Midway Lost

[von Adler]

The Japanese buys themselves a year, perhaps.

While the military matter places the Japanese at a great advantage compared to OTL, I think the biggest improvement to the Japanese strategical situation will be the US lacking a submarine base at Midway. The US subs will have to base in Australia (hard to supply if the Japanese are intercepting the supply lines) or Hawaii, both of which are much further away from the vital Japanese supply lines between Manchukuo/Kora-Japan and Dutch East Indees-Japan. US subs will have less time to spend patrolling for Japanese merchant vessels as they will require more fuel to get to and back from the patrolling areas. This will help the Japanese economy quite a bit.

The Japanese will produce more planes, put a few more ships in the water and might even force a reverse or two on the Americans as they are advancing in early 1944. By summer 1946, it will be over, though.

Perhaps the Soviets taking Manchukuo and Korea as well as Mengukuo and the Japanese positions in northern China will scare the Americans enough to make peace on the "the Emperor is not affected" terms that the Japanese offered IOTL?

 

[Snake Featherston]

The Japanese buys themselves a year, perhaps.

While the military matter places the Japanese at a great advantage compared to OTL, I think the biggest improvement to the Japanese strategical situation will be the US lacking a submarine base at Midway. The US subs will have to base in Australia (hard to supply if the Japanese are intercepting the supply lines) or Hawaii, both of which are much further away from the vital Japanese supply lines between Manchukuo/Kora-Japan and Dutch East Indees-Japan. US subs will have less time to spend patrolling for Japanese merchant vessels as they will require more fuel to get to and back from the patrolling areas. This will help the Japanese economy quite a bit.

The Japanese will produce more planes, put a few more ships in the water and might even force a reverse or two on the Americans as they are advancing in early 1944. By summer 1946, it will be over, though.

Perhaps the Soviets taking Manchukuo and Korea as well as Mengukuo and the Japanese positions in northern China will scare the Americans enough to make peace on the "the Emperor is not affected" terms that the Japanese offered IOTL?

If anything this is going to *really* enhance Soviet bargaining power relative to the USA at the equivalents of Yalta and Potsdam.....

 

[Astrodragon]

I cannot.

Several folks have pointed out the fact that luck played a big factor in this crucial battle. They are correct. But lets not forget that both sides had both good and bad luck up to and throughout the battle. The best of the US luck (and thus the worst of the IJN luck) would seem to be the tardiness of the IJN cruiser Tone in getting her seaplane up and away on that fateful day. Had this scout plane not been delayed in reaching her assigned patrol station (and didn't one Japanese scout plane also have radio problems, as well), what would have happened to the US carriers had they been discovered earlier? Only the bad luck the Japanese experienced allowed the USN carriers to get in their licks first. Otherwise, by the time the US carriers finally located the IJN carriers, the first strike would already have been launched.

Also, let us remember that the US dive bombers almost turned away (I think that some did actually turn back for lack of fuel IIRC) before stumbling upon the IJN carriers. The US had the great good fortune to have their dive bombers stumble upon the IJN carriers right at their moment of greatest vulnerability (their decks filled with fully fueled and bomb/torpedo laden aircraft), while the CAP was still down near sea level having just finished off the incoming carrier based torpedo bomber attack.

And what exactly did the motley collection of mismatched aircraft on midway actually accomplish? I cannot recall ever reading that they managed to sink (or even hit) a single Japanese ship during the battle. Surely this has to be partly luck, but then again, how many of these pilot's had actually been trained in bombing moving (ship) targets as opposed to hitting stationary targets? And exactly what kind of combat experience did the aircrews flying these planes have? I know that they had not been trained as a single, well coordinated air unit in the haste to get as many planes based upon midway as possible, but did no one even think to send even one of the B-17's out without bombs and just extra fuel --- to serve as an airborne director for all the land and carrier based strikes that were going to be gunning for the IJN carriers?

The US, having broken the IJN codes, and prepared the best trap they could pull off in the time they had, still came close to missing the mark.
What if the dive bombers had not spread out and searched to the limit of their fuel after getting lost and flying off in the wrong direction? What if the Tone's scout plane had located them earlier?

My first post in this thread was an attempt to describe (IMHO) the maximum that could have gone Japan's way, with the worst and greatest delay the USN could have suffered, before the inevitable at last befalls the Empire of the Rising Sun.

There are so many wrong statements here.... please read Shattered Sword, it dispels many of the myths you seem to be re-quoting from other sources.

 

[CalBear]

Just as an extra aside...

The Japanese NEVER found the Enterprise & Hornet, they literally did not know the carriers were even there. Nagumo assumes they were in the area due to the number of attacking aircraft, along with the fact that he assumed that his attacks had disabled two Yorktown class carriers, but he didn't know where they were.

It is really hard to engage units whose existance is only inferred and not confirmed.

The Japanese also suffered incredible losses in their strikes against Yorktown. Adding in strikes against the rest of the U.S. force to those losses (and the IJN always suffered horrific losses when it attacked U.S. naval units at sea, witness the losses suffered at Coral Sea, which put Zuikaku out of action for several months while she replaced her air group) and it is not unlikely that three, perhaps even all four, Japanese carriers, even without actually being sunk, would be mission killed for some months.

Interestingly, this level of loss would go a long way toward replacing the crucial war of attrition that occured IOTL Solomon's campaign (which would likely be greatly altered, if not eliminated, by the sort of losses in the OP). Japanese pilot losses were, with the exception of Hiryu's air group, actually not all that high at Midway. The pilots were the first things moved off the carriers when things went south, their status are exceptional assets ensured that they were not allowed to stay aboard and go down with the ship (see Shattered Sword, THE Gold Standard on Midway, along with numerous other resources for some details on this).

 

[Shadow Master]

There are so many wrong statements here.... please read Shattered Sword, it dispels many of the myths you seem to be re-quoting from other sources.

I don't currently have the time nor inclination to purchase and read a several hundred page book right now, but look forward to getting my hands on a copy at some point in the future when I will have the time to give it the attention it deserves. From the sounds of the intro, it may indeed be an interesting read. In the meantime:

Could you pick the top three (the worst) of the "so many wrong statements" in my post above and explain them? I assume that you have read "The Shattered Sword" personally, and I would be curious to hear about what mistakes I made in my earlier post. Thanks.

Just as an extra aside...
The Japanese NEVER found the Enterprise & Hornet.

Wait, wasn't there a scout that came back very late in the battle and had to report in person (because of a radio malfunction) that they had located a two carrier formation, after the attack(s) on the USS Yorktown had already returned?

IIRC, this was what first told the last IJN carrier captain that the reports from the first two attacks resulting in an American carrier sunk or put out of action were probably not accurate.

{Shrugs}

 

[Daylight Savings]

Victory at Midway does not make Japan win the war. It is a war of attrition and they cannot win it. That being said as a war of attrition such a big swing in resources clearly helps them a lot. The US is delayed in the island hopping campaign by 6-12 months. The reality of all this is that the biggest winner from a Japanese victory at Midway is the USSR. Another loss on par with Pearl Harbor is most likely going to draw more resources from the Atlantic to the Pacific for the US. Less US support in Europe slows down the Western Front, but does little to the Eastern Front. The race to Berlin is no longer much of a race. And with the US 6 months behind in the Pacific, the Russians probably carve out a larger sphere of influence in East Asia. I saw someone mentioning them on Hokaido, but even here I don't see that happening. They still have no capability or aptitude for amphibious actions and now it's the Ruskies the Japanese are preparing to defend the Home Islands from, so far less children and old men will be facing them.

 

[Boydfish]

I agree. You seem to be implanting a post-1945 mindsight into the middle of World War II.

You have to admit that what you're describing as a post-1945 mindset is pretty powerful and pervasive: It appeared to also affect the US strategic approaches in 1814 when they negotiated an end to a war that they still had a good chance of winning. Yeah, I know how the administration of 1812-1814 were really closet peaceniks and how they abbhorred the idea of fighting what they saw as a sequel to the ARW, but the idea that a US administration could lose their bottle on a war on their own soil wasn't invented until 1945. I'll drop the sarcasm now.

What you're missing is that while the US might be confident at that point, they were not and never would be sure of what was going to happen. People don't get to make decisions with absolute certainty as to the facts at hand, especially in war. I'm not suggesting that the US would cede everything west of the Ohio valley to the Japanese, but the idea that an "honourable peace" couldn't be suggested and accepted by the US in the wake of a strong defeat at Midway seems to be a little too Polly-Anna about the US. I doubt that the US would make any territorial concessions or that they wouldn't be more postponing an eventual large scale conflict with Japan, but to suggest the idea that the US was culturally incapable of a negotiated peace is stretching the boundaries of belief.

If you look at the media from that period you find that U.S. public opinion was as enraged as it would not be again until 9/11. Any politician who even suggested a cease-fire with Japan based on the reports that had been filtering in of the atrocities against American POWs and civilians would be taking his political and physical life in his hands! Psychologically America was ready for war and wanted to crush the Japanese and the Nazis.

It needs to be remembered that it won't be spun as a cease fire nor a surrender, but generally as a victory by the US. I'm having images of US politicians loudly saying "Tojo wanted to take our Hawaiian islands, he tried and we pushed them back. We won!". Remember, the best tool in maintaining popular support for a conflict is to keep the goals and objectives as ambiguous as possible: That way, when you declare peace, you can argue you actually won.

 

[Geon]

It needs to be remembered that it won't be spun as a cease fire nor a surrender, but generally as a victory by the US. I'm having images of US politicians loudly saying "Tojo wanted to take our Hawaiian islands, he tried and we pushed them back. We won!". Remember, the best tool in maintaining popular support for a conflict is to keep the goals and objectives as ambiguous as possible: That way, when you declare peace, you can argue you actually won.

Boydfish

I have to disagree with you here. No amount of public spin is going to portray a post Midway defeat and so-called honorable peace as anything else but a defeat for the U.S.

Consider, Japan still controls Wake Island, Guam, all of the Philippines, as part of one of the largest empires on earth--even if most of it is water! The people of the U.S. were furious at the perceived duplicity of the Japanese, they have lost several battles and there is no way they will put up with somebody spinning some fancy illusion that they have "won" anything. Furthermore there are still thousands of U.S. POWs in Japanese hands. That situation would have been flat out unacceptable to the Americans.

In point of fact you are making the same assumption here that led to the Japanese miscalculation for starting the war in the first place--that the U.S., did not have the stomach for a sustained war. History shows we can and did have the stomach for it if necessary. A cease fire in place would not be acceptable to anyone, either the general public or the politicians in general.

Geon

 

[CalBear]

...
Wait, wasn't there a scout that came back very late in the battle and had to report in person (because of a radio malfunction) that they had located a two carrier formation, after the attack(s) on the USS Yorktown had already returned?

IIRC, this was what first told the last IJN carrier captain that the reports from the first two attacks resulting in an American carrier sunk or put out of action were probably not accurate.

{Shrugs}

The #4 scout aircraft of the Tone and it was the aircraft that found TF 17 (Yorktown). Nagumo stated in his post war interrogation by the USSBS that a Soyru D4Y spotted the other two U.S carriers, but the timeline given doesn't match up with other records and some of his other statements do not, quite understandably, match up with others. Nagumo also states that later in the day his scouts told him their were five American carriers in the area, something that he communicated to Yamamoto.

When Hiyru sent out its final strike, it of course found the hastily repaired Yorktown and it was assumed that it was a new ship, not the smoking hulk left by the previous strike package. One of the confusing things at Midway was that all three of the American carriers were of the same class, so it was nearly impossible for the Japanese search aircraft to determine if it was a repeat sighting or a new one.

edit: BTW, the idea that the Japanese had their decks full of armed and fueled aircraft is one of the great myths of the War. Gun camera photos taken by Dick Best, among others, clearly show empty or near empty (one-two aircraft) decks. The same myth indicates that the U.S. barely managed to aviod the Japanese launching a massive strike. Since the Japanese had not even begun to move aircraft up to the flight deck it would have been the better part of an hour before the strike could have launched under ideal circumstances. The Japanese had far more difficulty with deck spotting than the U.S. did, in part due to their lack of tow vehicles. Japanese aircraft also could not be warmed up in the hanger, as was the usual procedure for U.S ships, due to their enclosed hanger design. This meant that, even after spotting aircraft had to wait for full warm up befre launching was possible.

 

[Domoviye]

You have to admit that what you're describing as a post-1945 mindset is pretty powerful and pervasive: It appeared to also affect the US strategic approaches in 1814 when they negotiated an end to a war that they still had a good chance of winning. Yeah, I know how the administration of 1812-1814 were really closet peaceniks and how they abbhorred the idea of fighting what they saw as a sequel to the ARW, but the idea that a US administration could lose their bottle on a war on their own soil wasn't invented until 1945. I'll drop the sarcasm now.

In the War of 1812, about half the US population didn't want to fight much less support a war with Britain for economic reasons, the US was suffering raids all along New England, couldn't defeat a minor colony of Britain after almost 3 years of fighting, had instigated the war, and were about to face the full weight of the British army which had just won the Napoleonic War.
How were they close to victory?

 

[Boydfish]

No amount of public spin is going to portray a post Midway defeat and so-called honorable peace as anything else but a defeat for the U.S

Oh, to be sure there will be some within the US that will call it a humiliating defeat, etc, but the main downside of patriotism is that it is very easy to manipulate for the purposes of the state. Anybody who got too loud with the criticism of the peace would be shouted down alternately with labels of "How dare you criticize the fine American fighting forces that kept Hawaii" or "How many more thousand would you add to the butchers bill?".

Based on the logic of outrage sustaining a war effort, explain why in 1814, after the British having taken large swaths of US territory, ransacked Washington and generally made Pearl Harbour look like a small traffic accident in comparison, the US lept at the chance for peace with the British?

The US not only took it, they declared that it was not only an honourable peace, but a victory for the US. I'm sure that any proposed treaty would not be slanted too much in either Japan or the US favour, or at least not overtly so. I'm not suggesting that the Japanese Army will march into Washington DC and dictate terms, nor would you see a Pacific Brest-Livtosk style treaty, but more along the lines of a ceasing of hostilities and an understanding by the US that they can't embargo the Japanese.

 

[Boydfish]

In the War of 1812, about half the US population didn't want to fight much less support a war with Britain for economic reasons, the US was suffering raids all along New England, couldn't defeat a minor colony of Britain after almost 3 years of fighting, had instigated the war, and were about to face the full weight of the British army which had just won the Napoleonic War.
How were they close to victory?

I have not the foggiest, but ask most Americans who are aware of the War of 1812 and they will assure you that if they did not win absolutely, they were just about to.

 

[Domoviye]

I have not the foggiest, but ask most Americans who are aware of the War of 1812 and they will assure you that if they did not win absolutely, they were just about to.

Thats mostly because the US won the battle of New Orleans and spun it out as a huge and important victory. Also the US had 'achieved' its official war aims, the main one being, stop the British from impressing American sailors into the British navy, and the second being stop the British from supplying guns to the Indians in the northwest.
The first was stopped 2 weeks before the declaration of war. The second occurred when the Indian Confederacy was basically destroyed during the war, not because the US defeated the British.
Also the US had fought Britain for 2 years, was suffering a severe recession from the lack of trade, had achieved none of the unofficial war goals that were trumpeted in the newspapers, had lost a large number of men, and were looking at facing the entire British army and navy.

In WW2, if Midway was lost, they would have had 6 months of fighting the Japanese, still very rich, slightly bloodied but not running out of soldiers, been humiliated by some bloody foreigners who were seen as little better than savages, and there was no way to declare a victory of any kind.
These are very different situations.

 

[Rayearth]

Nagumo stated in his post war interrogation by the USSBS that a Soyru D4Y spotted the other two U.S carriers, but the timeline given doesn't match up with other records and some of his other statements do not, quite understandably, match up with others. Nagumo also states that later in the day his scouts told him their were five American carriers in the area, something that he communicated to Yamamoto.

A side note: I think that this data was from the interrogation of Ohara, Soryu's XO, not Nagumo. I'm only pointing this out because I looked up Nagumo's bio and had a WTF moment when I found that he died on Saipan in 1944. At the moment, I couldn't help but think that the USSBS has some great freaking interrogators, to be able to interview the dead!

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Boydfish, how many times to you intend to make the argument that the US might sue for peace with Japan and even surrender territory and control of the national economy(no embargo) based on a different outcome had Midway when the point has been discredited by other members?

As for this idea that surrendering the entire US position in the Pacific west of Hawaii could possibly be spun as anything other than a clear defeat to the American people...

 

[Redcat]

I doubt that the US would make any territorial concessions or that they wouldn't be more postponing an eventual large scale conflict with Japan, but to suggest the idea that the US was culturally incapable of a negotiated peace is stretching the boundaries of belief.

As stated before, at this point in the war the Japanese hold the American territories of Wake, Guam, and most importantly the Philippines. Not to mention the thousands of American soldiers who were captured defending the Philippines. A negotiated settlement would allow Japan to keep the islands. This is a territorial concession.

 

[CalBear]

A side note: I think that this data was from the interrogation of Ohara, Soryu's XO, not Nagumo. I'm only pointing this out because I looked up Nagumo's bio and had a WTF moment when I found that he died on Saipan in 1944. At the moment, I couldn't help but think that the USSBS has some great freaking interrogators, to be able to interview the dead!

The USSBS transcript says Nagumo, and it didn't even click that he was seriously dead at the time until you mentioned it.

On rereading it, the transcript is a translation of Nagumo's after action report.

http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/rep/Midway/Nagumo/index.html

 

[Geon]

Oh, to be sure there will be some within the US that will call it a humiliating defeat, etc, but the main downside of patriotism is that it is very easy to manipulate for the purposes of the state. Anybody who got too loud with the criticism of the peace would be shouted down alternately with labels of "How dare you criticize the fine American fighting forces that kept Hawaii" or "How many more thousand would you add to the butchers bill?".

Based on the logic of outrage sustaining a war effort, explain why in 1814, after the British having taken large swaths of US territory, ransacked Washington and generally made Pearl Harbour look like a small traffic accident in comparison, the US lept at the chance for peace with the British?

The US not only took it, they declared that it was not only an honourable peace, but a victory for the US. I'm sure that any proposed treaty would not be slanted too much in either Japan or the US favour, or at least not overtly so. I'm not suggesting that the Japanese Army will march into Washington DC and dictate terms, nor would you see a Pacific Brest-Livtosk style treaty, but more along the lines of a ceasing of hostilities and an understanding by the US that they can't embargo the Japanese.

Again I have to disagree.

You are assuming that the American mindset in the 1940's was the same as the American mindset in 1814 (War of 1812), 1950's (Korea), 1960's (Vietnam). This was simply not the case.

Consider that during the American Civil War the Union suffered more then its share of defeats. Yes there were growing calls for a negotiated peace but the majority of Americans in the North wanted to keep fighting and did despite huge casualty lists.

I reitierate, at the time of the battle of Midway the U.S. had suffered a catastrophic defeat at Pearl Harbor 6 months ago. The American people knew they had lost Wake Island, Guam, the Phillipines, and now had lost all three of their carriers at Midway. The U.S. military would have known the IJN carriers had escaped with no losses. The military also knew where the public did not that more carriers were waiting to be completed and would be ready in the next 6 to 12 months. That meant they needed time. I agree that the military would have tried to put the best spin on the Midway defeat--we saved Hawaii! But that would not have lasted long and given a U.S. that was very much enraged by Pearl Harbor I do not honestly see a defeat at Midway as doing anything but steeling the determination of the country to win this war.

Regarding Vietnam and Korea--neither of these were regarded as a direct threat to U.S. territory. We were there to halt the spread of communism--supposedly. Because our national interests/territory were not directly threatened the American people would have been less willing to support a war with large casualties that did not have any direct impact on them. Again, contrast this with Japan where many political leaders and the media had already painted this war as a must-win if we were to preserve democracy here at home. Add to this the fact that fears of invasion of the West Coast were very real. Japanese submarines had already shelled parts of the California and Washington coasts and at least one of these had been reported in the newsreels. I doubt the people on the West Coast would have felt safe and cozy with a cease fire that let the Japanese pretty much do what they wanted.

To conclude, I really can't see the American mindset in 1942 tolerating any kind of negotiated peace with the Japanese assuming a U.S. defeat at Midway either for our leaders or the general public.

Again respectfully,
Geon

 

[Boydfish]

Boydfish, how many times to you intend to make the argument that the US might sue for peace with Japan and even surrender territory and control of the national economy(no embargo) based on a different outcome had Midway when the point has been discredited by other members?

Interesting position there. Others have voiced opinion in dissent, but in your mind, this transates as the point being discredited? People can hold contrary views to others you know.

I'm also curious how you equate the US not embargoing Japan with giving the Japanese control of the US economy. The economics of the scenario also support the US negotiating: By normalizing relations, Pacific trade is re-opened.

As for the arguments about territorial possessions, there is a profound difference between offshore holdings that few care about and actual intrinsic parts of the US itself. The US, when faced with a string of serious defeats, might well have put serious consideration to not facing further defeats.

I'd also point out that the territory that the Japanese took might have been negotiated back to the US with assurances that the embargo be cancelled and a Japanese free hand in China be respected.

Ultimately, the facts changing translates into the reactions changing. It is entirely possible for the US to do things differently when faced with different circumstances. While the more devoutly patriotic Americans might believe that there was and is something "special" or "bound by destiny" about the US, the reality is that there isn't. The idea that America wouldn't disengage from war for any reason at anytime prior to 1945 is not only wrong as borne out by the facts in our world, it requires a great deal of blindness on the part of a person to think that when the Japanese were at their high water mark in the war that the US wouldn't consider packing it in, if spun properly. Remember, the US had studiously and historically been very reluctant to engage in foreign adventures up to that point.

 

[Know Nothing]

I'm also curious how you equate the US not embargoing Japan with giving the Japanese control of the US economy. The economics of the scenario also support the US negotiating: By normalizing relations, Pacific trade is re-opened.

I'm still curious what historical facts support your argument that America would negotiate a surrender after losing a couple carriers at Midway and repelling the landing force.

Besides unrelated events in the Cold War.