions such as the Llanos, the rank-and-file, formed by rough peasants, generally opted for lancer regiments at large. As the regulars, organisation was based around the squadron, but were somewhat smaller in that each would be of 150 men instead of 200, each regiment being likewise composed of 4 squadrons, one often for detached service if needed (7). The reasoning behind this disposition was that their smaller size implied a more solid and cohesive unit, simplifying logistics, training, tactics, manoeuvres, and that a smaller unit also meant spare resources for the creation of more regiments, nonetheless discipline the recruits, especially the Llaneros which weren´t so docile, remain an arduous process. The requirements and conditions of enlistment were largely the same as for the infantry, with small differences, the significant exception was that they were required to stay in the regimental barracks for the entire instruction cycle. However, the most important thing was that they were recruited in a more select manner, if such a thing was possible. As previously stated, the officer’s role was fulfilled (and commonly considered as its exclusive prerogatives) by the sons of prominent citizens and aristocrats, that cope the vacancies for command in nearly all regiments, with few exceptions. Truth to be told, they prove innate commanders (if reckless at times), and because that, they often set in a race for attaining the same or higher levels of efficiency than the regulars, surprisingly this resulted beneficial to the regiments as these individuals tended to spend quite important sums of money for the purchased of the best horses from their own pockets for having the best saddled units possible, eventually nearing the dimensions of an informal gentlemen´s displaying race between them and eagerly supported by the soldiers themselves. All this implied that the conditions set by them for recruitment were very strict, again using as measuring pole the riding skills possess by the enlisted, thus setting high standards.
Artillery
It was agreed that if artillery units should be needed, they would be uniformly organized around the battery, this was mostly to tactical considerations, namely: the battery was the smallest operational artillery formation, and usually consisted of six guns, arrange under the “flying” system implemented in previous years, all six guns in a battery were of the same calibre, simplifying training and logistics. Each gun, or "piece", was operated by a gun crew of nine, plus four additional men to handle the horses and equipment. Two guns operating under the control of a lieutenant were known as a "section". The battery of six guns was commanded by a captain. In war, artillery brigades would be composed of five batteries and commanded by colonels, one was always of the regulars, and supported the superior organisations as follows: each Division was expected to be supported directly by one artillery brigade and, in the case of an army, five brigades formed the Artillery Reserve. Again, the conditions for enlistment would varied little, among other things: a wider recruiting base, between age 17 through to 38 years, the recruit should be a male citizen with basic notions on maths, arithmetic, geography and geometry, and given that it take less to instruct an enlisted man, relative to the other arms that is, they were train in the service of several types of pieces, which give as a result a complete, though haste, knowledge on the artilleryman and the artillery´s functions, but provide an effective base with which to work.
Superior Organizations
Finally, dispositions were made for the allocation of the regiments into the jurisdiction of the Headquarter of the nearest of the three active armies and assigned under the command of one of its Divisions (11), reinforcing and expanding its nominal strength, and setting the pattern for new formations. These stipulated an initial strength upon mobilisation that could varied between 9 to 18 battalions per Division (8), organized in 3 brigades (9), hence each could boast a force ranging between 10000 and 21000. Added to each divisional headquarters were its organic components of artillery, engineers, logistics and a mixed cavalry brigade (10), but as stated before these arrangements weren´t set in motion unless full mobilisation is decreed by Congress. Moreover, Corps level organisations were considered, but never taken seriously due the very theoretical status that enjoy among the officers, never mind that no one ever commanded one, furthermore was the fact that Colombian divisions were already a large combined-arms formation. In any case, many argued that this could be patch up easily with ad-hoc operational columns or wings, if an army possess several divisions that is, considered more flexible to handle by an army commander. Of course, these is easy to understand when one takes into account that Colombian armies usually wouldn´t number more than 4 divisions all arms and that the army applied an unofficial policy of allowing army commanders to pick themselves their senior officers, for the sake of a clear and smooth chain of command, certainly these had its shortcomings but on the whole was considered adequate for the time.
In all, these changes had the embracement of the principle of the nation-at-arms placed at its very core.
Infantry, Artillery and Officer uniforms of the state militias. Cavalry was dress like the regulars.
Notes:
Although different levels of military sub-divisions were in place for better defence of the nation, these were, to all effects and purposes, just for the garrisoning of the regular troops in key points throughout the country and not much else, to Bolivar´s annoyance, who wanted a strong army, in the expectation of renewed Spanish reconquest efforts or actually any threat, but his opinion was dismissed as gross exaggerations, even with the example of the failed Caracas landings at the end of the independence war it was argued, with good reason, that it was a proper navy not an army what was lacking, but later events would make a reflexion on Bolivar´s arguments.
As previously stated, by the late 1850´s the regular army was in a better and much-renovated shape, but after witnessing the sheer scale that supposed the Mexican-US war, many began to question if the recent reforms were enough to meet the demands of modern war and realized that a more efficient and systematic method of articulating the country´s manpower in wartime was required. The list of able-bodied men was a step in the right direction but a further, more thorough way of distributing and allocating troops and resources was required to stand a major effort. Indeed, from a military perspective, Colombia was ill-suited to meet its own logistical needs, despite having the second largest economy on the continent. If a full mobilization was required, further reforms were needed if the territorial integrity of the Republic ever found itself at stake. Several schemes were envisioned but one was eventually settled upon:
By Federal Law of 24 June 1858, anniversary of the Battle of Carabobo, it was established the integration of the State militias into the wider frame of the armed forces as a national service branch rather than a regional improvise police force, thus also formalizing their training with the creation of drilling camps in every major city, maintain at each State´s expense. The Drilling camps themselves would serve as acting headquarters of every regiment formed inside its jurisdiction in wartime, training and furnishing replacements as needed to each one. Though regiments were name after their State and nominally created under their sponsorship “at the request of the Federal Government”, this was merely a formality, by law they were obliged to create the necessary units requested, but even then, as a concession to its identity, the State flags formed part of the regimental colours. Training was under the direct supervision of regular reserve officers, as inspectors or instructors, assigned by request of each State. The system would be model along the lines of the Prussian Landwehr (1), which was based on one-year part-time conscripts, constituting an inexpensive reserve of relatively well train citizen-soldiers that could be call to serve with the colours in short notice, the difference being that instead of compulsory, enlistment would be on a volunteer basis, forming a new “Territorial Reserve” that was expected to yield an annual number 60k+ reservist. It was required that in addition to infantry, also cavalry should be train under the same system and conditions. Artillery was excluded as it was considered unnecessary and also because, if necessary, it take much less time to train an artillery unit.
These actions effectively stripe off the hands of the States Legislations and Governors the power to arbitrarily call the state militias to control riots and other kinds of civil unrest, such as the case of the Daquilema Uprising or the Workers riot which had a huge impact on the stability of the country. This was accomplished through some legal subterfuges, namely: The emplacement of regular officers in charge of the camps implied that they owed allegiance to the Republic not its autonomous components and that they received orders just from their superior army officers or Federal Officials (2), the Creation of the National Guard which would fill the former functions of the militias (3), and finally the Integral Defense Law (as it was call) made clear that just the Congress Assembled had the exclusive power to decree the mobilization of these forces just in the case of a national emergency, particularly in war were the “War to Death” or “Total Victory” Decree was required to pass a full-mobilization, this meant in political terms the separation between limited affairs (that could be solve through diplomatic means) and full-scale conflicts.
On the flip side it supposed that in any other circumstance that doesn´t imply a full-scale mobilisation, the regular army would have to deal with a given conflict on its own, without the support of any other reinforcements than its own reserves (and then just to those units on the field), plus whatever (any) other provisional (federal or provincial) volunteer unit organized through a federal call, that could be rise on the initiative of private citizens authorised by state legislatures, which are automatically put under Federal administration. On the other hand, conscription was never on the table mostly due to the 19th century taboos concerning the issue; at the time it was considered an honour and a moral duty to serve in the army, as heirs of the independence heroes and even more in wartime, were patriotic frenzies could make huge numbers of volunteers flock to the colours and not to join was considered shameful and even unmanly, and in any case as opposed to volunteers, conscription was considered an arbitrary and even autocratic act of oppression just resorted by the most absolute and despotic tyrannies, thus the concern at the time was actually how to organized, manage and supply the numbers rather than actually get them. The units themselves would be model at the image of the regular units, but with certain differences, the key ones being as follows:
Service and training
As stated before, unlike the regulars, service conditions in the militias call for a part-time one-year instruction cycle, that is to say, the recruits would be gather from their homes for a week per month (4), during which they were required to stay in the barracks. In this way, the daily civilian life wasn´t disrupted too greatly. The training would cover from basic manoeuvres to weapons handling in different levels of difficulty, initiating with the platoon, progressing to the company and finally regiment size manoeuvres (5), or company, squadron and regiment, in the cavalry´s case.
Officers
Officers, on the other hand, were chosen from among those well-to-do and prominent citizens, i.e. professionals, bourgeois and landed aristocrats, to be train as such separated from the rank-and-file, after which they were given a certificate that ensure their commission upon mobilisation. Nonetheless, in a bit of democratic rule, NCOs could and would be chosen generally by the soldiers themselves from their ranks, though it would be subject to approval by the commanding officer of the regiment. All this didn´t meant that rising through the ranks was impossible, but quite the contrary, in wartime militia officers could and would fill to command a brigade or Division, rise by merit by army commanders, if there wasn´t an available regular army officer, likewise the regiments could be commanded by an NCO rise by merit, in case that the former colonel should be relieve or kill in action.
In general, this arrangement resulted quite successful, the officers, far from being the dandies that one would think at first, prove excellent discipline instillers, devoted to the service and courageous under fire. The soldiers on the other hand were so full of eagerness and patriotism, that weren´t much troubled by the prospect of hard marching as far as they could come to grips with the enemy at the end of the day, giving chance to a French officer to remark “it’s like witnessing the Spirit of Valmy and Austerlitz”, after seeing a regiment of Caracas on manoeuvres.
Infantry
The infantry regiments would be composed of one battalion for administrative as well as tactical purposes, namely: the administrative apparatus of a regiment had a more comprehensive structure but having a single battalion eases the furnishing of supplies and replacements; the tactical consideration was that is more easy to manoeuvre battalions rather than proper regiment-size units on the field, that in any case will be active just for the duration of a given emergency; this had the side effect of making informal reference to the units in combat as “battalions” (which, truth to be told, they actually were anyways), but to administrative effects they were “regiments”, just rather small ones, though this was not a significant factor because the regulars themselves only fielded one battalion. The basic structure of each regiment would be the battalion, divided in twelve companies of 100 men, at image of the regulars, providing the mould for brand-new units. The basic service requirements were that the recruit should be either native-born or naturalised, single, male citizen, between the ages of 17 and 30, that upon taking the oath it accepted to be under military rather than civilian jurisdiction and as such, all matters concerning the recruit were to be regulated according to the military code, until completed the one-year service, at which time it would pass to the Territorial Reserve.
Cavalry
The mounted arm, on the other hand, was model along the lines of the regular cavalry, each regiment could choose the type of their unit, either cavalry or lancer (6), also could decide its own nickname, be it hussars, carabineers, etc. Usually the election was determined by geography, and thus, rather naturally, in urban regions, the regiments (usually made of middle-class citizens that weren´t acquainted with pole weapons) tended to be predominantly of the ¨dragoon¨ type, while in rural regions such as the Llanos, the rank-and-file, formed by rough peasants, generally opted for lancer regiments at large. As the regulars, organisation was based around the squadron, but were somewhat smaller in that each would be of 150 men instead of 200, each regiment being likewise composed of 4 squadrons, one often for detached service if needed (7). The reasoning behind this disposition was that their smaller size implied a more solid and cohesive unit, simplifying logistics, training, tactics, manoeuvres, and that a smaller unit also meant spare resources for the creation of more regiments, nonetheless discipline the recruits, especially the Llaneros which weren´t so docile, remain an arduous process. The requirements and conditions of enlistment were largely the same as for the infantry, with small differences, the significant exception was that they were required to stay in the regimental barracks for the entire instruction cycle. However, the most important thing was that they were recruited in a more select manner, if such a thing was possible. As previously stated, the officer’s role was fulfilled (and commonly considered as its exclusive prerogatives) by the sons of prominent citizens and aristocrats, that cope the vacancies for command in nearly all regiments, with few exceptions. Truth to be told, they prove innate commanders (if reckless at times), and because that, they often set in a race for attaining the same or higher levels of efficiency than the regulars, surprisingly this resulted beneficial to the regiments as these individuals tended to spend quite important sums of money for the purchased of the best horses from their own pockets for having the best saddled units possible, eventually nearing the dimensions of an informal gentlemen´s displaying race between them and eagerly supported by the soldiers themselves. All this implied that the conditions set by them for recruitment were very strict, again using as measuring pole the riding skills possess by the enlisted, thus setting high standards.
Artillery
It was agreed that if artillery units should be needed, they would be uniformly organized around the battery, this was mostly to tactical considerations, namely: the battery was the smallest operational artillery formation, and usually consisted of six guns, arrange under the “flying” system implemented in previous years, all six guns in a battery were of the same calibre, simplifying training and logistics. Each gun, or "piece", was operated by a gun crew of nine, plus four additional men to handle the horses and equipment. Two guns operating under the control of a lieutenant were known as a "section". The battery of six guns was commanded by a captain. In war, artillery brigades would be composed of five batteries and commanded by colonels, one was always of the regulars, and supported the superior organisations as follows: each Division was expected to be supported directly by one artillery brigade and, in the case of an army, five brigades formed the Artillery Reserve. Again, the conditions for enlistment would varied little, among other things: a wider recruiting base, between age 17 through to 38 years, the recruit should be a male citizen with basic notions on maths, arithmetic, geography and geometry, and given that it take less to instruct an enlisted man, relative to the other arms that is, they were train in the service of several types of pieces, which give as a result a complete, though haste, knowledge on the artilleryman and the artillery´s functions, but provide an effective base with which to work.
Superior Organizations
Finally, dispositions were made for the allocation of the regiments into the jurisdiction of the Headquarter of the nearest of the three active armies and assigned under the command of one of its Divisions (11), reinforcing and expanding its nominal strength, and setting the pattern for new formations. These stipulated an initial strength upon mobilisation that could varied between 9 to 18 battalions per Division (8), organized in 3 brigades (9), hence each could boast a force ranging between 10000 and 21000. Added to each divisional headquarters were its organic components of artillery, engineers, logistics and a mixed cavalry brigade (10), but as stated before these arrangements weren´t set in motion unless full mobilisation is decreed by Congress. Moreover, Corps level organisations were considered, but never taken seriously due the very theoretical status that enjoy among the officers, never mind that no one ever commanded one, furthermore was the fact that Colombian divisions were already a large combined-arms formation. In any case, many argued that this could be patch up easily with ad-hoc operational columns or wings, if an army possess several divisions that is, considered more flexible to handle by an army commander. Of course, these is easy to understand when one takes into account that Colombian armies usually wouldn´t number more than 4 divisions all arms and that the army applied an unofficial policy of allowing army commanders to pick themselves their senior officers, for the sake of a clear and smooth chain of command, certainly these had its shortcomings but on the whole was considered adequate for the time.
In all, these changes had the embracement of the principle of the nation-at-arms placed at its very core.
Infantry, Artillery and Officer uniforms of the state militias. Cavalry was dress like the regulars.
Notes:
- It should be remembered that ever since independence, there were already a good number of German and other foreign-born officers in the army and their influence in the evolution of doctrinal as well as tactical thinking and training of the army was significant, its principal sponsor was General Von Uslar.
- Even if the camps were under the command of regular officers they remain fiscally tied to and were considered as property of each State, and as such it could be discontinued or request a replacement commander to the Federal Government, paradoxically tying further the States to Central administration.
- Of course, under Federal control.
- The first week of every month for a 6-day training week, Sundays excluded.
- 4 weeks for each stage.
- That is to say, to carry or not lances.
- Generally, as orderlies, escorts, provost guard or simply pickets.
- In peacetime a Division would be composed of 6 regular regiments group in 3 brigades, but on mobilisation these formations would unfold to form new Divisions, each would have at its core 3 regular regiments as the skeleton of the three standard brigades pending the allotment of a number of the state regiments, giving place for a total of 22 Divisions approximately. This same principle applied to the Cavalry Divisions.
- Though the General officer could reorganise his command as he saw fit, adding or reducing the number of brigades by detaching battalions from the existing ones or merging reduce brigades, this according to the number of battalions assign to his Division. Usually, each brigade would average 4 or 5.
- 8 squadrons in 3 regiments, one regular and two militia, mixed in the sense that lancer and cavalry regiments would coexisted in the same unit.
- Distrito sur, America Central and Caribe, this last having the most of it. The Divisions themselves were numbered in sequential order, though in peacetime just designated an administrative area under the command of an army and the troops within, which were rotated through several garrisons on a monthly basis.
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@admiral charles What is the approx peacetime strength of the Colombian regular army in 1858?
With the recent reforms, each regiment would have 3 battalions of a nominal strength numbering 1,200 men each, half of which are in the Regular Reserve, totaling are 22 infantry regiments. Plus 14 Cavalry regiments, which are divided in four squadrons of 200 men each, finally and added to that, there are 12 artillery regiments which number 7 batteries, organized in 5 light batteries composed 8 guns, one battery is a heavy battery composed of six guns and one horse battery which is composed of Four Guns, each gun or piece is operated by a crew of nine.
All in all, infantry numbers 79.200, cavalry 11.200, artillery 1.944 men plus 600 guns. Remember, only the cavalry and artillery branches are fully manned in peacetime.
I had to made a account after looking at that map, not only did you take away the pleasure of chile from sacking Lima and gave territory to bolivia, you also repeated the blackmail from the argentos and made chile again sign the treaty of limits from 1881 (pacific war 1879-1883)...to keep them out of the war and not backstabbing Chile.
I have to say congratulations on this timeline, I've just completed a re-read of this entire epic story and i can only give you praise on what you've done. Given that I have a few questions:
1. Given the "recent" instability in the southern cone with the triple war, i wonder if the eventual conflict between Colombia and the USA for the Caribbean will result in sides being taken by the governments in this region to try to break out of their current spheres?
2. Since Colombia kinda had a crash industrialization, I wonder how that has affected the major cities, I remember you saying that in the early days a national decree was made to "beautify" these cities but a great amount of industry and farm to city migration can make a lot of slums pop up very quickly. (a problem that a lot of OTL South American cities are dealing with today)
1. Given the "recent" instability in the southern cone with the triple war, i wonder if the eventual conflict between Colombia and the USA for the Caribbean will result in sides being taken by the governments in this region to try to break out of their current spheres?
2. Since Colombia kinda had a crash industrialization, I wonder how that has affected the major cities, I remember you saying that in the early days a national decree was made to "beautify" these cities but a great amount of industry and farm to city migration can make a lot of slums pop up very quickly. (a problem that a lot of OTL South American cities are dealing with today)
Uhm, yeah? I wanted to discuss the Patagonia thing in the future.
Thank you very much! I'm glad you enjoy this project.
1. Probably not direct intervention by anyone, but neither the US nor Colombia are really liked by Brazil or La Plata. They may remain neutral, or take advantage and try to wrestle Paraguay and Rio Grande out of Colombia's sphere.
2. The cities are dumps of poverty, filled with ghettoes. Attempts at renovations have largely failed, since they couldn't keep up with the growing population and were abandoned due to the financial crisis. This has produced a "wealth flight" phenomenon where the rich and middle class flee neighborhoods where immigrants have come. In Quito, for example, they have escaped the old historic center for the North, and will then move into the Valleys.
So in a sense Chile in this TL lost less Men in the Pacific War (combat hardened ones), has nothing to fear from the north border(s), does have the strongest fleet in America like in the OTL!
At the same time Paraguay and Brasil would love to have a piece from la Plata, if you also consider that Brasil was "friends" with Chile, it becomes very possible that if Chile comes to blows with La Plata, they would happily jump at the fun too!
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